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Introduction
The possibility of very strong earthquakes in the
central Mississippi Valley has been known for 200
years in the New Madrid Seismic Zone. Awareness
of the seismic risk in the State of Indiana has
increased in the last decades. In the last two
decades identification of an independent tectonic
process occurring in the Wabash River Valley has
implications for the seismic risk of the State of
Indiana from what has recently been defined as the
Wabash Valley Seismic Zone. The occurrence of a
strong earthquake in these seismic zones or in
Indiana or the neighboring states due to other not
so well understood tectonic processes, as has
occurred in the past, has serious implications for
the State Transportation System. The definition of
Earthquake Emergency Routes for the state is a
priority for the Indiana Department of
Transportation. The identification of Emergency
Routes takes into account issues related to
transportation including coverage of population and
area and travel time along these routes.
This study formulates a multicommodity maximal
covering network design problem (MCNDP) for
identifying critical routes, for earthquake response
and to seismically retrofit bridges. The MCNDP
seeks routes that minimize the total travel time over
the selected routes and maximizes the total
population covered, subject to a budget constraint
on bridge retrofitting costs on the selected routes.
The problem is formulated as a two-objective

integer programming model and solved using the
branch-and-cut module in the CPLEX optimizer.
The model performance was analyzed using the
transportation network of a seismically-prone
region in southwest Indiana. Thereby, the search
for the critical routes for an origin-destination (OD) pair is confined to a limited geographical region
around it.
A Geographical Information System (GIS) system
was developed for evaluation of seismic
vulnerability of the proposed Indiana Emergency
Routes. The GIS based implementation of the
technical information developed in this project
through FEMA HAZUS-MH software was
conducted in collaboration with the Polis Center in
Indianapolis, nationally recognized and FEMA
authorized HAZUS implementation facility.
HAZUS software may be used for mitigation of
vulnerability, simulation, and response to a strong
earthquake in southwestern Indiana. It uses
information from the Indiana Department of
Transportation (INdot) maintenance database and
selected structural and geotechnical information
from the bridge drawings data base. Vulnerability
assessment was performed using the general
information from maintenance and final calibration
was performed using a series of cases based on
bridge drawings and soil exploration descriptions
contained in these drawings.

Findings
Computational experiments were conducted to
investigate the effects of varying the budget and the
relative weights of the two objectives. A set of
12-3 08/05 JTRP-2003/22

critical routes was obtained. Seismic retrofit planning
plays an important role in determining the
effectiveness of the operational stage of earthquake
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response management. At a strategic level, it is
dependent on the routes critical for effective
emergency response. However, past studies have not
addressed the identification of critical routes under
budget constraints. This is a very important practical
problem for emergency response planners as it
involves identifying effective transportation routes
while accounting for bridge structural conditions and
budget limitations. It implies the identification of
bridges to retrofit under earthquake response
planning. This study develops a network-level
methodology to assist decision-makers in identifying
an effective seismic retrofit scheme for the bridges of
a network.
This study formally defines the Multicommodity
Maximal Covering Network Design Problem
(MCNDP) and formulates it. To our knowledge,
it represents the first attempt to incorporate the
coverage objective in a generic network model,
leading to a new class of models with significant
practical implications. Past work has used the
coverage criterion in identifying a path, tree or
tour on a network by considering either the
routing or the fixed cost, while the proposed
model simultaneously considers the routing and
fixed costs subject to a budget constraint. That
is, none of the existing models consider routing
costs, fixed costs and coverage criterion in a
single framework.
From a practical standpoint, the key contribution
of this study is its ability to address planning
problems faced by emergency response agencies
vis-à-vis disaster management. The specific
problem addressed here relates to earthquake
response management. Under budget constraints,
there is a need to determine an effective retrofit
plan for the bridges in a seismically-prone
region. Most studies in the literature have
adopted a local perspective to solving this
problem, and do not consider the effect of
potential bridge failures on the transportation
system performance. The few methodologies
that use a systems approach do not consider the
influence of retrofit decisions on the quality of
the associated routes vis-à-vis effective
earthquake response. The proposed model fills
this critical gap by considering the total travel
time for the key O-D pairs in the network and
the total population covered by them as the
criteria for determining the critical routes. The
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budget limitation on the total bridge retrofit costs
for the links constituting the critical routes is
represented as a constraint in our model. Hence,
this methodology simultaneously determines the
set of bridges in a network requiring retrofit and
the routes that serve as focal points for
earthquake response.
The evolution of the earthquake resistant bridge
design requirements contained in the AASHTO
Specifications and the existence of a proposed
draft seismic design specification being
discussed have significant implications in the
assessment of the existing vulnerability, its
mitigation, and the design of new bridges along
the Emergency Routes. Along with this
development, the USGS assessment of the
seismic risk of southwestern Indiana and a
change of format of the definition of the
earthquake design ground motion that is integral
part of the proposed draft seismic design
specification also has important implications on
the assessment of the operational capabilities of
the Earthquake Emergency Routes of Indiana.
The effects of the 2001 Nisqually Earthquake
that occurred in the State of Washington gave
invaluable insight on the expected situation for
the State of Indiana due to a comparable bridge
inventory in age and bridge types and a parallel
increase of the seismic risk awareness in both
regions over the last decades.
Using the information collected in this study, the
GIS implementation through FEMA-HAZUSMH software may be used for mitigation of
vulnerability, simulation, and response to a
strong earthquake in southwestern Indiana.
Vulnerability was evaluated for different levels
of ground acceleration in order to obtain
behavior patterns for selected bridges. Using
these results, seismic behavior patterns were
obtained for bridges located in southwestern
Indiana included in the INdot Vincennes District
maintenance data base. Soil amplification and
liquefaction potential were evaluated for the
cases having reported SPT measurements from
borings. Based on this process, information
critical for the identification of upgrade needs
for the transportation structures part of the
Earthquake Emergency Routes is made available
to the INdot.
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Implementation
The findings and developments of this research
project are presented next in the form of
suggested implementation steps by the Indiana
Department of Transportation.
1.

2.

3.

Formal adoption of the selected
emergency routes or some variation of
the same by the state is a necessary
step. Such routes adopted and
maintained by INdot will be affected by
issues and policies outside the scope of
those considered in this study. For
instance, policy decisions, budgetary
constraints,
new
projects,
i.e.
continuation of I-69, will likely affect
the formal adoption of a set of
emergency routes and will continue to
impose changes in the future. The
methodology developed in this study
and the information implemented in
HAZUS-MH should be of assistance to
state decision makers in the future.
Future implementation strategies can be
studied through simulation studies
using appropriately updated information
for different earthquake scenarios
including earthquake ground motion
defined in current AASHTO Standard
Specifications,
proposed
Draft
AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions, or
other. These simulations will provide
corresponding bridge retrofit scope for
the proposed routes or alternative
definitions.
The information in the maintenance
database should be periodically
evaluated
and
should
include
information currently available only in
the bridge drawings (see Section 7.5 of
the final report). This will improve the
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vulnerability assessment of the bridges
refining the mitigation policies to adopt
in the future. This expansion of the
maintenance database can be extended
to other counties and districts not
covered in this research project.
4.

Establish a program for assessing the
liquefaction,
soil
spread,
and
embankment failure potential along the
routes at locations other than bridge
sites by providing a consistent
evaluation methodology supported with
the information developed in this study.
This implementation will require a soil
exploration
program
to
obtain
geotechnical properties of sites where
no information exists or where such
information was obtained years ago
with
different
objectives
than
liquefaction evaluation. In the research
conducted in this study, liquefaction
evaluations were made using solely
boring information contained in
selected bridge drawings.

5.

To establish procedures for emergency
response under different earthquake
occurrence scenarios.

6.

INdot should consider the formal
adoption of HAZUS-MH software for
scenario management, mitigation and
vulnerability studies and to train
appropriate personnel. An important
feature in this implementation step is
the engagement of the Polis Center in
the training of INdot personnel on the
use of HAZUS-MH software. The Polis
Center is a nationally recognized
HAZUS implementation facility.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and Motivation
Earthquakes can significantly disrupt societal functioning, cause ecological damage,
and lead to loss of human lives and property, warranting a coordinated and efficient
response to mitigate their negative impacts. Past experience with earthquakes has
demonstrated the vulnerability of the critical infrastructural lifelines and the need for
mitigation strategies as well as emergency response planning. For example, the bridge
failures under the 1989 Loma Prieta and the 1994 Northridge earthquakes resulted in
substantial losses to the regional economies [Chang and Nojima, 2001].
Highway transportation systems are vital to the normal functioning of a society and
can be even more so under disasters. Under disasters, emergency response agencies need
to transport various commodities, including food, clothing, medicine, medical supplies,
machinery and personnel from different points of origin to different locations in the
disaster areas in an efficient manner [Haghani and Sei-Chang, 1996]. Damage to the
highway system can seriously affect emergency response, recovery operations and
disrupt the regional economy; hence the functionality of these systems is critical for postdisaster response. Gordon et al. [1998] estimate that twenty percent of the $6.5 billion in
losses due to the Northridge earthquake resulted from damage to the transportation
system. This highlights the need for countermeasures to mitigate the possible risk of
damage to the highways and the associated consequences.
Bridges typically represent the elements of a highway system that are most
susceptible to failure under earthquakes. Hence, the seismic vulnerability of bridges has
been extensively studied [Buckle et al. 1994]. As a consequence, seismic retrofitting of
bridges has been the most preferred solution adopted in the pre-disaster strategic planning
stage so as to minimize the risk of unacceptable damage to highways in earthquake-prone
regions. Due to the significant effort and cost involved in strengthening existing bridges
to seismic design standards it is not practical to retrofit every bridge in an earthquake-
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prone region, and even if it were possible, retrofitting cannot be done simultaneously
across all bridges. Also, seismic risk can vary across bridges due to their physical
characteristics, age, and current structural condition. Hence, a key problem faced by
earthquake response planners is the identification of the set of bridges for seismic
retrofitting. This implies prioritization given budget limitations and the effort involved.
The bridge prioritization problem, that is, the selection of bridges for seismic
retrofitting, can be viewed from structural and transportation domains vis-à-vis
performance. From a structural perspective, the risk/vulnerability of a bridge to seismic
failure is the predominant factor that influences prioritization. In the transportation
context, the focus is on ensuring the survival of links (and the bridges on those links) that
minimize emergency response times and maximize the population that can be reached, by
retaining a network-level perspective. The existing literature predominantly addresses the
prioritization problem from a structural perspective. The dominant approach is the use of
multi-attribute utility theory [Nojima, 1999] to determine the risk for each bridge in the
highway network. This is done by weighing the values of the various attributes to
generate a measure of risk. For example, one study [Osaka Municipal Government
Report, 1998] uses attributes on seismic capacity (or vulnerability) and importance (or
criticality). Seismic capacity, an indicator of the structural sufficiency of a bridge with
regard to an anticipated earthquake, is based on the bridge type, structural condition,
service life, and geotechnical and seismic hazards. The importance criterion indicates the
criticality of the bridge to post-disaster relief operations based on the traffic flow on the
associated link, economic impacts due to its failure, and the connectivity with crossroads.
While the seismic capacity criterion has been well-studied in the literature, the
importance criterion has not been adequately addressed [Chang and Nojima, 2001]. This
is because bridge importance is not readily quantifiable, implying subjectivity in its
determination. The issue of accessibility across the transportation network vis-à-vis
earthquake response can be influenced by political, social and economic factors in
addition to the engineering solutions. Hence, only a few retrofitting schemes exist in
practice, and are primarily based on engineering judgment [Buckle, 1994], indicating
methodological gaps in the state of knowledge to address this problem. The intuitive
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solution to the earthquake response planning problem is the retrofitting of every bridge in
the shortest path between the selected origin-destination (O-D) pairs in the network.
However, this is typically cost prohibitive. This implies the need for a network level
perspective to address the problem which considers the interactions between the failure of
a bridge and its influence on the network-level system performance [Werner et al., 1997,
Chang and Nojima, 2001]. The Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering
Research (MCEER) Bulletin (1994) suggests that the system performance considerations
be addressed before performing the seismic capacity evaluation of bridges.
Few studies consider network-level transportation system performance in determining
prioritization schemes. Basoz and Kiremidjian [1994] develop a network-level procedure
to quantify the importance of bridges. It determines the bridges that constitute minimal
cuts in a transportation network and ranks the individual bridges within the set. The
minimal cut for a given O-D node pair in a network is the minimum number of links
whose failure disconnects the two nodes. Performance was tied to the connectivity
between critical destinations under disasters. Wakabayashi [1997] performs an
importance analysis of the Kobe highway network based on several network realizations.
The travel time between Osaka and Kobe represented the performance criterion. The
structural vulnerability of the links was not considered.
Nojima [1999] proposed a performance based prioritization method for upgrading
network components with limited resources. The performance measure was the reliability
of system flow capacity, defined as the maximum flow between a specified O-D pair in
the network. The study rank-orders links based on their ability to improve the reliability
measure. Chang and Nojima [2001] develop performance measures based on the total
length of the surviving network and the accessibility provided by it.
The overview of the past work indicates that several studies exist that address the
bridge seismic retrofit aspects of the earthquake response planning problem. Hence, the
problem has been addressed primarily in the structural engineering domain. Different
criteria have been used to evaluate the bridges in the network. Some of them are ad-hoc
in nature and involve considerable subjectivity. Only a few studies exist that address the
seismic retrofit problem from a transportation systems perspective. Among those, there
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are very few studies that analyze the problem at a network-level. Those that do are
primarily concerned with the effect of retrofit decisions on vehicular flow performance
measures for the surviving network. Studies addressed from the perspective of earthquake
response are sparse, and typically consider a single criterion such as connectivity between
O-D node pairs, travel time for a single O-D pair, or accessibility to population. None of
these studies explicitly consider budget constraints in the planning problem. This
significantly increases the problem complexity due to the dependence of the surviving
network under an earthquake on the budget investment decisions. This key gap,
significant from a practical standpoint, motivates the development of a new class of
models that can aid planners in developing an effective budget allocation scheme to
prioritize retrofit decisions. The proposed research addresses this by developing the
MCNDP model.

1.2 Study Objectives
The primary study objective is to develop a methodology to address the strategic
planning problem at a network-level for earthquake response. This methodology enables
the decision-makers to identify an effective seismic retrofit scheme vis-à-vis earthquake
response for the bridges of a network. The proposed methodology is motivated by the
need to consider the key factors for effective earthquake response in a single framework.
This is done by first defining the concept of “critical routes”. The critical routes of a
transportation network are the set of routes whose functionality is critical to the
effectiveness of earthquake response. The associated problem is labeled the critical routes
problem. The specific tasks to address the study objective are:
1. Identification of criteria for selection of critical routes. These criteria are based on
factors that directly affect the effectiveness of earthquake response.
2. Formally define the critical routes problem. This involves the description of the
problem context, its constraints and the criteria used to solve the problem.
3. Development of a model to address the critical routes problem. A mathematical
formulation is developed that seeks to optimize the response criteria under budget
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limitations and other constraints. This generates the critical routes for the study region of
interest.
4. Application of the model to a case study. Sensitivity analyses are conducted with
respect to the model parameters to derive insights that assist decision-makers. This is
done primarily by identifying a non-inferior frontier, which provides an intuitive practical
tool for decision-making. The region of interest in this study is the earthquake-prone
southwest region of Indiana. Figure 1.1 depicts the seismic map of the region.

1.3 Organization of the Report
This report is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the relevant
literature in network design and coverage. Chapter 3 defines the critical routes problem
and formulates it. It further proves that the problem is NP-hard, and identifies valid
inequalities to enhance solution efficiency. Chapter 4 discusses the application of the
formulation to a case study in the southwest Indiana region, and provides the
implementation details. Chapter 5 reports the results from experiments conducted and
derives insights. Chapter 6 reports the results from experiments conducted after
incorporating the recommendations of the Study Advisory Committee in terms of
“required” routes as part of the critical routes subnetwork. Chapter 7 provides some
concluding remarks.
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Figure 1.1 Seismic map of southwest Indiana
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter provides a brief review of the methodological approaches relevant to the
problem addressed in this research. As the focus is on network-level transportationrelated planning for disaster response, especially under earthquakes, most of the relevant
literature is in the urban operations research domain as applied to network models. For
the sake of exposition, we first define the two types of link costs that are typically
encountered in network design problems, namely fixed costs and routing costs. The fixed
cost of a link is a one-time cost incurred with choosing that link for routing commodity
flows and is independent of the quantity routed through it. The routing cost of a link is
defined as the cost incurred in transporting a unit commodity across that link. For
example, in an earthquake response planning context, bridge seismic retrofit costs would
represent fixed costs for that link, and the time to traverse that link would correspond to
the routing costs.

2.1 Network Design
A broad range of practical network optimization problems occur in the context of
transportation, distribution planning, emergency response, telecommunications and
computer networking. A specific class of these, labeled as network design problems,
arises primarily in the capital investment phase of engineering problems. The network
design problem generally seeks to determine a network configuration that minimizes the
sum of the fixed costs of the links chosen and the cost of routing different commodities
through the network defined by these links. Due to its usefulness in the aforementioned
applications, the fixed charge network design problem has been well studied. Magnanti
and Wong [1984] provide a comprehensive survey of integer programming-based
methods to address network design problems. They develop a generic discrete choice
network design formulation that unifies the different types of network design models.
Well-known problems in combinatorial optimization, including the shortest path,

7

minimum spanning tree, Steiner tree and traveling salesman problem have been shown to
be special cases of the generic network design model. However, these models have
focused primarily on cost minimization and do not consider other important criteria like
population coverage, environmental impacts and revenues.

2.2 Network Coverage
Current and Min [1986] emphasize the potential for multiple objectives in
transportation planning problems and highlight the conflicting nature of such objectives
in the context of public sector decision-making. For example, the shortest path network
across O-D pairs may not maximize the accessibility to the population in the region. To
overcome these limitations, Current et al. [1985] introduce the notion of coverage to the
network design problem by formulating the maximum covering shortest path problem for
a single O-D pair with two objectives: (i) to minimize the path cost for that O-D pair, and
(ii) to maximize the total population covered by that path. They associate some fraction
of the population with each node, which is labeled as the demand of that node. They
define a demand node as covered if the path includes the node or passes through another
node that is within a pre-specified distance from that node. They also formulate a
variation of this problem for hazmat routing applications, called the minimum covering
shortest path problem [Current at al., 1988], in which the demand covered is minimized.
Hutson and Revelle [1989] extend the concept of coverage to tree networks by
considering two types of coverages: direct and indirect. A demand node is directly
covered if there is a link in the tree incident upon it. Indirect coverage is assumed if the
demand node is within a prescribed distance from a link in the tree. The maximal direct
covering tree problem seeks to minimize the cost of the subtree and maximize the total
demand covered by it. Hutson and Revelle [1993] extend the approach to develop the
maximal indirect covering tree problem. They suggest the use of these models for
problems involving road network construction in sparsely populated areas under resource
constraints.
Kim et al. [1989] introduce the subtree r-cover problem which seeks a connected
subgraph covering every demand node with minimum total length for a given network. A
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cover radius is associated with each demand node. It is used to ensure that the distance
between the demand node and the closest point in the subgraph does not exceed a
threshold value. The formulation is applied to position troops in a war situation to ensure
that troops protect/cover the various demand nodes within pre-specified threshold
response times. Kim et al. [1990] consider a special case in which the given network is a
tree.
Current and Schilling [1989] adapt the coverage concept to the traveling salesman
problem by formulating the covering salesman problem. The problem aims to identify a
minimum cost subtour in a network such that every demand node is within a specified
distance from a node on the subtour. They extend this model to develop the maximal
covering tour problem [1994], in which the objectives are to minimize the total tour
length and maximize the demand covered by the tour, subject to a requirement on the
number of nodes in the subtour. Suggested application domains include rural health care
and overnight delivery systems. Gendreau et al. [1997] solve a variant of the maximal
covering tour problem in which a given set of nodes must always be present in a tour, and
propose its application to the location of post boxes and the design of collection routes.
They also propose classes of valid inequalities for use in a branch-and-cut algorithm to
solve large problem instances in a reasonable amount of time.

2.3 Discussion
The overview of the literature indicates that the coverage criterion has been
successfully applied to identify a path, tree or tour, all of which are special network
structures. This research extends the coverage criterion to a network problem with
multiple O-D pairs, labeled the multicommodity maximal covering network design
problem (MCNDP). Its objectives are to minimize the routing costs over all O-D pairs
and maximize the total demand covered, subject to a budget constraint based on the fixed
costs incurred on the chosen links. To our knowledge, there exist no prior studies that
consider budgetary limitations, routing costs and coverage criteria in a single model with
multiple O-D pairs. Such a model is essential for strategic planners to make long-term
budget allocation decisions that factor in system-wide impacts of budgetary decisions
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over time vis-à-vis performance. Potential applications of the MCNDP other than the
problem addressed in this study include the design of regional transit systems and the
planning of truck shipment routes. With modifications, the MCNDP can be used to
design electric power networks to build high voltage lines for new power plants or to
connect to existing power plants.
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CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY

This chapter develops the methodology to address the critical routes problem using
the MCNDP. Section 3.1 illustrates the applicability of the MCNDP to the “critical
routes problem”. Section 3.2 states the MCNDP. Section 3.3 presents the mathematical
model. Notation and parameters are introduced in Section 3.3.1, the decision variables are
defined in Section 3.3.2, and the formulation is illustrated in Section 3.3.3. Section 3.4
examines the computational complexity of the MCNDP. Section 3.5 presents valid
inequalities for the formulation.

3.1 The Critical Routes Problem
Network-level disaster management planning is vital for effectively responding to
natural calamities and security-related problems. For example, the availability of the
transportation network is critical to emergency response [Haghani and Oh, 1996] under
earthquakes. It entails the identification of “critical routes” in a planning context that
remain functional following an earthquake, to enable the response operators to access as
much population as possible in a minimum amount of time. This implies two objectives
for the selection of the critical routes: (i) minimizing the total travel time on the routes
between the O-D pairs, and (ii) maximizing the total population that can be covered by
these routes. The functionality or survivability of a route, implying its availability under
an earthquake, is governed significantly by its weakest elements, the bridges. The seismic
retrofitting [Cooper et al., 2001] of bridges can enhance the survivability of the
associated routes under earthquakes. However, as discussed earlier, due to the significant
cost and effort involved in retrofitting, it is impractical to retrofit every bridge in an
earthquake-prone region, especially with limited budgets. Hence, the budget serves as a
constraint in the determination of the critical routes. Therefore, the critical routes problem
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can be viewed as a budget-constrained covering network design problem which seeks low
cost routes that cover the maximum population while satisfying budget constraints
introduced by the need to retrofit bridges on the critical routes.

3.2 Problem Statement
We formulate the MCNDP generically here, and apply it to the critical routes
problem in the next chapter. We are given the locations of demand centers of a region
and its associated undirected network. The network links have a fixed cost for their usage
and a routing cost. There is a budget constraint on the total fixed cost incurred. The
MCNDP seeks to allocate a limited budget to links such that the total routing costs for a
set of O-D pairs is minimized and the total demand covered by the routes connecting
them is maximized. The demand of a center is covered if a link in one of the selected
routes provides access to it.

3.3 Mathematical Model
This section first introduces the notation, parameters and decision variables, and then
proposes an integer programming formulation for the MCNDP.

3.3.1 Notation and Parameters
Let G(N, E) denote an undirected network with node set N and link set E. The indices
i and j denote a node in the network, i, j ∈ N and E ⊆ N×N, where [i, j] denotes an
undirected link between nodes i and j with a nonnegative fixed cost fij. Let B to denote
the available budget. Each O-D pair in the network is represented as a unique commodity
type. Let k represent the commodity type index, k ∈ K, where K denotes the set of all
commodities. One unit of flow of commodity k must be transported over the network
from its origin O(k) to its destination D(k). To differentiate the direction of flow of a
commodity, we consider two directed links (i, j) and (j, i) corresponding to each original
undirected link [i, j]. Let A denote the set of the directed links; all links are uncapacitated.
Let c ijk be the nonnegative routing cost for a unit of commodity k on link (i, j), and m
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demand the demand center index, m ∈ M, the set of demand centers in the region. Let rm
represent the demand associated with demand center m, and Em the set of links that are
eligible to cover it. We treat the demand centers separately from the nodes in the
network, whereas past studies assign demand centers to a node in the network which is a
more restrictive approach.

3.3.2 Decision Variables
The formulation contains three types of variables: (i) the arc flow variables denoted
by the vector x = { xijk }, which define the flow of different commodities in each of the
selected links, (ii) the design variables denoted by the vector y = { yij }, which define the
links selected for the network design, and (iii) the coverage variables denoted by the
vector z = { zm }, which define whether or not a demand center is covered. They are
defined as follows:

⎧1, if there is a unit flow of commodity k on link (i, j )
xijk = ⎨
⎩0, otherwise

⎧1, if link [i, j ] is used in a flow path
y ij = ⎨
⎩0, otherwise
⎧1, if demand center m is accessible from a link of a flow path
zm = ⎨
⎩0, otherwise

3.3.3 The MCNDP Formulation
The MCNDP formulation has two objectives: Z1, the total routing cost, and Z2, the
total demand covered where,
Z1 =

k k
k k
∑ ∑ (cij xij + c ji x ji ) and Z2 = - ∑ rm zm .

k∈K [i , j ]∈E

m∈M

The integer programming formulation for the MCNDP is expressed as follows:
MCNDP:

Minimize Z = [Z1, Z2]
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(1)

subject to
∑

(i , j )∈ A

xijk

−

x kji

⎧ 1, if i = O(k )
⎪
= ⎨− 1, if i = D(k )
⎪⎩ 0, otherwise

∀ i, k

(2)

∀m

(3)

xijk ` ≤ yij

∀ k, [i, j] ∈ E

(4)

x kji ≤ yij

∀ k, [i, j] ∈ E

(5)

∑

( j ,i )∈ A

zm ≤ ∑

k
k
∑ ( xij + x ji )

k ∈K [i , j ]∈E m

∑

[i , j ]∈E

f ij yij ≤ B

∑

xijk ≤ 1

∑

xijk ≤ 1

(i , j )∈A

(i , j )∈A
k
∑ xij

(6)

∀ i, k

∀ k, j = D(k)

≤ | Q | −1

(7)

(8)

∀ k, Q ⊆ N, 2 ≤ |Q| ≤ |N|-2 (9)

{(i , j ) ∈A|∀ i , j ∈Q}

xijk , x kji = 0 or 1

∀ k, [i, j] ∈ E

(10)

yij = 0 or 1

∀ [i, j] ∈ E

(11)

zm = 0 or 1

∀m∈M

(12)

x ∈ S

(13)

In multiobjective programming, there may never exist a single solution that optimizes
all the objectives. Thus, the notion of an optimal solution is not relevant here and is
replaced by the concept of a noninferior solution set from which the decision-maker
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selects the most preferred solution. A solution to the above formulation is said to be
noninferior if there exists no other feasible solution that improves one objective without
degrading the other. There are two popular solution approaches to multiobjective
programming: preference based techniques and generating techniques [Cohon, 1978].
The latter approach, which has been commonly employed due to its simplicity, generates
the entire noninferior solution set or an approximation of it. We adopt this approach. An
approximation of the set can be obtained by using a single objective function formed by
different convex combinations of the objective functions. Our objective function
becomes:
Z(w1,w2) = w1Z1 + w2Z2

(14)

where w1 + w2 = 1, and w1, w2 ≥ 0.
The use of the weight pair (w1,w2) reflects the explicit tradeoffs between the total
routing cost and the demand that can be covered. Due to the discrete nature of the
MCNDP solution set, the above weighting method is incapable of identifying noninferior
solutions that lie in the duality gap of the convex hull of the set. Figure 3.1 illustrates an
example of a noninferior frontier which is a discrete set of points. The boundary of its
convex hull is obtained by joining its exterior points. However, there can be nondominated solutions that lie within the convex hull. For example, point B represents such
an instance in the figure. Hence, point B is said to lie in the duality gap of the convex
hull. Solving a constrained version to enable such identification entails a substantial
increase in the computational effort. Also, the number of noninferior solutions is large,
though finite, for even small-size discrete optimization problems and in the worst case
increases exponentially with problem size. Hence, it is not practical to generate the entire
noninferior set. Instead, it is appropriate to focus on generating an approximation to the
noninferior solution set.
Constraints 2 denote the network flow conservation constraints that require x to
describe a simple path from the origin to the destination for all commodities. Constraints
3 represent the coverage constraints, which imply that a demand center is covered only
when at least one of the links providing accessibility to the center is in a flow path.
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Constraint sets 4 and 5 are the forcing constraints; they state that no flow is allowed in
either direction of link [i, j] unless the associated fixed cost is incurred. The MCNDP can
be formulated in an alternative way by expressing the forcing constraints in an
aggregated form:

∑x

k∈K

k
ij

∑x

k∈K

k
ji

≤ | K | yij

∀ [i, j] ∈ E

(15)

≤ | K | yij

∀ [i, j] ∈ E

(16)

Using constraint sets 15 and 16 instead of 4 and 5, respectively, significantly reduces the
number of constraints in the formulation, and consequently the problem size. However,
past efforts suggest that the generic network design models with the less efficient
disaggregate formulation perform computationally much better than the more efficient
aggregate formulation [Magnanti and Wong, 1984]. This is because the disaggregate
version of the forcing constraints better approximates the convex hull of the set of
feasible integer solutions of the MCNDP, and hence, yields tighter lowerbounds for the
linear programming (LP) relaxation of the formulation.
Constraint 6 is the budget constraint; it states that the sum of the fixed costs of the
links in any solution should not exceed B.
Due to constraint set 3, any solution can entail looping paths of the kind C1 and C2,
as shown in Figure 3.2, for one or more commodities as loops help to achieve extra
population coverage. We seek loopless paths and this is enabled through constraint sets 7
and 8. Constraints 7 state that the maximum flow of any commodity type exiting any
node in the network should not exceed unity. Constraints 8 prevent the occurrence of
loops at destination nodes (similar to C2), which is not precluded by 7.
The coverage constraints can also lead to isolated subtours such as ST (as shown in
Figure 3.2) that do not share any link with the corresponding commodity flow paths in
the solution. These subtours are prevented by adding subtour elimination constraints 9, in
which Q denotes the nodes in a subtour. Since, |Q| can potentially take several values
between 2 and |N|-2, there are potentially an exponential number of such constraints.
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Constraint sets 10, 11 and 12 restrict the flow, design, and coverage variables,
respectively, to 0-1 values.
Constraint 13 restricts the flow variables to the set S which represents a restricted
solution domain S in which some flow variables are fixed a priori. As discussed in the
next chapter, this is necessary to restrict the geographical region within which the search
is performed to enable computational time savings. Presumably, the commodity paths to
be determined would be confined to a subnetwork surrounding the O-D pair, and not
circuitous. Hence, it models the topological restrictions upon the commodity flows in the
network.
The MCNDP is a linear integer program with (2|K||E|+|E|+|M|) integer variables and
comprises of (|K||N|+|M|+2|K||E|+1+|N||K|+|K|) constraints and an exponential number
(O(2|E|)) of subtour elimination constraints.

3.4 Computational Complexity of MCNDP
Lemma: The MCNDP is NP-hard.
Proof: We prove it by restriction. Consider the instance MCNDPR of problem MCNDP:

|M| = 0, that is, there are no demand centers and the objective function is just the total
routing cost of the various commodities. The coverage constraints 3 cannot be imposed as
there are no demand centers. Also, the constraints sets 7, 8 and 9 are redundant in the new
formulation and can be ignored. Solving this instance, which has only one objective, is
equivalent to solving a budget design problem which is known to be NP-hard [Johnson et
al., 1978]. Therefore, the MCNDP generalizes the budget design problem. It follows that
the MCNDP is NP-hard.
Hence, the MCNDP is rather intractable, implying that the solution approach is
typically an enumeration-type procedure.

3.5 Valid Inequalities
Typically, integer programming formulations are solved using branch-and-bound type
methods that solve linear programs at the nodes of the branch-and-bound tree. The
computational time for such procedures is dependent on the number of tree nodes
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enumerated to obtain the solution, as well as the time required to solve the formulation at
each enumerated node. The number of nodes to be enumerated is dependent on the
quality of the bounds generated by associated LP relaxations. Valid inequalities, which
are constraints based on the problem characteristics, are useful in this context. They are
redundant in an integer programming formulation but can eliminate non-integer solutions
that are optimal for the LP relaxations. Hence, they improve the lower bounds computed
by the solution algorithms, thereby generating computational time savings. Valid
inequalities can be appended to the MCNDP to enhance the formulation.
Proposition 1. The constraint

xijk + x kji ≤ yij

∀ k, [i, j] ∈ E

(17)

is a valid inequality for the MCNDP.
Proof: In any feasible design, a link [i, j] is either chosen or not. Consider the case where

link [i, j] is selected, which implies yij = 1. Then, the corresponding set of inequalities for
that link in constraints 17 are its subtour elimination constraints for |Q| = 2. If that link is
not selected, it implies yij = 0. Then, the forcing constraints imply that xijk = 0,∀ k, and the
corresponding constraints in 17 are valid. This completes the proof.
This valid inequality is a virtual constraint vis-à-vis the problem as it is not a direct
representation of a physical reality or a logical characteristic. However, it can replace
constraints 4 and 5, and part of constraints 9 (that is, for |Q| = 2). Hence, it can be used to
generate some computational time savings by reducing the problem size.

Proposition 2. The following constraints are valid for the MCNDP.

yij ≤ zm

∀ m, [i, j] ∈ Em

(18)

xijk ≤ z m

∀ m, k, [i, j] ∈ Em

(19)

xijk + x kji ≤ zm

∀ m, k, [i, j] ∈ Em

(20)

18

Proof: If xijk = 1 for some k and [i, j] ∈ Em then yij assumes the value 1, and the demand

center m is covered implying zm = 1. If xijk = 0 ∀ k, [i, j] ∈ Em then no fixed cost is
incurred for the ∀ [i, j] ∈ Em and the demand center m is not covered. This completes the
proof of constraints 18. The proof of constraints 19 follows directly from the forcing
constraints, and the result just proved. Constraint set 18 is redundant in the MCNDP
formulation and directly follows from constraints 17 and 18.
These valid inequalities imply that if a demand center m is not chosen, then links in
Em do not appear in the solution. This simplifies the budget constraint and network flow
conservation constraints, leading to potential computational efficiencies.
Proposition 3. Let m1 and m2 be two demand centers such that Em1 ⊆ Em2, then the

following relation holds.
zm1 ≤ zm 2

(21)

Proof: Suppose demand center m1 is covered by flow of some commodity k in arc (i, j),

this flow also covers demand center m2. If demand center m1 is not covered, constraint
21 reduces to the nonegativity constraint for the variable zm2. The proof is complete.
This valid inequality can potentially reduce computations by exploiting the problem
characteristic that if a demand center is covered by a link (i, j), it is redundant to search
other links to cover this demand center.
In summary, the MCNDP is a NP-hard integer programming formulation. It is
exacerbated by the need for subtour and looping elimination constraints. In addition,
valid inequalities can be proposed to increase computational efficiency by exploiting the
problem structure. The next chapter discusses the application of the MCNDP to the
determination of critical routes for earthquake response planning.
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Total population covered

Total travel time

Figure 3.1 Example of noninferior
solution in the duality gap
B
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D

C2
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ST

Figure 3.2 Example of a solution with looping paths and a subtour
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CHAPTER 4 CASE STUDY: CRITICAL ROUTES FOR EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE
PLANNING

This chapter discusses the application of the MCNDP formulation to the
determination of critical routes for earthquake response in southwest Indiana. It first
describes the details of the case study, followed by a summary of the solution procedure
and its implementation. A problem reduction strategy is proposed to reduce
computational times.

4.1 Case Study
The MCNDP is used to determine the critical routes under earthquakes for a network
representing southwest Indiana, as shown in Figure 4.1. It consists of 184 nodes, 307
links, and 93 population centers. The demand of a center is set equal to its population as
obtained from the US Census 2000 Data [US Census Bureau, 2000]. Fifteen centers have
a population greater than 5000 and are denoted as major population centers. The
remaining 78 have a population between 3000-5000, and are labeled minor population
centers. O-D node pairs, which represent the commodities (that is each O-D pair
represents one commodity), are chosen so as to ensure connectivity between the major
population centers. From Figure 4.1, the 15 major population centers can be viewed to lie
in five different layers from top to bottom: 3 centers each in the first three levels, 2 in the
fourth level, and 4 in the fifth level. To enable connectivity across the region it is
reasonable to choose O-D node pairs that connect major population centers between
adjacent layers, as also those within each layer. Note that the network topology
constituted by any feasible set of critical routes is connected. This approach generated 33
O-D node pairs. Using engineering judgment, the paths of 5 O-D pairs are predetermined. The fixed cost of a link is the total retrofit area of all the bridges on that link.
The link routing costs are their free-flow travel times, implying that link capacity is

22

ignored. This is because the problem addresses the planning stage of earthquake
emergency response. The link travel times are assumed to be symmetric. The links that
can potentially cover a population center are those that are within some pre-specified
threshold distance of it. They were identified by observing its location and the proximity
of roads (interstates, US roads and state roads) to it using the geographical map of the
region.

4.2 Solving the MCNDP

4.2.1 Solution Procedure
The MCNDP is solved using the branch-and-cut algorithm in CPLEX [ILOG CPLEX
7.1, 2001]. It is a search technique that uses the tree structure in which CPLEX
dynamically adds cut constraints at the tree nodes to reduce the tree size. The solution
procedure has two primary computational aspects. The first is the number of the tree
nodes searched in the branch-and-cut method since each requires the solution of a linear
program (that is, the LP relaxation of the MCNDP formulation). The LP relaxation
represents the formulation obtained by allowing the integer decision variables to assume
continuous values in the range within their upper and lower limits. The optimal value of
this formulation provides a lower bound for the MCNDP formulation as it is less
restrictive than the original formulation. Thereby, larger the number of tree nodes
searched, the greater the computational time. This highlights the critical importance of
the second computational aspect, the MCNDP formulation size, which depends on the
number of constraints. In this context, computational savings can be generated by using
valid inequalities, and/or by including or excluding the subtour elimination constraints.
The solution procedure first excludes most of the subtour elimination constraints to make
the problem computationally tractable. The only ones included are those for |Q|=2
implying link subtours. This is because there are only a few constraints with |Q|=2, and
preliminary analysis indicates that the associated subtours can occur frequently in the
solution if they are not precluded. Next, the solution procedure identifies subtours in the
solution obtained from CPLEX using this relaxed formulation. If subtours exist, it adds
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the necessary subtour elimination constraint(s) and reoptimizes the new formulation. This
step is repeated until no more subtours are encountered in the solution.
The best-known integer solution, which is the upper bound to the optimal solution, is
the final solution obtained from CPLEX. The lower bound to the optimal solution is the
best objective function value across all LP relaxation solutions of the branch-and-cut
nodes. They are used to determine the percentage optimality gap, which is a measure of
the quality of the solution. The percentage optimality gap is defined as [(upper bound –
lower bound)*100]/lower bound, where the bounds are obtained from CPLEX. It
indicates how close the best-known integer solution is to the optimal solution.

4.2.2 Implementation Details
The computing environment consists of a Sun Ultra Enterprise server E6500 with 26
400Mhz UltraSparc II processors under the multi-user Solaris 7 operating environment
with 23GB RAM, 131GB swap space and 8MB cache. A C++ program was implemented
to solve the problem and was compiled using GNU, g++ v2.95.3. It invokes subroutines
from the CPLEX Callable Library version 7.1 to construct the formulation and solve it
with the in-built mixed integer programming (MIP) optimizer that provides a customized
branch-and-cut procedure. Experiments are performed by excluding and including the
valid inequalities in the formulation.
A preliminary analysis was performed to calibrate the CPLEX parameter settings for
different experimental scenarios in terms of the budgets and the relative weights of the
two objectives, and for different % optimality gaps. A trial and error approach was
adopted in order to determine a good choice for the optimality tolerance level to solve an
instance to the maximal permissible closeness to optimality as possible within a
reasonable computational time. Our test runs indicated that for very low values w2 (≤
0.005), default settings yielded good computational performance. However, some
analysis was required to arrive at a good setting for higher values of w2. It was based on
aggressive probing, best estimate search for the node selection strategy, and variable
branching using pseudo reduced costs. The CPLEX preprocessor was set to on, as it was
able to achieve reduction in the MIP problem size leading to faster solution times. Also,
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based on our preliminary analysis a priority order was assigned to the variables in which
branching would be performed first on the x variables, then on the y variables and finally
on the z variables. Each instance was solved under exactly identical parameter settings for
the set of experiments with or without valid inequalities to compare the performance of
the two cases.

4.2.3 Problem Reduction Strategy
The preliminary runs indicated the intractable nature of the MCNDP; an instance
with budget B = 3.33 million sqft and weight pair (w1,w2) = (0.99,0.01) required over 5
days to solve to a 1% optimality gap. To generate significant computational time savings,
a strategy to reduce the search domain was incorporated based on the notion that the
solution for an O-D pair would lie within some restricted geographical area around it.
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the path for an O-D pair is confined to a
subnetwork around it rather than including circuitous components that are geographically
further away. This enables us to set the commodity flow variables to zero for the rest of
the network, which provides the restricted solution domain S for the formulation.
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Major population center

Minor population center

Figure 4.1 Road network of southwest Indiana
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CHAPTER 5 RESULTS FROM COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS

This chapter reports the results and derives insights from the computational
experiments conducted using the case study. The primary objective of the experiments is
to analyze model sensitivity for different budgets and relative weights for the two
objectives. We make a few comments on the computational performance. Subsequently
we seek to develop noninferior frontiers that illustrate the trade-offs between the
conflicting objectives for different budgets to provide practical insights to decisionmakers.

5.1 Model Sensitivity and Computational Performance
An effective problem reduction strategy was sought to be identified based on
computational efficiency of the test runs conducted. In the runs all the valid inequalities
were included for computational efficiency. A strategy which sets 83.46% of the total
number of flow variables to zero a priori, performed in a robust manner. Hence, further
experiments were conducted using this strategy. The formulation was solved for the
following weight pairs: (0.999,0.001), (0.99,0.01), (0.95,0.05) and (0.9,0.1) for the
budget range 1.43 million sqft to 3.33 million sqft. The value 1.43 million sqft is the
minimum budget required for a feasible solution to the formulation. Table 5.1 illustrates
the total travel time and the total population covered for the instances solved. The
computational times were higher for larger w2 values because of the need to search more
routes due to the increased importance of population coverage in the objective function.
When w2 is smaller, the problem approaches the budget design problem where the
network structure can be favorably exploited to yield better computational performance.
For low budgets, the problems are more difficult to solve due to interactions between
commodities caused by the need to share links in the final solution. This was also
observed by Dionne and Florian [1979]. In our experiments, subtours occur in the
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intermediate solutions for all budgets with weight pairs (0.95,0.05) and (0.9,0.1), and
only for two instances in (0.99,0.01). This is because a larger weight for population
coverage leads to physically meaningless isolated subtours in an effort to improve the
objective function value.

5.2 Noninferior Frontiers: Travel Time-Population Coverage Trade-offs
Figure 5.1 displays the noninferior solution set for the budget range 1.43 million sqft
to 3.33 million sqft. In the figure, the solutions towards the left of the graph for any
budget correspond to lower w2 values; for example, the leftmost points correspond to w2
= 0.001.
In general, for a budget, higher values of w2 lead to greater population coverage at the
expense of increased system travel time. This plot provides flexibility [Hall, 1985] to the
decision-maker by generating a range of solutions. Noninferior solution sets, like the ones
shown here, can be very useful to the decision-maker as they highlight the tradeoffs
between conflicting objectives. They also aid decision-makers to compare the additional
benefits accrued in terms of system travel time savings and extra population coverage due
to additional budget. For example, the marginal benefits that could be realized from a
budget of 2 million sqft instead of 1.67 million sqft would be higher than those under
2.33 million sqft instead of 2 million sqft.
Figures 5.2a-g depict the critical routes for seven of the instances solved above. For
the lowest budget, 1.43 million sqft., the subnetwork formed by the critical routes is
sparse, but still covers approximately 90% of the total population of the region. For the
critical route networks shown in these figures, the travel times and the population covered
are higher as the weight for population is increased, keeping the budget fixed. This is
because the routes are more circuitous.
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Figure 5.1 Noninferior solution set for different budget values
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Figure 5.2a Critical routes for the weight pair (0.9,0.1) and budget 1.43 million sqft
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Figure 5.2b Critical routes for the weight pair (0.99,0.01) and budget 1.67 million sqft
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Figure 5.2c Critical routes for the weight pair (0.9,0.1) and budget 1.67 million sqft
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Figure 5.2d Critical routes for the weight pair (0.99,0.01) and budget 2 million sqft
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Figure 5.2e Critical routes for the weight pair (0.95,0.05) and budget 2 million sqft
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Figure 5.2f Critical routes for the weight pair (0.99,0.01) and budget 2.33 million sqft

35

Figure 5.2g Critical routes for the weight pair (0.95,0.05) and budget 2.33 million sqft
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Table 5.1 Objective function values for the instances solved

1.43

(0.999,0.001)
(0.99,0.01)
(0.95,0.05)
(0.9,0.1)

Total travel time
(minutes)
1656.67
1670.96
1670.96
1686.42

Total population
covered
409572
412062
412062
412354

% of Total
population covered
89.46
90.00
90.00
90.06

1.67

(0.999,0.001)
(0.99,0.01)
(0.95,0.05)
(0.9,0.1)

1442.33
1510.70
1758.24
1766.11

415148
430861
437885
438561

90.68
94.11
95.64
95.79

2.00

(0.999,0.001)
(0.99,0.01)
(0.95,0.05)
(0.9,0.1)

1350.84
1454.16
1639.79
1903.84

423192
441712
450129
449489

92.44
96.48
98.32
98.18

2.33

(0.999,0.001)
(0.99,0.01)
(0.95,0.05)
(0.9,0.1)

1342.47
1428.82
1601.52
1809.39

433975
448727
452715
455482

94.79
98.01
98.88
99.49

2.67

(0.999,0.001)
(0.99,0.01)
(0.95,0.05)
(0.9,0.1)

1335.77
1407.88
1620.63
1786.13

436682
450804
456039
455953

95.38
98.47
99.61
99.59

3.00

(0.999,0.001)
(0.99,0.01)
(0.95,0.05)
(0.9,0.1)

1335.77
1409.15
1561.31
1713.74

436682
452018
455904
457111

95.38
98.73
99.581
99.85

3.33

(0.999,0.001)
(0.99,0.01)
(0.95,0.05)
(0.9,0.1)

1335.77
1409.15
1584.22
1635.3

436682
452018
456184
456448

95.38
98.73
99.64
99.70

Budget
(million sqft)

(w1,w2)
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CHAPTER 6 RECOMMENDED CRITICAL ROUTES CONSISTENT WITH INDOT
(SAC) NEEDS

This chapter reports the results from the computational experiments conducted using
the case study after incorporating the recommendations of the Study Advisory Committee
based on the critical route subnetworks identified in Chapter 5. Section 6.1 states the
recommendations briefly and discusses them. Section 6.2 discusses the critical routes
obtained by incorporating the recommendations.

6.1 Feedback from Study Advisory Committee and Emergency Response Operators
Based on the feedback from the SAC, the following recommendations were proposed
for the critical routes:
1) Inclusion of the section of I-64 that passes through the study region.
2) Provision of connectivity of the critical routes to adjacent states, namely, Illinois
and Kentucky.
The first recommendation attempts to address the omission of I-64 in the critical
routes shown in Chapter 5. Since I-64 is a freeway, it would potentially provide an
efficient critical route subnetwork component due to the superior structural and
maintenance characteristics of freeways; that is, it would need minimal budgetary
investments to ensure seismic tolerance. Hence, it would seem natural for it to be a part
of at least some of the critical routes. To analyze the reasons for its omission in the
critical route subnetworks suggested in Chapter 5, we revisit the model presented in
chapter 3 that determines the critical routes. This model trades off three factors, namely
total travel time, population covered and budget. Observing the figures (figures 5.2a-g)
shown in Chapter 5, we note that the population centers close to I-64 that are not covered
in most critical routes are Griffin, Elberfield and Lynnville. Their populations are 160,
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636 and 781, respectively. Hence, together they constitute only 0.34% of the total
population of the study region. Due to the budgetary constraints, the benefits of higher
population coverage achievable through the routes other than I-64 are greater than the
lower total travel time achieved due to its inclusion. Hence, the model excludes I-64 from
the critical routes shown in Chapter 5.
Routes that provide connectivity to adjacent states are important. They aid in the
coordination of response plans with adjacent states and also enable the response operators
in Indiana to utilize the assistance offered by their counterparts in the adjacent states in
the event of an earthquake primarily causing damage in Indiana. This potentially
increases response effectiveness.
Both sets of recommendations were incorporated into the determination of the critical
routes by adding the associated constraints into the original MCNDP formulation. This
also means that the new formulation has a more restricted solution set compared to the
original one. Therefore, the new objective function value (denoting the optimal solution
for the more-constrained problem) incorporating these additional constraints can never be
better than that of the original formulation corresponding to the results in Chapter 5.

6.2 Characteristics of the Recommended Critical Routes
After the addition of constraints to incorporate the SAC recommendations, the
minimum budget required for a feasible solution increased to 1.67 million sqft. The
critical routes were solved for budgets ranging from 1.67 million sqft. to 3.33 million
sqft. Table 6.1 shows the total travel time and the total population covered for the various
instances solved. Figure 6.1 depicts the noninferior solution frontier obtained. It
illustrates that the marginal benefits realizable from a 2 million sqft. budget compared to
the 1.67 million sqft. case are higher than those corresponding to the noninferior frontiers
illustrated in Chapter 5 for the same budgets. The results (Figures 6.2a-f) suggest that the
critical routes identified in Chapter 5 do not differ perceptibly from those computed here.
For identical problem parameters, in most cases, the total travel time and the total
population covered have worsened due to the recommendations. This is because the
addition of new constraints leads to a more restricted solution set.
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It may be noted that, in some instances, the results in Table 6.1 seem better than those
shown in Table 5.1. This is not because the solution is inherently better in the restricted
case. As just stated, the restricted optimal solution will always be worse. However, due
the problem complexity (NP-hard problem) discussed in Chapter 3, neither of these two
cases is solved to optimality, but only to a certain optimality tolerance level. Hence, when
more variables are fixed (as is done in Chapter 6), the problem can in many instances be
solved much closer to optimality though the problem is more constrained.
Connectivity was provided at three sections with Illinois and two sections with
Kentucky as desired by the SAC.
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Total population covered

455000

445000

435000

1.67 million s qft

425000

2.00 million s qft
2.33 million s qft
2.67 million s qft

415000

3.00 million s qft
3.33 million s qft
405000
1300

1400

1500

1600

1700

1800

Total travel time (minutes)

Figure 6.1 Noninferior solution set for different budget values
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1900

Figure 6.2a Recommended critical routes for the weight pair (0.99,0.01) and budget 1.67
million sqft
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Figure 6.2b Recommended critical routes for the weight pair (0.9,0.1) and budget 1.67
million sqft
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Figure 6.2c Recommended critical routes for the weight pair (0.99,0.01) and budget 2.00
million sqft
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Figure 6.2d Recommended critical routes for the weight pair (0.95,0.05) and budget 2.00
million sqft
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Figure 6.2e Recommended critical routes for the weight pair (0.99,0.01) and budget 2.33
million sqft
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Figure 6.2f Recommended critical routes for the weight pair (0.95,0.05) and budget 2.33
million sqft
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Table 6.1 Objective function values for the instances solved

1.67

(0.999,0.001)
(0.99,0.01)
(0.95,0.05)
(0.9,0.1)

Total travel time
(minutes)
1662.63
1685.59
1686.69
1715.19

Total population
covered
408422
410802
410802
411855

% of Total
population covered
89.21
89.73
89.73
89.96

2.00

(0.999,0.001)
(0.99,0.01)
(0.95,0.05)
(0.9,0.1)

1391.75
1466.27
1646.53
1755.28

413091
429665
434609
434461

90.23
93.85
94.93
94.90

2.33

(0.999,0.001)
(0.99,0.01)
(0.95,0.05)
(0.9,0.1)

1346.02
1398.75
1584.67
1778.19

427829
445473
449826
450736

93.45
97.30
98.25
98.45

2.67

(0.999,0.001)
(0.99,0.01)
(0.95,0.05)
(0.9,0.1)

1337.33
1425.29
1599.52
1695.34

435301
450589
453614
455026

95.08
98.42
99.08
99.39

3.00

(0.999,0.001)
(0.99,0.01)
(0.95,0.05)
(0.9,0.1)

1328.15
1411.76
1592.24
1689.16

436562
451015
455519
456991

95.36
98.51
99.50
99.82

3.33

(0.999,0.001)
(0.99,0.01)
(0.95,0.05)
(0.9,0.1)

1323.77
1407.76
1516.12
1614.49

436682
452018
456048
457661

95.38
98.73
99.61
99.97

Budget
(million sqft)

(w1,w2)
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS

This chapter summarizes the study and highlights its contributions.

7.1 Summary
Seismic retrofit planning plays an important role in determining the effectiveness of
the operational stage of earthquake response management. At a strategic level, it is
dependent on the routes critical for effective emergency response. However, past studies
have not addressed the identification of critical routes under budget constraints. This is a
very important practical problem for emergency response planners as it involves
identifying effective transportation routes while accounting for bridge structural
conditions and budget limitations. It implies the identification of bridges to retrofit under
earthquake response planning. This study develops a network-level methodology to assist
decision-makers in identifying an effective seismic retrofit scheme for the bridges of a
network. It introduces the MCNDP, which seeks routes that minimize the total routing
costs over the selected routes and maximizes the total demand covered, subject to a
budget constraint. An integer programming formulation of the problem is presented, and
is shown to be NP-hard. The problem characteristics are exploited to develop some valid
inequalities.
In general, the MCNDP model is useful in addressing network-level disaster
management planning. The MCNDP is applied to generate critical routes for earthquake
response planning in southwest Indiana, which is part of a seismically active region that
includes parts of Illinois, Kentucky and Missouri as well. The branch-and-cut procedure
of the CPLEX MIP optimizer is used to solve the problem. A problem reduction strategy
is proposed to reduce computational time while ensuring that the resulting solution is
close to or equal to the optimal solution. Noninferior frontiers are generated using convex
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combinations of the two objectives so as to provide practical insights for decisionmakers. These frontiers assist the decision-maker in analyzing the trade-offs among
various objectives and making budget allocation decisions.
A new set of critical routes were developed based on the SAC feedback for the first
set of critical routes identified. The SAC recommendations were to include the section of
I-64 passing through the study region, and to provide connectivity to the adjacent states
(Illinois and Kentucky) to ensure seamless inter-state coordination and cooperation in the
event of an actual earthquake. These recommendations were incorporated to generate a
new set of critical routes through the addition of constraints to the MCNDP formulation.
The updated critical routes do not differ perceptibly from those obtained from the
experiments prior to the SAC recommendations.

7.2 Contributions of the Study
This study formally defines the Multicommodity Maximal Covering Network Design
Problem (MCNDP) and formulates it. To our knowledge, it represents the first attempt to
incorporate the coverage objective in a generic network model, leading to a new class of
models with significant practical implications. Past work has used the coverage criterion
in identifying a path, tree or tour on a network by considering either the routing or the
fixed cost, while the proposed model simultaneously considers the routing and fixed costs
subject to a budget constraint. That is, none of the existing models consider routing costs,
fixed costs and coverage criterion in a single framework.
From a practical standpoint, the key contribution of this study is its ability to address
planning problems faced by emergency response agencies vis-à-vis disaster management.
The specific problem addressed here relates to earthquake response management. Under
budget constraints, there is a need to determine an effective retrofit plan for the bridges in
a seismically-prone region. Most studies in the literature have adopted a local perspective
to solving this problem, and do not consider the effect of potential bridge failures on the
transportation system performance. The few methodologies that use a systems approach
do not consider the influence of retrofit decisions on the quality of the associated routes
vis-à-vis effective earthquake response. The proposed model fills this critical gap by
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considering the total travel time for the key O-D pairs in the network and the total
population covered by them as the criteria for determining the critical routes. The budget
limitation on the total bridge retrofit costs for the links constituting the critical routes is
represented as a constraint in our model. Hence, this methodology simultaneously
determines the set of bridges in a network requiring retrofit and the routes that serve as
focal points for earthquake response.
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Introduction
The possibility of very strong earthquakes in the
central Mississippi Valley has been known for 200
years in the New Madrid Seismic Zone. Awareness
of the seismic risk in the State of Indiana has
increased in the last decades. In the last two
decades identification of an independent tectonic
process occurring in the Wabash River Valley has
implications for the seismic risk of the State of
Indiana from what has recently been defined as the
Wabash Valley Seismic Zone. The occurrence of a
strong earthquake in these seismic zones or in
Indiana or the neighboring states due to other not
so well understood tectonic processes, as has
occurred in the past, has serious implications for
the State Transportation System. The definition of
Earthquake Emergency Routes for the state is a
priority for the Indiana Department of
Transportation. The identification of Emergency
Routes takes into account issues related to
transportation including coverage of population and
area and travel time along these routes.
This study formulates a multicommodity maximal
covering network design problem (MCNDP) for
identifying critical routes, for earthquake response
and to seismically retrofit bridges. The MCNDP
seeks routes that minimize the total travel time over
the selected routes and maximizes the total
population covered, subject to a budget constraint
on bridge retrofitting costs on the selected routes.
The problem is formulated as a two-objective

integer programming model and solved using the
branch-and-cut module in the CPLEX optimizer.
The model performance was analyzed using the
transportation network of a seismically-prone
region in southwest Indiana. Thereby, the search
for the critical routes for an origin-destination (OD) pair is confined to a limited geographical region
around it.
A Geographical Information System (GIS) system
was developed for evaluation of seismic
vulnerability of the proposed Indiana Emergency
Routes. The GIS based implementation of the
technical information developed in this project
through FEMA HAZUS-MH software was
conducted in collaboration with the Polis Center in
Indianapolis, nationally recognized and FEMA
authorized HAZUS implementation facility.
HAZUS software may be used for mitigation of
vulnerability, simulation, and response to a strong
earthquake in southwestern Indiana. It uses
information from the Indiana Department of
Transportation (INdot) maintenance database and
selected structural and geotechnical information
from the bridge drawings data base. Vulnerability
assessment was performed using the general
information from maintenance and final calibration
was performed using a series of cases based on
bridge drawings and soil exploration descriptions
contained in these drawings.

Findings
Computational experiments were conducted to
investigate the effects of varying the budget and the
relative weights of the two objectives. A set of
12-3 08/05 JTRP-2003/22

critical routes was obtained. Seismic retrofit planning
plays an important role in determining the
effectiveness of the operational stage of earthquake
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response management. At a strategic level, it is
dependent on the routes critical for effective
emergency response. However, past studies have not
addressed the identification of critical routes under
budget constraints. This is a very important practical
problem for emergency response planners as it
involves identifying effective transportation routes
while accounting for bridge structural conditions and
budget limitations. It implies the identification of
bridges to retrofit under earthquake response
planning. This study develops a network-level
methodology to assist decision-makers in identifying
an effective seismic retrofit scheme for the bridges of
a network.
This study formally defines the Multicommodity
Maximal Covering Network Design Problem
(MCNDP) and formulates it. To our knowledge,
it represents the first attempt to incorporate the
coverage objective in a generic network model,
leading to a new class of models with significant
practical implications. Past work has used the
coverage criterion in identifying a path, tree or
tour on a network by considering either the
routing or the fixed cost, while the proposed
model simultaneously considers the routing and
fixed costs subject to a budget constraint. That
is, none of the existing models consider routing
costs, fixed costs and coverage criterion in a
single framework.
From a practical standpoint, the key contribution
of this study is its ability to address planning
problems faced by emergency response agencies
vis-à-vis disaster management. The specific
problem addressed here relates to earthquake
response management. Under budget constraints,
there is a need to determine an effective retrofit
plan for the bridges in a seismically-prone
region. Most studies in the literature have
adopted a local perspective to solving this
problem, and do not consider the effect of
potential bridge failures on the transportation
system performance. The few methodologies
that use a systems approach do not consider the
influence of retrofit decisions on the quality of
the associated routes vis-à-vis effective
earthquake response. The proposed model fills
this critical gap by considering the total travel
time for the key O-D pairs in the network and
the total population covered by them as the
criteria for determining the critical routes. The
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budget limitation on the total bridge retrofit costs
for the links constituting the critical routes is
represented as a constraint in our model. Hence,
this methodology simultaneously determines the
set of bridges in a network requiring retrofit and
the routes that serve as focal points for
earthquake response.
The evolution of the earthquake resistant bridge
design requirements contained in the AASHTO
Specifications and the existence of a proposed
draft seismic design specification being
discussed have significant implications in the
assessment of the existing vulnerability, its
mitigation, and the design of new bridges along
the Emergency Routes. Along with this
development, the USGS assessment of the
seismic risk of southwestern Indiana and a
change of format of the definition of the
earthquake design ground motion that is integral
part of the proposed draft seismic design
specification also has important implications on
the assessment of the operational capabilities of
the Earthquake Emergency Routes of Indiana.
The effects of the 2001 Nisqually Earthquake
that occurred in the State of Washington gave
invaluable insight on the expected situation for
the State of Indiana due to a comparable bridge
inventory in age and bridge types and a parallel
increase of the seismic risk awareness in both
regions over the last decades.
Using the information collected in this study, the
GIS implementation through FEMA-HAZUSMH software may be used for mitigation of
vulnerability, simulation, and response to a
strong earthquake in southwestern Indiana.
Vulnerability was evaluated for different levels
of ground acceleration in order to obtain
behavior patterns for selected bridges. Using
these results, seismic behavior patterns were
obtained for bridges located in southwestern
Indiana included in the INdot Vincennes District
maintenance data base. Soil amplification and
liquefaction potential were evaluated for the
cases having reported SPT measurements from
borings. Based on this process, information
critical for the identification of upgrade needs
for the transportation structures part of the
Earthquake Emergency Routes is made available
to the INdot.
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Implementation
The findings and developments of this research
project are presented next in the form of
suggested implementation steps by the Indiana
Department of Transportation.
1.

2.

3.

Formal adoption of the selected
emergency routes or some variation of
the same by the state is a necessary
step. Such routes adopted and
maintained by INdot will be affected by
issues and policies outside the scope of
those considered in this study. For
instance, policy decisions, budgetary
constraints,
new
projects,
i.e.
continuation of I-69, will likely affect
the formal adoption of a set of
emergency routes and will continue to
impose changes in the future. The
methodology developed in this study
and the information implemented in
HAZUS-MH should be of assistance to
state decision makers in the future.
Future implementation strategies can be
studied through simulation studies
using appropriately updated information
for different earthquake scenarios
including earthquake ground motion
defined in current AASHTO Standard
Specifications,
proposed
Draft
AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions, or
other. These simulations will provide
corresponding bridge retrofit scope for
the proposed routes or alternative
definitions.
The information in the maintenance
database should be periodically
evaluated
and
should
include
information currently available only in
the bridge drawings (see Section 7.5 of
the final report). This will improve the
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vulnerability assessment of the bridges
refining the mitigation policies to adopt
in the future. This expansion of the
maintenance database can be extended
to other counties and districts not
covered in this research project.
4.

Establish a program for assessing the
liquefaction,
soil
spread,
and
embankment failure potential along the
routes at locations other than bridge
sites by providing a consistent
evaluation methodology supported with
the information developed in this study.
This implementation will require a soil
exploration
program
to
obtain
geotechnical properties of sites where
no information exists or where such
information was obtained years ago
with
different
objectives
than
liquefaction evaluation. In the research
conducted in this study, liquefaction
evaluations were made using solely
boring information contained in
selected bridge drawings.

5.

To establish procedures for emergency
response under different earthquake
occurrence scenarios.

6.

INdot should consider the formal
adoption of HAZUS-MH software for
scenario management, mitigation and
vulnerability studies and to train
appropriate personnel. An important
feature in this implementation step is
the engagement of the Polis Center in
the training of INdot personnel on the
use of HAZUS-MH software. The Polis
Center is a nationally recognized
HAZUS implementation facility.

INDOT Division of Research

West Lafayette, IN 47906

Contacts

For more information:
Prof. Mete Sozen
Principal Investigator
School of Civil Engineering
Purdue University
West Lafayette IN 47907
Phone: (765) 494-2186
Fax: (765) 496-1105
sozen@ecn.purdue.edu
Prof. Julio Ramirez
Principal Investigator
School of Civil Engineering
Purdue University
West Lafayette IN 47907
Phone: (765) 494-2716
Fax: (765) 496-1105
ramirez@ecn.purdue.edu

Indiana Department of Transportation
Division of Research
1205 Montgomery Street
P.O. Box 2279
West Lafayette, IN 47906
Phone: (765) 463-1521
Fax: (765) 497-1665
Purdue University
Joint Transportation Research Program
School of Civil Engineering
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1284
Phone: (765) 494-9310
Fax: (765) 496-7996
jtrp@ecn.purdue.edu
http://www.purdue.edu/jtrp

Prof. Srinvas Peeta
Principal Investigator
School of Civil Engineering
Purdue University
West Lafayette IN 47907
Phone: (765) 494-2209
Fax: (765) 496-7996
peeta@ecn.purdue.edu

12-3 03/04 JTRP-2003/22

INDOT Division of Research

West Lafayette, IN 47906

TECHNICAL REPORT STANDARD TITLE PAGE
1. Report No.

2. Government Accession No.

3. Recipient's Catalog No.

FHWA/IN/JTRP-2003/22
4. Title and Subtitle

5.

Emergency Earthquake Routes for the State of Indiana
Part I: Criteria for Selection of Primary Routes: Transportation Aspects
Part II: Route Seismic Vulnerability Aspects

Report Date

August 2005
6. Performing Organization Code

7. Author(s)

8. Performing Organization Report No.

Luis Garcia, Srinivas Peeta, Julio Ramirez, Mete Sozen, Kannan Viswanath

FHWA/IN/JTRP-2003/22
10. Work Unit No.

9. Performing Organization Name and Address

Joint Transportation Research Program
550 Stadium Mall Drive
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN 47907-2051
11. Contract or Grant No.

SPR-2480
13. Type of Report and Period Covered

12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address

Indiana Department of Transportation
State Office Building
100 North Senate Avenue
Indianapolis, IN 46204

Final Report

14. Sponsoring Agency Code

15. Supplementary Notes

Prepared in cooperation with the Indiana Department of Transportation and Federal Highway Administration.
The occurrence of a strong earthquake in Indiana or neighboring states, as has occurred in the past, has serious implications for the State Transportation
System with respect to adequate response. The definition of Earthquake Emergency Routes for the State of Indiana became a priority for the Indiana
Department of Transportation. These Emergency Routes take into account various aspects related to transportation including coverage of population and
area and travel time along these routes, and issues related to structural and geotechnical seismic vulnerability of the roads and bridges along these routes.
Part I of the overall study report formulates a multi-commodity maximal covering network design problem (MCNDP) for identifying critical routes, for
earthquake response and to seismically retrofit bridges. In the MCNDP, routes are sought that minimize the total travel time over the selected routes and
maximize the total population covered, subject to a budget constraint on bridge retrofitting costs on the selected routes. The problem is formulated as a twoobjective integer programming model and solved using the branch-and-cut module in the CPLEX optimizer. The model performance is analyzed using the
transportation network in southwest Indiana. A problem reduction strategy is introduced to reduce computational times by recognizing that the critical
routes are not usually circuitous. Thereby, the search for the critical routes for an origin-destination (O-D) pair is confined to a limited geographical region
around it. To further reduce computational costs, the formulation is extended to incorporate valid inequalities that exploit the problem structure. Simulation
studies are conducted to investigate the effects of varying the budget and the relative weights of the two objectives. Noninferior frontiers that illustrate the
trade-offs between the conflicting objectives for different budgets are constructed to provide practical insights to decision-makers. The final selected routes
in addition include constraints set by the Study Advisory Committee regarding specific roads to be included in the final set.
Part II of the study report covers the structural and geotechnical seismic issues related to the definition of Earthquake Emergency Routes for the State of
Indiana. Previous worldwide experience on bridge damage during strong earthquakes has influenced the bridge earthquake design specifications and
mitigation procedures. The evolution of the relevant requirements in the AASHTO Specifications and the existence of a proposed draft seismic design
specification under development as part of the NCHRP Project 12-49 have significant implications in the assessment of the existing vulnerability, its
mitigation, and the design of new bridges along the Emergency Routes. Geographical Information System (GIS) was implemented to assist the evaluation of
seismic vulnerability of the proposed Indiana Emergency Routes. Using the available information, the GIS implementation may be used for mitigation of
vulnerability, simulation, and response to a strong earthquake in Indiana incorporating information from the Indiana Department of Transportation (Indot)
maintenance database and selected structural and geotechnical information from the relevant bridge drawings. Findings from a vulnerability assessment as
well as final calibration performed using selected representative bridge data such as drawings and soil exploration descriptions are also reported.
Vulnerability was evaluated for different levels of ground acceleration in order to obtain behavior patterns for selected bridges and to illustrate upgrade
needs for the transportation structures on the Emergency Routes. The information contained in this report could be used to assist the engineers in
conducting simulations that will help Indot to devise mitigation policies for different earthquake occurrence scenarios and to evaluate potential alternative
routes.
17. Key Words

18. Distribution Statement

Emergency routes; critical routes; earthquake response; transportation
structures; highway bridges; retrofit of bridges; bridge design
specifications; transportation systems; transportation networks;
liquefaction; bridge seismic vulnerability; seismic risk of Indiana; New
Madrid Seismic Zone; Wabash Valley Seismic Zone
19. Security Classif. (of this report)

No restrictions. This document is available to the public through the
National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161

20. Security Classif. (of this page)

21. No. of Pages

Part I – 54

Unclassified
Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-69)

Unclassified

Part II - 155

22. Price

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors acknowledge the assistance and feed back from the members of the study
advisory committee. They also want to thank the enthusiastic collaboration of all the
personnel of the Indiana Department of Transportation Vincennes District in all stages of
the research performed. The project was funded by the Joint Transportation Research
Program of Purdue University in conjunction with the Indiana Department of
Transportation and the Federal Highway Administration. We acknowledge and appreciate
their support and assistance.

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
LIST OF TABLES.............................................................................................................. v
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... viii
ABSTRACT...................................................................................................................... xv

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1
1.1 Purpose...................................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Scope......................................................................................................................... 1
1.3 Methodology ............................................................................................................. 2
1.4 Participants................................................................................................................ 2
1.5 Organization of the report......................................................................................... 3

CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND .......................................................................................... 5
2.1 Transportation systems ............................................................................................. 5
2.2 Bridges ...................................................................................................................... 9
2.2.1

Bridge performance during earthquakes..................................................... 9

2.2.2

Bridge seismic design criteria evolution................................................... 20

The early days ....................................................................................................... 20
The 1975 AASHTO Interim ................................................................................. 21
The ATC 6 and Division I-A of AASHTO Standard Specifications.................... 24
AASHTO LRFD ................................................................................................... 30
Caltrans Seismic Design Criteria .......................................................................... 33
Draft AASHTO LRFD Update ............................................................................. 37
Bridge retrofit........................................................................................................ 48
2.3 Geotechnical issues................................................................................................. 50
2.3.1

Ground motion amplification due to soil profile characteristics .............. 51

ii

2.3.2

Liquefaction .............................................................................................. 55

2.3.3

Fault rupture.............................................................................................. 65

2.3.4

Embankment failure.................................................................................. 66

2.3.5

Landslides ................................................................................................. 67

CHAPTER 3 SEISMIC RISK OF SOUTHWESTERN INDIANA ................................. 68
3.1 Tectonic setting....................................................................................................... 68
3.2 Earthquake history of Indiana................................................................................. 76
3.3 Design earthquake return period............................................................................. 79
3.4 Seismic risk assessment for bridge design in Indiana............................................. 82
3.4.1

1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications for Highway Bridges .................. 84

3.4.2

ATC 6 and AASHTO Division I-A .......................................................... 85

3.4.3

USGS 1996 Maps for the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions .... 87

3.4.4

2002 Update of the 1996 USGS Maps...................................................... 92

3.4.5

JTRP Project SPR 2812 – Analysis of Seismic Hazard Assessment for

Indiana

95

3.4.6

Comments on the results from the different maps and bridge design

requirements.............................................................................................................. 96

CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATION OF SEISMIC
VULNERABILITY OF THE INDIANA EMERGENCY ROUTES............................. 107
4.1 Route Alternatives ................................................................................................ 107
4.2 Available Information........................................................................................... 112
4.3 GIS Implementation.............................................................................................. 114
4.4 Vulnerability Assessment Approach..................................................................... 116
4.5 Mitigation and Simulation .................................................................................... 118

CHAPTER 5 GEOTECHNICAL ASSOCIATED SOURCES OF VULNERABILITY 119
5.1 Introduction........................................................................................................... 119
5.2 Soil profile amplification ...................................................................................... 121

iii

5.3 Liquefaction .......................................................................................................... 124
5.4 Soil spread............................................................................................................. 136
5.5 Embankment stability ........................................................................................... 137

CHAPTER 6 BRIDGE VULNERABILITY .................................................................. 138
6.1 Introduction........................................................................................................... 138
6.2 Information from the Inspection and Maintenance Database ............................... 138
6.3 Approximate vulnerability assessment methodology ........................................... 140
6.4 Formal vulnerability assessment methodology..................................................... 142
6.4.1

Routine tasks........................................................................................... 143

6.4.2

Ground motion intensity-dependent tasks .............................................. 144

CHAPTER 7 UPGRADE NEEDS OF BRIDGES ON THE EMERGENCY ROUTES 147
7.1 Introduction........................................................................................................... 147
7.2 Bridges studied...................................................................................................... 147
7.3 Retrofit Needs ....................................................................................................... 149
7.4 Improvement of the approximate vulnerability assessment.................................. 151

CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................... 153
8.1 Conclusions........................................................................................................... 153
8.2 Recommendations................................................................................................. 154

CHAPTER 9 REFERENCES ......................................................................................... 157

iv

LIST OF TABLES

Table

Page

Table 2-1 – Seismic Performance Categories (SPC) Division I-A Seismic Design
of the current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications .................................. 26
Table 2-2 – Response Modification Factors (R) Division I-A Seismic Design
of the current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications .................................. 29
Table 2-3 – Response Modification Factors (R) in AASHTO LRFD Specifications ........ 32
Table 2-4 – Design Earthquakes and Seismic Performance Objectives in the
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) ................................ 39
Table 2-5 – Seismic Hazard Level based on FvS1 – Draft AASHTO LRFD
Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) .....................................................................42
Table 2-6 – Seismic Hazard Level based on FaSS – Draft AASHTO LRFD
Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) .................................................................... 43
Table 2-7 – Seismic Design and Analysis Procedure (SDAP) – Draft AASHTO
LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) ......................................................... 43
Table 2-8 – Base Response Modification Factors, RB, for the substructure – Draft
AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) ......................................... 44
Table 2-9 – Seismic Detailing Requirements (SDR) – Draft AASHTO
LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) ......................................................... 45
Table 2-10 – Component Detailing Requirements for SDR’s — Draft
AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) ......................................... 47
Table 2-11 – Site Classification [NEHRP, 2000] .............................................................53
Table 2-12 – Corrections to SPT [Youd and Idriss, 2001] .............................................. 63
Table 2-13 – Cases for SDR 3 to 6 for which liquefaction potential evaluation
need not be performed in Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions
(NCHRP 12-49) ....................................................................................................64

v

Table 3-1 – Design Ground Motion Mean Return period used
in different documents ..........................................................................................81
Table 3-2 – Maximum zonal acceleration to be used with
map of Fig. 3-12 [Housner, 1970] ........................................................................83
Table 3-3 – Maximum values for the Response Coefficient (C) in Indiana
1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications [AASHTO, 1975] .................................... 85
Table 3-4 – Seismic Zone definition and mapped values of acceleration for
selected cities in Indiana for the different maps .................................................. 97
Table 3-5 – Analysis and Design requirements for selected cities in Indiana for
the current Division I-A and proposed Draft LRFD requirements
(spectral values in rock) ..................................................................................... 102
Table 3-6 – Values of the site coefficient for a Type III soil profile under
current Division I-A requirements and a Type D soil under proposed
Draft LRFD Provisions....................................................................................... 104
Table 3-7 – Analysis and Design requirements for selected cities in Indiana
for the current Division I-A and proposed Draft LRFD requirements
(spectral values in soil) ...................................................................................... 106
Table 4-1 – Distribution by County of Vincennes District bridges contained
in Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database ................................................. 113
Table 5-1 – Minimum peak ground acceleration in rock required to
produce liquefaction on the 182 bridges sites studied along
the Earthquake Emergency Routes .....................................................................131
Table 5-2 – Minimum peak ground acceleration in rock required to
produce liquefaction on the 11 borings that report liquefaction
for Bridge 50-42-04625 .......................................................................................135
Table 6-1 – Basic information from Indot Inspection and Maintenance
Database that was included in the software implementation database ............... 139
Table 6-2 – Basic information from bridge drawings needed for formal vulnerability
assessment and included in the software implementation database.................... 142

vi

Table 7-1 – Distribution by bridge type in the Vincennes Indot District of the
total bridge inventory, in the suggested emergency routes, and in
the bridges studied in detail ................................................................................148

vii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

Page

Fig. 2-1 – Map showing hypothetical maximum intensities for a magnitude 7.6
earthquake in the Central United States region [CUSEC, 2000] ........................... 6
Fig. 2-2 – Earthquake Emergency Routes and staging facilities of the CUSEC State
Departments of Transportation .............................................................................. 8
Fig. 2-3 – Bridge collapse during the February 9, 1971, San Fernando Earthquake ....... 11
Fig. 2-4 – Collapse of the Cypress Street Viaduct during the Loma Prieta,
California, 1989 Earthquake ................................................................................ 12
Fig. 2-5 – Collapse of a span of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge
during the Loma Prieta, California, 1989 Earthquake ......................................... 13
Fig. 2-6 – Failure of flared column in the Route 118, Mission Gothic Undercrossing
during the Northridge, California, 1994 Earthquake ........................................... 14
Fig. 2-7 – Collapse of the Gavin Canyon Undercrossing during the
Northridge, California, 1994 Earthquake.............................................................. 15
Fig. 2-8 – Damage to the I-5 Holgate Street overpass, Seattle, during the
2001 Nisqually, Washington State, Earthquake .................................................. 17
Fig. 2-9 – Age of the total bridge inventory affected by the 2001 Nisqually,
Washington State, Earthquake ............................................................................. 18
Fig. 2-10 – Percentage of damaged bridges by decade of construction for the
2001 Nisqually, Washington State, Earthquake ................................................... 19
Fig. 2-11 – Spectral acceleration (%g at T = 0.3 s) at the bridge site for
the total bridge inventory affected by the 2001 Nisqually,
Washington State, Earthquake ............................................................................. 19

viii

Fig. 2-12 – Percentage of bridge damaged for different values of spectral
acceleration (%g at T = 0.3 s) at the bridge site during the 2001 Nisqually,
Washington State, Earthquake ............................................................................. 19
Fig. 2-13 – Seismic Risk Map contained in the 1975 AASHTO Interim
Specifications for Highway Bridges ......................................................................22
Fig. 2-14 – Response coefficient C for 81-150 ft depth of alluvium contained
in the 1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications for Highway Bridges ..................... 23
Fig. 2-15 – Northern Midwest portion of the map of horizontal acceleration A (%g)
in rock with 90 percent probability of not being exceeded in 50 years
(Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th Edition of the
Standard Specifications) ....................................................................................... 26
Fig. 2-16 – Soil Profile Types (Division I-A Seismic Design of the current
17th Edition of the Standard Specifications) ....................................................... 27
Fig. 2-17 – Seismic response coefficient Cs for different soil profiles normalized
with respect to acceleration coefficient A (Division I-A Seismic Design
of the current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications) .................................. 28
Fig. 2-18 – Minimum support length definition (Division I-A Seismic Design
of the current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications) ................................. 30
Fig. 2-19 – Local displacement capacity – cantilever column with fixed base
(Caltrans Seismic Design Criteria [Caltrans, 2001]) ........................................... 35
Fig. 2-20 – Local displacement capacity – framed column assumed as fixed-fixed
(Caltrans Seismic Design Criteria [Caltrans, 2001]) .......................................... 35
Fig. 2-21 – Design Response Spectrum – Probabilistic general procedure
(Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12 49)) ............................. 41
Fig. 2-22 – Minimum Deterministic Design Response Spectrum
(Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12 49)) ............................. 41
Fig. 2-23 – Caltrans Seismic Retrofit Program Poster ......................................................48
Fig. 2-24 – Values of Fa [NEHRP, 2000] ........................................................................ 54
Fig. 2-25 – Values of Fv [NEHRP, 2000] .........................................................................54

ix

Fig. 2-26 – Damage due to liquefaction on Bridge 002/6s-w 2001 Nisqually,
Washington, Earthquake .......................................................................................56
Fig. 2-27 – Turnagain Heights, Anchorage, a sector approximately 2,600 m
by 270 m slid 21 m toward Cook Inlet. Sand lenses liquefied and
moved down slope. Slope failure began 2 minutes after the start of
ground motion – 1964, Alaska, Earthquake.......................................................... 57
Fig. 2-28 – Damage caused by lateral spreading at Sunset Lake trailer park
in Tumwater – 2001 Nisqually, Washington, Earthquake ....................................58
Fig. 2-29 – Settlement of pile cap in liquefied soil beneath industrial building
south of downtown Seattle – 2001 Nisqually, Washington, Earthquake ............. 59
Fig. 2-30 – Collapse of Bei-Feng Bridge located on the earthquake causing
fault Chi-Chi, Taiwan Earthquake, Sep. 21, 1999 ................................................65
Fig. 2-31 – Bolu Viaduct, crossed by the North Anatolian Fault, November
12, 1999 Duzce, Turkey, Earthquake ....................................................................66
Fig. 2-32 – Landslide induced by the earthquake. A nearby bridge had
major structural damage – Morgan Hill, California, Earthquake
of April 24, 1984 .................................................................................................. 67
Fig. 3-1 – The Reelfoot Rift in the New Madrid Region ................................................. 69
Fig. 3-2 – Isoseismal map for the Arkansas earthquake of December 16, 1811,
first of the 1811-1812 New Madrid series [Stover and Coffman, 1993] ............. 70
Fig. 3-3 – The New Madrid seismic zone showing the three faults that ruptured
in 1811-1812 and earthquakes recorded in recent years [Hough, 2002] ............. 71
Fig. 3-4 – Estimated ages of paleoliquefaction features (vertical axis) arranged
by site location, from north (left) to south (right), excluding the Current
River sites. Vertical gray shaded segments indicate most probable ages,
with brackets showing approximate two standard deviation uncertainties.
Shaded horizontal bars indicate the inferred timing of paleoearthquakes.
Dashed horizontal line is at 1811-1812. [Participants, 2000] .............................. 72
Fig. 3-5 – Comparison of areas of damage from the New Madrid and
San Francisco Earthquakes ................................................................................... 73

x

Fig. 3-6 – Wabash River Valley Faults [René and Stanonis, 1995] ................................ 74
Fig. 3-7 – Map of southern two-thirds of Indiana showing sites where
ancient sandblows have been found, and showing areas of
liquefaction for six major prehistoric earthquakes. [Kirby, 2001] ....................... 75
Fig. 3-8 – Earthquakes in the New Madrid and Wabash Valley, red circles
indicate earthquakes that occurred from 1974 to 2002 with
magnitudes larger than 2.5, green circles denote earthquakes that
occurred prior to 1974 [USGS, 2002] .................................................................. 76
Fig. 3-9 – Isoseismal map for the Wabash River Valley, Indiana, Earthquake of
September 27, 1909. .............................................................................................77
Fig. 3-10 – Isoseismal map for the Evansville, Indiana, Earthquake
of June 18, 2002 ................................................................................................... 78
Fig. 3-11 – Mean return period as a function of the probability of exceedance
and the life span of the structure in years ............................................................ 82
Fig. 3-12 – U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey Seismic Probability Map
of the United States (Revised 1949) .................................................................... 83
Fig. 3-13 – Northern Midwest portion of the map included with the
1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications [AASHTO, 1975] .................................... 84
Fig. 3-14 – Values for peak ground acceleration for the State on Indiana in
Division I-A Seismic Design of 17th Edition of AASHTO Standard
Specifications [AASHTO, 2002] ......................................................................... 86
Fig. 3-15 – 1996 USGS Map of peak ground acceleration in rock for a
probability of exceedance of 10% in 50 years ..................................................... 87
Fig. 3-16 – 1996 USGS Map of peak ground acceleration in rock for a
probability of exceedance of 3% in 75 years (= to 2% in 50 years) .................... 88
Fig. 3-17 – 1996 USGS Map of spectral acceleration SS in rock for
a probability of exceedance of 3% in 75 years .................................................... 90
Fig. 3-18 – 1996 USGS Map of spectral acceleration S1 in rock for
a probability of exceedance of 3% in 75 years .................................................... 90

xi

Fig. 3-19 – Results obtained for Vincennes, IN, for spectral acceleration SS
for the frequent earthquake, in rock for 50% probability of
exceedance in 75 years ......................................................................................... 91
Fig. 3-20 – 2002 USGS Map for Peak Ground Acceleration in rock
with 10% probability of exceedance in 50 years ................................................. 93
Fig. 3-21 – 2002 USGS Map for Peak Ground Acceleration in rock
with 3% probability of exceedance in 75 years ................................................... 94
Fig. 3-22 – 2002 USGS Map for SS Spectral Acceleration in rock
with 3% probability of exceedance in 75 years ................................................... 95
Fig. 3-23 – 2002 USGS Map for S1 Spectral Acceleration in rock
with 3% probability of exceedance in 75 years ................................................... 96
Fig. 3-24 – Location were acceleration mapped values are compared for
the different seismic risk map versions (see Table 3-4). Base map
shows INDOT districts ........................................................................................ 98
Fig. 3-25 – EPA = Sa/2.5 and EPV = Sv/2.5 obtained from a response spectrum
with 5% damping as prescribed by ATC 3-06 [ATC, 1978] ............................. 102
Fig. 3-26 – Bridge Design Spectra in rock for Bloomington, Evansville, Jasper,
and Vincennes in current Division I-A and proposed Draft AASHTO
LRFD requirements ............................................................................................ 103
Fig. 3-27 – Bridge Design Spectra in rock for Indianapolis, New Albany, and
Terre Haute in current Division I-A and proposed Draft AASHTO
LRFD requirements .............................................................................................104
Fig. 3-28 – Bridge Design Spectra in soil for Bloomington, Evansville,
Jasper, and Vincennes in current Division I-A and proposed
Draft AASHTO LRFD requirements .................................................................. 106
Fig. 3-29 – Bridge Design Spectra in soil for Indianapolis, New Albany,
and Terre Haute in current Division I-A and proposed Draft AASHTO
LRFD requirements ............................................................................................ 107
Fig. 4-1 – National Truck Network in southwestern Indiana ........................................ 109
Fig. 4-2 – National Highway System ............................................................................. 110

xii

Fig. 4-3 – Congressional High Priority Corridors ......................................................... 111
Fig. 4-4 – Highways in Indiana designated as part of
the National Highway System ........................................................................... 112
Fig. 4-5 – Suggested grid of Earthquake Emergency Routes in
the Indot Vincennes District .............................................................................. 113
Fig. 4-6 – Vincennes District bridges contained in Indot Inspection and Maintenance
Database (those whose drawings were used in this research are marked
as blue filled dots) .............................................................................................. 116
Fig. 4-7 – Organization of the GIS implementation ...................................................... 117
Fig. 4-8 – Number of bridges built per decade (Vincennes District) ............................. 118
Fig. 4-9 – Percentage of bridges rebuilt according to decade of construction
and average year when rebuilding was made (Vincennes District bridges) ...... 119
Fig. 5-1 – USDA Textural Soil Classification Chart [USDA, 1951] routinely
used for soil classification by soil exploration boring teams ..............................122
Fig. 5-2 – Main screen for the liquefaction evaluation module developed ....................121
Fig. 5-3 – Typical results for soil profile classification and amplification potential ......123
Fig. 5-4 – Worse soil profile type at bridge site for 182 bridges on the Earthquake
Emergency Routes ..............................................................................................124
Fig. 5-5 – Soil particle size according to several soil classification procedures
[Winkerkorn and Fang, 1975] .............................................................................125
Fig. 5-6 – FAA textural classification of soils [Winkerkorn and Fang, 1975] ................126
Fig. 5-7 – Maximum magnitude for the Central and Eastern U.S.
[Frankel et al., 2002] ...........................................................................................127
Fig. 5-8 – Example description of boring log as presented in the
implemented software .........................................................................................128
Fig. 5-9 – Example description of liquefaction safety factor for the lowest
ground surface acceleration inducing liquefaction. In this case 15% g
leads to a safety factor of 0.9 meaning that liquefaction would occur ...............129
Fig. 5-10 – Example description of liquefaction safety factor for a different
ground surface acceleration from the one shown in Fig. 5-9 not

xiii

inducing liquefaction. In this case the lowest safety factor
for 10% g acceleration is 1.4 ...............................................................................130
Fig. 5-11 – Percentage of bridges along the Earthquake Emergency
Routes that will not have liquefaction at the site for a given
peak ground acceleration in rock computed using the minimum
acceleration to produce liquefaction at the site................................................... 132
Fig. 5-12 – Percentage of bridges along the Earthquake Emergency
Routes that will not have liquefaction at the site for a given peak
ground acceleration in rock computed using the average
acceleration to produce liquefaction at the site....................................................133
Fig. 5-13 – Recommendation for bridges located along the Earthquake
Emergency Routes ..............................................................................................136
Fig. 6-1 – Formal vulnerability assessment implemented software flow diagram ........ 139
Fig. 7-1 – Bridge type distribution on the Earthquake Emergency Routes ................... 142
Fig. 7-2 – Typical Expansion Rocker Bearing ............................................................... 143

xiv

ABSTRACT

Awareness of the seismic risk in the State of Indiana has increased in the last decades.
The possibility of very strong earthquakes in the central Mississippi Valley has been
known for 200 years in the New Madrid Seismic Zone. In the last two decades
identification of an independent tectonic process occurring in the Wabash River Valley
has implications for the seismic risk of the State of Indiana from what has recently been
defined as the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone. The occurrence of a strong earthquake in
these seismic zones, or in Indiana, or in the neighboring states due to other not so well
understood tectonic processes as has occurred in the past, has serious implications for the
State Transportation System. The definition of Earthquake Emergency Routes for the
State of Indiana became a priority for the Indiana Department of Transportation. The
definition of these Emergency Routes takes into account issues related to transportation
including coverage of population and area and travel time along these routes, and issues
related to structural and geotechnical seismic vulnerability of the transportation structures
along these routes. The transportation related issues are presented in Part I of this Report,
and the structural and geotechnical seismic related issues are presented in Part II.
Previous experience in the United States and elsewhere in the world with bridge damage
during strong earthquakes has influenced the bridge earthquake resistant specifications
and mitigation procedures. The effects of the Nisqually Earthquake that occurred in the
State of Washington in 2001 give insight on the expected situation for the State of
Indiana due to a comparable bridge inventory in age and bridge types and a parallel
increase of the seismic risk awareness in both regions over the last decades. The
evolution of the earthquake resistant bridge design requirements contained in the
AASHTO Specifications and the existence of a proposed draft seismic design
specification being discussed have significant implications in the assessment of the
existing vulnerability, its mitigation, and the design of new bridges along the Emergency

xv

Routes. Along with this development, the USGS assessment of the seismic risk of
southwestern Indiana and a change of format of the definition of the earthquake design
ground motion that is an integral part of the proposed draft seismic design specification
also has important implications on the assessment of the operativeness of the Earthquake
Emergency Routes of Indiana.

Vulnerability assessment was performed using the general information from
inspection and maintenance, and final calibration was performed using a series of cases
based on bridge drawings and soil exploration descriptions contained in these drawings.
Vulnerability was evaluated for different levels of ground acceleration in order to obtain
behavior patterns for selected bridges. Using these results, seismic behavior patterns were
obtained for bridges located in southwestern Indiana included in the Indot Vincennes
District Inspection and Maintenance Database. Soil amplification and liquefaction
potential were evaluated for the cases having reported SPT measurements from borings.
Based on this process, information, upgrade needs for the transportation structures part of
the Earthquake Emergency Routes were obtained. With this information, it is possible to
perform simulations that will help Indot in devising mitigation policies, perform
simulations for different earthquake occurrence scenarios, and establish, evaluate, and
implement alternatives for response strategies using the Earthquake Emergency Routes.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has developed HAZUS-MH,
a GIS-based software tool that empowers communities with the ability to assess risk from
earthquakes, flood, and wind related disasters. While HAZUS-MH can be used to assess
risk with the significant default inventory that it includes, it is possible to integrate local
data into the HAZUS-MH analysis in order to produce more realistic loss estimates. As
a component of the research work conducted in this project and with the approval of the
Study Advisory Committee, The Polis Center from Indianapolis was tasked with the
integration of bridge and soils data into HAZUS-MH for the purpose of using that tool to
conduct earthquake risk analysis. The Polis Center is a FEMA authorized HAZUS-MH
earthquake and flood service provider and is thus able to support the goals of INDOT in

xvi

this instance. The GIS implementation through FEMA HAZUS-MH software conducted
during this study uses information from the Indiana Department of Transportation (Indot)
Inspection and Maintenance Database and structural and geotechnical information from
the bridge drawings data base.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose
The purpose of the project was to propose Earthquake Emergency Routes for the
State of Indiana with emphasis in the southwestern part of the State, to review the
selected routes for earthquake hazards identifying conditions related to the structures
along those routes that may affect their functioning in case of occurrence of a strong
earthquake in the region, and to propose procedures for mitigation, evaluation and
maintenance of their status as emergency routes.

1.2 Scope
1. To recommend Earthquake Emergency Routes for the Vincennes District of the
Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT), located in the southwestern
corner of the State, based on travel times and scope of retrofit work necessary to
implement these routes with the final decision of which routes to select resting
with INDOT (see Part I of this report).
2. To develop a tool based on geographical information systems technology (GIS)
that INDOT engineering may use for identifying and maintaining the Earthquake
Emergency Routes network of Indiana and for establishing policies for mitigation
of earthquake hazard on these routes, to perform simulations for different
earthquake scenarios, and to help in the response to an actual emergency caused
by the occurrence of a strong earthquake in the region.
3. To assess the seismic vulnerability of selected bridges belonging to the Vincennes
INDOT District based on detailed information, and to correlate this vulnerability
assessment with one obtained using just the information currently contained in the
INDOT Inspection and Maintenance Database. To recommend items relevant to

1

the vulnerability of the routes to be added to the Inspection and Maintenance
Database.
4. To give guidance on how to prioritize the mitigation of the vulnerability of
existing bridges according to the analyses performed and their importance in
keeping the transportation network system functional with emphasis in the
Earthquake Emergency Routes selected.

1.3 Methodology
Given the multidisciplinary nature of the project, the methodology used took
advantage of the most advanced resources of each discipline. The methodology
corresponding to each of the components is described in detail along this report at the
pertinent locations, with Chapter 4 of this report presenting a summary of the
vulnerability assessment methodology used.

1.4 Participants
Joint Transportation Research Program – JTRP
Kumares C. Sinha, Director
Study Advisory Committee
Indiana Earthquake Preparedness Committee
J. Thompson, Chairman
K. Dughaish, Secretary
W. Dittelberger
B. Dittrich
S. Garrison
J. R. Hill
K. Hoernschemeyer
D. Leonard
T. McClellan
J. McCrary
T. Nantung
C. Schum
G. Snyder
J. Steel
L. Vaughan
M. Wood
M. Zaheer

(Indiana Department of Transportation)
(Indiana Department of Transportation)
(Indiana Department of Transportation)
(Indiana Department of Transportation)
(Indiana Department of Transportation)
(Indiana Geological Survey)
(Federal Highway Administration)
(Indiana Department of Transportation)
(Indiana Department of Transportation)
(Indiana Department of Transportation)
(Indiana Department of Transportation)
(Indiana Department of Transportation)
(Indiana Department of Transportation)
(Indiana State Emergency Management Agency)
(Indiana Department of Transportation)
(Indiana Department of Transportation)
(Indiana Department of Transportation)
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Purdue University
Earthquake Engineering and Structural Engineering:
Mete A. Sozen, Investigator, Kettelhut Distinguished Professor of Civil
Engineering
Julio A. Ramirez, Co-Principal Investigator, Professor of Civil
Engineering
Luis E. Garcia, Research Engineer, Visiting Professor of Civil
Engineering (Professor of Civil Engineering, Universidad de los
Andes, Bogotá, Colombia)
Laura Jones Metzger, Graduate Research Assistant
Geotechnical:
Antonio Bobet, Co-Principal Investigator, Associate Professor of Civil
Engineering
Dimitri Loukidis, Graduate Research Assistant
Transportation:
Srinivas Peeta, Co-Principal Investigator, Associate Professor of Civil
Engineering
Kannan Viswanath, Graduate Research Assistant
1.5 Organization of the report
This report is presented in two volumes; the first one – Part I – deals with
Transportation issues related to definition of the selected Earthquake Emergency Routes;
this second volume – Part II – is organized in the following manner:
Chapter 2 presents background on seismic vulnerability of transportation networks. It
includes the reasons behind the need of defining earthquake emergency routes. Discusses
the seismic vulnerability issues linked to transportation structures. A summary of the
performance of transportation networks in past earthquakes is presented. Finally, it
presents and discusses the development of the specifications that govern their design
including associated geotechnical issues.
Chapter 3 discusses the tectonic setting of the southwestern corner of Indiana and
how it fits within the two main regional seismogenic structures – the New Madrid
Seismic Zones and the Wabash River Faulting System – commenting on the earthquakes
that have affected the region. The earthquake mean return period is presented and the
importance of its definition for earthquake resistant design of structures is brought into
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perspective by describing the values being used in current and proposed earthquake
resistant bridge design specifications. The implications of adopting a draft seismic design
specification by AASHTO are discussed.
Chapter 4 presents the methodology for evaluation of seismic vulnerability of the
selected Indiana Emergency Routes, the available information, the Geographical
Information System (GIS) implementation and its use for mitigation of vulnerability,
simulation, and response to a strong earthquake in southwestern Indiana.
Chapter 5 is devoted to geotechnical sources of vulnerability for transportation
structures in general and, in particular, the approach used in defining and assessing these
sources of vulnerability for the Earthquake Emergency Routes of the State of Indiana.
Chapter 6 parallels the previous chapter, with the focus on bridges. The methodology
used and its application is discussed in detail.
Chapter 7 defines the upgrade needs for the transportation structures part of the
Earthquake Emergency Routes.
Chapter 8 presents the conclusions and recommendations of the study.
Chapter 9 lists the bibliographic references relevant to the study.
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CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND

This chapter describes previous background information related to earthquake
emergency routes and performance during earthquakes of highway systems,
transportation facilities, and structures with special reference to the State of Indiana. This
background information has been divided in information related to highway systems,
bridges, and issues associated with geotechnical aspects.

2.1 Transportation systems
The Federal Response Plan (FRP) of the United States [FEMA, 2003] created under
the auspices of the Robert T. Stafford Act, which is the enabling legislation for
emergency response in the United States, provides the legal mandate, the resources, and
the mechanisms for an integrated emergency response after the declaration of any disaster
by the President. The Federal Response Plan establishes 12 Emergency Support
Functions (ESF) to facilitate the implementation and coordination of a broad spectrum of
integrated emergency response activities after natural and technological disasters.
ESF No. 1 is “Transportation” and is defined as access to the disaster area. It is based
on the assumptions that the transportation infrastructure in the area will sustain damage,
which will influence the means and accessibility of relief services and supplies to protect
people and property. The disaster responses requiring transportation capacity will be
difficult to coordinate effectively during the immediate post-disaster period. Clearing of
debris and completion of repairs will be gradual, in spite of best efforts, disrupting access
routes for a significant period.
Transportation systems in the Central U.S. – including highways, bridges, railways,
waterways, ports, and airports – are vulnerable to the effects of a damaging earthquake in
the New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) [CUSEC, 2000]. Furthermore, damages to
transportation systems may extend to several states, which present transportation officials
in government and the private sector with unique problems and challenges.
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The Central U.S. Earthquake Consortium (CUSEC) is a nonprofit organization,
funded by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which is dedicated to reducing
deaths, injuries, damage to property and economic losses resulting from earthquakes
occurring in the Central United States. Its members are the seven states that are most
vulnerable to earthquakes in this region: Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Missouri, and Tennessee.

Fig. 2-1 – Map showing hypothetical maximum intensities for a magnitude 7.6
earthquake in the Central United States region [CUSEC, 2000]
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The document [CUSEC, 2000] discusses the transportation system vulnerability and
the earthquake risk in the Central United States taking into account the multi-state impact
of future damaging earthquakes in the region including associated problems with
earthquake induced hazards such as faulting, liquefaction, slope instability, dam or levee
failure, and hazardous materials spills. The effects of earthquakes on the transportation
system including: highway, railroad, waterway, and air transportation and liquid fuel
transport; the steps that must be taken for mitigation of vulnerability of transportation
systems in the region; and response and recovery policies are discussed in this important
document. It assigns the following consequences of failure in a transportation system due
to an earthquake or other natural disaster:
•

Direct loss of life due to collapse or structural failure of the lifeline.

•

Indirect loss of life due to an inability to respond to secondary catastrophes,
such as fires, and/or provide emergency medical aid.

•

Delayed recovery operations.

•

Release of hazardous products (e.g., losses from tank cars derailed by track
failure, gas leaks from ruptured utility lines) and environmental impacts.

•

Direct loss of property and utility service (e.g., the collapse of a bridge
carrying utilities).

•

Losses due to interruption of access (e.g., export losses due to port damage).

•

Disruption of economic activity across the region and nation as well as in the
community directly affected.

The [CUSEC, 2000] document proposes a New Madrid Transportation Plan and
Strategy, which would be the product of an intergovernmental-private sector planning
process, aimed at addressing the following:
1. Loss estimates and functionality assessments for selected earthquake scenarios.
2. Common set of planning assumptions for federal, state, and local governments.
3. Criteria for decisions on establishing field operations in a multi-state, multiple
region disaster.
4. Proper allocation of resources to multiple impacted areas.
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5. State versus Federal roles in determining priorities and planning for infrastructure
repair.
6. Procedures and criteria for conflict resolution in meeting requests for resources.
7. Pre-disaster determination of conditions that must be present before federal
transportation support is withdrawn.
Similar tasks have been studied in other regions of the U.S., but there has been none
requiring such a broad coordination between different States and the Federal
Government. The role played by CUSEC and the State Departments of Transportation in
implementing this plan can not be underestimated. At present, CUSEC has compiled the
Emergency Routes shown in Fig. 2-2.

Fig. 2-2 – Earthquake Emergency Routes and staging facilities of the
CUSEC State Departments of Transportation
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These routes are currently under study individually by each State. Detailed literature
review on transportation issues is presented in Part I of this report.
2.2 Bridges
2.2.1 Bridge performance during earthquakes
In general, the likelihood of bridge damage increases if the ground motion is
particularly intense, the soils are soft, the bridge was constructed before modern codes
were implemented, or the bridge configuration is irregular [Moehle and Eberhard, 2000].
Depending on theses conditions, bridge damage could be grouped in the following
general categories:
1. Unseating of the superstructure — Short seat lengths at span hinges or simple
supports permit the partial or total collapse of the superstructure if the
displacements caused by the ground motion exceed the support length. Curved
bridges are especially vulnerable for this condition. Restrainers have been
used for several years to mitigate this problem; although, there were cases in
which they were not effective during the Northridge Earthquake [EERI,
1995a].
2. Column failure — Lack of adequate confining transverse reinforcement leads
to brittle modes of failure of reinforced concrete columns and piers. Short lap
splices or inadequate embedment length of anchorage at the foundation of
vertical reinforcement has led to numerous failures. For steel columns, local
buckling may allow damage leading to collapse.
3. Damage to abutments — The abutment is affected by the underlying soil
conditions, the type of foundation, and the demands imposed by the
superstructure movement. Usually, abutments are elements where it is
difficult to provide ductility and toughness.
4. Damage to bearings — Bearings used in bridges designed only for gravity
effect are especially prone to failure under horizontal displacement of the
superstructure transverse to the direction of thermal expansion.
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5. Structural configuration — Unique complex structures with curved or
significant skew geometry, or bridges having unique features or details, are
more susceptible to damage induced by ground motion.
6. Age, Modifications and Maintenance — Bridge design specifications have
changed in recent years as a result of experience from earthquakes and
structural research. The correlation between bad behavior and old bridges is
high as observed in many recent earthquakes. Changes introduced after
original construction sometimes affect behavior. Numerous cases in which
protection barriers or walls reduce the clear height of columns have led to
failures under earthquake ground motions. Deterioration of the bridge due to
corrosion and other causes has had an influence in the observed behavior.
7. Geotechnical conditions — Liquefaction, soil spread, slope instability,
proximity to the fault, approach settlement, and other causes of distress
influence the response, and damage of the bridge.
The following publications describe extensively bridge behavior and damage during
earthquakes [ACI, 1999], [Moehle and Eberhard, 2000], [Penzien, 2000], and [Priestley
et al., 1996]. Reports from earthquakes were damage to bridges is specially described are:
San Fernando, California, 1971 Earthquake [Lew et al., 1971]; Chile 1985 Earthquake
[EERI, 1986]; Whittier Narrows, California, 1987 Earthquake [EERI, 1988]; Loma
Prieta, California, 1989 Earthquake [EERI, 1990] and [NRC, 1994]; Costa Rica 1991
Earthquake [EERI, 1991]; Northridge, California, 1994 Earthquake [EERI, 1995a] and
[CRSI, 1994], the Kobe, Japan, 1995 Earthquake [EERI, 1995b]; the Turkish
Earthquakes of 1999 [EERI, 2000]; the Taiwan Earthquake of 1999 [EERI, 2001], and
the 2001 Nisqually, Washington State, Earthquake [Ranf et al., 2001], and [Nisqually EQ
Clearinghouse Group, 2001]. Just a summary will be presented limiting it to cases of
bridges designed using U.S. or comparable specifications. Direct reference is made to the
relevant U.S. earthquakes. Even with these limitations, several things have to be kept in
mind in translating this information for application in the State of Indiana. These issues
will be discussed after the performance information is presented.
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Although there is record of previous damage to bridges both in the U.S. and abroad,
the February 9, 1971, San Fernando, California, Earthquake constitutes the first case on
intense damage to bridges of modern design that belonged to the Interstate system [Lew
et al., 1971]. The 1971 San Fernando Earthquake affected the greater Los Angeles area
and specially the northern San Fernando Valley. Post-earthquake reports by the
California State Highway Commission indicated that the earthquake damaged
approximately 11 miles of multilane freeways and 6 miles of conventional state
highways, in addition to numerous city and county streets. Approximately 1/5 of the total
damage cost to transportation infrastructure was represented in damage to sixty bridges.
Several of these bridges either collapsed or were severely damaged to the point of having
to be replaced. Considerable disruption of traffic was caused by the bridge damage. The
heavily traveled Interstate 5 was reopened to traffic using emergency detours within five
days of the earthquake occurrence. Approximately 80% of the bridge damage cost was
concentrated in 4 miles of highway at the intersection of I-5, I-210, and State Road 14. It
is interesting to note that one of the collapsed curved bridges rebuilt after the San
Fernando Earthquake collapsed during the Northridge 1994 Earthquake.

Fig. 2-3 – Bridge collapse during the February 9, 1971, San Fernando Earthquake
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The Loma Prieta, California, 1989 Earthquake [EERI, 1990] provided insight on the
influence of geotechnical conditions on bridge behavior by the preponderance of damage
in the perimeter of San Francisco Bay where relatively deep and soft soil deposits
amplified the ground motion. The collapsed portions of the two-story Cypress Street
viaduct (see Fig. 2-4) coincide with the soft soil sites. Soil conditions may have played a
role in damaging a structure of 1950’s with detailing common at that time that did not
provide toughness.

Fig. 2-4 – Collapse of the Cypress Street Viaduct during the
Loma Prieta, California, 1989 Earthquake
Loma Prieta Earthquake also highlighted the vulnerability of adjacent short and long
spans imposing differential deformation demands and producing the collapse of the short
span next to a large span (see Fig. 2-5). During this earthquake there were five bridge
collapses (counting the extensive Cypress Viaduct as one) and four other bridges
sustained major damage.
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Fig. 2-5 – Collapse of a span of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge
during the Loma Prieta, California, 1989 Earthquake
The Costa Rica 1991 Earthquake [EERI, 1991] confirmed the influence of soil
conditions on bridge behavior especially in abutment failures, embankment settlement,
and liquefaction. Collapses caused by unseating of skewed spans were also observed.
The 1994 Northridge Earthquake, [EERI, 1995a] and [CRSI, 1994], produced high
accelerations throughout the Los Angeles metropolitan area where the California
Department of Transportation owns and maintains approximately 2,200 bridges.
Approximately 1,200 were located in zones that experienced horizontal accelerations
more than 0.25g and several hundred bridges were subjected to accelerations more than
0.5g [ACI, 1999].
Five bridges presented partial or complete collapse. All these structures were of
reinforced and/or prestressed concrete, with construction completion dates ranging from
1964 through 1976. Several had been retrofitted with hinge restrainers following the 1971
San Fernando Earthquake. Collapse causes in all cases appear to involve column flexural
or shear failures (see Fig. 2-6), or unseating at in-span or abutment hinges (see Fig. 2-7).
Three reinforced and/or prestressed concrete bridges sustained major to moderate damage
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to their columns but did not collapse. There was damage to bridge abutments throughout
the epicentral region.

Fig. 2-6 – Failure of flared column in the Route 118, Mission Gothic Undercrossing
during the Northridge, California, 1994 Earthquake
The observed abutment damage included shear key cracking and failure, spalling or
failure of abutment backwalls and wingwalls, approach settlement, and approach slab
buckling. Damage in steel bridges comprised pounding damage between adjacent
elements, buckling of cross bracing, bending of cross-brace gussets, bearing damage
including anchor bolt and restrainer fractures, and damage to supporting abutments and
pier walls.
The epicentral region contained 132 bridges that had been retrofitted using post San
Fernando, 1971, details (Caltrans Phase I), and 63 with post Loma Prieta retrofit details
(Caltrans Phase II). Retrofit consisted in hinge restrainers and/or column jackets. Most of
the retrofitted bridges performed adequately although, in some cases, hinge restrainers
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presented problems. Column jackets, whether made of steel or fiberglass, performed well
in all cases.

Fig. 2-7 – Collapse of the Gavin Canyon Undercrossing during the
Northridge, California, 1994 Earthquake
The Los Angeles County Department of Public Works reported serious damage in
only four out of 1,500 bridges on the county system. The City of Los Angeles reported
that 62 out of a total of 800 spans were damaged, and two required closure due to column
damage in one case, and fill settlement in the other. Other damage to city bridges
consisted of approach-fill settlement, pavement cracking, shear key damage,
superstructure rotation, rocker bearing damage, and architectural damage.
Several important observations were made regarding the performance of the
transportation system [EERI, 1995a].
•

In this earthquake, all bridge collapses were associated with poor performance of
older columns with inadequate transverse reinforcement and short seat widths,
both of which have been identified as sources of vulnerability in previous
earthquakes. The progress in knowledge and design practice was evident in the
good performance of bridges constructed or retrofitted to current standards.
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•

Architectural column flares affected the pier behavior. Earlier design practice
assumed that flares spalled off, whereas actually they act as an integral part of the
column.

•

Current and older design procedures may not adequately represent the distribution
of design forces in long, multiframe bridges. Failure and damage in end frames
indicates that the stiffer end frames may attract larger forces than anticipated in
design.

•

As with other construction forms, structural changes can occur during
construction and maintenance that invalidate the design assumptions. It is
important to verify that as-built conditions are consistent with design
assumptions, and not just the design drawings. Improved documentation of design
assumptions may be desirable.

•

Caltrans Phase I hinge restrainer retrofits had mixed performance. There were
many examples of restrainer unit failure (cable fracture, fitting failure, and
diaphragm punching).

•

Older bridges with 6-inch and 8-inch seats should be reevaluated, even if
retrofitted with restrainers.

•

Caltrans Phase II retrofits appeared to perform well in all instances. (Its focus was
on retrofitting columns in single-column bridges because of the perception that
they were more vulnerable than multicolumn bridges.)

•

Several skewed bridges collapsed. An apparent cause was torsional response
associated with skewed geometries. Methods are needed for improved design of
skewed bridges, possibly including elimination of the skew where feasible,
elimination of in-span hinges, and lengthening of seats.

•

Damage to abutments and approaches was widespread. Considering the extent of
this damage for a moderate earthquake, it seems that the current design strategy to
accept abutment damage should be reevaluated.

•

Major damage and collapse in multicolumn bridges indicates that the increased
reliability associated with redundancy of multicolumn bents is not necessarily
sufficient to avoid collapse. Retrofit priorities given to multicolumn bridges and
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high-traffic-volume bridges may need to be reconsidered. Furthermore, damage
and collapse required closure of bridges that usually carry heavy traffic volume.
•

Modern traffic management techniques were effective in managing traffic
following the earthquake. Furthermore, emergency procedures, including strong
incentive and disincentive clauses, were effective in achieving rapid
reconstruction of the freeways.

The February 28, 2001, Nisqually, Washington State, Earthquake affected the Seattle,
Tacoma, Olympia region [Ranf et al., 2001], and [Nisqually EQ Clearinghouse Group,
2001]. No bridge collapses were observed during this earthquake. In total, 78 bridges
were damaged. A total of 10 bridges sustained moderate damage, 16 had mild damage,
and 52 bridges had minor damage. The event had a moment magnitude of 6.8 and a depth
of focus of 52 km on the Juan de Fuca Plate. The distance from the hypocenter to Seattle
was 78 km, 57 km to Tacoma, and 54 km to Olympia.

Fig. 2-8 – Damage to the I-5 Holgate Street overpass, Seattle, during the
2001 Nisqually, Washington State, Earthquake
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The Nisqually Earthquake caused moderate ground motion throughout the Puget
Sound region. Of the 31 stations for which preliminary information was available, only
13 showed peak ground accelerations more than 10%g and only 2 stations recorded
values more than 25%g. Several correlations of damage with bridge characteristics and
ground motion intensity were made [Ranf et al., 2001]. For 72 bridges that were damaged
(6 movable bridges were excluded because of their unusual characteristics) types of
damage were: 48 with damage to concrete, 6 with damage to steel, 11 with damage to
beams, restrainers or joints, and 7 with damage due to settlement.
In order to help interpret the correlation of damage with age of the bridge, Figure 2-9
shows the age of construction of the total bridge inventory in the region. The number of
bridges built increased from the beginning of the 1950’s and then decreased at the
beginning of the 1980’s coinciding with the construction of the interstate highway
system. Figure 2-10 shows the correlation of age of construction with damage observed.
From this figure it is evident that bridges built between 1910 and 1940 suffered more
damage.

Fig. 2-9 – Age of the total bridge inventory affected by the
2001 Nisqually, Washington State, Earthquake
Figure 2-11 shows the spectral accelerations in percentage of g (T = 0.3 s) for each
bridge site for the total bridge inventory in the area and Fig. 2-12 correlates the damage
observed with the spectral acceleration. Correlation of spectral acceleration and bridge
damage is evident from these figures.
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Fig. 2-10 – Percentage of damaged bridges by decade of construction for the
2001 Nisqually, Washington State, Earthquake

Fig. 2-11 – Spectral acceleration (%g at T = 0.3 s) at the bridge site for
the total bridge inventory affected by the 2001 Nisqually, Washington State, Earthquake

Fig. 2-12 – Percentage of bridge damaged for different values of spectral acceleration
(%g at T = 0.3 s) at the bridge site during the 2001 Nisqually, Washington State,
Earthquake
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The bridge behavior observed during the Nisqually Earthquake is relevant because it
may be similar to what would be expected in southwestern Indiana for a large earthquake
in the New Madrid zone. The accelerations expected are of the same order of magnitude
of those recorded during Nisqually Earthquake. The bridge inventory has similar
characteristic with respect to age and type of bridges. Awareness of the seismic risk in the
Pacific Northwest evolved about the same time as that for awareness of the seismic risk
in the Central U.S. Earthquake resistant design of new bridges started about the same
time in Central U.S. and Pacific NW.

2.2.2 Bridge seismic design criteria evolution
The early days
In 1931 the American Association of State Highway Officials (AASHO) published
the first edition of the Standard Specifications for Highway Bridges [AASHO, 1931].
These specifications were – and still are – for ordinary bridges having span lengths less
than 500 feet. No reference to considering earthquake effects on bridges was made in the
Standard Specifications until the fifth edition (1949) in which a statement requiring that
earthquake effects should be considered was included without guidance on how to
account for them. The same statement was kept in the sixth (1953) and seventh (1957)
editions.
The eighth edition (1961) of the Standard Specifications [AASHO, 1961] was the
first to specify an earthquake loading for design (EQ) to be applied statically in any
horizontal direction as part of Group VII load combination which included along with
earthquake effects: dead loads, earth pressure, buoyancy, and stream flow effects. This
load combination was to be used in the working stress design (WSD) procedure with a 1/3
increase in allowable stress permitted for occasional loads. The earthquake load was
defined using a seismic coefficient (C) that multiplied the dead load (D):

EQ = C ⋅ D

(2-1)

Values of C were 0.02 for structures supported on spread footings where the soil
bearing capacity was rated to be greater than 4 t/ft2, 0.04 for structures supported on
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spread footings where the soil bearing capacity was rated to be less than 4 t/ft2, and 0.06
for structures founded on piles. No seismic zone factors or seismic zoning map was
provided, leaving to the State Bridge Commissioner or the State Highway Department the
decision of considering the State, or regions within the State, as seismic. These seismic
provisions were an extension of the lateral force requirements for buildings developed
prior to 1961 by the Structural Engineers Association of California (SEAOC). The
seismic loading provisions of the eighth (1961) edition of the Standard Specifications
were kept, without modification, in the ninth (1965), tenth (1969) and eleventh (1973)
editions.

The 1975 AASHTO Interim
As a result of the 1971 San Fernando, California, Earthquake, during which many
highway bridges were severely damaged and some even collapsed – as described
previously – the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) issued, in 1973, a
new seismic design procedure for bridges which formed the basis of the 1975 AASHTO
Interim Specifications for Highway Bridges [AASHTO, 1975]. This document specified
an equivalent static lateral force:

EQ = C ⋅ F ⋅W

(2-2)

The procedure was restricted to bridges having supporting members of approximately
equal lateral stiffness. The equivalent static lateral force was to be applied in any
horizontal direction as part of the same Group VII load combination used in the eighth
(1961) Standard Specifications edition in a working stress design procedure permitting a
1/3 increase in allowable stress. In Eq. (2-2), W represents dead load, F is a framing
factor assigned the values of 1.0 for single columns and 0.8 for moment resisting frames
with the horizontal force acting along the frame, and C was a combined response
coefficient expressed by:

C=

A⋅ R ⋅ S
Z
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(2-3)

in which A denotes the maximum expected peak ground acceleration (PGA) associated
with each seismic risk zone of the map of the United States shown in Fig. 2-13, R is a
normalized (PGA = 1g) acceleration response spectral value for a rock site, S is a soil
amplification factor, and Z is a force reduction factor depending upon structuralcomponent type which accounts for the allowance of inelastic deformations.
The numerical values specified for A were 0.09g, 0.22g, and 0.50g in seismic zones
numbered 1, 2, and 3 respectively in the map of Fig. 2-13.

Fig. 2-13 – Seismic Risk Map contained in the
1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications for Highway Bridges
Numerical values for R, S, and Z were not provided in the 1975 AASHTO Interim

Specifications for Highway Bridges; instead four plots of C as a function of period T were
given for different values of A. Each of these plots represents a different depth range of
alluvium to rock-like material. The ranges were 0-10 ft, 11-80 ft, 81-150 ft, and greater
than 150 ft. Figure 2-14 shows the response coefficient C values as a function of period T
for 81 to 150 ft depth of alluvium. Minimum values for C were set at 0.10 for values of A
greater than or equal to 0.3g, and 0.06 for values of A less than 0.3g.
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Fig. 2-14 – Response coefficient C for 81-150 ft depth of alluvium contained in the
1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications for Highway Bridges
Period T was to be evaluated using the relationship

T = 0.32

W
P

(2-4)

in which P was equal to the total uniform static load required to cause a 1-inch lateral
deflection of the whole structure. For complex or irregular structures the 1975 Interim
Specifications required use of the modal response spectrum analysis method to obtain
design loads. For structures adjacent to active faults, sites with unusual geologic
conditions, unusual structures, and structures having a fundamental period greater than 3
seconds it required that the design should be made using current seismicity, soil response,
and dynamic analysis techniques. The 1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications for Highway
Bridges also included a procedure for design of restraining features to limit the
displacement of the superstructure including hinges, ties, and shear blocks.
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The seismic design criteria contained in the 1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications
were kept in the twelfth (1977), thirteenth (1983), and fourteenth (1989) editions of
AASHTO’s Standard Specifications. The only modification was to allow the use of loadfactor design (LFD) or ultimate strength design (USD). For WSD the same Group VII
load combination was specified with a 1/3 allowable stress increase – see Eq. (2-5) –.
When using LFD, the Group VII combination was as shown in Eq. (2-5).

Group VII (WSD) = D + E + B + SF + EQ
Group VII (LFD) = γ [ β D ⋅ D + β E ⋅ E + B + SF + EQ ]

(2-5)

where D denotes dead load; E earth pressure; B buoyancy; and SF stream flow; γ = 1.3;

βD = 0.75 when checking columns for minimum axial load and maximum moment or
eccentricity, βD = 1.0 when checking columns for maximum axial load and minimum
moment, and βD = 1.0 for flexure and tension members; and βE = 1.3 for lateral earth
pressure and βE = 0.5 for positive moment in rigid frames.
Although the introduction of these requirements for computing seismic forces and
their use in design was an improvement with respect to previous practice, no
corresponding changes were introduced in the detailing requirements for the structural
materials within the Standard Specifications. Seen from a more recent perspective, the
lack of requirements to introduce toughness to the structural elements as was being
required at the same time for the earthquake resistant design of buildings [ACI, 1977]
would turn later to be one of the major sources of seismic vulnerability for transportations
structures designed and built during this era.
The ATC 6 and Division I-A of AASHTO Standard Specifications
In the aftermath of the February 9, 1971, San Fernando, California, Earthquake the
Structural Engineers Association of California (SEAOC) established the Applied
Technology Council (ATC), an independent, nonprofit, tax-exempt corporation for the
purpose of implementing current technological developments into active structural
engineering practice. Their initial efforts were aimed at earthquake resistant design of
buildings. In the late 1970’s with the sponsorship of the National Science Foundation and
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the National Bureau of Standards the Applied Technology Council published document
ATC-3-06 [ATC, 1978] devoted to building earthquake resistant design. This document
was the draft of what was to become current Model Code seismic requirements in the
United States and many countries. In 1981 ATC, with the sponsorship of the Federal
Highway Administration, Department of Transportation, published document ATC-6
Seismic Design Guidelines for Bridges [ATC, 1981]. These guidelines with minor
revision made by the National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research (NCEER) in
Buffalo, NY, under the sponsorship of the National Cooperative Highway Research
Program (NCHRP), were adopted as the earthquake resistant design requirements for
bridges in the fifteenth (1992) edition of AASHTO Standard Specifications. These
requirements were kept without modification in the sixteenth (1996) and in the current
seventeenth (2002) edition [AASHTO, 2002] as Division I-A Seismic Design.
Under the requirements of Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th Edition of
the Standard Specifications the acceleration coefficient A for the bridge site must be
obtained from the acceleration contour maps provided. The northern Midwest portion of
the map of horizontal acceleration A (expressed as a percent of gravity) in rock with 90
percent probability of not being exceeded in 50 years – mean return period 475 years – is
shown in Fig. 2-15. This map was prepared by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) for
the 1988 edition of the NEHRP Recommended Provisions for the Development of Seismic
Regulations for New Buildings [NEHRP, 1988]. Although the values of A in this map do
not differ in the order of magnitude from those contained in the original ATC-6 1981
report for the same geographical regions, the 1988 map uses a finer resolution by
assigning values of A in a county by county basis and presenting them in smaller
acceleration increments.
Once the acceleration coefficient is obtained, the bride structure must be classified as
either “Essential” or “Other” in accordance with given guidelines. An importance
classification (IC= I) shall be given to Essential bridges and (IC=II) shall be given to
ordinary bridges. The classification of “Essential” must be given to all bridges located in
zones where the value of A is greater than 0.29g and on the basis of social, survival,
security, or defense requirements. Guidance is given in the commentary of ATC-6 for
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including bridges in either importance group. The bridge also must be assigned to a
Seismic Performance Category (SPC) A, B, C or D as a function of the acceleration
coefficient A as defined in Table 2-1.

Fig. 2-15 – Northern Midwest portion of the map of horizontal acceleration A (g) in rock
with 90 percent probability of not being exceeded in 50 years (Division I-A Seismic
Design of the current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications)
Table 2-1 – Seismic Performance Categories (SPC) Division I-A Seismic Design
of the current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications
Bridge Classification
Acceleration Coefficient
Essential
Other
A
A
A ≤ 0.09g
B
B
0.09g < A ≤ 0.19g
C
C
0.19g < A ≤ 0.29g
0.29g < A
D
C
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The effects of site conditions on bridge response are determined from a Site
Coefficient (S) based on soil profile types summarized in Fig. 2-16.
Soil Profile Type I - S = 1.0
Surface

Surface
Rock
Rock with shear wave
velocity greater than
2,500 ft/sec

Less than 200 feet of stiff
sand or gravel, or stiff clays

< 200 ft

Rock
Soil Profile Type II - S = 1.2
Surface
> 200 ft

More than 200 feet of stiff
sand or gravel, or stiff clays
Rock
Soil Profile Type III - S = 1.5
Surface

> 30 ft

More than 30 feet of soft
to medium stiff clays
Rock
Soil Profile Type IV - S = 2.0
Surface

> 40 ft

More than 40 feet of soft
clays or silts with shear wave
velocity less than 500 ft/sec
Rock

Fig. 2-16 – Soil Profile Types
(Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications)
No dynamic analysis is required in Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th
Edition of the Standard Specifications for bridges having single spans, regardless of the
value of the site acceleration coefficient A, and for all bridges in SPC A. All other
bridges, regular or irregular, having two or more spans must be analyzed by at least one
of two dynamic analysis procedures, namely, the single-mode spectral method (SMSM)
or the multi-mode spectral method (MMSM). The SMSM is specified as minimum for
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regular bridges in SPC B, C, and D; while the MMSM is specified as minimum for
irregular bridges in these same categories. An "irregular" bridge is defined as one having
abrupt or unusual changes in mass, stiffness, and/or geometry from abutment to
abutment; a "regular" bridge is one not meeting the definition of an "irregular" bridge.
The seismic input in any horizontal direction to be used in each of these minimum
dynamic analysis procedures is specified in terms of an elastic seismic response
coefficient, Cs, as expressed for the single-mode spectral SMSM method for a bridge
period T by:
Cs =

1.2 ⋅ A ⋅ S
T 2/3

(2-6)

The value of Cs need not exceed 2.5⋅A. For sites with soil profile types III and IV in
areas where A is greater or equal to 0.3g, Cs need not exceed 2.0⋅A.

Normalized Design Coefficient (Cs /A )

3.0
Soil Profile Type III
and IV and A < 0.3

2.5

Soil Profile Type IV

2.0
Soil Profile Type III

1.5

1.0
Soil Profile Type I
Soil Profile Type II

0.5

0.0
0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

Period T (sec)

Fig. 2-17 – Seismic response coefficient Cs for different soil profiles normalized with
respect to acceleration coefficient A (Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th
Edition of the Standard Specifications)
For the multi-mode spectral method (MMSM) the same relationship for Cs is used
and for each individual vibration mode “m” the mode period Tm must be used in Eq. (2-6)
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as T. In this case a reduction of Cs is allowed for modes other than the fundamental and
periods shorter than 0.3 sec, with the value of Cs tending to the value of A at a period
equal to zero. For long periods greater than 4 sec a minimum value of Cs is required.
Deformations in the nonlinear range of response of the bridge elements are expected
to occur when subjected to the earthquake design ground motion prescribed in the
Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications.

Response modification factors (R) are prescribed for the cases listed in Table 2-2.
Table 2-2 – Response Modification Factors (R) Division I-A Seismic Design of the
current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications
R
Connections
R
Substructure
Wall-Type Pier
2
Superstructure to abutment
0.8
Reinforced concrete pile bents
Expansion joints within a
0.8
a. Vertical piles only
3
span of the superstructure
b. One or more battered piles
2
Single columns
3
Columns, piers, or pile bents
1.0
to cap beam or superstructure
Steel or composite & steel
Columns or piers to
1.0
concrete pile bents
foundation
a. Vertical piles only
5
b. One or more battered piles
3
Multiple-column bent
5
In a great departure from the earthquake resistant design of buildings in which the
response modification factor is assigned for the structure as a whole by dividing the
design forces by R before performing the analysis; in the ATC-6 document the analysis,
static or dynamic, is performed for the bridge without reducing the design forces by the
response modification factor. Here it is used at the element level by dividing the design
forces by R just when computing modified values (EQM) that replace values of (EQ) in
Eq. (2-5). This form of use for the response modification factor in bridges has been kept
up to Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th Edition of the Standard
Specifications.

Other major departure from previous bridge design practice introduced by the ACT-6
document was to assign differential detailing requirements depending on the Seismic
Performance Categories (SPC). This leads to increased structural toughness from
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category A to D, with category A corresponding to the Standard Specifications
requirements without any seismic provisions beyond using seismic forces in analysis and
design and no special detailing. The reinforced concrete requirements for SPC B to D
were based on corresponding requirements of the ACI 318 Code [ACI, 1977] for
buildings. This may be considered a landmark in improved expected performance of
transportations structures subjected to strong earthquake ground motion.
Other significant improvement with respect to previous practice was the introduction
of dimension of minimum support-width length to be used at expansion ends of girders in
all bridges; regardless of seismic performance category and number of spans (see Fig. 218). Prescribed minimum support lengths depend on angle of skew of the support,
distance between expansion joints, pier height, and seismic performance category.

Fig. 2-18 – Minimum support length definition (Division I-A Seismic Design
of the current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications)
AASHTO LRFD
Reinforced concrete design departed from the working-stress design (WSD)
philosophy in the mid 1950’s and by the early 1970’s had moved completely into
ultimate strength design (USD) philosophy. Other materials lagged but by the mid 1980’s

30

a push for probabilistic design methods coined a new term for USD as load and resistance
factor design (LRFD) which was adopted especially by the steel industry and later by
AASHTO. Between 1988 and 1993 with the sponsorship of the Federal Highway
Administration under the National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP)
developed and published in 1994 the first edition of AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design
Specifications, reviewed later for a second edition in 1998 [AASHTO, 1998], and

recently in a third edition in 2004 [AASHTO, 2004].
The AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design Specifications, First (1994), Second (1998), and
Third (2004) Editions, requires that each bridge component and connection satisfy all
limit states in accordance with the relation

η ∑ ( γ i ⋅ Qi ) ≤ φ ⋅ Rn

(2-7)

in which η is a factor related to a ductility factor ηD, a redundancy factor ηR, and an
operational importance factor ηi in accordance with η = ηD⋅ηR⋅ηi; γi is a statisticallybased load factor applied to force effect Qi; and φ is a statistically-based resistance factor
applied to the nominal resistance Rn. The numerical values to be used for these factors
can be found in the LRFD Specifications (AASHTO LRFD, 1994, 1998, and 2004).
The value of Qi for the value of i representing an extreme seismic event, designated
EQ, is found using the same procedure described above for Standard Specifications,
Fifteenth (1992), Sixteenth (1996), and seventeenth (2002) Editions.
An additional bridge classification, "Critical," has been added to the LRFD
Specifications; and the number of substructure response modification factors R, have
been increased and made different in all three classifications, "Critical," "Essential," and
"Other" as indicated in Table 2-3. The response modification factors for connections
remained the same in the LRFD Specifications than in the Standard Specifications.
Although, at first glance it may look that the impact of adoption of AASHTO LRFD
Specification to replace the AASHTO Standard Specifications with respect to seismic

design is minor because they are based on the same requirements, this is not true for
bridges in the “Critical” and “Essential” categories where seismic design forces described
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by EQM (EQ/R) increase by a factors ranging from 1.33 to 3.33 for “Critical” bridges and
from 1.33 to 1.5 for “Essential” bridges.
Table 2-3 – Response Modification Factors (R) in AASHTO LRFD Specifications
Substructure
Wall-type piers-larger
dimension
Reinforced concrete pile bents
• Vertical piles only
• One or more battered piles
Single columns
Steel or composite & steel
concrete pile bents
• Vertical piles only
• One or more battered piles
Multiple-column bent

Critical
1.5

Importance Category
Essential
1.5

Other
2.0

1.5
1.5
1.5

2.0
1.5
2.0

3.0
2.0
3.0

1.5
1.5
1.5

3.5
2.0
3.5

5.0
3.0
5.0

The presented material describes current AASHTO Specifications both Standard and
LRFD. Notwithstanding, several important changes on seismic bridge specifications are

being discussed in the corresponding drafting committees and it is important to be aware
of their implications, if approved. These changes come basically from three sources:
•

the first one corresponds to changes in the California Department of
Transportation (Caltrans) seismic design criteria,

•

the second one from changes in the way to define the design ground motion
both in the description of the movement at rock by the U.S. Geological Survey
(USGS) that is discussed in Chapter 3, and

•

the third in the way to assess the amplification caused by the soil profile by
the Building Seismic Safety Council (BSSC) as part of the National
Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP) for incorporation in the
NEHRP Recommended Provision for Seismic Regulations for New Buildings
that is discussed in 2.3.1.
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Some of these new trends have already been adopted as regulations in the corresponding
earthquake resistant design requirements for new buildings. A brief description of these
trends follows.

Caltrans Seismic Design Criteria
In the aftermath of the Loma Prieta Earthquake of 1989, the California Department of
Transportation (Caltrans) decided to sponsor a project to conduct a critical review and to
recommend changes where needed in the seismic design part of the Caltrans Bridge
Design Specifications (BDS) also known as the California Seismic Design Criteria
(SDC). The result of this project was presented in document ATC-32 [ATC, 1996] which
provided a number of recommended improvements to seismic bridge design practice in
California. The project focused on issues related to seismic loading, structural response
analysis, and component design. Special attention was given to design issues related to
reinforced concrete components, steel components, foundations, and conventional
bearings. In addition, the specifications were revised to give a bigger role to the
evaluation of displacement and to use it as a tool to define performance criteria. Although
a new definition of the design ground motion was contained, the production of new
seismic risk maps was considered then outside the scope of the project.
The ATC-32 was, as the title indicated, a recommendation. It took some time for
Caltrans to update the Caltrans SDC. In July 1999 Version 1.1 of the Caltrans SDC was
published [Caltrans, 1999], with Version 1.2 in December of 2001 [Caltrans, 2001], and
Version 1.3 in February 2004 [Caltrans, 2004].
The Caltrans SDC adopts a performance-based approach specifying minimum levels
of structural system performance, component performance, analysis, and design practices
for ordinary standard bridges. For bridges with non-standard features or operational
requirements above and beyond the ordinary standard bridge a greater degree of attention
than specified by the SDC is required. Many of the methodologies contained in the SDC
evolved from the seismic retrofit program and some of the procedures are major
departures from previous practice while others are slight modifications to current
practice. The most significant change in design philosophy for new bridges is a shift from
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a force-based assessment of seismic demand to a displacement-based assessment of
demand and capacity. The displacement approach is based on comparing the elastic
displacement demand to the inelastic displacement capacity of the primary structural
components while insuring a minimum level of inelastic capacity at all potential plastic
hinge locations.
The SDC document [Caltrans, 2004] warns about its applicability in places different
from California: “This document is intended for use on bridges designed by and for the
California Department of Transportation. It reflects the current state of practice at
Caltrans. This document contains references specific and unique to Caltrans and may not
be applicable to other parties either institutional or private.” One important aspect that

makes its direct applicability elsewhere difficult is the way the earthquake design ground
motion is defined. California has unique tectonic characteristics with a relatively thin
earth’s crust producing predominantly shallow earthquakes. The fault mapping of
California is comprehensive; leading to definition of design ground motion supported on
relatively well-known faults that lend themselves to establish earthquake mean recurrence
periods with somewhat less uncertainty than in other places in the U.S. (this will be
discussed latter in Chapter 3 with respect to the implication for the State of Indiana). This
means that the design ground motion proposed by Caltrans SDC is particular for the
tectonic setting and the types of soil profiles common in California. Other important
aspect is that the Caltrans SDC is focused on concrete bridges. The Caltrans SDC
specifies target ductility demands, defined as the ratio of the estimated global frame
displacement demand to the yield displacement of the subsystem from its initial position
to the formation of plastic hinge, for different structural components. For instance, for
multi-column bents a value of 5 is prescribed while for wall piers in the strong direction a
value of unity (= 1) is given. The structure must be designed to resist the internal forces
generated when the structure reaches its Collapse Limit State. The Collapse Limit State is
defined as the condition when a sufficient number of plastic hinges have formed within
the structure to create a local or global collapse mechanism.
The local displacement capacity of a member is based on its rotation capacity (see
Fig. 2-19 for cantilever column and Fig. 2-20 framed columns), which in turn is based on
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its curvature capacity. The curvature capacity must be determined from a momentcurvature (M-φ) analysis. Each ductile member shall have a minimum local displacement
ductility capacity of 3 to ensure dependable rotational capacity in the plastic hinge
regions regardless of the displacement demand imparted to that member.

Fig. 2-19 – Local displacement capacity – cantilever column with fixed base
(Caltrans Seismic Design Criteria [Caltrans, 2004])

Fig. 2-20 – Local displacement capacity – framed column assumed as fixed-fixed
(Caltrans Seismic Design Criteria [Caltrans, 2004])
Caltrans SDC defines how the expected material properties can be obtained, how to

compute the plastic moment capacity for ductile concrete members, how to perform the
moment curvature (M-φ) analysis, and how to obtain the shear capacity of the
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components. The designer is required to check that the nominal capacity of the
superstructure longitudinally and of the bent cap transversely are sufficient to ensure that
the columns respond in the nonlinear range prior to the superstructure or bent cap
reaching its expected nominal strength. Caltrans SDC requires assessing the force and
deformation demands and capacities on the structural system, and its individual
components, using analysis. The document prescribes for ordinary standard bridges the
use of equivalent static analysis and linear elastic dynamic analysis for estimating the
displacement demands, and inelastic static analysis (push-over) for establishing the
displacement capacities. The Caltrans SDC document gives guidance with respect to the
use of appropriate cracked sections for each type of analysis.
The geotechnical engineer is required to provide the following information relative to
the bridge site: seismicity, fault distance, earthquake magnitude, peak rock acceleration,
soil profile type, liquefaction potential, and foundation stiffness or the soil parameters
necessary for determining the force deformation characteristics of the foundation. The
document contains standard acceleration response spectra for preliminary design, but in
general requires a site specific spectrum for design. The standard acceleration and
displacement response spectra provided are function of soil profile type and design
earthquake magnitude. Magnitude ranges from 6.5 to 8, and envisioned peak ground
accelerations in rock as high as 0.7g are presented. Acceleration amplification caused by
the soil profile follows latest BSSC and NEHRP recommendations (see 2.3.1). The
foundation subsystem response must be evaluated based on the quality of the surrounding
soil. Soils are classified as competent, poor, or marginal.
In the Caltrans SDC the bridge designer is required to maintain the ratio of effective
stiffness between any two bents within a frame or between any two columns within a
bent within prescribed limits. Hinge seat width are prescribed to accommodate the
anticipated thermal movement, prestress shortening, creep, shrinkage, and the relative
longitudinal earthquake displacement demand between adjacent frames. As a rule
adequate seat width must be provided to prevent unseating as a primary requirement.
Hinge restrainers are considered secondary members to prevent unseating. Moment
resisting connections between the superstructure and the column must be designed to
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transmit the maximum forces produced when the column has reached its flexural and
shear overstrength capacity. Caltrans SDC considers bearings as sacrificial elements for
ordinary standard bridges. Typically bearings must be designed and detailed for service
loads. However, bearings must be checked to insure their capacity and mode of failure
are consistent with the assumptions made in the seismic analysis. The designer must
detail bearings so they can be easily inspected for damage and replaced or repaired after
an earthquake. Columns flares require special treatment to insure proper behavior of the
column. At the foundation, the size and number of piles and the pile group layout must be
designed to resist service level moments, shears, and axial loads and the moment demand
induced by the column plastic hinging mechanism. The linear elastic demand analysis
model must include an effective abutment stiffness that accounts for expansion gaps, and
incorporates realistic values of the embankment fill response. Seat type abutments must
be designed to resist elastically all transverse service load and moderate earthquake
demands.

Draft AASHTO LRFD Update
The Caltrans SDC imposed a trend that was picked up by the National Cooperative
Highway Research Program (NCHRP) for incorporation in an update of the AASHTO
LRFD Specifications. A research project sponsored by AASHTO in cooperation with the

Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) produced a draft update of the AASHTO
LRFD Specifications that is summarized and described in NCHRP Report 472 [NCHRP,
2002] and presented in final form in four reports published by the Applied Technology
Council: “Recommended LRFD guidelines for the seismic design of highway bridges –
Part I: Specifications” [ATC/MCEER, 2003a], “Recommended LRFD guidelines for the
seismic design of highway bridges – Part II: Commentary and Appendices”
[ATC/MCEER, 2003b], “Liquefaction Study Report for Recommended LRFD guidelines
for the seismic design of highway bridges” [ATC/MCEER, 2003c], and “Design
Examples for Recommended LRFD guidelines for the seismic design of highway
bridges” [ATC/MCEER, 2003d],. The research was performed by a joint venture of the
Applied Technology Council (ATC) and the Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake
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Engineering Research (MCEER), Buffalo, NY. The project purpose was to develop new
specifications for the seismic design of bridges, considering all aspects of the design
process. These aspects include the following: (1) design philosophy and performance
criteria, (2) seismic loads and site effects, (3) analysis and modeling, and (4) design
requirements. The new specification should be nationally applicable with provisions for
all seismic zones. The emphasis was on design of new bridges rather than on retrofit of
existing ones. The Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) contains a
number of new concepts and additions, as well as some major modifications to existing
provisions. These are summarized in the following paragraphs.
The definition of the design earthquake has been moving away from the 10%
probability of exceedance in a 50-year life span of the structure towards a definition of a
maximum considered earthquake with a lower (3%) probability of exceedance and
sometimes a longer life span (75 years). On the other hand, the use of effective peak
ground acceleration as the mapped parameter to define the design ground motion has
been substituted in the specifications for design of new buildings for a direct definition of
the design response spectrum including the site effects. The USGS has developed maps
for these new definitions as will be explained in Chapter 3 of this report. The Draft
AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) uses these new definitions and

maps.
The proposed provisions provide performance objectives and damage states for two
design earthquakes with explicit design checks to ensure that the performance objectives
are met (see Table 2-4).
In Table 2-4 the upper-level event, termed the “rare” or Maximum Considered
Earthquake (MCE), describes ground motion that, for most locations, is defined
probabilistically and has a probability of exceedance of 3% in 75 years (approximately
2500-year mean return period). The frequent or expected earthquake has a probability of
exceedance of 50% in 75 years (approximately 100-year mean return period). For the
service level: “Immediate” means full access to normal traffic and the bridge must be
available for traffic after an inspection, and “Significant Disruption” means limited
access (reduced lanes, light emergency traffic) may be possible after shoring but the
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bridge may need to be replaced. Detailed geometric constraints on service level are
presented in the draft. For the damage levels: “None” means evidence of movement may
be present but no notable damage; “Minimal” means some visible signs of damage
produced by minor nonlinear response (narrow flexural cracking), no permanent
deformations, and repair can be performed under non-emergency conditions,
“Significant” means no collapse, but permanent offsets, cracking, reinforcement yielding,
and major spalling of concrete may require closure for repairs. Partial or complete
replacement of columns may be required in some cases.
Table 2-4 – Design Earthquakes and Seismic Performance Objectives in the Draft
AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49)
Probability of exceedance for
design earthquake ground motion
Rare earthquake (MCE)
3% in 75 years

Frequent or expected earthquake
50% in 75 years

Service
Damage

Performance level
Life Safety
Operational
Significant
Immediate
Disruption
Significant
Minimal
Disruption

Service

Immediate

Immediate

Damage

Minimal

Minimal to none

The design ground motion in Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP
12-49) is described through a design response spectrum that can be obtained from the

general procedure or from a site-specific study. The site-specific study is required if the
bridge is considered a major or very important structure, when the site is located within
10 km of an active fault, or when the site has a Type F soil profile (see 2.3.1) with peats
or highly organic soils, high plasticity clays, or very thick deposits of soft to medium stiff
clays.
The general procedure defines response spectra for the rare MCE earthquake and for
the frequent earthquake based on maps produced (or being produced in the case of the
frequent earthquake) by the USGS. The acceleration spectrum for 5% of critical damping
is obtained using a two point procedure. The spectral design acceleration at 0.2-second
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period, SDS, and at 1-second period, SD1, are obtained from Equations (2-8) and (2-9)
respectively.
S DS = Fa ⋅ S S

(2-8)

S D1 = Fv ⋅ S1

(2-9)

where SS and S1 are the 0.2-second and 1-second period spectral accelerations on rock
(Class B site, see 2.3.1) from ground motion maps and Fa and Fv are site coefficients
associated with the site class and mapped acceleration value. The maps for the Maximum
Considered Earthquake contained in the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions
(NCHRP 12-49) are the same maps produced by the USGS for BSSC to be included in

the 1997 NEHRP recommendations for new buildings [NEHRP, 1997]. These maps are
presented and discussed in Chapter 3. For the frequent earthquake there were no maps
available when the draft was produced and the draft suggests obtaining them by
interpolation from the hazard curves produced by the USGS compatible with the maps
for the MCE. The design spectrum is obtained from the values given by Equations (2-8)
and (2-9). Two control periods are given: Ts and T0 defined in Equations (2-10) and
(2-11) respectively. Figure 2-21 shows the design spectrum construction using the twopoint method.

S D1
S DS
T0 = 0.2 ⋅ Ts
Ts =

(2-10)
(2-11)

For periods less than or equal to T0, the design response spectral acceleration is
defined by Eq. (2-12). Note that as T tends to T = 0 seconds, the resulting value of Sa is
equal to the peak ground acceleration (PGA).

Sa = 0.60 ⋅

S DS
⋅ T + 0.4 ⋅ S DS
T0

For periods greater than or equal to T0 and less than or equal to Ts, the design
response spectral acceleration, Sa, is defined by Eq. (2-13).
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(2-12)

Sa = S DS

(2-13)

For periods greater than Ts the design response spectral acceleration, Sa, is defined by
Eq. (2-14).

Sa =

S D1
T

(2-14)

Sa = SDS =Fa ⋅ SS

Sa
(g)

Ts =
Sa =

SD1
T

SD1
SDS

T0 = 0.2 ⋅ Ts
Sa = SD1 =Fv ⋅ S1

0.4 ⋅ SDS

T0

Ts
1.0 s
Period, T (sec)
0.2 s
Fig. 2-21 – Design Response Spectrum – Probabilistic general procedure
(Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49))
When a site-specific response spectrum is used, a probabilistically based spectrum
must be obtained using a characterization of the seismic sources and ground motion
attenuation that includes current scientific interpretations, including uncertainties in
seismic source and ground motion models and parameter values. If the spectrum obtained
this way exceeds the limits shown in Fig. 2-22, a deterministic spectrum may be used.
The deterministic design response spectrum may be used in regions having known
active faults if the deterministic spectrum ordinates are less than those of the probabilistic
spectrum. The deterministic spectrum must be the median-plus-standard-deviation
spectrum calculated for characteristic maximum magnitude earthquakes on known active
faults (the corresponding building requirements require 150% instead of the 184% for
bridges), but must not be less than the spectrum shown in Fig. 2-22. If there is more than
one active fault in the site region, the deterministic spectrum must be computed as the
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envelope of spectra for the different faults. Alternatively a deterministic spectrum may be
computed for each fault, and each spectrum, or the spectrum that govern bridge response,
may be used for the analysis of the bridge. When the design response spectrum is
determined from a site-specific study, the spectrum ordinates must not be less than 2/3 of
the ordinates of the probabilistic spectrum obtained following the general procedure. The
draft permits also the use of acceleration time histories instead of a design response
spectrum and provides guidance on how to define them. Design for vertical acceleration
effects are prescribed in detail for bridges located less than 50 km from an active fault.

Sa
(g)

Sa = 1.5 ⋅ Fa

Sa =

0.6 ⋅ Fv
T

0.6 ⋅ Fa
Period, T (sec)

Fig. 2-22 – Minimum Deterministic Design Response Spectrum
(Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49))
The Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) defines a Seismic
Hazard Level (SHL) classification into four groups (I to IV). The bridge must be assigned
in the larger SHL obtained from Table 2-5 or 2-6.
Table 2-5 – Seismic Hazard Level based on FvS1
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49)
Value of FvS1
Fv S1 ≤ 0.15g
0.15g < FvS1 ≤ 0.25g
0.25g < FvS1 ≤ 0.40g
0.40g < FvS1

Seismic Hazard Level
I
II
III
IV
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Table 2-6 – Seismic Hazard Level based on FaSS
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49)
Value of FaSS
FaSS ≤ 0.15g
0.15g < FaSS ≤ 0.35g
0.35g < FaSS ≤ 0.60g
0.60g < FaSS

Seismic Hazard Level
I
II
III
IV

The Seismic Design Level is used, in turn, to define the Seismic Design and Analysis
Procedure (SDAP) and the Seismic Detailing Requirements (SDR). Table 2-7 defines the
Seismic Design and Analysis Procedure.
Table 2-7 – Seismic Design and Analysis Procedure (SDAP)
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49)
Seismic Hazard Level
I
II
III
IV

Life Safety
A1
A2
B/C/D/E
C/D/E

Operational
A2
C/D/E
C/D/E
C/D/E

Brief description of the different Seismic Design and Analysis Procedures (SDAP):

•

SDAP A — Observance of minimum seat widths, checking of connection
design forces for bearings, and use of minimum shear reinforcement in
concrete piles are the only requirements. The horizontal connection design
force in the restrained direction must be 10% of the vertical reaction for
SDAP A1 and 25% for SDAP A2. No rigorous analysis is required instead
these default values are used as design forces.

•

SDAP B — Does not require a seismic demand analysis. Capacity design
principles and minimum design detailing are required. There are certain
restrictions to use SDAP B associated with span length (maximum 80 feet),
skewness of the bridge (maximum 30°), bent stiffness, and element crosssection dimension and reinforcement, and other.

•

SDAP C — Requires the use of the capacity design spectrum approach. This
procedure applies only to bridges that behave and can be modeled as a single-
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degree-of-freedom system. The procedure is also restricted to bridges with a
very regular configuration, bridges not having more than six spans, spans not
greater than 60 feet, maximum skewness of 30°, and other.

•

SDAP D — Requires the use of the elastic response spectrum method.
Cracked sections are required. The procedure is divided into a single-mode
equivalent lateral load procedure, and a multimode dynamic analysis
procedure.

•

SDAP E — Consist in an elastic response spectrum analysis used for design
plus a displacement capacity verification performed afterwards.

Response modification factor, RB, to be used in SDAP D and E are presented in Table
2-8 for the substructure. Response modification factor for connections are all R = 0.8 but
are not intended for cases where the design of the connection is made using capacity
design principles.
Table 2-8 – Base Response Modification Factors, RB, for the substructure
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49)

Substructure Element
Wall pier – larger dimension
Columns – Single and multiple
Ductile detailing
Pile bents and drilled shafts – vertical piles –
above ground
Pile bents and drilled shafts – vertical piles –
2 diameters below ground level – no owner’s
approval required
Pile bents and drilled shafts – vertical piles –
in ground – owner’s approval required
Pile bents with batter piles
Seismically isolated structures
Steel braced frame – ductile
Steel braced frame – Nominally ductile
All elements for frequent or expected
earthquake

Performance Objective
Life Safety
Operational
SDAP
SDAP
SDAP
SDAP
D
E
D
E
2
3
1
1.5
4

6

1.5

2.5

4

6

1.5

2.5

1

1.5

1

1

N/A

2.5

N/A

1.5

N/A
1.5
3
1.5

2
1.5
4.5
2

N/A
1
1
1

1.5
1.5
1.5
1

1.3

1.3

0.9

0.9

The value of R must be obtained from Eq. (2-15)
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R = 1 + ( RB − 1) ⋅

T
≤ RB
T*

(2-15)

where T* = 1.25 Ts and Ts is defined in Eq. (2-10).
Table 2-9 defines the Seismic Detailing Requirements (SDR) for each Seismic
Hazard Level (SHL) and Table 2-10 defines the component detailing requirements for
each SDR.
Table 2-9 – Seismic Detailing Requirements (SDR)
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49)
Seismic Hazard Level
I
II
III
IV

Life Safety
1
2
3
5

Operational
2
3
4
6

Minimum seat width must not be less than 1.5 times the displacement of the
superstructure at the seat including P-Δ effects, Δm, obtained using Eq. (2-16), but can not
be less than the value of N obtained from Eq. (2-17):
Δ m = Rd ⋅ Δ
⎧ ⎛ 1 ⎞ T* 1
⋅ +
for T < T *
⎪= 1 −
Rd ⎨ ⎜⎝ R ⎟⎠ T R
⎪= 1 for T ≥ T *
⎩

2
⎡
⎛ B ⎞ ⎤ 1 + 1.25Fv S1
N = ⎢0.1 + 0.0017 L + 0.007 H + 0.05 H ⋅ 1 + ⎜ 2 ⎟ ⎥ ⋅
≥ 1.25 ⋅ Δ m
L⎠ ⎥
cos α
⎢
⎝
⎣
⎦

where,
Δ

= displacement demand from the seismic analysis

Δm

= nonlinear displacement demand

Rd

= displacement amplification factor

L

= distance between joints in m
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(2-16)

(2-17)

H

= height of the tallest pier between the joints in m

B

= width of the superstructure in m

α

= skew angle
In Eq. (2-17) the ratio B/L need not be taken greater than 3/8.
The proposed LRFD design provisions contain an incentive from a design and

construction perspective for performing a more sophisticated “pushover analysis”
[NCHRP, 2002]. The response modification factor (R) increases approximately 50
percent when a pushover analysis is performed, primarily because the analysis results
will provide a greater understanding of the demands on the seismic resisting elements.
The analysis results are assessed using additional plastic rotation limits on the
deformation of the substructure elements to ensure adequate performance.
The proposed LRFD provisions provide a mechanism to permit the use of some
seismic resisting systems and elements –– termed earthquake resisting systems (ERS) and
earthquake resisting elements (ERE) –– that are not permitted in current AASHTO
provisions. Selection of an appropriate ERS is fundamental to achieving adequate seismic
performance. The classification of ERS and ERE into three categories: permissible,
permissible with owner’s approval, and not recommended, is done to trigger due
consideration of seismic performance that leads to the most desirable outcome.
The state of the art in earthquake resistant bridge design has been presented. The
more recent changes in mandatory and proposed specifications derive from behavior
experiences during recent earthquakes; from the intensive seismic retrofit programs in
some states, specially in the West Coast; and from recent research in seismic behavior of
bridges.
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Table 2-10 – Component Detailing Requirements for SDR’s — Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49)
Component
Seat width
Bearing

Conventional
Isolation
Flexure

Column
Shear

Connection of column to
superstructure, bent beam,
footing/pile cap
Soil and pile
Concrete
aspects of
foundation
Steel
design

SDR 1

SDR 2

SDR 3

SDR 5

SDR 6

N/A except
bearing above

N/A except
bearing above

Design forces from capacity design using over-strength ratios of 1.5 and 1.4
for concrete and steel respectively

N/A

Piles top 3D
minimum
reinforcement

Design forces
from capacity
design using
over-strength
factor of 1.0

N/A

N/A

Concrete

N/A

Steel

N/A

Min. shear reinf.
down to 10D
below surface
N/A

Abutments

N/A

N/A

Liquefaction

Only if requested by owner

ESR/ERE

N/A

N/A

SDAP B and C –
non-seismic req.
SDAP D and E –
Detailed req.
If Mw < 6 not
required. If >6
full procedure
Use procedure

Approach/settlement slab

N/A

N/A

N/A

Pile bents

SDR 4

Use Eq. (2-17)
Capacity design procedure or elastic forces with R = 0.8
0.10 ⋅ DL
0.25 ⋅ DL
Detailed and tested for 1.1 times 5% in 75-years forces and displacements
SDAP B and C – non-seismic or minimum steel or P-Δ or 50% in 75-years
Non-seismic requirements
forces for C.
SDAP D and E – Moment demand divided by R or minimum steel or P-Δ
Non-seismic
Minimum shear
From capacity design procedures or elastic forces with R = 0.67
requirements
reinforcement

Design forces from capacity design and overstrength
factor of 1.5 and 1.4 for concrete and steel respectively.
Minimum shear reinforcement apply

Design forces from capacity design using over strength ratio of 1.5 and 1.4
for concrete and steel respectively. Minimum shear reinforcement as per
SDR 2.
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Detailed requirements

Full procedure
System requiring owner’s approval not permitted
Encouraged but
N/A
Required
not mandated

Bridge retrofit
The leader in seismic retrofit programs has been the State of California. There are
more than 12,000 bridges in the California State Highway system, plus an additional
12,000 city and county bridges. Since the 1971 San Fernando earthquake struck the Los
Angeles area Caltrans has been engaged in an ongoing bridge retrofit program. Initially,
Caltrans Seismic Retrofit program consisted of restraining sections of 1,262 bridges with
steel cables. The Seismic Retrofit program now involves strengthening the columns of
existing bridges by encircling certain columns with a steel casing or, in a few instances,
an advanced woven fiber casing. In addition to the column casing, some of the bridge
footings are made bigger and given more support by placing additional pilings in the
ground or by using steel tie-down rods to better anchor the footings to the ground. In a
few projects bridge abutments are made larger and the existing restrainer units are made
stronger because encasing the columns make them stiffer and can change the way forces
are transmitted within the bridge. Many Seismic Retrofits involve "hinge seat extensions"
which enlarge the size of the hinges that connect sections of bridge decks and helps
prevent them from separating during severe ground movement.
The Seismic Retrofit program was divided into Phase 1 and Phase 2. Phase 1 included
1,039 bridges identified for strengthening after the Loma Prieta quake. Phase 2 identified
an additional 1,364 bridges for strengthening following the January 1994 Northridge
earthquake. Currently the state's bridge earthquake strengthening program will involve
approximately 2,200 additional structures, including the state's toll bridges. In addition a
total of 1,114 city and county-owned bridges have been identified as candidates for
seismic strengthening.
Washington Sate has carried similar programs. Between 1999 and 2001 more than
350 bridges were retrofitted statewide. After the 2001 Nisqually, Washington State,
Earthquake the scope of the retrofit program was expanded.
Since 1983 the Federal Highway Administration has published three documents on
seismic retrofit of highway bridges [FHWA, 1983, 1987, and 1995]. The latest, 1995
document, is compatible with current Division I-A of the AASHTO Standard
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Specifications [AASHTO, 2002]. This document covers procedures for preliminary
screening of the bridges, detailed evaluation, and design of retrofit measures.

Fig. 2-23 – Caltrans Seismic Retrofit Program Poster
The preliminary screening – Chapter 2 – emphasizes the need of developing an
inventory of bridge seismic information accompanied by a seismic rating system, and
gives guidance for establishing them. Using the vulnerability rating a priority index of
retrofit is computed.
The detailed evaluation guidelines – Chapter 3 – define the different evaluation
methods starting with the analysis procedures: analysis procedures for capacity/demand
method, and analysis procedure for lateral strength method. Then, gives detailed
requirements for performing a capacity/demand evaluation of the bridge, and establishes
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the principles for applying the lateral strength method. Using the results of the two
procedures an overall assessment of the bridge components is described including
assessment of: bearings and expansion joints; columns, walls, and footings; abutments;
and the possibility of liquefaction. Potential retrofit measures are discusses for each of the
assessed components.
The rest of the document [FHWA, 1995] is devoted to detailed retrofit measures for
the assessed components including: Chapter 4 – discuses seismic retrofit strategies
including conventional and innovative earthquake protective systems; Chapter 5 – deals
with the retrofit of bearings, seats, and expansion joints; Chapter 6 – covers retrofit of
columns, cap beams, and joints; Chapter 7 – discusses the retrofit measures for
foundations including footings and abutments; Chapter 8 – covers retrofit measures for
bridges on hazardous sites including bridges across or near active faults and bridges on
liquefiable soils discussing potential remedial solutions for these cases ; and Chapter 9 –
discusses protective measures using seismic isolation. The appendices cover: (A) detailed
indication for obtaining capacity/demand ratios for bridge components, (B) the
assessment of members strength and deformation capacity, and (C, D, and E) worked
examples for two bridges and the use of cable restrainers.
Although this document was developed a few years ago, it covers all the basic
procedures. This document [FHWA, 1995] combined with some of the detailed concepts
covered by the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) [NCHRP,
2002] makes an excellent seismic bridge retrofit guide that is totally up-to-date.

2.3 Geotechnical issues
In the previous section when discussing the evolution of the bridge seismic design
criteria the parameters associated with geotechnical issues were presented without
explaining and discussing their background. The following sections present the
corresponding background and relevant information that that will be needed for the
assessment for geotechnical issues of the earthquake emergency routes of Indiana as
presented in Chapter 4.
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2.3.1 Ground motion amplification due to soil profile characteristics
Association of earthquake damage with poor soil conditions have been known for
many years. Early approach to the problem was manifest in seismic codes through a
difference in seismic design forces associated with bearing capacity used in foundation
design (see 2.2.2). With the increase deployment of strong ground motion accelerometers
from the 1950’s on, instrumental evidence of the influence of the underlying soil profile
permitted interpretations of earthquake damage in several events such as the 1957 San
Francisco, California, Earthquake; the 1957 Mexico City Earthquake; the 1964
Anchorage, Alaska, Earthquake; and the 1967 Caracas, Venezuela, Earthquake.
From the mid 1970’s on, a clearer picture emerged and different approaches were
adopted to account for the effect of amplification by the soil profile. For the first time in
the 1974 SEAOC Blue Book Lateral Force Requirements for Buildings [SEAOC, 1974]
included a coefficient S, called then Coefficient for Site-Structure Resonance having
values between 1.0 and 1.5 depending on the ratio between the fundamental period of the
structure, T, and a characteristic site period Ts. The 1974 SEAOC Requirements included
an Appendix for obtaining a range of values for the soil deposit characteristic period.
This procedure was adopted by the 1976 Uniform Building Code and was kept for several
issues of this Code.
Studies conducted for moderate magnitude events in the western U.S. [Seed et al.,
1976a] permitted grouping different soil profiles into broad categories [Seed et al.,
1976b]. This type of soil profiles and the corresponding amplifications were combined
with studies of spectral shapes and were included in the ATC-3-06 project [ATC, 1978]
for incorporation in model building earthquake resistant regulations. This classification
comprised three types of soil profiles namely: Type 1 – Stiff soils and rock, Type 2 –
Deep cohesionless or stiff clay soils, and Type 3 – Soft to medium clays and sands. As
part of the requirements a soil coefficient, S, was introduced. This coefficient amplified
the medium to long period part of the acceleration spectrum in rock to model the effects
of the soil according to the soil profile type by factors of 1.0, 1.2, and 1.5 respectively.
This is the same soil profile classification that was used in the seismic bridge design
recommendation ATC-6 project [ATC, 1981].
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During the 1985 Mexico City Earthquake very large soil amplifications were
recorded. This brought the introduction of an additional soil profile type for deep soft
clay deposits that was termed Type 4 and was assigned a soil coefficient S = 2. With this
addition this corresponds to the soil profile classification used when the ATC-6
requirements were modified to be adopted as Division I-A Seismic Design of the fifteenth
(1992) edition of AASHTO Standard Specifications. These requirements have been kept
without modification in the sixteenth (1996) and in the current seventeenth (2002) edition
[AASHTO, 2002] of the AASHTO Standard Specifications. The soil profile definition
and soil factor, S, were shown previously in Fig. 2-16.
Information mainly from the 1989 Loma Prieta, California, Earthquake, and the 1985
Mexico City event, in addition to data from other cases in other parts of the world
permitted in the early 1990’s to restudy the ground motion amplification due to soil
profile characteristics and to propose a new classification of soil profile types and soil
amplification factors [Whitman, 1992]. These new procedures take into account the level
of shaking, rock stiffness, and soil type, and the stiffness and depth effect on the
amplification of ground motions at short and long periods. These new soil profile types
and soil amplification factors were incorporated into the 1994 NEHRP Provisions
[NEHRP, 1994]. Among the more important changes are larger amplification factors for
lower levels of acceleration caused by the soil responding in the linear range with less
damping as compared with larger amplitude movement responding in the nonlinear range
and inducing greater damping. Some adjustments were introduced in the 1997 NEHRP
Provisions [NEHRP, 1997] with the change of the definition of the design ground motion
introduced then, and were kept in the 2000 NEHRP Provisions [NEHRP, 2000].
The soil site must be assigned into one of six soil profile classes labeled A to F. The
definition of the soil profile is based on averaged soil properties for the upper 100 feet
(30 m) of soil profile. The properties used for this definition are: average shear wave
velocity ( vs ), average standard penetration resistance ( N ), average standard penetration
resistance for the cohesionless soils only ( N ch ), and average undrained shear strength in
case of cohesive soils ( su ). These averages are weighted with respect to each layer
thickness. Table 2-11 indicates how these parameters are used to define the soil profile.
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Table 2-11 – Site Classification [NEHRP, 2000]
Site class

vs

N or N ch

su

A
Hard rock

>5000 ft/s
(> 1500 m/s)

N/A

N/A

B
Rock

2500 to 5000 ft/s
(760 to 1500 m/s)

N/A

N/A

C
Very dense soil or
soft rock

1200 to 2500 ft/s
(360 to 760 m/s)

> 50

> 2000 psf
(> 100 kPa)

D
Stiff soil

600 to 1200 ft/s
(180 to 360 m/s)

15 to 50

1000 to 2000 psf
(50 to 100 kPa)

< 600 ft/s
(< 180 m/s)

< 15

< 1000 psf
(< 50 kPa)

E
Soft soil

F
Soils requiring sitespecific evaluation

Any profile with more than 10 ft (3 m) of soil having
• Plasticity Index PI > 20,
• Moisture content ω ≥ 40%, and
• Undrained shear strength su < 500 psf (25 kPa)

1. Soils vulnerable to potential failure or collapse (liquefiable,
quick- or highly-sensitive clays, collapsible weakly
cemented soils).
2. More than 10 ft (3 m) of peat and/or highly organic clays.
3. More than 25 ft (7.5 m) of very high plasticity clays
(PI > 75).
4. More than 120 ft (37 m) of soft to medium clays.

N/A =Not applicable.
Figure 2-24 shows the values of the coefficient Fa as a function of the site class and the
short period maximum considered earthquake spectral acceleration SS. Figure 2-25 shows
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the values of the coefficient Fv as a function of the site class and the 1-second period
maximum considered earthquake spectral acceleration S1. For sites class F a site-specific
procedure must be used for determining the maximum considered earthquake spectral
acceleration.
3.5

3.0

2.5

Site Class E

2.0

Fa
1.5
Site Class D

Site Class D

Site Class C

1.0

Site Class B
Site Class A

Site Class E

0.5

0.0
0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

1.25

1.50

S S (g)

Fig. 2-24 – Values of Fa [NEHRP, 2000]
It is important to note that the reference accelerations for obtaining Fa and Fv, as
shown in Figure 2-24 and 2-25, were changed in the 1997 NEHRP Provisions [NEHRP,
1997] from what was presented originally in the 1994 NEHRP Provisions [NEHRP,
1994]. In the 1994 Edition the abscissa of Figures 2-24 and 2-25 were mapped values of
effective peak ground acceleration Aa (EPA) and acceleration Av derived from effective
peak ground velocity (EPV), respectively, based on a 10% probability of being exceeded
in a 50-year life span of the structure — 475 years mean return period —. In the 1997
Edition the definition of the design ground motion was changed to the spectral values of
the maximum considered earthquake — 2500 years mean return period — described
through SS and S1 respectively, as used in Figures 2-24 and 2-25.
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Fig. 2-25 – Values of Fv [NEHRP, 2000]
Although this methodology for evaluation of site effects was originally introduced in
documents for earthquake resistant building design, it is as well applicable to bridge
design, as recognized in the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49)
[NCHRP, 2002]. This last document requires a site-specific evaluation for Site Class F
soils, when the bridge is considered a major or very important structure requiring a higher
degree of confidence of meeting the seismic performance objectives, or when the site if
within 10 km of an active fault. The Draft document includes Appendix 3A containing
guidelines for conducting site-specific geotechnical investigations and dynamic response
analyses. Appendix 3A gives guidance on the site-specific geotechnical investigation to
be performed, the modeling of the soil profile, the selection of the ground motion at
bedrock to use in the analysis, the procedure of the analysis, and how to interpret the
results.

2.3.2 Liquefaction
Liquefaction is a process caused by the earthquake ground motion vibration by which
sediments below the water table temporarily lose strength and behave as a viscous liquid
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rather than a solid. The type of sediments most susceptible are clay-free deposits of sand
and silts; occasionally, gravel liquefies [Seed and Idriss, 1982]. Seismic waves, primarily
shear waves, passing through saturated granular layers, distort the granular structure, and
cause loosely packed groups of particles to readjust. This readjustment increases the
pore-water pressure between particles if drainage cannot occur. It the pore-water pressure
raises to a level approaching the weight of the overlying soil, the granular layer
temporarily behaves as a viscous liquid producing what is called liquefaction of the soil.
In the liquefied condition, soil may deform with little shear resistance. Deformations
large enough to cause damage to structures are called ground failures. The ease with
which a soil can be liquefied depends primarily on the looseness of the soil, the amount
of cementing or clay between particles, and the amount of drainage restriction. The
amount of soil deformation following liquefaction depends on the looseness of the
material, the depth, thickness, and extension measured in area of the liquefied layer, the
ground slope, and the distribution of loads applied by the structure.

Fig. 2-26 – Damage due to liquefaction on Bridge 002/6s-w
2001 Nisqually, Washington, Earthquake
Liquefaction is restricted to certain geologic and hydrologic environments primarily
recent deposited sand and silt in areas with high ground water levels. Generally, the
younger and looser the sediment and the higher the water table, the more susceptible the
soil is to liquefaction. Sediments most susceptible to liquefaction include Holocene (less
than 10,000-year-old) delta, river channel, flood plain, and aeolian deposit, and poorly
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compacted fills. Liquefaction has been most abundant in areas where ground water lies
close — generally within 30 ft — to the ground surface; few instances of liquefaction
have occurred in areas with ground water deeper than 60 ft. Dense soils, including wellcompacted fills, have low susceptibility to liquefaction.
Only when liquefaction is accompanied by some form of ground displacement or
ground failure it is destructive to the built environment. For engineering purposes, it is
not the occurrence of liquefaction that is of prime importance, but its severity or its
capability to cause damage. Adverse effects of liquefaction can take many forms. These
include: flow failures; lateral spreads; ground oscillations; lose of bearing strength;
settlement; and increased pressure on retaining walls.
Flow failures — Is evident by lateral displacement of large masses of soil. Flows may
consist on completely liquefied soil or blocks of intact material riding on a layer of
liquefied soil. It occurs on sites having loose saturated sands or silts lying on steep slopes.

Fig. 2-27 – Turnagain Heights, Anchorage, a sector approximately 2,600 m by 270 m slid
21 m toward Cook Inlet. Sand lenses liquefied and moved down slope. Slope failure
began 2 minutes after the start of ground motion – 1964, Alaska, Earthquake
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Lateral spread — Lateral spreads involve lateral displacement of large, surficial
blocks of soil as a result of liquefaction of a subsurface layer. Displacement occurs in
response to the combination of gravitational forces and inertial forces generated by an
earthquake. Lateral spreads generally develop on gentle slopes (most commonly less than
3 degrees) and move toward a free face such as an incised river channel. Horizontal
displacements commonly range up to several meters. The displaced ground usually
breaks up internally, causing fissures, scarps, horsts, and grabens to form on the failure
surface. Damage caused by lateral spreads is severely disruptive. For example, during the
1964 Alaska Earthquake, more than 200 bridges were damaged or destroyed by spreading
of floodplain deposits toward river channels. The spreading compressed the
superstructures, buckled decks, thrust stringers over abutments, and shifted and tilted
abutments and piers [NAS, 1973].

Fig. 2-28 – Damage caused by lateral spreading at Sunset Lake trailer park
in Tumwater – 2001 Nisqually, Washington, Earthquake
Loss of Bearing Strength — When the soil supporting the structure liquefies and loses
strength, large deformations can occur within the soil which may allow the structure to
settle and tip. Conversely, buried tanks and piles may rise buoyantly through the liquefied
soil. For example, many buildings settled and tipped during the 1964 Niigata, Japan,
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Earthquake. The most spectacular bearing failures during that event were in an apartment
complex where several four-story buildings tipped as much as 60 degrees. Apparently,
liquefaction first developed in a sand layer several meters below ground surface and then
propagated upward through overlying sand layers. The rising wave of liquefaction
weakened the soil supporting the buildings and allowed the structures to slowly settle and
tip. In many cases, the weight of a structure will not be great enough to cause the large
settlements associated with soil bearing capacity failures. However, smaller settlements
may occur as soil pore-water pressures dissipate and the soil consolidates after the
earthquake. The eruption of sand boils (fountains of water and sediment emanating from
the pressurized, liquefied sand) is a common manifestation of liquefaction that can also
lead to localized differential settlements.

Fig. 2-29 – Settlement of pile cap in liquefied soil beneath industrial building south of
downtown Seattle – 2001 Nisqually, Washington, Earthquake
Increased Lateral Pressure on Retaining Walls — If the soil behind a retaining wall
liquefies, the lateral pressures on the wall may greatly increase. As a result, retaining
walls maybe laterally displaced, tilt, or structurally fail, as has been observed for
waterfront walls retaining loose saturated sand in a number of earthquakes.
Now we turn our attention to the evolution of the engineering procedures to evaluate
the liquefaction potential. The number of variables that should be taken into account to
properly evaluate the liquefaction potential can be grouped into three broad groups [Seed
and Idriss, 1982]: soil properties (dynamic shear modulus, damping characteristics, unit
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weight, grain characteristics, relative density, and soil structure), environmental factors
(procedure of soil formation, seismic history, geologic history – aging, cementation –,
lateral earth pressure coefficient, depth of water table, and effective confining pressure),
and earthquake characteristics (intensity of ground shaking, and duration of ground
shaking). A combination of in-situ test and laboratory tests of undisturbed samples may
be used to obtain properties that can be used to define the liquefaction potential using
engineering judgment to properly account for the large intrinsic variability of the
measured properties — because of the difficulty of retrieving and testing really
undisturbed samples — and unknown or difficult to estimate parameters, specially those
associated with the earthquake ground motion.
Because of the noted reasons, since the mid 1970’s a methodology termed the
“simplified procedure” has evolved to be the accepted standard of practice for evaluating
liquefaction resistance of soils. This procedure is based on regressions of data from field
observations and laboratory measurements. Recently an update of the procedures
involved was made by a panel of experts under the sponsorship of the National Center for
Earthquake Engineering and the National Science Foundation [Youd and Idriss, 2001].
The proposed updated procedure constitutes the method of choice in which an allencompassing procedure is not employed.
The procedure requires the computation of two variables that describe the seismic
demand on a soil layer — cyclic stress ratio (CSR) — and the capacity of the soil layer to
resist liquefaction — cyclic resistance ratio (CRR) — respectively. The factor of safety to
liquefaction of the soil layer is the obtained as:

FS =

CRR
CSR

(2-18)

The cyclic stress ratio, CSR, is obtained from:

⎛τ ⎞
⎛a
CSR = ⎜ av ⎟ = 0.65 ⋅ ⎜ max
⎝ g
⎝ σ vo′ ⎠
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⎞ ⎛ σ vo ⎞
⎟ ⋅ ⎜ ′ ⎟ ⋅ rd
⎠ ⎝ σ vo ⎠

(2-19)

where amax = peak ground acceleration at the ground surface generated by the earthquake;
g = acceleration of gravity; σ vo and σ vo′ are total and effective overburden stresses,
respectively; τav = induced shear stress; and rd = stress reduction coefficient accounting
for flexibility of the soil profile.
For a depth below ground surface z in m, rd can be obtained from:

⎧1.0 − 0.00765 ⋅ z
rd = ⎨
⎩1.174 − 0.0267 ⋅ z

for z ≤ 9.15 m
for 9.15 m < z ≤ 23m

(2-20)

Four field tests are recommended for routine evaluation of liquefaction resistance
CRR: the cone penetration test (CPT), the standard penetration test (SPT), shear-wave
velocity (Vs) measurements, and for gravelly sites the Becker penetration test (BPT).
Each test has its advantages and limitations with the CPT providing the most detailed soil
stratigraphy and robust field-data based liquefaction resistance curves now available.
CPT testing should always be accompanied by soil sampling for validation of soil type
identification. The SPT has a longer record of application and provides disturbed soil
samples from which fines content and other grain characteristics can be determined.
Measured shear-wave velocities provide fundamental information on small-strain soil
behavior that is useful beyond analyses of liquefaction resistance. Vs is also applicable at
sites, such as landfills and gravelly sediments, where CPT and SPT soundings may not be
possible or reliable. The BPT test is recommended only for gravelly sites and requires use
of rough correlations between BPT and SPT, making the results less certain than other
tests. Where possible, two or more test procedures should be applied to assure adequate
definition of soil stratigraphy and a consistent evaluation of liquefaction resistance.
When using the standard penetration test (SPT) the blow count must be normalized to
take into account the overburden pressure and the hammer energy. This is done by
adjusting the blow count values, N, to a normalized value termed (N1)60 that corresponds
to an overburden pressure, Po, of approximately 100 kPa (2 kip/sq ft) and a hammer
efficiency of 60%. The cyclic resistance ratio (CRR) is first defined for an ideal cleansand base curve for magnitude 7.5 earthquakes:
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CRR7.5 =

( N1 )60
1
50
1
+
+
−
2
34 − ( N1 )60
135
200
⎡⎣10 ⋅ ( N1 )60 + 45⎤⎦

(2-21)

Equation (2-21) is valid for (N1)60 values less than 30. For greater values clean
granular soils are too dense to liquefy and are classified as non-liquefiable. A series of
adjustments must be made to CRR7.5, as follows:
Fines content adjustment — CRR increase with soil fines content (FC) by adjusting
(N1)60 to an equivalent clean sand value (N1)60cs. This is performed using the following
empirical equation:

( N1 )60cs = α + β ⋅ ( N1 )60

(2-22)

and α and β are obtained from:

⎧
⎪0
⎪ ⎛
190 ⎞
⎪ ⎜1.76− 2 ⎟
α = ⎨e⎝ FC ⎠
⎪
⎪5.0
⎪
⎩
⎧
⎪1.0
⎪
⎪
FC 1.5
β = ⎨0.99 +
1, 000
⎪
⎪
⎪1.2
⎪⎩

for FC ≤ 5%
for 5% < FC ≤ 35%
for 35% < FC
(2-23)
for FC ≤ 5%
for 5% < FC ≤ 35%
for 35% < FC

Other corrections to SPT — Several corrections in addition to the fines content
influence SPT results. They are incorporated by:

( N1 )60cs = N m ⋅ CN ⋅ CE ⋅ CB ⋅ CR ⋅ CS
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(2-24)

where Nm = measured SPT blows; CN = factor to take into account the overburden stress;
CE = factor to take into account hammer energy ratio; CB = factor to take into account the
borehole diameter; CR = factor to take into account the rod length; and CS = correction for
samplers with or without liners. Table 2-12 lists the values for these corrections factors.
Table 2-12 – Corrections to SPT [Youd and Idriss, 2001]
Factor
Overburden pressure

Equipment variable
—

Overburden pressure
Energy ratio
Energy ratio
Energy ratio
Borehole diameter
Borehole diameter
Borehole diameter
Rod length
Rod length
Rod length
Rod length
Rod length
Sampling method
Sampling method

—
Donut hammer
Safety hammer
Automatic trip Donut
65-115 mm
150 mm
200 mm
<3m
3–4m
4–6m
6 – 10 m
10 – 30 m
Standard sampler
Sampler w/o liners

Term
CN

Correction
0.5
( Po / σ vo′ )

CN
CE
CE
CE
CB
CB
CB
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CS
CS

CN ≤ 1.7
0.5 – 1.0
0.7 – 1.2
0.8 – 1.3
1.0
1.05
1.15
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.95
1.0
1.0
1.1 – 1.3

The recommended procedure [Youd and Idriss, 2001] presents procedures to obtain
CRR based on cone penetration test (CPT) and on shear wave velocity (Vs). They were
not used in present research due to lack of CPT and Vs information for bridge sites in
Indiana with few exceptions [Bobet et al., 2001]. The interested reader is referred to
[Youd and Idriss, 2001].
Magnitude correction — An earthquake magnitude scaling factor (MSF) must also be
applied using Eq. (2-25).

⎛ CRR7.5 ⎞
FS = ⎜
⎟ ⋅ MSF
⎝ CSR ⎠

(2-25)

The magnitude scaling factor, MSF, for moment magnitude, Mw, is presented in Eq.
(2-26).
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MSF =

102.24
M w2.56

(2-26)

The proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) [NCHRP,
2002] requires a liquefaction potential evaluation, as indicated in Table 2-10, for the
different component detailing requirements (SDR). For SDR 1 and 2 no evaluation is
required unless requested by the owner. For SDR 3 to 6 its must be performed unless
requested by the owner or one of the conditions in Table 2-13 are met.
Table 2-13 – Cases for SDR 3 to 6 for which liquefaction potential evaluation need not be
performed in Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49)
Magnitude for the 3%
probability of exceedance
75-year event
Mw < 6.0
6.0 ≤ Mw < 6.4

Normalized SPT blow
count, (N1)60

Fa ⋅ SS

N/A
> 15
> 10
>5

N/A
N/A
0.375g > Fa ⋅ SS ≥ 0.25g
0.250g > Fa ⋅ SS

Maps of mean earthquake magnitude are provided. These maps were prepared by the
USGS using the maximum magnitude that can affect the site for all relevant seismic
sources to produce the design ground motion with 3% of being exceeded in 75 years. If
liquefaction potential must be evaluated, the procedures of Appendix 3B must be used.
Appendix 3B is devoted to liquefaction and other geological hazards. It uses the same
principles presented [Youd and Idriss, 2001], and gives guidance for making an in depth
evaluation of liquefaction potential. The results of the liquefaction assessment are used to
evaluate the potential severity of three liquefaction related hazards to the bridge: (1) flow
failures involving large slope failures, (2) limited lateral spread, and (3) ground
settlement. It permits to evaluate these hazards on the basis of safety factor for
liquefaction. If the safety factor is less than 1.0 to 1.3 the potential related hazards must
be evaluated following detailed guidelines for each one of them.
In general the procedures included require improving the soil or locating the support
foundation elements below the liquefiable layer and to design the bridge to meet the
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performance objectives while being subjected to the settlements and/or lateral
displacements imposed by the lateral spread.

2.3.3 Fault rupture
The morphology of rivers is associated with geological fault setting in many cases.
The possibility of having a bridge located along the path of a geological fault is real. Two
recent cases of bridge damage caused by the bridge crossing the fault path are shown in
Figures 2-30 and 2-31.

Fig. 2-30 – Collapse of Bei-Feng Bridge located on the earthquake causing fault
Chi-Chi, Taiwan Earthquake, September 21, 1999
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Fig. 2-31 – Bolu Viaduct, crossed by the North Anatolian Fault
November 12, 1999 Duzce, Turkey, Earthquake
In many cases the fault existence and location is difficult to detect. The degree of
activity of a fault is subjective and estimation the amount of displacements and
recurrence period is difficult to forecast. There are very few acceleration records obtained
very close to a fault and the expected ground motion is difficult to estimate. Design for
theses circumstances is challenging and has a high degree of uncertainty in meeting any
performance objective. The proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP
12-49) [NCHRP, 2002] recommends avoiding bridge construction across faults.

2.3.4 Embankment failure
High embankments in bridge approaches may fail due to different type of problems.
Liquefaction may cause lateral spread or settlement, leading to failure of the
embankment. The ground motion, without liquefaction occurring, may cause the failure
of the slopes. Techniques developed for embankment dams and slope stability may be
used to assess the possibility of failure of the road embankment or the bridge approach.
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2.3.5 Landslides
Landslides present a significant hazard to roadways in seismically active areas and
can pose a hazard for bridges. Damage can be in the form of ground movement either at
the abutment or extending to the central piers of the bridge. Bridges located near steep
slopes, or places with a history of rock falls, or avalanches.

Fig. 2-32 – Landslide induced by the earthquake. A nearby bridge had major
structural damage – Morgan Hill, California, Earthquake of April 24, 1984
Design must include dynamic slope stability analysis or other procedures of stability
assessment of nearby slopes, such as Newmark sliding block method. It is important to
estimate the order of magnitude of displacement during the landslide.
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CHAPTER 3 SEISMIC RISK OF SOUTHWESTERN INDIANA

3.1 Tectonic setting
The great majority of the World’s seismic activity occurs at the tectonic plate
boundaries. Continental U.S. is contained within the North American Plate with Indiana
practically in the middle of it and far away from the plate boundaries. Notwithstanding,
earthquakes have been felt in Indiana since colonization began by the French in
Louisiana and from the east after the Louisiana Purchase. Intraplate earthquakes can be
caused by a number of different kind of stresses — large scale glacial rebound (the slow
flexure of the crust back up after a large sheet of ice is removed), for example, or the
broad compresional stress caused within eastern North America by the compression
forces from the mid-Atlantic spreading center.
In recent decades, earth scientists have collected evidence that strong earthquakes in
the central Mississippi Valley have occurred repeatedly in the geologic past. Small
earthquakes happen in the region frequently. The area in which most of these quakes
occur is referred to as the New Madrid seismic zone (NMSZ) which stretches from just
west of Memphis, Tennessee, into southern Illinois. Several times in the past century,
moderate earthquakes have been widely felt in southern Illinois and southwestern
Indiana. In the last decade geologic evidence that the Wabash Valley faults, initially
considered the northern portion of the New Madrid Seismic Zone, is a different system
with its own tectonic setting has led to define it as an independent seismic zone that has
been named the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone (WVSZ).
The New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) — Geologic structures related to earthquakes
in the central Mississippi Valley region have been deeply buried over hundreds of
millions of years by thick layers of sediment. Geophysical studies have revealed a major
buried northeast-trending feature known as the Reelfoot Rift [Hildenbrand and
Hendricks, 1995], which formed more than 500 million years ago by a process of
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extension in the middle of the North American Plate. A rift structure is created when
geologic forces begin to pull the Earth's crust apart. If this process continues long
enough, the crust separates to form an ocean basin, as happened to form the Atlantic
Ocean basin. The Reelfoot Rift is called a failed rift because the Earth's crust did not
separate enough to create a new ocean basin. However, the crust was disturbed enough to
form major faults that mark the axis and margins of the rift and now contribute to the
occurrence of earthquakes in the NMSZ.

Fig. 3-1 – The Reelfoot Rift in the New Madrid Region
A sequence of powerful earthquakes struck the mid-Mississippi River Valley, central
United States, in the winter of 1811-1812. The first one occurred December 16, 1811,
Intermittent strong shaking continued through March 1812 and aftershocks strong enough
to be felt occurred through the year 1817. The initial earthquake of December 16 was
followed by two other principal shocks, one on January 23, 1812, and the other on
February 7, 1812. Judging from newspaper accounts of damage to buildings, the
February 7 earthquake was the biggest of the three. On the basis of the large area of
damage (600,000 km2), the widespread area of perceptibility (5,000,000 km2), and the
complex physiographic changes that occurred, the Mississippi River valley earthquakes
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of 1811-1812 rank as some of the largest in the United States since its settlement by
Europeans [Stover and Coffman, 1993]. The estimated magnitudes for these events vary
considerably from different sources (7.2 to 8.8 depending on the parameters used to
define the magnitude and the scale in which it is reported).

Fig. 3-2 – Isoseismal map for the Arkansas earthquake of December 16, 1811, first of
the 1811-1812 New Madrid series [Stover and Coffman, 1993]
The association of the 1811-1812 earthquakes to a causing fault has been hindered by
lack of information from a scarcely inhabited region at the time of occurrence. Since the
early 1970´s a great amount of multidisciplinary research have been devoted to find and
define characteristics of the events and the tectonic setting in order to understand the
tectonic process taking place and validate seismic risk assessments for the region.
From the information gathered from different sources it is accepted (with dissent) that
the causing faults were those shown in Fig. 3-3. The USGS along with the Geological
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Surveys of the CUSEC member States and several universities in the region have to a
certain degree reached consensus on what is known with certainty and what needs more
research to frame adequately the seismic risk assessment for the region. The primary
types of evidence are geological — paleoseismological, stratigraphic, geomorphic,
structural, and sedimentological information — and seismological, instrumental and
historical.

Fig. 3-3 – The New Madrid seismic zone showing the three faults that ruptured in
1811-1812 and earthquakes recorded in recent years [Hough, 2002]
Paleoliquefaction investigations have provided constraints on recurrence in the
NMSZ and have been conducted at 44 sites. From these studies it is know that two pre1811 episodes of liquefaction comparable to that of 1811-1812 can be interpreted
[Participants, 2000]. Best estimates of the dates of these events are 1450 and 900 (Fig.
3-4), which leads to a median recurrence interval ranging between 267 and 644 years.
The volume of sand mobilized at many of the liquefaction sites in the NMSZ implies they
could not have been formed by local events of moderate magnitude. Further indication of
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very strong shaking comes from geotechnical measurements at liquefaction sites in the
NMSZ, which show the shallow sub-surface materials to be only moderately liquefiable.

Fig. 3-4 – Estimated ages of paleoliquefaction features (vertical axis) arranged by site
location, from north (left) to south (right), excluding the Current River sites. Vertical gray
shaded segments indicate most probable ages, with brackets showing approximate two
standard deviation uncertainties. Shaded horizontal bars indicate the inferred timing of
paleoearthquakes. Dashed horizontal line is at 1811-1812. [Participants, 2000]
The paleoliquefaction interpretations also suggest that recurrence rates for events with
magnitude on the range of 5 and the largest earthquakes cannot be simply related.
Magnitude regressions of the large events for the approximate periods of recurrence
implied from the paleoliquefaction record indicate that the mean return period for the
smaller magnitude events should be smaller (more frequent). Quoting from [Participants,
2000]: “In short, the largest earthquakes occur much more frequently than the rate of
smaller earthquakes would imply. Finally, the paleoliquefaction record suggests that the
clustering of earthquakes that occurred in 1811-1812 also occurred in prior events.
Multiple units of vented material are evident in many of the sandblows and have been
interpreted as resulting from major events that occurred within weeks to months of each
other. The lack of soil development, but evidence for bioturbation in materials between
the units, constrains the timing between clustered events.”

72

The length of the active fault system and the lack of relative motion measured across
the system make the use of models that work well for earthquakes occurring in plateboundary settings not appropriate. Models for intraplate tectonics have recently been
proposed but their use is just being implemented in the NMSZ. Magnitude estimates of
large New Madrid earthquakes rely on uncertain conversions of observations of their
effects measured as Modified Mercalli intensities derived mainly from newspapers
accounts. It is evident that the spread of intensity is much larger than for comparable
events in the West Coast, as shown in Fig. 3-5. The magnitude conversion may be biased
by different causes, but one that has been pointed out several times is that soil profile
amplification may have increased the reported magnitudes because most towns at the
time were settlements along rivers.

Fig. 3-5 – Comparison of areas of damage from the New Madrid
and San Francisco Earthquakes
Slip rates for the known faults in the region estimated mainly using characteristics of
secondary features show that three episodes of deformation are apparent in folded fluvial
deposits overlying the Reelfoot fault with their ages close to the three major events
evident in the paleoliquefaction record. The inferred rates of slip are compatible with the
short recurrence interval for major earthquakes evident in the paleoseismic record. The
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potential for currently classified as non-active faults within and beyond the NMSZ
producing moderate-to-large earthquakes remains unknown, although Quaternary surface
faulting has been documented on the periphery of the NMSZ [Participants, 2000].
Wabash Valley Seismic Zone — The Wabash Valley Fault System is about 90 km
long and 50 km wide in southeastern Illinois, southwestern Indiana, and northwestern
Kentucky near the deepest part of the Illinois Basin. The fault system consists of
subparallel, high-angle normal faults that have vertical displacements as great as 150 m.
The faults bound horsts and grabens, and commonly overlap one another. Major fault
plains dip at angles ranging from 50 to 85 degrees. Individual fault blocks are only
slightly tilted, and drag is generally absent or weakly expressed.

Fig. 3-6 – Wabash River Valley Faults [René and Stanonis, 1995]
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In the past decade, there has been increasing awareness that the seismic hazard in this
zone may be greater than the historical earthquake record would suggest. Numerous
prehistoric large magnitude earthquakes have struck southern Indiana and Illinois; some
may have been larger. Geologic evidence for these earthquakes in the form of sand-andgravel intrusions in river sediments has been discovered at more than 200 sites in the
Wabash River Valley and along its tributaries in Indiana and Illinois. This information is
the result of USGS studies done in cooperation with the Indiana Geological Survey,
Indiana University, Illinois Department of Natural Resources-Illinois State Museum and
the Illinois State Geological Survey. Clastic dikes filled with sand and gravel, interpreted
to be the result of earthquake induced liquefaction, occur throughout much of southern
Indiana and adjacent parts of Illinois. At least seven and probably eight prehistoric
earthquakes have been documented during the Holocene, as well as, at least one during
the latest Pleistocene (see Fig. 3-7) [Munson et al., 1997]. Nearly all of these liquefaction
features originated from earthquakes centered in southern Indiana and Illinois, and not
further south in the nearby source region of the great 1811-12 New Madrid earthquakes
[Crone and Wheeler, 2000].

Fig. 3-7 – Map of southern two-thirds of Indiana showing sites where
ancient sandblows have been found, and showing areas of liquefaction
for six major prehistoric earthquakes. [Kirby, 2001]
In the absence of well-determined data on the timing of paleoevents and the amount
of tectonic slip associated with those events, it is impossible to estimate reliable or even
meaningful Holocene or late Quaternary slip rates [Crone and Wheeler, 2000]. In
summary the tectonics of the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone it not well understood at
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present. No historical earthquakes in the Wabash Valley region have been strong enough
to cause liquefaction. It is likely that numerous other magnitude 6 to 7 Holocene
earthquakes have struck the region, but did not leave a record because of the lack of
liquefiable deposits in large parts of the region.

3.2 Earthquake history of Indiana
Earthquakes originated within Indiana and from neighboring seismic zones have been
felt in Indiana since the start of the colonization. Figure 3-8 shows the seismicity for the
New Madrid and Wabash Valley Seismic Zones. The following description of the seismic
history of Indiana was abridged from [Stover and Coffman, 1993].

Fig. 3-8 – Earthquakes in the New Madrid and Wabash Valley, red circles indicate
earthquakes that occurred from 1974 to 2002 with magnitudes larger than 2.5, green
circles denote earthquakes that occurred prior to 1974 [USGS, 2002]
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The most damaging Indiana earthquake originating within the State occurred on
September 27, 1909, near the Illinois border between Vincennes and Terre Haute. Some
chimneys fell, several building walls were cracked, light connections were severed, and
pictures were shaken off the walls. It was strong in Indianapolis and Oakland City. It was
felt over an area of 80,000 km2 (see Fig. 3-9) including the southwestern half of Indiana,
all of Illinois and parts of Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, Arkansas, and probably in parts of
Kansas.

Fig. 3-9 – Isoseismal map for the Wabash River Valley, Indiana,
Earthquake of September 27, 1909.
The latest important earthquake originated within the State occurred June 18, 2002,
with magnitude 4.6 (USGS, but mb = 5.0 according to other sources) near Evansville.
There was very little damage. The location of the earthquake and its hypocentral depth
(14-18 km) indicated ongoing deformation along reactivated Precambrian and Paleozoic
basement structures, in a zone of recurring seismic activity, and in an area of possibly
heightened neotectonic strain [Hamburger et al., 2002]. Figure 3-10 shows the intensity
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map for this earthquake obtained from the Community Internet Intensity Map USGS
program.

Fig. 3-10 – Isoseismal map for the Evansville, Indiana,
Earthquake of June 18, 2002
Other damaging earthquakes originated in Indiana include the April 29, 1899,
Earthquake with rated intensity VI to VII on the Modified Mercalli Scale. It was
strongest at Jeffersonville and Shelbyville; at Vincennes, chimneys were thrown down
and walls cracked. It was felt over an area of 110,000 km2.
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In 1876, twin shocks fifteen minutes apart were felt over an area of 160,000 km2. A
shock in 1887 centered near Vincennes was felt over 200,000 km2 and an 1891 shock
damaged property and frightened people in church at Evansville.
Indiana has also suffered from damage caused by earthquakes originating in
neighboring States. The worst occurred on November 9, 1968, and centered near Dale in
southern Illinois. The shock, a magnitude 5.3, was felt over 1,500,000 km2 and 23 States
including all of Indiana. Intensity VII was reported from Cynthiana where chimneys were
cracked, twisted, and toppled; at Fort Branch where groceries fell from shelves and a loud
roaring noise was heard, and at Mount Vernon, New Harmony, Petersburg, Princeton,
and Stewartsville, all of which had similar effects.
Almost exactly ten years earlier on November 7, 1958, an earthquake originating near
Mt. Carmel, Illinois, caused plaster to fall at Fort Branch. Roaring and whistling noises
were heard at Central City and the residents of Evansville thought there had been an
explosion or plane crash. It was felt over 90,000 km2 of Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, and
Kentucky.
On March 2, 1937, a shock centering near Anna, Ohio, threw objects from shelves at
Fort Wayne and some plaster fell. Plaster was also cracked at Indianapolis. Six days later,
another shock originating at Anna brought pictures crashing down and cracked plaster in
Fort Wayne and was strongly felt at Lafayette.
The great New Madrid earthquakes of 1811 and 1812 must have strongly affected the
State, particularly the southwestern part, but there is little information available.

3.3 Design earthquake return period
For the foregoing discussion on the seismic risk of Indiana it is important to establish
a common base for comparing the probability of exceedance of the design ground
motion, the earthquake mean return period, and the lapse of exposure or life of the
structure.
The probability, q, of having ground motion that exceeds in one year a pre-fixed
value of a descriptive parameter, ao, – for example peak ground acceleration – is:
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q = P(a ≥ ao , in one year )

(3-1)

The probability of not exceeding the value of ao in t years, under the assumption of
statistical independence between events, is:
qt = (1 − q ) (1 − q ) (1 − q ) " (1 − q )
1

2

3

"

(3-2)

t

Then:
qt = (1 − q )t

(3-3)

The probability, qo, of having at least one event with a value greater than ao in a time
span of t years is:

qo = 1 − qt = 1 − (1 − q)t

(3-4)

The return period is defined as the mean time, in years, between events producing a
value of the descriptive parameter greater or equal to ao:

T =

1
q

(3-5)

Then:

⎛ 1⎞
qo = 1 − qt = 1 − ⎜1 − ⎟
⎝ T⎠

t

(3-6)

For example, if the design earthquake has been defined as an event that produces a
value of the descriptive parameter having a probability of 3% of being exceeded in a 75
year interval; using the formulation presented: qo = 0.03 and t = 75 years. Applying Eq.
(3-6):
⎛ 1⎞
0.03 = 1 − ⎜1 − ⎟
⎝ T⎠

75

⎛ 1 ⎞

75

⎜ ⎟
⎛ 1⎞
⎛ 1⎞
then 0.97 = ⎜1 − ⎟ and ⎜1 − ⎟ = 0.97⎝ 75 ⎠ = 0.999594
T
T
⎝
⎠
⎝
⎠

1
= 1 − 0.999594 = 0.00040604 , and the mean period of recurrence for
T
this case is, then:

It follows that
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T =

1
= 2463 years
0.00040604

Table 3-1 – Design Ground Motion Mean Return period used in different documents

Document and reference
AASHO Standard Specifications for
Highway Bridges 5th Edition (1949)
AASHO Standard Specifications for
Highway Bridges 8th Edition (1961)
AASHTO 1975 Interim Specifications
for Highway Bridges [AASHTO,
1975]
ATC-3-06 Recommendations for
Buildings [ATC, 1978]
ATC-6 Design Guidelines for Bridges
[ATC, 1981]
Division I-A of AASHTO Standard
Specifications (15th to current 17th
Edition) [AASHTO, 2002]
AASHTO LRFD Specifications (1st,
2nd, and 3rd Edition) [AASHTO, 1998]
Caltrans Seismic Design Criteria
[Caltrans, 2001]
NEHRP Recommendations for New
Buildings [NEHRP, 1997] – Maximum
Considered Earthquake (see Note)
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic
Provisions [NCHRP, 2002] –
Maximum Considered Earthquake
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic
Provisions [NCHRP, 2002] – Frequent
Earthquake

Structure
life-span
(years)

Probability
of
exceedance

Mean
Return
Period
(years)

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

50

10%

475

50

10%

475

50

10%

475

50

10%

475

N/A

N/A

N/A

50

2%

2475

75

3%

2463

75

50%

109

Note – In NEHRP 1997 the Design Ground Motion for buildings corresponds to 2/3 of the Maximum
Considered Earthquake ground motion. This reduction is not used in the Draft AASHTO LRFD seismic
provisions for bridges although the definition of the Maximum Considered Earthquake is practically the
same.

Figure 3-11 shows the sensitivity to the mean return period when changing the life
span of the structure or the probability of exceedance.
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Fig. 3-11 – Mean return period as a function of the probability of
exceedance and the life span of the structure in years
3.4 Seismic risk assessment for bridge design in Indiana
The awareness of the seismic risk associated with the New Madrid Seismic Zone and
more recently the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone, as presented before, has been increasing
in the last decades with the corresponding increase in the seismic forces and related
requirements used in design of building structures and bridges. The following sections
present the seismic risk parameters presented by the bridge specifications in the last
decades in order to set a common frame of reference to be used in the vulnerability
assessment of the transportation structures within the selected Earthquake Emergency
Routes of Indiana.
Figure 3-12 shows the 1949 revision of the seismic risk map developed by the U.S.
Coast and Geodetic Survey [Housner, 1970]. Table 3-2 presents the peak ground
accelerations suggested by Housner to be used with the map of Fig. 3-12.
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Fig. 3-12 – U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey Seismic Probability Map
of the United States (Revised 1949)
Table 3-2 – Maximum zonal acceleration to be used with
map of Fig. 3-12 [Housner, 1970]
Maximum
Acceleration
0.50g
0.33g
0.16g
0.08g
0.04g

Zone 3 (near a great fault)
Zone 3 (not near a great fault)
Zone 2
Zone 1
Zone 0

M
8.5
7.0
5.75
4.75
4.25

This map was developed before seismic zoning was introduced in the building or
bridge design requirements. Although the map was referred as a seismic probability map
it actually was based on Mercalli intensity and no guidance was given on the
corresponding return period or probability of exceedance. Seen from a modern point of
view this map contains features such a neighboring Zone 1 and 3 areas without a
transition Zone 2 in between, and other that currently would be frowned at.
Notwithstanding, the general location of the zones and envisioned peak ground
acceleration do not differ much from more recent maps. In this map southwestern Indiana
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is located in a Zone 2 corresponding to a maximum acceleration of 0.16g and a
corresponding magnitude of 5.75 for the design event. The rest of Indiana, with the
exception of a small Zone 2 bordering Ohio, was located in a Zone 1 (maximum expected
acceleration of 0.08g and magnitude of 4.75 for the design event. No design response
spectrum was defined. This map was never mandatory in Indiana for bridges or buildings.

3.4.1 1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications for Highway Bridges
In Section 2.2.2 the 1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications [AASHTO, 1975] were
presented. Figure 3-13 shows the northern Midwest portion of the map including Indiana
(the whole U.S. map is shown in Fig. 2-13). The seismic design criteria contained in the
1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications was included in the twelfth (1977), thirteenth
(1983), and fourteenth (1989) editions of AASHTO’s Standard Specifications.

1
2
1

3

2
Fig. 3-13 – Northern Midwest portion of the map included with the
1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications [AASHTO, 1975]
No more detailed map was included with the 1975 Interim. The southwestern corner
of Indiana containing Gibson, Posey and Vanderburgh counties was a Zone 3 with a peak
ground acceleration A = 0.5g. A region south of an approximate line linking Terre Haute,
Indianapolis and Fort Wayne was included in a Zone 2 (A = 0.22g PGA). The rest of the
State was located in a Zone 1 (A = 0.09g PGA).
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Table 3-3 – Maximum values for the Response Coefficient (C) in Indiana
1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications [AASHTO, 1975]
Depth of
Alluvium
0 – 10’
11’ – 80’
80’ – 150’
> 150’

Zone 1 (A = 0.09g)
C max
T at peak
0.060
0.066
0.40 s
0.080
0.60 s
0.065
0.65 s

Zone 2 (A = 0.22g)
C max
T at peak
0.072
0.30 s
0.120
0.35 s
0.110
0.55 s
0.090
0.55 s

Zone 3 (A = 0.50g)
C max
T at peak
0.163
0.30 s
0.203
0.30 s
0.155
0.50 s
0.120
0.50 s

3.4.2 ATC 6 and AASHTO Division I-A
The ATC-6 [ATC, 1981] recommendations were modified to be incorporated in the
fifteenth (1992) edition of AASHTO Standard Specifications as Division I-A Seismic
Design. These requirements were kept without modification in the sixteenth (1996) and
in the current seventeenth (2002) edition [AASHTO, 2002]. The ATC-6 document used
for peak ground acceleration in rock, A, the map of Av originally proposed for the ATC-306 building requirements project.
The ATC-3-06 requirements for buildings were taken over by the BSSC and became
the NEHRP recommended provisions. By the time the ATC-6 proposed bridge
requirements were incorporated into AASHTO Standard Specifications the maps had been
updated in the 1988 NEHRP provisions [NEHRP, 1988] by the USGS [Algermissen et
al., 1990]. The map included in the 15th Edition AASHTO Standard Specifications and
still contained in the current 17th Edition correspond to the Av map as modified in 1988.
Figure 3-14 shows the State of Indiana portion of this map. The values given correspond
to peak ground acceleration in rock expressed as percentage of the acceleration of gravity
for a probability of exceedance of 10 percent in 50 years, which is approximately equal to
a 15 percent probability of exceedance in the 75-year design life now advocated for a
typical highway bridge (see Fig. 3-11).
The southwestern corner of Indiana is located within contours labeled for peak grouns
acceleration of A = 0.075g and A = 0.10g; including totally (t) or partially (p) the
following 20 counties: Brown (p), Clay (p), Daviess (t), Dubois (p), Gibson (t), Greene
(t), Knox (t), Lawrence (p), Martin (t), Monroe (p), Morgan (p), Owen (t), Pike (t), Posey
(t), Putnam (p), Spencer (p), Sullivan (t), Vanderburgh (t), Vigo (p), and Warrick (t)..
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Section 3.2 of Division I-A Seismic Design indicates that “Local maxima (and minima)
are given inside the highest (and lowest) contour for a particular region. Linear
interpolation shall be used for sites located between contour lines and between a contour
line and local maximum (or minimum).”
The rest of the south half of the state is located within a contour line for peak ground
acceleration A = 0.05g and local maxima labeled as A = 0.06g. This zone includes Terre
Haute and Indianapolis. The northern half of the State, including the cities of Lafayette
and Fort Wayne, located within the contour line for peak ground acceleration A = 0.05g
and local maxima labeled as A = 0.04g.
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Fig. 3-14 – Values for peak ground acceleration for the State on Indiana in
Division I-A Seismic Design of 17th Edition of AASHTO Standard Specifications
[AASHTO, 2002]
All editions of the AASHTO LRFD Specifications (1994, 1998, 2004) [AASHTO,
2004] include the same map but contain variations in the design requirements that may
lead to a different design although based on the same seismic risk assessment (see 2.2.2).
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3.4.3 USGS 1996 Maps for the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions
In 1993, the USGS embarked on a major project to prepare updated national
earthquake ground motion maps. The result of that project was a set of probabilistic maps
published in 1996 that cover several rock ground motion parameters (peak ground
acceleration — PGA — and elastic response spectral accelerations for periods of
vibration of 0.2, 0.3, and 1.0 sec) and three different probability levels or return periods
(10% probability of exceedance in 50 years, 5% probability of exceedance in 50 years,
and 2% probability of exceedance in 50 years – which is approximately equal to 3%
probability of exceedance in 75 years). In addition to the maps, the ground motion values
at any specified latitude and longitude can be obtained via the Internet.

Fig. 3-15 – 1996 USGS Map of peak ground acceleration in rock
for a probability of exceedance of 10% in 50 years
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These maps form the rock ground motion basis for seismic design using the Draft
AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) [NCHRP, 2002]. Figure 3-15 shows
the 1996 USGS Map of peak ground acceleration in rock for a probability of exceedance
of 10% in 50 years that although not used in the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic
Provisions, is given here for reference with previous requirements.

Fig. 3-16 – 1996 USGS Map of peak ground acceleration in rock
for a probability of exceedance of 3% in 75 years (= to 2% in 50 years)
The upper-level event, termed the “rare” or Maximum Considered Earthquake
(MCE), describes ground motions that, for most locations, are defined probabilistically
and have a probability of exceedance of 3% in 75 years (mean return period
approximately 2500 years). Figure 3-16 shows the 1996 USGS Map of peak ground
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acceleration in rock for a probability of exceedance of 2% in 50 years (equivalent to 3%
in 75 years as shown in Fig. 3-11) that although not used also in the Draft AASHTO
LRFD Seismic Provisions, is given here for reference with previous requirements using a
different return period.
For locations close to highly active faults, the mapped Maximum Considered
Earthquake ground motion was deterministically bounded so that the levels of ground
motion did not become unreasonably high. Deterministic bounds on the ground motion
were calculated by assuming the occurrence of maximum magnitude earthquakes on the
highly active faults. It is equal to 150% of the median ground motion for the maximum
magnitude earthquake, but not less than 1.5g for the short-period spectral acceleration
plateau and 0.6g for 1.0-sec spectra acceleration (see Fig. 2-22). Deterministic bounds
were applied in high-seismicity portions of the West Coast, Alaska, and Hawaii leading
to a design ground motion lower than the ground motion for 3% probability of
exceedance in 75 years. The Maximum Considered Earthquake governs the limits on the
inelastic deformation in the substructures and the design displacements for the support of
the superstructure.
The lower level design event, termed the “expected” or “frequent” earthquake,
defines a ground motion corresponding to 50% probability of exceedance in 75 years.
This event ensures that essentially elastic response is achieved in the bridge substructure
for the more frequent or expected earthquake. This design level is similar to the 100-year
flood and has similar performance objectives. An explicit check on the strength capacity
of the bridge substructure is required. Parameter studies made as part of the development
of the draft provisions show that the lower level event will only impact the strength of
columns in parts of the western United States.
With respect to Indiana the USGS 1996 Maps used the then recently identified
paleoearthquakes in southern Indiana and Illinois based on widespread paleoliquefaction
features as described in 3.1. An areal zone with a higher Mmax of 7.5 to account for such
large events was used. The Wabash Valley Mmax zone that was used in the maps was
based on the Wabash Valley fault zone.
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Fig. 3-18 – 1996 USGS Map of spectral acceleration S1 in rock
for a probability of exceedance of 3% in 75 years (= to 2% in
50 years)

Fig. 3-17 – 1996 USGS Map of spectral acceleration SS in rock
for a probability of exceedance of 3% in 75 years (= to 2% in
50 years)
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The Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions uses maps that define spectral
ordinates at periods of 0.2 sec. (SS) and 1.0 sec. (S1) to be used as a two point procedure
to obtain the design response spectrum (see Fig. 2-21). Figures 3-17 and 3-18 show the
maps for SS and S1 in rock respectively for the Maximum Considered Earthquake having
a 3% probability of exceedance in 75 years.
No maps were developed by USGS for the expected frequent earthquake, defining a
ground motion corresponding to 50% probability of exceedance in 75 years. The Draft
AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions suggests the values of SS and S1 for this earthquake
may be obtained from interpolation from information provided by USGS either in the
CD-ROM published with the maps or in the Internet by using latitude and longitude for
the site or the ZIP code of the location. The web site to perform these operations is:
http://eqint.cr.usgs.gov/eq/html/deaggint.html

Fig. 3-19 – Results obtained for Vincennes, IN, for spectral acceleration SS
for the frequent earthquake, in rock for 50% probability of exceedance in 75 years
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Figure 3-19 show the results obtained for Vincennes for spectral acceleration SS in
rock for 50% probability of exceedance in 75 years as required for the frequent
earthquake. The values obtained were SS = 0.06g and S1 = 0.01g.
3.4.4 2002 Update of the 1996 USGS Maps
In 2002 changes were introduced by the USGS [Frankel et al., 2002] to the maps
developed in 1996. Numerous changes were introduced with varying effects on the
mapped values. Some of these changes affected the parameters used in the New Madrid
Seismic Zone and the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone. Among them the more important are
changes in the mean recurrence time, the characteristic magnitude, and the spatial
concentration of New Madrid sources of large earthquakes, and the incorporation of
additional attenuation relations. Two versions of the maps exist one from January and the
other from October. Only the later version maps are be presented here.
The 2002 update uses a shorter mean recurrence time for characteristic earthquakes in
New Madrid than was used in the 1996 maps, as well as a smaller median magnitude than
that applied in 1996. The three equally weighted “fictitious sources” used in the 1996
maps were substituted for three sources consisting in a fault trace matching recent microearthquake activity and two adjacent sources that are situated near the borders of the
Reelfoot Rift. It is important to note that the probabilistic ground motions for the 10%
probability of exceedance level have increased markedly around the New Madrid area,
compared to the 1996 maps. This is caused by the shorter mean return time of 500 years
for characteristic earthquakes used in the 2002 maps. The Mmax 7.5 zone assigned to the
Wabash Valley area was enlarged to include the most likely rupture zones from
paleoearthquakes with magnitudes above about 7.0.
Significant differences between the 1996 and 2002 maps are caused by the inclusion
of additional attenuation relations in the 2002 maps. These changes affected mainly the
Atlantic seaboard. There is little change for the probabilistic ground motions at 2%
probability of exceedance in 50 years for most of the central U.S. During 2003, changes
were made twice to the 2002 maps but these changes only affect some areas of the West
Coast.
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Fig. 3-20 – 2002 USGS Map for Peak Ground Acceleration in
rock with 10% probability of exceedance in 50 years

Fig. 3-21 – 2002 USGS Map for Peak Ground Acceleration in
rock with 3% probability of exceedance in 75 years (= to 2% in
50 years)
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Fig. 3-23 – 2002 USGS Map for S1 Spectral Acceleration in
rock with 3% probability of exceedance in 75 years (= to 2% in
50 years)

Fig. 3-22 – 2002 USGS Map for SS Spectral Acceleration in
rock with 3% probability of exceedance in 75 years (= to 2% in
50 years)
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In April 2004 the USGS included in their website the possibility of producing maps
for latitude and magnitude pairs. The Indiana PGA map for 475-year return period is
presented in Fig. 3-20 and for the 2500-year return period in Fig. 3-21, and the maps for
SS and S1 for 2500-year return period in Figures 3-22 and 3-23 respectively.
3.4.5 JTRP Project SPR 2812 – Analysis of Seismic Hazard Assessment for Indiana
A Joint Transportation Research Program Project (SPR 2812) lead by Purdue
Professors J. Haase and R. Nowack is currently working on an assessment of the seismic
hazard in Indiana with specific application to transportation structures. The results of this
research were not available to be used in the Emergency Routes Project but undoubtedly
will have a large impact in the application of future bridge design specifications for the
Indiana Department of Transportation and seismic rehabilitation policies to be used with
existing bridges. Once the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) is
adopted by AASHTO, and later by INDOT, the need for having an in-house State
assessment of the seismic risk to be coordinated with the USGS will become very
important.
The Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) includes in
Commentary to Section 3.10.2.1 a clause that reads: “In lieu of using the national ground
motion maps referenced in the Specification, ground motion response spectra may be
constructed based on approved State ground motion maps. To be accepted the
development of State maps should conform to the following:
1. The definition of design ground motion should be the same as described in Article
3.10.1.2 and Table 3.10.1-1.
2. Ground motion maps should be based on a detailed analysis demonstrated to lead
a quantification of ground motion at a regional scale that is as or more accurate
than achieved at the scale of the national maps. The analysis should include:
characterization of seismic sources and ground motion that incorporates current
scientific knowledge; incorporation of uncertainty in seismic source and ground
motion models and parameter values used in the analysis; detailed documentation
of map development; detailed peer review. The peer review process should

95

preferably include one or mode individuals from the U.S. Geological Survey who
participated in the development of the national maps.”

3.4.6 Comments on the results from the different maps and bridge design requirements
Mapped values for acceleration in rock in Bloomington, Evansville, Indianapolis,
Jasper, New Albany, Terre Haute, and Vincennes (see Fig. 3-24 for location) are shown
as read from the different seismic risk maps in Table 3-4.

Indianapolis

Terre Haute
Bloomington

Vincennes
Jasper

New Albany

Evansville

Fig. 3-24 – Location where acceleration mapped values are compared for the different
seismic risk map versions (see Table 3-4). Base map shows INDOT districts.
In comparing the values shown in Table 3-4 is must be noticed that the values from
the 1949 map developed by the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey [Housner, 1970] and in
the 1975 AASHTO Interim [AASHTO, 1975] are higher, as a rule, than the values for
peak ground acceleration contained in Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th
Edition of the AASHTO Standard Specifications AASHTO, 2002]. It may be argued than
the values contained in Division I-A correspond to EPA (Effective Peak Ground
Acceleration) which takes into account several additional parameters such as duration of
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the strong ground motion and are not directly comparable to the instrumental peak
ground acceleration recoded in an accelerometer, in addition to the acceleration in the
1949 and 1975 documents not being defined clearly with respect to mean return period.

AASHTO
Div. I-A

1996
USGS
Maps

2002
USGS
Maps

Jasper
(Du Bois)

New Albany
(Floyd)

Terre Haute
(Vigo)

Vincennes
(Knox)

AASHTO
1975
Interim

Indianapolis
(Marion)

1949
USCGS

Evansville
(Vanderburgh)

Map

City (County)
→
Parameter
Presented ↓

Bloomington
(Monroe)

Table 3-4 – Seismic Zone definition and mapped values of acceleration for selected cities
in Indiana for the different maps

Zone

2

2

1

2

1

2

2

PGA

0.16g

0.16g

0.08g

0.16g

0.08g

0.16g

0.16g

Zone

2

3

2

2

2

2

2

A (PGA)

0.22g

0.50g

0.22g

0.22g

0.22g

0.22g

0.22g

A (PGA)
10% PE 50y
PGA
10% PE 50y
PGA
2% PE 50y
SS
2% PE 50y
S1
2% PE 50y
PGA
10% PE 50y
PGA
2% PE 50y
SS
2% PE 50y
S1
2% PE 50y

0.078g 0.085g 0.063g 0.075g 0.068g 0.070g 0.090g
0.045g 0.130g 0.032g 0.070g 0.039g 0.056g 0.110g
0.14g

0.49g

0.08g

0.20g

0.12g

0.08g

0.40g

0.28g

0.80g

0.20g

0.60g

0.22g

0.36g

0.80g

0.12g

0.30g

0.10g

0.16g

0.14g

0.14g

0.20g

0.046g 0.120g 0.034g 0.070g 0.043g 0.060g 0.100g
0.12g

0.40g

0.10g

0.20g

0.12g

0.16g

0.30g

0.28g

0.80g

0.20g

0.60g

0.28g

0.36g

0.60g

0.12g

0.20g

0.10g

0.16g

0.12g

0.12g

0.16g

The maps in current bridge design requirements contained in Division I-A of the
AASHTO Standard Specifications were developed by the USGS in the 1970’s and
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updated in 1988 and they are comparable in respect of having the same mean return
period with the 1996 and 2002 PGA USGS maps for 10% probability of exceedance in
50 years (Figures 3-15 and 3-20). The impact of the knowledge that has been
accumulated about the New Madrid and Wabash Valley Seismic Zones is evident in the
more detailed acceleration values reported. The values of PGA for the same return period
in the new 1996 and 2002 maps are lower for Bloomington, Indianapolis, Japer, New
Albany and Terre Haute, and higher for Evansville and Vincennes. This is consistent with
the reported new understanding of the tectonic process of the Wabash Valley Seismic
Zone and if the new maps were made part of Division I-A of the AASHTO Standard
Specification the impact on the design of new bridges in Indiana would be marginal if not
less demanding in many cases.
In order to assess the impact of adopting the proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic
Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) [NCHRP, 2002] as seen solely from the design acceleration
point of view the following aspects come into play: (a) a change from a 475-year to a
2500-year return period design earthquake, (b) a change from peak ground acceleration
(effective or accelerographic reported) description of the design ground motion to be
routinely converted into a design spectrum to a new direct definition of the design
spectrum, (c) site effects that amplify design acceleration in a different way including
now short period accelerations along with long period ones both of them specially
affecting the low acceleration range where precisely Indiana sites are located, and (d) use
of a “frequent” earthquake for serviceability assessment.
The pertinent comments will follow in the same order listed. Although, the research
presented in this report deals mainly with existing bridges — the reference for any bridge
upgrade has been customarily related to current or in the process of being adopted
requirements for new bridges — the approach adopted minimizes the dependence on the
seismic risk assessment and focus on the expected behavior for increasingly severe
ground motions without putting a tap on them.
(a) Impact of change of design event return period — It is debatable that with a
relatively short-timed documented record of events proper extrapolations can be
performed. Extrapolation is common in other civil engineering disciplines with
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acceptable results from the point of view of proper design parameters and public
awareness of the problems involved in distinguishing between acceptable risk and
forecast. Flood control is a good example of the differences involved and the
acceptability of the design parameters involved. On the other hand, both extreme wind
design and earthquake resistant design have come into public scrutiny because of the gap
between code design parameters and reported measured values. This has brought a trend
to define design parameters in the same order of magnitude of the reported measured
values. The basis for this change is well documented in the related literature and the real
impact on the design procedures has been moderate because the reference to actual
behavior during catastrophic events is the judging parameter in most cases. The new
seismic risk maps presented in the USGS 1996 and 2002 maps describe a Maximum
Considered Earthquake (MCE) that is supposed to produce measurable parameters such
as peak ground acceleration of the same order of magnitude of those that may be
recorded in the occurrence of a catastrophic event. How these values are made
compatible with acceptable design parameters — from the economic and code
requirements perspectives — have been solved in different ways.
The building design requirements were the first to adopt this approach [NEHRP,
1997]. The MCE was accepted but the design ground motion was defined as 2/3 that
produced by the MCE. The end result was design parameters that did not differ much
from what was being used. The proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions
(NCHRP 12-49) [NCHRP, 2002] does not introduce the same reduction, although
changes the accepted Response Modification Factors (R) to higher values that may bridge
the difference (please compare values listed in Tables 2-3 and 2-8). Other subtle
difference between the approach for buildings and for bridges is that in the case of site
specific studies the building requirements require that the deterministic spectrum be
obtained from 150% the mean of the spectra computed for characteristic maximum
magnitude earthquakes while for bridges it requires the median-plus-one-standarddeviation which leads to 184% of the mean spectrum. One important conclusion is that in
the future the basic seismic risk design factors will be different for buildings and for
bridges although based on the same seismic risk maps.
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(b) Impact of change from PGA to spectral description — The description of the
design ground motion through a response spectrum was formalized in the ATC 3-06
project [ATC, 1978] based on the work of N. Newmark. The spectrum description was
based on two parameters defined as Effective Peak Acceleration (EPA) and Effective
Peak Velocity (EPV) that were related to the spectral ordinates as shown in Fig. 3-25
with EPA made equal to parameter Aa and EPV proportional to Av. This procedure was
the one adopted in ATC 6 for bridges and later in Division I-A of the Standard AASHTO
Specification and is the basis of current 17th edition with the acceleration parameter A
corresponding to the mapped value of Av of the 1988 maps[NEHRP, 1988] by the USGS
[Algermissen et al., 1990].
10

Sv
1
Spectral
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0.5
1.0
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Fig. 3-25 – EPA = Sa/2.5 and EPV = Sv/2.5 obtained from a response
spectrum with 5% damping as prescribed by ATC 3-06 [ATC, 1978]
The use of two different parameters to define the design response spectrum one based
on acceleration and the other based on velocity was a wise decision because attenuation
with distance for the two parameters is not the same. The 2.5 proportional constant was
developed by Newmark based on the study of many accelerograms and their
corresponding response spectrum and in general works well for most records but the
commentary of the ATC-3-06 made it clear that effective peak acceleration and effective
peak velocity were different from the peak acceleration in the accelerogram, and the peak
velocity obtained by integration of the accelerogram.
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The proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions moves away from this
definition of the design ground motion and directly states the design spectrum severing
the link with the effective peak ground acceleration and velocity, although it states a way
to obtain the peak ground acceleration as 0.4SDS as was shown in Fig. 2-21 thus
apparently keeping the same 2.5 ratio. As shown in Table 3-4 for the seven Indiana sites,
in the 2002 USGS maps the ratio between SS and PGA for the same return period reports
ratios between 2 and 3 with a mean of 2.27. Although these ratios are not fixed and will
probably change in the future as new versions of the maps appear, the impact of moving
from a PGA definition to a directly defined spectrum as the description of the design
ground motion is minor.
Figures 3-26 and 3-27 show the combined impact of the change in return period and
the spectral definition from the current Division I-A seismic design requirements response
spectrum to the one required in the proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD requirements using
the 2002 USGS maps.
Design Spectra - Rock
0.90
0.80
Draft LRFD - Evansville

0.70

Sa (g)

0.60
0.50
Draft LRFD - Jasper and Vincennes

0.40
Draft LRFD - Bloomington

0.30

Current Division I-A
Bloomington, Evansville,
Jasper, and Vincennes

0.20
0.10
0.00
0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

Period (s)

Fig. 3-26 – Bridge Design Spectra in rock for Bloomington, Evansville, Jasper, and
Vincennes in current Division I-A and proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD requirements
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Design Spectra - Rock
0.40
Draft LRFD - Terre Haute

0.35
Draft LRFD - New Albany

0.30

Sa (g)

0.25
Draft LRFD - Indianapolis

0.20
Current Division I-A
Indianapolis, New
Albany,
dT
H

0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
0.0

0.5
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2.0
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Fig. 3-27 – Bridge Design Spectra in rock for Indianapolis, New Albany, and Terre Haute
in current Division I-A and proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD requirements

Indianapolis
(Marion)

Jasper
(Du Bois)

New Albany
(Floyd)

Terre Haute
(Vigo)

Vincennes
(Knox)

AASHTO
SPC
A/A
Div. I-A (Essent./Other)
SHL
II
Proposed
SDAP
A2/
Draft
(Life S. /Oper.) CDE
LRFD
SDR
2/3
(Life S. /Oper.)

Evansville
(Vanderburgh)

Specs

City (County)
→
Requirements
↓

Bloomington
(Monroe)

Table 3-5 – Analysis and Design requirements for selected cities in Indiana for the
current Division I-A and proposed Draft LRFD requirements (spectral values in rock)

A/A

A/A

A/A

A/A

A/A

A/A

IV
CDE/
CDE

II
A2/
CDE

III
BCDE/
CDE

II
A2/
CDE

5/6

2/3

3/4

2/3

III
III
BCDE/ BCDE/
CDE
CDE
3/4

3/4

Table 3-5 shows the implication from the point of view of the corresponding
associated design analysis and detailing requirements presenting the Seismic
Performance Category (SPC) (see Table 2-1) of the current requirements and for the
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proposed Draft LRFD requirements the Seismic Hazard Level (SHL) (see Tables 2-5 and
2-6), the Seismic Design and Analysis Procedure (SDAP) (see Table 2-7), and Seismic
Detailing Requirements (SDR) (see Tables 2-9 and 2-10).
(c) Impact of change of site effects evaluation procedure — The USGS 1996 and
2002 maps are defined at the B-C soil profile type interface (see Table 2-11) which is the
dividing line between rock and very dense soil or soft rock. The soil amplification factors
are both Fa =1.0 and Fv = 1.0 for soil profiles type B. This is similar to the Soil Profile
Type I of Division I-A of the current 17th Edition of the Standard AASHTO Specifications
for which has a Site Coefficient S =1.0 (see Fig. 2-16). Up to this point the procedures are
similar. When other soil profile types come into play, the difference is large because the
proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) [NCHRP, 2002] has
soil amplification factors Fa that affects the short period part of the design spectrum.
AASHTO current Standard Specifications does not have a comparable soil dependent
factor. Both Fa and Fv are acceleration dependent with comparatively larger values for
lower accelerations (see Figures 2-24 and 2-25). Just for comparison purposes a site,
common in Indiana, with more than 30 ft of soft to medium stiff soil under current
Division I-A requirements would be a Type III soil profile and would have a Site
Coefficient S = 1.5 that amplify the medium to long period part of the design spectrum.
The same soil would probably be classified as a Type D Stiff Soil when using the
proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions. Table 3-6 shows the values obtained
for the cases being use for comparison.
For the short period portion of the design spectrum under the proposed Draft Seismic
Provisions the amplification caused by the soil profile would be 18% to 60% percent
higher than the current requirements with no amplification required. For the medium to
long period portion of the design spectrum the values under the proposed Draft Seismic
Provisions the amplification caused by the soil profile would be 33% to 60% percent
higher than the current requirements. The reason for this large impact is linked to Indiana
having mapped accelerations in the low range where the soil amplification effect is
relatively larger.
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Indianapolis
(Marion)

Jasper
(Du Bois)

New Albany
(Floyd)

Terre Haute
(Vigo)

Vincennes
(Knox)

A (PGA)
AASHTO 10% PE 50y
Div. I-A Site Coefficient
S
SS
2% PE 50y
Draft
AASHTO Soil Type D
Factor Fa
LRFD plus
2002
S1
USGS
2% PE 50y
Maps
Soil Type D
Factor Fv

Evansville
(Vanderburgh)

Specs

City (County)
→
Parameter
Presented ↓

Bloomington
(Monroe)

Table 3-6 – Values of the site coefficient for a Type III soil profile under current Division
I-A requirements and a Type D soil under proposed Draft LRFD Provisions

0.09g

0.09g

0.06g

0.09g

0.06g

0.06g

0.09g

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

0.28g

0.80g

0.20g

0.60g

0.28g

0.36g

0.60g

1.58

1.18

1.60

1.32

1.58

1.51

1.32

0.12g

0.20g

0.10g

0.16g

0.12g

0.12g

0.16g

2.32

2.00

2.40

2.16

2.32

2.32

2.16

Figures 3-28 and 3-29 show the combined impact of the change in return period, the
spectral definition and the soil amplification requirements for a Type III soil profile from
the current Division I-A seismic design requirements design spectrum to the one required
in the proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD requirements for a Type D profile using the 2002
USGS maps.
Table 3-7 shows the implication from the point of view of the corresponding
associated design analysis and detailing requirements presenting the Seismic
Performance Category (SPC) (see Table 2-1) of the current requirements and for the
proposed Draft LRFD requirements the Seismic Hazard Level (SHL) (see Tables 2-5 and
2-6), the Seismic Design and Analysis Procedure (SDAP) (see Table 2-7), and Seismic
Detailing Requirements (SDR) (see Tables 2-9 and 2-10).
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Design Spectra - Type III or Type D Soil Profile
1.00
Draft LRFD - Evansville

0.90
Draft LRFD - Jasper and Vincennes

0.80
0.70

Sa (g)
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Fig. 3-28 – Bridge Design Spectra in soil for Bloomington, Evansville, Jasper, and
Vincennes in current Division I-A and proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD requirements
Design Spectra - Type III or Type D Soil Profile
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Fig. 3-29 – Bridge Design Spectra in soil for Indianapolis, New Albany, and Terre Haute
in current Division I-A and proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD requirements
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It is evident from the values presented for rock and for soil that the impact of the
proposed Draft LRFD requirements is significant both for the design forces and for the
analysis and detailing requirements. Under the current Division I-A requirements the
analysis and detailing are the simplest (SPC-A) while for the proposed Draft LRFD the
most strict covered (SHL-IV) are required for Evansville and Vincennes in both cases
(rock and soil) studied and for Jasper in soil. In no case the simpler (SHL-I) is required.
The implications from the point of view of complexity of design and cost of
construction are significant.

Jasper
(Du Bois)

New Albany
(Floyd)

Terre Haute
(Vigo)

Vincennes
(Knox)

AASHTO
SPC
A/A
A/A
Div. I-A (Essent./Other)
SHL
III
IV
Proposed
SDAP
BCDE/ CDE/C
Draft
(Life S. /Oper.) CDE
DE
LRFD
SDR
3/4
5/6
(Life S. /Oper.)

Indianapolis
(Marion)

Evansville
(Vanderburgh)

Specs

City (County)
→
Requirements
↓

Bloomington
(Monroe)

Table 3-7 – Analysis and Design requirements for selected cities in Indiana for the
current Division I-A and proposed Draft LRFD requirements (spectral values in soil)

A/A

A/A

A/A

A/A

A/A

II
A2/
CDE

IV
III
III
IV
CDE/ BCDE/ BCDE/ CDE/
CDE
CDE
CDE
CDE

2/3

5/6

3/4

3/4

5/6

(d) Impact of use of “frequent” earthquake — The proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD
Seismic Provisions introduces a frequent earthquake to be used in verification of
serviceability of the bridge. Figure 3-19 shows the value 0.06g obtained for SS at
Vincennes for this earthquake based on results of the 1996 USGS maps. The impact of
using such a low spectral acceleration for verification of serviceability will be probably
negligible.
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CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATION OF SEISMIC
VULNERABILITY OF THE INDIANA EMERGENCY ROUTES

4.1 Route Alternatives
U.S. Congress and the Federal Administration through the FHWA have defined
priority and critical routes in different instances. One such example is the National Truck
Network established in 1982 by the Surface Transportation Assistance Act in order to
designate a national network of highways that would allow the passage of trucks of
specified minimum dimensions and weight. Figure 4-1 shows the National Truck
Network in southwestern Indiana.

Fig. 4-1 – National Truck Network in southwestern Indiana
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One more recent highway system definition is the National Highway System. The
National Highway System Designation Act of 1995 selected 264,000 km of roadways as
the National Highway System (NHS) including 4,750 km in Indiana. Figure 4-2 shows
the whole National Highway System.

Fig. 4-2 – National Highway System
NHS consists of five parts. The first component is the Interstate Highway System,
which accounts for almost 30 percent of NHS. The second component includes 21
congressionally designated high-priority corridors (see Fig. 4-3), three of which include
highways in Indiana as part of them. The third component is the non-interstate portion of
the Strategic Highway Corridor Network identified by the Department of Defense in
cooperation with the Department of Transportation. These corridors and the interstate
highways are critical strategic links. The fourth component is major Strategic Highway
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Corridor Network connectors linking major military installations and other defenserelated facilities to the Strategic corridors. The fifth component are important arterial
highways that serve interstate and interregional travel and that provide connections to
major ports, airports, public transportation facilities, and other intermodal facilities.

Fig. 4-3 – Congressional High Priority Corridors
The National Highway System and its role in determining geometric design of
highways is discussed in Section 40-1.03 (01) of Chapter 40 "Basic Design Controls" of
the Indiana Department of Transportation’s Design Manual.
Figure 4-4 shows the highways designated in Indiana as part of the National Highway
System. It includes in the north-south direction: SR-69 from I-64 to Mount Vernon in the
Kentucky border (Ohio River), US 41 from Terre Haute to Evansville and across the
Ohio River to Kentucky, I-164 from I-64 to Evansville, SR-57 from the intersection with
SR-67/US-231 to I-64, US-231 from the intersection with SR-67 to Kentucky border
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(Ohio River) south of Rockport, and SR-67 from Indianapolis to the intersection with SR57. In the east-west direction includes US-50 from the Ohio border to Vincennes in the
Illinois border (Wabash River), I-64 for the Ohio border to Illinois border (Wabash
River), SR-66 from Rockport on the Kentucky border (Ohio River) to Evansville, and
SR-62 fro Evansville to Mount Vernon on the Kentucky border (Ohio River).

Fig. 4-4 – Highways in Indiana designated as part of the National Highway System
From the methodological point of view it is evident that the routes in southwestern
Indiana contained in both the National Truck Network and the National Highway
Network had to be studied as candidates for the Earthquake Emergency Routes of
Indiana.
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Part I of this report presents different alternatives for Earthquake Emergency Routes
for the State of Indiana based on trade off of three parameters, namely total travel time,
population covered, and number of square feet of bridge deck (as a parameter associated
with eventual retrofit cost).
The Indiana Department of Transportation provides maintenance within the State to
Interstate Highways, U.S. Routes, and Indiana State Highways. County roads and city
roads are excluded unless special agreements are in effect. The grid of routes presented in
Fig. 4-5 corresponds to routes that belong to the National Truck Network, the National
Highway System, and are within the domain of the Indiana Department of
Transportation, and is presented as the preferred choice of Earthquake Emergency Routes
of Indiana.

Fig. 4-5 – Selected grid of Earthquake Emergency Routes
in the Indot Vincennes District
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The grid of routes presented in Fig. 4-5 comprises the following:
•

US 41 from Terre Haute South to Evansville and the Kentucky border (Ohio
River).

•

SR 67 from Freedom to SR 57 junction and SR 57 from SR 67 to I-64.

•

I-164 from I-64 to US 41.

•

US 231 from SR 54 at Bloomfield south to Rockport and to Kentucky border
(Ohio River).

•

SR 37 from Bloomington south to SR 237 and SR 237 to Cannelton and the
Kentucky border (Ohio River).

•

SR 154 from Illinois border (Wabash River) to US 41, and SR 54 from US 41 east
to SR 45.

•

US 50 from Illinois border (Wabash River) at Vincennes east to SR 446 east of
Bedford.

•

SR 64 from Illinois border (Wabash River) to Princeton to US 41.

•

I-64 from Illinois border (Wabash River) to SR 66 at Carefree.

•

SR 57 from US 41 past Evansville Airport to I-164.

•

SR 62 from Illinois border (Wabash River) thru Evansville to US 231

•

SR 66 from US 41 east to Rockport.

4.2 Available Information
The Indiana Department of Transportation has a very well organized data base where
information for the purposes of present project was obtained. The information used was
the following:
•

Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database – This database was modernized
just before the initiation of the project. It consists in a MS Access database that
contains records of all bridges being maintained by Indot. It follows Federal
Highway Administration guidelines [FHWA, 1996] and contains additional
information beyond the FHWA requirements. Only the portion related to bridges
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in the Vincennes Indot District was used containing 827 bridges, distributed by
Counties as shown in Table 4-1. See Fig. 4-6 for their location.
Table 4-1 – Distribution by County of Vincennes District bridges
contained in Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database
County
Crawford
Daviess
Dubois
Gibson
Greene
Knox
Lawrence
Martin
Monroe
Orange
Owen
Perry
Pike
Posey
Spencer
Sullivan
Vanderburgh
Vigo
Warrick
Washington
Total

•

No. Vincennes District
Bridges in Database
35
22
50
66
41
42
36
51
1
27
60
62
63
65
60
40
121
84
72
1
827

Bridge Drawings – The bridge drawings at the Indot Vincennes District offices
were consulted for bridges located on the selected Earthquake Emergency
Routes. The drawings contain the original design plans, those corresponding to
changes and modifications, and a description of the soil boring performed at the
time of design of the bridge reporting SPT values in many cases.

•

GIS Information – Geographical Information System (GIS) related to the State of
Indiana, and other information was supplied by Indot. This information can also
be

downloaded

from

the

following

Indiana

http://igs.indiana.edu/arcims/southwest/download.html
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University

webpage:

Fig. 4-6 – Vincennes District bridges contained in Indot Inspection
and Maintenance Database (those whose drawings were used in this
research are marked as blue filled dots)
4.3 GIS Implementation
A two tier approach was developed for managing the information described in the
previous section. The first stage consisted in developing tools for assessing the
vulnerability condition of the studied Earthquake Emergency Routes. The second stage
consisted in implementing the results in a dynamic database with Geographical
Information Systems (GIS) capabilities.
For the first stage a database was developed as a search-engine to allow the static and
dynamic evaluation of the condition of the selected critical routes prior to and following
an earthquake disaster. Several specialized software programs were developed to act as
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independent units — all of them interacting with the database as needed — for evaluating
the different sources of vulnerability along the Earthquake Emergency Routes.
Three modules were developed, as shown in Fig. 4-7. The first module corresponds to
a Data Management Module. This module handles the information related to the routes,
and bridges. The information included is the one described in the previous section
obtained from Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database.

Data Management Module

FEMA
HAZUS

Pattern Recognition Module

Mitigation
Simulation

Scenario Management Module
Response

Fig. 4-7 – Organization of the GIS implementation
The Pattern Recognition Module uses the information contained in the Data
Management Module to process and obtain vulnerability assessment of bridge structures
and geotechnical aspects of the bridges and routes and was used to feed information to
the Scenario Management Module.
The Scenario Management Module is implemented on the extraordinary capabilities
of HAZUS software developed by the Federal Management Agency [FEMA, 2005] that
is capable of accepting the feed-back of the results obtained from the Pattern Recognition
Module. HAZUS is capable of obtaining vulnerability assessments for any case in
particular for mitigation purposes, allows simulations for different earthquake occurrence
scenarios, and will allow in the future to be used when online capabilities are
implemented within Indot for monitoring response to an actual earthquake occurrence.
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4.4 Vulnerability Assessment Approach
The assessment of seismic vulnerability for a significant number of structures
requires the use of identification of patterns of behavior of these structures to the
envisioned earthquake ground motion. The approach used in comparable previous cases
has been to define groups of structures having similar properties or configuration for
which common behavior patterns can be defined. These behavior patterns have been
referred in the literature as fragility curves relating probability of having a particular type
of damage to a ground motion descriptor such as peak ground acceleration.
For implementation in this project several shortcomings were identified in using this
approach:
•

The inventory of bridges under study covers from bridges recently built to
bridges built in the 1910’s and 1920’s. Figure 4-8 shows the year of construction
of the Indot Vincennes District bridges. Establishing general fragility curves
giving probability that a certain type of damage occurs for such a diverse
inventory lead to many types of fragility curves and their use in establishing
actual vulnerability may be questionable.

•

Many of the bridges have been rebuilt (except bridges built after 1990) at
different moment. Figure 4-9 shows the percentage of the Vincennes District
bridges that have been rebuilt, and the average year when the rebuilding took
place. The influence of such a significant percentage of bridges having been
rebuilt makes the fragility curve type of approach even more difficult to apply.

•

Associating the bridge vulnerability of a set value of seismic risk assessment as
presented in a specific map, for example the one contained in Current 17th
Edition of the Standard AASHTO Specifications, will require a new assessment
if the map contained in the requirements changes. The adoption of new more
modern specifications will surely take place in the near future, but the nature of
the changes that will be introduced before adoption are unknown presently. The
adoption of the proposed Draft LRFD Seismic Requirements has been voted
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down by several states who have questioned the complexity and eventual
unneeded extra cost that their adoption will bring.

Decade Built (Vincennes District Bridges)
180
160
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No. of Bridges
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19901999

20002001

Fig. 4-8 – Number of bridges built per decade (Vincennes District)
Percentage of Bridges Rebuilt and Average Year of Rebuild
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Fig. 4-9 – Percentage of bridges rebuilt according to decade of construction and average
year when rebuilding was made (Vincennes District bridges)
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Based on these limitations a different approach was implemented in this study. The
approach used is based in selecting a number of bridges to study their seismic behavior
under varying earthquake ground motion severity thus making the study independent of
current requirements and making the results valid under mapped values having different
return period or acceleration (peak ground or spectral) values. Using the results from the
study of these bridges a procedure to extrapolate the results to the rest of the bridges in
the Vincennes District was devised, requiring as information only that contained in the
Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database. This establishes two levels of confidence on
the vulnerability assessment. The first one is general and covers all bridges in the
Inspection and Maintenance Database. The second one is more detailed because is based
on the information contained in the bridge drawings. The advantage of this approach is
that it permits to gage the vulnerability of the whole bridge inventory. It permits devising
policies of general nature with respect to the selection, or variation in the future, of the
Earthquake Emergency Routes. It also permits a more detailed assessment by supplying
additional information to the GIS system data base, in case the detailed data is not already
in the system. A detailed explanation of the procedure is given in Chapter 6.

4.5 Mitigation and Simulation
Vulnerability mitigation policies that cover the bridge inventory in southwestern
Indiana are possible using the HAZUS GIS system. The assessment of the impact of a
variation of the seismic risk maps or the simulation of occurrence of an earthquake with
specific location and magnitude can be easily achieved by matching the new values to the
already computed curves relating the bridge expected damage to the level of acceleration.
If a bridge is retrofitted, the changes introduced to the bridge substructure or
superstructure can be introduced to the database for future assessments or simulations.
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CHAPTER 5 GEOTECHNICAL ASSOCIATED SOURCES OF VULNERABILITY

5.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the methodology implemented for processing the geotechnical
information available for the selected bridges and to be used, in the future, as the
database is expanded by adding more information from drawings or from soil
explorations. The Inspection and Maintenance Database does not contain geotechnical
information; therefore, the approximate vulnerability assessment does not include
evaluation of the geotechnical sources of vulnerability.
Not all the studied bridge drawings contained soil exploration boring information. In
the majority of cases studied the boring logs included in the drawings contained the soil
description for each layer and reported the Standard Penetration Test (SPT) values at
appropriate intervals. In rock sites many of the boring logs report the recovery percentage
appropriately. In some instances the boring logs only report the soil classification for
each layer without any SPT values. Textural description of the soil is the accepted
practice for defining the soil classification in the field by the boring team to be reported
in the boring log. In general, especially for older borings, the description is based on the
U.S. Department of Agriculture textural classification chart [USDA, 1951] presented in
Fig. 5-1. Percentages of sand, silt, and clay are established visually based only in the
particle size. The soil classification description used corresponds to the one in the zone of
the figure where the three percentage values meet. No laboratory procedures are involved
in assigning the soil layer description. The AASHTO Soil Classification System or the
Unified Soil Classification (ASTM D2487 — “Standard Classification of Soils for
Engineering Purposes — Unified Soil Classification System”) require laboratory tests
and are routinely performed on the soil samples and included later in the soils report.
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Fig. 5-1 – USDA Textural Soil Classification Chart [USDA, 1951] routinely
used for soil classification by soil exploration boring teams
The software implementation uses the soil exploration boring reports contained in the
selected bridge drawings to study the geotechnical sources of vulnerability for each of the
bridge sites. Other sites can be studied by adding information to the database in the
future.
Two evaluations are performed using the boring information: a soil profile
amplification assessment and a liquefaction potential assessment. These evaluations are
made for varying peak ground accelerations in rock to be consistent with the adopted
approach in this research project of obtaining the vulnerability for different levels of
ground motion at the site and not to depend on a unique description of ground motion as
contained in a particular set of seismic risk maps. Soil profile amplification and
liquefaction potential are acceleration dependent; therefore, the values obtained cover
different seismic risk levels.
The possibilities of evaluation are presented in the main screen of the software
developed for this purpose, as shown in Fig. 5-2.
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Fig. 5-2 – Main screen for the liquefaction evaluation module developed
This module permits to enter, save, and retrieve boring information for any bridge site
borings, and to process it to obtain the soil profile amplification potential, evaluate the
liquefaction susceptibility, and to save to results for further analysis.

5.2 Soil profile amplification
The amplification potential of the soil profile is needed for the liquefaction evaluation
and for the bridge vulnerability assessment; in the former case for estimating the ground
motion acceleration at the surface and in the later case for defining the ground motion
description for evaluation of the bridge. The methodology used is based on the procedure
contained in the 2000 NEHRP Provisions [NEHRP, 2000] as described in Section 2.3.1
of this report.
The first step is to define the site class (A to F) as presented in Table 2-11. The
classification is made using average shear wave velocity ( vs ), average standard
penetration resistance ( N ), average standard penetration resistance for the cohesionless
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soils only ( N ch ), and average undrained shear strength in case of cohesive soils ( su ). The
software implementation is capable of using the more appropriate parameter from the soil
exploration and laboratory reports. For the selected bridges because only Standard
Penetration Test are reported the amplification potential is evaluated from the average
standard penetration resistance ( N ) computed for the upper 100 ft (30 m) of the site
profile using Eq. (5-1). Profiles containing distinctly different layers are subdivided into
those layers by a number that ranges from 1 to n.
n

N=

∑d
i =1
n

i

di
∑
N
i =1
i

(5-1)

where di is the thickness of any layer between 0 and 100 ft (30 m) and N is the Standard
Penetration Resistance (SPT) not to exceed 100 blows/ft as directly measured in the field
without corrections.
Once the site is classified as being Class A to E (Class F requires a site specific
evaluation) the curves presented in Figures 2-24 and 2-25 are used to obtain the
amplification parameters Fa and Fv for the acceleration value under study. Spectral
acceleration (Ss or S1) values are used directly to obtain Fa and Fv. If peak acceleration in
rock is used (A) the value is multiplied by 2.5 to be used in Fig. 2-24 to obtain Fa and is
used directly in Fig. 2-35 to obtain Fv.
The values obtained were compared with results using the program SHAKE as
described for several sites in Indiana in [Bobet et al., 2001] obtaining good correlations of
the amplification levels obtained.
Figure 5-3 shows the results obtained for a specific case. The figure reports that in
this case (Bridge No. 41-42-04638) the bridge drawings included four borings. It also
indicates that the procedure classified the soil profile in all borings as being Type E. The
statistics shown in the screen indicate the number of borings that report a certain soil
profile type. As opposed to buildings, where usually a single soil profile type is present,
bridges by being extended structures may have different soil profile types under the
abutments or at the bridge piers. This is specially true in alluvial plain sites, where many
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of Indiana bridges are sited. Figure 5-3 also shows in graphic form the relationship
between the horizontal acceleration in rock and the horizontal acceleration in surface for
peak ground acceleration, or spectral ordinates (Ss and S1).

Fig. 5-3 – Typical results for soil profile classification and amplification potential
In total 182 bridge sites located on the defined Earthquake Emergency Routes were
evaluated. This includes all the bridges located on the Emergency Routes whose
drawings contained soil boring records shown as part of them. The information was used
directly to define the soil profile type for each boring using the procedure described.
When reporting the soil profile type that causes the maximum amplification the results
shown in Fig. 5-4 are obtained indicating that for 159 bridges out of 182 (87%) the soil
profile is classified as Type E (see Table 2-11 for description of the soil profiles). Soil
profile Type D is obtained in 16 bridges (9%), soil profile types (B and C) just carry 7
bridges (4%), and none are classified in soil profile Type A. These results are hardly
surprising for the State of Indiana where very few rock type sites are found.
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Notwithstanding, this situations has important implications from the point of view that
mild earthquakes may produce moderate to high peak ground accelerations on surface
due to the soil amplification caused by the intervening soil responding essentially in a
elastic manner without the possibility of a decrease caused by the damping inherent in the
nonlinear response of the soil ever occurring.
Soil Profile Type for Studied Bridge Sites
E
87%

A
0%
D
9%

C
2%

B
2%

Fig. 5-4 – Worse soil profile type at bridge site for 182 bridges
on the Earthquake Emergency Routes
5.3 Liquefaction
The liquefaction potential is evaluated using the procedure described in Section 2.3.2
of this report. The software implementation accepts information from field test in the
form of cone penetration test (CPT), standard penetration test (SPT), or shear-wave
velocity (Vs) measurements. The application of the procedure using the boring
information available was restricted to evaluations using Standard Penetration Test
values, but as more information is included in the database it is desirable to use more
reliable field information such as CPT or shear wave velocity measurements for
evaluations in the future.
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For the selected bridge evaluation corrections, as described in Section 2.3.2, for fines
content and earthquake magnitude were implemented. The corrections to SPT listed in
Table 2-12 were implemented but not used (except overburden pressure and rod length
corrections that were used in all cases) due to lack of information on the boring
equipment and procedures as reported in the bridge drawings. As the database is
expanded in the future the software implementation permits the use of these corrections if
reported in the boring log.
Fines content in a soil can have a significant influence in the liquefaction potential of
a soil layer. The procedure to account for the presence of fines in the evaluation of the
liquefaction potential is to adjust the value of the corrected blow count (N1)60 using Eq.
(2-22) to an equivalent value for clean sand, (N1)60cs. The effect of the adjustment is an
increase of the value of (N1)60 effectively used. It is considered [Youd and Idriss, 2001]
that clean granular soils having a value of (N1)60 greater than 30 are too dense to liquefy
and are classed as non-liquefiable. For most soil classification procedures, as shown in
Fig. 5-5, fines are considered particles that can pass through a No. 200 sieve
corresponding to a 0.08 mm size particle.

Fig. 5-5 – Soil particle size according to several soil classification
procedures [Winkerkorn and Fang, 1975]
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Boring reports as presented in bridge drawings do not include the results from the
sieve analysis. In order to adjust the fine content of the soils as reported in the boring logs
the percentage of silt and clay was determined from the soil classification reported in the
borings using the chart presented in Fig. 5-1 or alternatively for some soil descriptions
not contained there using the values suggested by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) classification as shown in Fig. 5-6. The implemented software permits editing the
value of the fines content for any soil layer when needed.
The influence of the fines content in the evaluation of the liquefaction potential
cannot be underestimated and is recommendable that in the future, as more sites are
included in the database, that fine content be reported from sieve analysis of the soil.

Fig. 5-6 – FAA textural classification of soils [Winkerkorn and Fang, 1975]
When evaluating liquefaction potential the expected number of cycles needed for the
pore pressure increase development has been traditionally associated with the causing
earthquake magnitude. The developers of the liquefaction evaluation procedure used the
moment magnitude scale — Mw. Magnitude for the 1811-1812 New Madrid events has
been estimated using different techniques, reporting values that range from a lower value

126

of 6 to an upper value of 9. The magnitude scale in which these values have been
reported is uncertain and in some cases is not reported.
The preference for moment magnitude is based on being the most consistent scale
along a wide magnitude range, but it is the scale that requires more instrumental
information to define its assigned value. Recent studies made by the USGS [Frankel et
al., 2002] for the 2002 seismic risk maps update have set a maximum characteristic
magnitude for the central and eastern U.S. for purposes of seismic risk assessment. The
scale in which the characteristic magnitude is expressed is moment magnitude and has
direct use in liquefaction potential evaluation.
Figure 5-7 shows the maximum characteristic moment magnitude assessed for the
central and eastern U.S. A value of Mw = 6.5 is given for all the state of Indiana, except
the Wabash River Valley that is assigned a value Mw = 7.5. JTRP Project SPR 2812 on
Analysis of Seismic Hazard Assessment for Indiana being currently conducted by Purdue
Professors Haase and Nowack will surely give more insight on the values of Mw to be
used and implemented in future liquefaction potential assessments. The software
developed permits the variation of the magnitude to use.

Fig. 5-7 – Maximum magnitude for the Central and Eastern U.S. [Frankel et al., 2002]
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It is interesting to note that if the proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD seismic
requirements are adopted in Indiana, for the seven Indiana cities evaluated for
comparison purposes in section 3.4.6 of this report any new bridge design would require
liquefaction evaluation for the bridge site. Table 2-13 indicates the cases in which no
liquefaction evaluation is needed for Seismic Detailing Requirements (SDR) 3 to 6 that
require in all cases magnitudes lower than 6.4.
Typical results screens from the implemented software are shown in Figures 5-8 to 510. In Fig. 5-8 the description of the boring is given reporting the soil layers and the
Standard Penetration Test (SPT) values and the water table level.

Fig. 5-8 – Example description of boring log as presented in the implemented software
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In Fig 5-9 the safety factor for liquefaction is given. The software first searches for
the lowest surface ground acceleration that will produce liquefaction — in this case it is
15% of the acceleration of gravity g — and reports the safety factor along the soil profile.
In this case liquefaction occurs in a sand layer that reports a SPT value of 17 blows per
foot at elevation 410. The peak ground acceleration in rock that produces the acceleration
in surface leading to liquefaction corresponds in this case to 6% g. The soil profile
reported by this boring is classified as being Type E and for a peak rock acceleration of
6%g the amplification factor, Fa, has a value of 2.5 thus converting the 6% g acceleration
in rock into 15% g acceleration in surface.

Fig. 5-9 – Example description of liquefaction safety factor for the lowest ground surface
acceleration inducing liquefaction. In this case 15% g leads to a safety factor of 0.9
meaning that liquefaction would occur
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Different peak ground accelerations in rock can be evaluated. Figure 5-10 shows the
results in the liquefaction potential as described by the liquefaction safety factor for peak
ground acceleration in rock of 4%g leading to a ground surface acceleration of 10%g the
safety factor against liquefaction increases to a value of 1.4 thus reporting no
liquefaction. In this manner the safety factor is obtained for different acceleration
scenarios.

Fig. 5-10 – Example description of liquefaction safety factor for a different ground
surface acceleration from the one shown in Fig. 5-9 not inducing liquefaction. In this case
the lowest safety factor for 10% g surface acceleration is 1.4
The factor of safety for liquefaction for a range of ground surface acceleration is
stored in the database. This permits to handle different seismic risk scenarios without
having to reprocess the boring information in each instance.
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Bridge 050-42-06963 reported in the previous figures (Fig. 5-8 to Fig. 5-10) has
description for four borings included in the drawings. Borings 1 and 3 are classified as
being Soil Profile Type D while borings 2 and 4 are classified as Soil Profile Type E. The
peak ground acceleration in rock required to produce liquefaction obtained were 6% g for
borings No. 1, 2, and 4 and 4% g for boring No. 3.
The situation just described in present in many of the 182 bridges studied along the
Earthquake Emergency Routes. The evaluation was performed for two values of Mw (Mw
= 6.5 and Mw = 7.5). Table 5-1 presents a summary of the minimum peak ground
acceleration in rock required to produce liquefaction at bridge sites studied. The
information is presented for the two moment magnitude studied.

Table 5-1 – Minimum peak ground acceleration in rock required to produce liquefaction
on the 182 bridges sites studied along the Earthquake Emergency Routes
PGA rock (g)
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.10
0.11
0.12
0.13
0.14
0.15
0.16
0.17
0.18
0.28
0.42
0.48
No liquefaction

Mw=7.5
2
27
23
10
3
2
1
4
1
2
1
1

1
1

103
182

No. of Bridges
%
Mw=6.5
1.1%
14.8%
3
12.6%
18
5.5%
24
1.6%
10
1.1%
7
0.5%
2
2.2%
2
0.5%
1
1.1%
0.5%
1
0.5%
2
0.0%
2
0.0%
1
0.0%
0.5%
0.5%
2
0.0%
1
0.0%
1
0.0%
1
56.6%
104
182
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%
0.0%
1.6%
9.9%
13.2%
5.5%
3.8%
1.1%
1.1%
0.5%
0.0%
0.5%
1.1%
1.1%
0.5%
0.0%
0.0%
1.1%
0.5%
0.5%
0.5%
57.1%

With the minimum peak ground acceleration in rock needed to produce liquefaction
at the bridge site it is possible to have a general picture of the vulnerability caused by
liquefaction for the bridges along the Earthquake Emergency Routes. This information is
presented in Fig. 5-11. In this figure the percentage of bridge sites that may be affected
by liquefaction when the peak ground acceleration in rock reaches a certain value may be
obtained. At peak ground accelerations in rock of the order of 10% g the curve flattens,
meaning that the number of bridges sites susceptible of liquefaction would remain
essentially the same even for higher accelerations. At this level of acceleration in rock
approximately 40% of the bridges located along the Earthquake Emergency Routes
would have reported liquefaction. This acceleration is of the same order of magnitude of
those contained in current Division I-A of AASHTO Standard Specifications.
% of bridges that will not have liquefaction by PGArock
100%
90%
80%

% of bridges

70%
60%
Mw=7.5
Mw=6.5

50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

PGArock (g)

Fig. 5-11 – Percentage of bridges along the Earthquake Emergency Routes that will not
have liquefaction at the site for a given peak ground acceleration in rock computed using
the minimum acceleration to produce liquefaction at the site
Liquefaction potential was computed at all borings for each of the studied bridge
sites. Only in few cases the minimum acceleration needed to produce liquefaction is the
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same for all borings. If instead of reporting the minimum peak ground acceleration in
rock the average acceleration for those borings reporting liquefaction is computed, the
vulnerability situation changes. Figure 5-12 shows the information computed for the
average peak ground acceleration in rock to produce liquefaction at the site. The curves
shown flatten at a higher acceleration (15% g) but show a similar trend. Using the
average peak ground acceleration in rock at the bridge site, the number of vulnerable
bridges due to liquefaction at the level of acceleration of the current AASHTO Standard
Specifications reduces to approximately 35% of the bridges on the Earthquake
Emergency Routes.
% of bridges that will not have liquefaction by PGArock
100%
90%
80%

% of bridges

70%
60%
Mw=7.5
Mw=6.5

50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

PGArock (g)

Fig. 5-12 – Percentage of bridges along the Earthquake Emergency Routes that will not
have liquefaction at the site for a given peak ground acceleration in rock computed using
the average acceleration to produce liquefaction at the site
The primary concern when interpreting the data just presented is related to the
difference in peak ground acceleration in rock values for the same bridge site. If the
difference between the minimum accelerations to produce liquefaction and the mean
acceleration for the same bridge site is relatively large, it indicates significant variations
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in the soil profile recorded in the soil exploration borings for the same bridge site. The
ratio of mean to minimum peak ground acceleration producing liquefaction at the same
bridge site has values that range from 1 to 6 with an average of the order of 1.4 for the
bridge sites studied, indicating significant variations in the soil profiles.
To emphasize the need for engineering judgment in interpreting the results presented,
the following example brings out features found in many of the bridges located in the
Earthquake Emergency Routes. Bridge 50-42-04625 on the Wabash River carries US
Route 50 across the river to Illinois. The bridge drawings contain records of 24 soil
borings made in 1960 all of them containing appropriate information (soil description and
standard penetration test – SPT – logs) to evaluate the soil amplification potential and the
liquefaction potential at each boring. The evaluation of the Soil Profile Type indicates
that the profile at one boring would be Type B, at five borings Type D, and Type E at the
remaining 18 borings. The general classification of the bridge site based on the softer
profile would assign the bridge site as being Type E. The liquefaction evaluation for the
borings report possibility of liquefaction in 11 out of the 24 borings for magnitude Mw =
7.5. Table 5-2 presents the peak ground acceleration in rock required for producing
liquefaction at each of the borings reporting liquefaction. In the same table the minimum
and maximum peak ground acceleration obtained is reported as well as the mean and
standard deviation for the acceleration.
In order to interpret the liquefaction potential computation for the studied bridges
besides the information presented, two other variables were studied:

•

Percentage of borings reporting liquefaction of the total number of borings.

•

Ratio of the range of peak ground acceleration in rock producing liquefaction
to the mean peak ground acceleration.

For Bridge 50-42-04625 the percentage of borings reporting liquefaction was 58%
and the ratio of the range of peak ground acceleration in rock producing liquefaction to
the mean peak ground acceleration was (0.36–0.05)/0.10 = 3.1. These values were
computed for all bridges reporting liquefaction and based on the values obtained a
recommendation was formulated dividing the bridges studied into four groups designated
as: bridges having no liquefaction, bridges with a high probability of liquefaction, bridges
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with an appreciable probability of liquefaction, and bridges having liquefaction but were
a wide variability of the results is present that require additional soil exploration and a
more in depth liquefaction study performed by geotechnical consultants.
Table 5-2 – Minimum peak ground acceleration in rock required to produce liquefaction
on the 11 borings that report liquefaction for Bridge 50-42-04625
Peak Ground
Acceleration in Rock
for liquefaction
8% g
8% g
9% g
7% g
6% g
6% g
8% g
36% g
5% g
7% g
7% g
5% g
36% g
10% g
9% g

Boring No.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Min. PGArock
Max. PGArock
Mean PGArock
Standard Deviation

Figure 5-13 presents the percentage of bridges studied that fall into the
recommendation categories for the two moment magnitude studied.
Other considerations that are beyond present study are related to issues related to
variation of the soil profile as used in the evaluation that may have occurred during the
years since the borings were performed. Other important consideration to take into
account is related to the water table at the site. Liquefaction can only occur in relatively
loose granular soils located under the water table. The potential for liquefaction studied
and reported used the water table level reported in the borings. The possibility of
variations of the water table level due to seasonal effect with respect to the moment the
borings were performed can affect the results presented. This is specially important for
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those cases not reporting liquefaction due to a depressed water table in cases were loose
granular soils exist at the site.
Recommendation
57%
60%

57%

50%
40%
24%
30%
13%
15% 5%

20%
10%

20%
8%

0%

Mw=6.5
Mw=7.5

No
Liquefaction

High
Appreciable
Liquefaction
Probability of
Probability of
But Wide
Liquefaction
Liquefaction
Variation in
Results - More
Studies
Needed

Fig. 5-13 – Recommendation for bridges located along the Earthquake Emergency
Routes
Using has HAZUS-MH [FEMA, 2005] — a GIS-based software tool developed by
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) — Indot bridge inventory was
assessed for the liquefaction potential that was evaluated using the actual soil borings
included in the bridge drawings, as described before. The Indot bridge data base was
integrated within HAZUS-MH and the GIS functions were activated. The liquefaction
potential was evaluated using HAZUS-MH own liquefaction potential evaluation
routines. This was performed for the Mw = 6.5 earthquake scenario obtaining comparable
result.
5.4 Soil spread
For a soil spread situation to occur during earthquake liquefaction has to occur. The
soil spread scenarios are difficult to state and requires analysis and studies beyond what
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can be implemented in application software of the type implemented in this project. In a
previous JTRP project [Bobet et al., 2001] soil spread scenarios and consequences were
studied for several sites in southwestern Indiana indicating the possibility of their
occurrence. The study also indicated that the Indiana Department of Transportation
practice of using steel H piles and steel encased concrete (SEC) piles reduces
significantly the potential damage to piles during earthquakes. This study recommends
mitigation studies and implementations that should be adopted for all bridge structures
located along the Indiana Emergency Routes. A warning should be issued when
liquefaction may occur and the bridge is supported on footings. The same type of
warning is given when possibility of liquefaction is identified bellow the tip of piles,
situation that seldom occurs.

5.5 Embankment stability
The absence of information on embankment slope geometry and description of
mechanical properties of the fill material both in the Inspection and Maintenance
Database and the selected bridge drawings precludes the inclusion of test cases for the
Earthquake Emergency Routes. Not withstanding, test cases studied for fill material
commonly used in Indiana indicate that for embankments with slopes of 1 vertical to 2
horizontal there is a low probability of instability in the embankment itself for ground
accelerations up to the order of 15% g and embankment heights lower than 30 ft (10 m).
The possibility of liquefaction or other type of ground failure under the embankment
must be studied independently along the routes. Information on soil profile under the
embankment and properties of the fill material probably would require soil exploration
for that purpose along the Emergency Routes.
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CHAPTER 6 BRIDGE VULNERABILITY

6.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the methodology implemented for assessing the bridge seismic
vulnerability by processing information available for all bridges located in the Vincennes
District of the Indiana Department of Transportation and for selected bridges whose
drawings were used. The information contained in the Indot Inspection and Maintenance
Database was used directly for obtaining an approximate evaluation of the bridge seismic
vulnerability. The drawings of selected bridges were used for obtaining a more reliable
vulnerability assessment of each selected bridge. The results of the analysis of the bridges
whose drawings were used to calibrate the approximate procedures based on the
Inspection and Maintenance Database information.

6.2 Information from the Inspection and Maintenance Database
Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database is implemented in MS Access and
contains information descriptive of the bridge that is relevant from the inspection and
maintenance management point of view. Only part of the information contained in the
database is related to structural information and although general in nature, lends itself to
assign the bridge within broad seismic behavior categories.
The information from the database that was used directly in the approximate
vulnerability assessment can be grouped in the following general categories: for database
indexing purposes, relative to location, road under or over the bridge, date of construction
and repair, general bridge geometry, superstructure characteristics including deck
information, substructure characteristics, and information on the approaches and
abutments. Table 6-1 presents the database keys that were used for processing the
approximate vulnerability assessment.
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Table 6-1 – Basic information from Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database
that was included in the analysis
Group
Database

File Data

Road Data

Age Data

Geometry Data

Superstructure Data

Substructure Data

Information
Number of Records
Total No. of Bridge Records
Record No.
National Bridge Inventory No.
INDOT Bridge No.
District Code
County Code
Sub-district No.
City Town Code
Location
Facility Carried
Feature Intersected
Road Number Over
Road Number Under
Year Built
Structure Designation
Year Reconstructed
Sufficiency Rating
Number of Intermediate Piers
Approach Structure Type
Deck Width
Skew Angle
Structure Length
Minimum Vertical Clearance Over
Minimum Vertical Clearance Under
Total Horizontal Clearance Over
Largest Vertical Distance
Structure Type
Length Maximum Span
Number of Main Spans
Deck Structure Type
Deck Thickness
Bearing Diaphragm
Bridge Joint Type Interior
Bridge Joint Type (N/E)
Bridge Joint Type (S/W)
Cross Bracing
Hinge Pin Connection
Intermediate Diaphragms
Main Structure Type
Number of Approach Spans
Number of Beams
Number of Floor Beams
Number of Girders
Number of Stringers
Redundancy Code
Abutment Type (W/S)
Abutment Type (E/N)
Approach Material
Approach Construction
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6.3 Approximate vulnerability assessment methodology
The approach to an approximate evaluation of vulnerability in many instances has
been based just on the type of bridge. This methodological approach depends on general
correlations for each bridge type, usually called fragility relationships, between
probability of reaching a certain performance level (total collapse, partial collapse,
reparable damage, or other) and expected ground acceleration at the bridge site. Results
from this type of analysis are applicable, within the uncertainties inherent to this type of
methodology, at a national or state level. As the size of the sample becomes smaller the
results obtained are less reliable especially if diverse bridge types of varying age are
present in the sample. In this research project it was considered that the information
contained in the Inspection and Maintenance Database is appropriate to determine, in an
approximate but more reliable manner, the relevant parameters that are needed to
establish a vulnerability level. The relevant parameters considered are:

•

Mass of the bridge

•

Stiffness of the substructure

•

Toughness available for adequate nonlinear response

•

Strength of the lateral load resisting elements

The Inspection and Maintenance Database contains information from which the
values of the relevant parameters can be estimated as follows:
The mass of the bridge is associated mainly with the mass of the superstructure and
the deck is generally the main contributor. The Inspection and Maintenance Database
lists the deck material, and deck width and thickness; thus permitting to obtain a good
approximation of its mass. Allowances for wearing surface, barriers and, guard rails are
also included. The number of girders, beams, and stringers; and the structural material is
listed in the database. Their mass can be estimated as a function of a span dependent
depth that is characteristic of each superstructure type. The contribution to mass of the
diaphragms and bracing elements can also be estimated from the number and type as
listed in the database. Having an estimative of the superstructure mass and geometry it is
possible to establish minimum cross-sectional dimensions required to support the gravity
effects for the bents based on the adjacent span lengths and structural type. Vertical
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clearance indicates the height of the bents. Results from these estimates were compared
with mass computed for the selected bridges whose drawings were used in the formal
vulnerability assessment and with comparison of projects whose information was
available in the literature.
The lateral stiffness of the bridge depends on the substructure type whose minimum
dimensions were established in the computation of mass. The Inspection and
Maintenance Database does not describe if the bridge is supported on frame or wall type
bents, thus the estimate of the lateral stiffness is approached from the low side.
Adjustments are made to this estimate for live load allowance especially in short span
bridges.
Using the estimative of mass and lateral stiffness fundamental vibration periods for
the transverse and longitudinal directions are computed taking into account the expansion
joint and hinge pin connection descriptions contained in the database. Lateral force
demand, longitudinal and transverse, is established for varying values of ground
acceleration. Expected lateral deformation of the superstructure and base shear demand
on the substructure is then estimated for each acceleration level.
The level of toughness required for adequate nonlinear response of the substructure
elements is associated directly with the date of construction of the bridge. Lateral load
strength is associated directly with the estimated substructure dimensions.
Bridge vulnerability is then established for each acceleration level based on excessive
lateral deformations or lack of strength to resist the imposed base shear. For each
acceleration level the bridge is red-tagged meaning vulnerable, yellow-tagged meaning
marginal vulnerability, and green-tagged meaning not vulnerable.
These computations are made for all bridges in the Vincennes district inventory. For
selected bridges the results were compared to the results obtained using the actual
dimensions and reinforcement from the bridge drawings.
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6.4 Formal vulnerability assessment methodology
The implemented software permits to include information from the bridge drawings
in the vulnerability assessment database. This was performed for selected bridges as
previously mentioned. The information covered is divided as shown in Table 6-2.
Table 6-2 – Basic information from bridge drawings needed for formal vulnerability
assessment and included in the software implementation database
Group
Database

Information
File management

General Bridge Information
Bridge
Information
Deck and Span Information
Geotechnical Information
Bent Column Information

Bent Beam Information

Bearings Information
Structural
Elements

Restrainers

Piles

Footings

Abutments

Bents

Ground Motion

Bent Types
Bent Location
Spectrum
Accelerogram
Spectrum computed from
accelerogram
Increasing ground motion
definition

Detail
Same Information from Inspection and
Maintenance Database
Number of spans, bents, element types, units (US
customary or metric SI)
Number of vibration modes to use
Use of rigid zones in bents
Deck width, thickness, additional mass,
Span Information
Deck expansion joints type and location
Same as described in section 5.2
Cross-section dimensions
Material information
Modeling parameters (cracking, effective area,
nonlinear characteristics)
Cross-section dimensions
Material information
Modeling parameters (cracking, effective area,
nonlinear characteristics)
Type
Dimensions
Type
Dimensions
Material properties
Pile types
Piles dimensional properties
Piles material properties
Footing Type
Footing dimensional properties
Footing material Properties
Piles geometrical distribution
Abutment Type
Abutment dimensional properties
Abutment material Properties
Piles geometrical distribution
Geometry
Element type
Location in bridge
From Bridge Specs
From accelerogram database
Computation of spectrum from ground motion and
smoothing possibilities
Parameters to obtain performance patterns by
variation of ground motion intensity
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The information gathering process for each bridge is initiated including the
information contained in the Inspection and Maintenance Database. The rest of the data
must be provided from information contained in the bridge drawings.
Using this information several tasks were performed once a process is initiated. Some
of these tasks are performed only once in the process — routine tasks — while others are
performed repeatedly with each level of intensity of ground motion — ground motion
intensity-dependent tasks—.
6.4.1 Routine tasks
Those processes that are not dependent on the ground motion intensity were
performed first. They comprised the following tasks:

•

Computation of element section properties.

•

Computation of mass and stiffness properties for the superstructure and
substructure elements.

•

Computation of transverse and longitudinal vibration periods and modal
shapes.

•

Definition of strength in flexure and shear for all elements. For bent girders
this was performed at sections where maximum stresses are expected under
seismic effects. For bent piers and walls flexure-axial force interaction
diagrams were computed. Reinforcement anchorage strength at joints was
evaluated.

•

Collapse mechanisms were evaluated for all bents defining the maximum
tributary base shear strength. Distinction was made between flexural and shear
collapse mechanisms.

•

The lateral-load strength of bearings was evaluated. For bearings vulnerable to
overturning or sliding under lateral load, the maximum transmitted shear
before overturning or sliding was evaluated. Maximum available seat lengths
were defined at non-fixed joints.

•

For abutments and foundation elements, stiffness and deformation properties
were evaluated. Strength for shear and overturning were evaluated.
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From the above computed information a path of least strength was defined. For
example bent piers were evaluated for the possibility of reaching shear strength before
flexural strength thus initiating a brittle failure mode. At pier-foundation or wallfoundation joints the ability to transmit the forces developed when the pier reaches its
maximum strength was evaluated, thus defining a weak link in the seismic load path. The
maximum seismic ground-motion induced-forces that the structural system is capable of
resisting were defined from the load path evaluation. These forces indicate the level of
seismic base shear that may induce severe damage or collapse of the bridge.
6.4.2 Ground motion intensity-dependent tasks
The processes that depend on the ground motion intensity were performed for
increasing levels of intensity of the ground motion. The ground motion intensity was
defined in rock as peak ground acceleration, Aa. For a set value of peak ground
acceleration in rock the following tasks (see Fig. 6-1) were performed in the order
presented:
1. From the geotechnical information the soil profile amplification was determined
using the procedure described in Section 5.2. This permitted the computation of
spectral ordinates that are comparable to those defined through parameters SS and

S1 as described in the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions. This fully
described the response spectrum for which the rest of the vulnerability assessment
for the set ground motion was made.
2. The liquefaction potential was evaluated for the set acceleration value and
reported. No further analysis on collateral potential of damage to the bridge
caused by liquefaction was performed as explained in Section 5.4.
3. Structural element internal forces were obtained using a linear modal spectral
response procedure based on the vibration periods and modal shapes computed in
the routine tasks and the response spectrum from Step 1. Strength demands were
compared with the strength capacity levels obtained in the routine tasks. A similar
comparison was performed for the displacement demand against the maximum
allowable displacement obtained in the routine tasks. The bridge was deemed not
vulnerable for the set intensity of seismic ground motion and green-tagged and no
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further analysis was performed if: a) the strength demand in all the structural
elements was not exceeded, b) the displacement demand was within the
established tolerable limit, and c) displacements at the supports did not exceed the
limits established previously in the routine tasks,. If any of the strength or
displacements limits were exceeded tasks 4 to 7 were performed.
4. If the shear strength level or the evaluation of reinforcement anchorage indicated
possibility of a bond failure, the bridge was deemed vulnerable. The bridge was
yellow-tagged or red-tagged depending on the level of expected damage and the
spread of damage to the different elements.
5. If the possibility of bearing element failure by overturning or excessive
displacement at movable supports was detected, the bridge was deemed
vulnerable. The bridge was yellow-tagged or red-tagged based on the amount of
expected deformation and the magnitude of potential horizontal or vertical
permanent displacements of the superstructure.
6. The bridge was updated to red-tag if compound yellow-tagging was obtained both
from the strength and the displacement checks. No further analysis was performed
and the vulnerability level was reported for the set value of ground acceleration if
steps 4, 5, or 6 yellow-tagged or red-tagged the bridge.
7. If the flexural strength for any element was exceeded in the evaluation performed
in step 3, a nonlinear response evaluation was made. A substitute-structure
procedure [Shibata and Sozen, 1976] was performed by introducing damage
ratios, μ, greater than unity to the elements where flexural strength was reached.
A series of analyses were carried out for increasing values of the damage ratios to
the elements until the base shear strength of the bridge as computed in the routine
tasks was reached. The expected lateral displacement for the set value of ground
motion intensity was the one obtained when the bridge reached the base shear
strength. This procedure gives comparable results to those obtained by performing
a push-over analysis. The stability of the structure was judged for the
displacements obtained using displacement-based procedures. Based on these
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results the vulnerability of the bridge was assessed as yellow-tagged or redtagged.
Set value of peak
ground acceleration
in rock, Aa

Geotech
data

Obtain soil profile
amplification
Evaluate
liquefaction

Define response
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Liquefaction
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Linear modal
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demands
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acceleration, Aa

Shear
failure?

yes

no
Support
unseating?
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no
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Flexural
strength
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Nonlinear spectral
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support unseating?

yes

Bridge is
vulnerable
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Fig. 6-1 – Flow diagram for the formal vulnerability assessment implemented
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CHAPTER 7 UPGRADE NEEDS OF BRIDGES ON THE EMERGENCY ROUTES

7.1 Introduction
The approach of developing and implementing a tool for studying the alternatives for
defining the Indiana Earthquake Emergency Routes and the upgrade needs of the
transportation structures along theses routes responds to the importance of two variables
linked to the emergency routes selected, and the definition of the earthquake ground
motion intensity for which the vulnerability of the current inventory of bridges should be
gauged. The effect on the upgrade needs of these two variables is substantial. Variations
of the road segments to be included within the emergency routes affect the travel times
and the number of bridges that may need upgrading. Once a set of routes were defined,
the envisioned earthquake ground motion intensity to be used in defining the
vulnerability of the transportation structures affects directly the upgrade needs for these
structures.
7.2 Bridges studied
Table 7-1 shows the distribution by bridge type of the inventory of bridges in the
Indot Vincennes District. Currently there are 827 bridges that are located in the Interstate
System, in US Routes, and in State Roads. The distribution by location in the different
counties was presented in Table 4-1. A total of 230 of these bridges are located in the
selected Earthquake Emergency Routes of Indiana, corresponding to 28% of the
inventory. Table 7-1 also shows the distribution by bridge type of the 69 bridges that
were studied in detail using the information contained in drawings. The sample was
defined trying to maintain the bridge type percentages similar.
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Sum
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1
1
23
69
5
1
27
1
162
3
89
16
2
51
1
56
10
8
1
23
3
10
61
31
1
3
1
32
1
17
16
51
21
2
2
6
6
9
1
3

0.1%
0.1%
2.8%
8.3%
0.6%
0.1%
3.3%
0.1%
19.6%
0.4%
10.8%
1.9%
0.2%
6.2%
0.1%
6.8%
1.2%
1.0%
0.1%
2.8%
0.4%
1.2%
7.4%
3.7%
0.1%
0.4%
0.1%
3.9%
0.1%
2.1%
1.9%
6.2%
2.5%
0.2%
0.2%
0.7%
0.7%
1.1%
0.1%
0.4%

827

100.0%

% by bridge
type

Bailey Truss
Continuous Concrete T - Beam
Continuous Prestressed Concrete Box Beam
Continuous Prestressed Concrete I - Beam
Continuous Prestressed Concrete T - Beam
Continuous Reinforced Concrete Box
Continuous Reinforced Concrete Girder
Continuous Reinforced Concrete Rigid Frame
Continuous Reinforced Concrete Slab
Continuous Riveted Plate Girder
Continuous Steel Beam
Continuous Steel Girder
Continuous Steel Tied Arch - Truss
Composite Continuous Steel Beam
Composite Continuous Steel Box Girder
Composite Continuous Steel Girder
Composite Steel Beam
Composite Steel Girder
Metal Pipe Arch
Multi-Plate Arch - Underfill
Precast Concrete Arch - Underfill
Precast Concrete Beam
Prestressed Concrete Box Beam
Prestressed Concrete I - Beam
Precast Concrete Slab
Precast Concrete Slab - Underfill
Post-Tensioned Reinforced Concrete Slab
Reinforced Concrete Arch
Reinforced Concrete Arch - Open Spandrel
Reinforced Concrete Arch - Underfill
Reinforced Concrete Box - Underfill
Reinforced Concrete Girder
Reinforced Concrete Slab
Reinforced Concrete Slab - Underfill
Riveted Plate Girder
Steel Beam
Steel Pony Truss
Steel Thru Truss
Unreinforced Concrete Arch
Welded Steel Thru Girder

Located on
EQ Emerg.
Routes

BT
CCTB
CPCBB
CPCIB
CPCTB
CRCB
CRCG
CRCRF
CRCS
CRPG
CSB
CSG
CSTA
KCSB
KCSBG
KCSG
KSB
KSG
MPA
MPAUF
PCAUF
PCB
PCBB
PCIB
PCS
PCSUF
PTRCS
RCA
RCAOS
RCAUF
RCBUF
RCG
RCS
RCSUF
RPG
SB
SPT
STT
UCA
WSTG

Bridge Type Description

% by bridge
type

Bridge
Type

Amount in
Vincennes
District

Table 7-1 – Distribution by bridge type in the Vincennes Indot District of the total bridge
inventory, in the suggested emergency routes, and in the bridges studied in detail

1
4
22
2

0.4%
1.7%
9.6%
0.9%

15
1
53
2
46
10

6.5%
0.4%
23.0%
0.9%
20.0%
4.3%

31

13.5%

33

14.3%

2
2
1

0.9%
0.9%
0.4%

2
1

0.9%
0.4%

1

0.4%

1

0.4%

230

100.0%

Figure 7-1 shows the distribution by bridge type on the Earthquake Emergency
Routes. The most abundant type of bridge (23%) corresponds to Continuous Reinforced
Concrete Slab bridge type both in the whole district and in the selected emergency routes.
Continuous Steel Beam bridges (20%) and Composite Continuous Steel Girder (14.3%)
correspond to the next largest groups.
BRIDGE TYPES ON EMERGENCY ROUTES

CSG
4.3%

KCSB
13.5%

KCSG
14.3%

CSB
20.0%

PCB
0.9%
PCBB
0.9%
PCIB
0.4%
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0.9%
RCS
0.4%
SB
0.4%
WSTG
0.4%

CRPG
0.9%
CPCIB
9.6%
CRCS
23.0%

CRCRF
0.4%

CRCG
6.5%

CPCTB
0.9%

CCTB
0.4%
CPCBB
1.7%

Fig. 7-1 – Bridge type distribution on the Earthquake Emergency Routes

7.3 Retrofit Needs
The current inventory of bridges in the Vincennes Indot District was studied for
varying degrees of earthquake ground motion intensity using an approximate
vulnerability assessment methodology. The same approach of varying the intensity of the
ground motion was performed for the selected bridges that were studied in detail.
As expected, bridge vulnerability and liquefaction potential in some bridge sites
increased with the ground acceleration level. The importance of the definition of the
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ground motion intensity for which the vulnerability level is assessed is explained by the
number of bridges that would be red-tagged — 7% of the total Vincennes District bridge
inventory — when the envisioned design ground motion contained in current 17th Edition
of the AASHTO Standard Specifications are used as compared with a 15% when the
ground motion description contained in the Draft AASHTO LRFD Update.
The vulnerability assessment indicates that the most frequent cause of concern is
associated with unseating of the superstructure at supports (65% of bridges red-tagged)
followed by shear failure of bent vertical elements (25% of bridges red-tagged). Other
sources of vulnerability studied account for the rest of the red-tagged bridges. This figure
is consistent for the whole inventory and for the selected bridges studies in detail. Bridge
age correlates directly with vulnerability in the entire sample.
Overturning of the widely used movable expansion support of the type shown in Fig.
7-2 was found to be associated with many of the cases of unseating detected. In some
instances peak ground accelerations in surface as low as 10%g would cause overturning.

Fig. 7-2 – Typical Expansion Rocker Bearing
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Liquefaction as a source of vulnerability was present in the sample studied using the
bridge drawings that reported soil borings. 182 bridges out of 230 reported a geotechnical
exploration that could be used for evaluating liquefaction with 43% of them reporting
sand or sandy soil and a water table level above the material susceptible of liquefaction.
Lowest peak ground acceleration in rock that would produce liquefaction was below 5%
g in several sites. The average peak ground acceleration in rock to produce liquefaction
for the 79 sites where potential for liquefaction was detected was found to be
approximately 5% g for the Mw = 7.5 scenario and 8% g for the Mw = 6.5 scenario.
The HAZUS-MH implementation produced comparable results indicating the
approach of using the FEMA methodology is warranted.

7.4 Improvement of the approximate vulnerability assessment
The approximate seismic vulnerability assessment based on the information contained
in Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database can be improved in the future by including
additional information in the database. This additional information already exists in each
set of bridge drawings. Although the drawings are available in electronic form they were
scanned from hard copies and this format is not amenable for automatic retrieval of the
information thus requiring participation of an experienced engineer for collecting and
adding the information to the vulnerability assessment database.
There is a natural tradeoff between the effort of adding and maintaining this
additional information and the degree of resolution sought in the approximate assessment
procedure. The possibility of making a more detailed vulnerability analysis as
implemented for selected bridges constitutes the upper limit of the additional information
to be included. This may be unnecessary for a properly calibrated approximate procedure.
The amount of additional information must be selected in a manner that maximizes the
quality of the result and minimizes the data acquisition effort.
Based on this, the minimum suggested set of additional information is the following:

•

Description of bent type and element dimension for all supports of the bridge.

•

Reinforcement at selected sections of the bent elements focusing mainly on
transverse reinforcement.
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•

Additional information on bearings more from the point of view of vulnerability
to seismic effects.

•

Additional information on foundation types and soil profile.

This additional information may be collected when the routine programmed
inspections of the bridge are performed.
The improvement in dependability on the approximate vulnerability analysis with just
this additional information may well justify the information gathering effort.
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 Conclusions

Different alternatives for Earthquake Emergency Routes for the Vincennes District of
the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT), located in the southwestern corner of
the State, were studied from the transportation point of view (Part I of this report) and the
implications of seismic vulnerability of the transportation structures located in these
roads were studied (Part II of this report).

The Indot bridge inventory data and soils information were incorporated in a software
tool based on geographical information systems technology (GIS) developed by FEMA
(HAZUS-MH [FEMA, 2005]) for evaluation of the Earthquake Emergency Routes
network of Indiana and for establishing policies for mitigation of earthquake hazard on
these routes. This tool may be used to perform simulations for different earthquake
scenarios, and to help in the response to an actual emergency caused by the occurrence of
a strong earthquake in the region.

The software tool is capable of performing a seismic vulnerability approximate
assessment of the bridge inventory of the Vincennes Indot District using solely the
information contained in Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database. Using information
from the bridge drawings the software tool developed allows performing a detailed
seismic vulnerability assessment of selected bridges. The vulnerability assessment
performed for the selected bridges was used to calibrate the approximate analysis
procedure based only on Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database and to evaluate the
vulnerability of the selected bridges for different levels of earthquake ground motion
intensity.
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The reported research will help in the study and adoption of emergency response
policies for different earthquake occurrence scenarios. These policies may be updated in
the future as mitigation programs are implemented and their results incorporated in the
bridge vulnerability assessment database.

The reported comments on the current state of seismic risk evaluation for the
southwestern region of Indiana will help the State of Indiana in making decisions related
to the adoption of proposed bridge seismic design provisions or proposed seismic risk
maps by permitting an evaluation of the impact of the new provisions or seismic risk
maps.

8.2 Recommendations

It is suggested that the findings and developments of this research project may be
applied by the Indiana Department of Transportation in the following ways:

1.

Indot should consider formally adopting the Earthquake Emergency Routes
for the State of Indiana from the routes studied, or variations of them. It is
clear that the final set of Earthquake Emergency Routes adopted and
maintained will be affected by issues and policies whose scope is outside
those studied and reported in this research project. Policy decisions, budgetary
constraints, and decisions related to new road projects, such as the projected
south western continuation of I-69, will affect the formal adoption of the
selected routes and will surely impose variations in the future. The
methodology developed in this research project will provide valuable
information to assist Indot the decision-making process presently and in the
future.
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2.

The study and adoption of mitigation strategies to implement in the future by
Indot to update and maintain the Emergency Routes of Indiana can be made
possible by performing simulations for different earthquake scenarios
including earthquake ground motion defined in current AASHTO Standard
Specifications, proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions, or other
appropriate

bridge

specification.

These

simulations

will

provide

corresponding bridge retrofit scope for the selected routes or alternative
definitions.

3.

It is recommended that Indot expands the information contained in the
Inspection and Maintenance Database to include information currently
available only in the bridge drawings (see section 7.5). This will improve the
vulnerability assessment of the bridges refining the mitigation policies to
adopt in the future. This expansion of the database can be extended to other
counties and districts not covered in this research project.

4.

It is recommendable that Indot adopt a program for assessing the liquefaction,
soil spread, and embankment failure potential along the routes at locations
different from just bridge sites by providing a consistent evaluation
methodology based on the implementation developed in this research project.
This implementation will require a soil exploration program to provide
geotechnical properties of sites where no information exists or was performed
many years ago with different objectives than liquefaction evaluation. In the
reported research liquefaction evaluations were made using solely boring
information contained in selected bridge drawings.

5.

It is recommended that FEMA HAZUS-MH software be adopted as the
methodology for vulnerability assessment, mitigation decisions through the
study of appropriate earthquake occurrence scenarios, and emergency
response programs tuned to the study of these scenarios. Along with this
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recommendation a key feature is the training of Indot personnel in the use of
FEMA HAZUS-MH software. Engaging of the services of the Polis Center of
Indiana University, an authorized HAZUS-MH earthquake and flood service
provider, for this purpose should be studied by Indot.
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Introduction
The possibility of very strong earthquakes in the
central Mississippi Valley has been known for 200
years in the New Madrid Seismic Zone. Awareness
of the seismic risk in the State of Indiana has
increased in the last decades. In the last two
decades identification of an independent tectonic
process occurring in the Wabash River Valley has
implications for the seismic risk of the State of
Indiana from what has recently been defined as the
Wabash Valley Seismic Zone. The occurrence of a
strong earthquake in these seismic zones or in
Indiana or the neighboring states due to other not
so well understood tectonic processes, as has
occurred in the past, has serious implications for
the State Transportation System. The definition of
Earthquake Emergency Routes for the state is a
priority for the Indiana Department of
Transportation. The identification of Emergency
Routes takes into account issues related to
transportation including coverage of population and
area and travel time along these routes.
This study formulates a multicommodity maximal
covering network design problem (MCNDP) for
identifying critical routes, for earthquake response
and to seismically retrofit bridges. The MCNDP
seeks routes that minimize the total travel time over
the selected routes and maximizes the total
population covered, subject to a budget constraint
on bridge retrofitting costs on the selected routes.
The problem is formulated as a two-objective

integer programming model and solved using the
branch-and-cut module in the CPLEX optimizer.
The model performance was analyzed using the
transportation network of a seismically-prone
region in southwest Indiana. Thereby, the search
for the critical routes for an origin-destination (OD) pair is confined to a limited geographical region
around it.
A Geographical Information System (GIS) system
was developed for evaluation of seismic
vulnerability of the proposed Indiana Emergency
Routes. The GIS based implementation of the
technical information developed in this project
through FEMA HAZUS-MH software was
conducted in collaboration with the Polis Center in
Indianapolis, nationally recognized and FEMA
authorized HAZUS implementation facility.
HAZUS software may be used for mitigation of
vulnerability, simulation, and response to a strong
earthquake in southwestern Indiana. It uses
information from the Indiana Department of
Transportation (INdot) maintenance database and
selected structural and geotechnical information
from the bridge drawings data base. Vulnerability
assessment was performed using the general
information from maintenance and final calibration
was performed using a series of cases based on
bridge drawings and soil exploration descriptions
contained in these drawings.

Findings
Computational experiments were conducted to
investigate the effects of varying the budget and the
relative weights of the two objectives. A set of
12-3 08/05 JTRP-2003/22

critical routes was obtained. Seismic retrofit planning
plays an important role in determining the
effectiveness of the operational stage of earthquake
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response management. At a strategic level, it is
dependent on the routes critical for effective
emergency response. However, past studies have not
addressed the identification of critical routes under
budget constraints. This is a very important practical
problem for emergency response planners as it
involves identifying effective transportation routes
while accounting for bridge structural conditions and
budget limitations. It implies the identification of
bridges to retrofit under earthquake response
planning. This study develops a network-level
methodology to assist decision-makers in identifying
an effective seismic retrofit scheme for the bridges of
a network.
This study formally defines the Multicommodity
Maximal Covering Network Design Problem
(MCNDP) and formulates it. To our knowledge,
it represents the first attempt to incorporate the
coverage objective in a generic network model,
leading to a new class of models with significant
practical implications. Past work has used the
coverage criterion in identifying a path, tree or
tour on a network by considering either the
routing or the fixed cost, while the proposed
model simultaneously considers the routing and
fixed costs subject to a budget constraint. That
is, none of the existing models consider routing
costs, fixed costs and coverage criterion in a
single framework.
From a practical standpoint, the key contribution
of this study is its ability to address planning
problems faced by emergency response agencies
vis-à-vis disaster management. The specific
problem addressed here relates to earthquake
response management. Under budget constraints,
there is a need to determine an effective retrofit
plan for the bridges in a seismically-prone
region. Most studies in the literature have
adopted a local perspective to solving this
problem, and do not consider the effect of
potential bridge failures on the transportation
system performance. The few methodologies
that use a systems approach do not consider the
influence of retrofit decisions on the quality of
the associated routes vis-à-vis effective
earthquake response. The proposed model fills
this critical gap by considering the total travel
time for the key O-D pairs in the network and
the total population covered by them as the
criteria for determining the critical routes. The
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budget limitation on the total bridge retrofit costs
for the links constituting the critical routes is
represented as a constraint in our model. Hence,
this methodology simultaneously determines the
set of bridges in a network requiring retrofit and
the routes that serve as focal points for
earthquake response.
The evolution of the earthquake resistant bridge
design requirements contained in the AASHTO
Specifications and the existence of a proposed
draft seismic design specification being
discussed have significant implications in the
assessment of the existing vulnerability, its
mitigation, and the design of new bridges along
the Emergency Routes. Along with this
development, the USGS assessment of the
seismic risk of southwestern Indiana and a
change of format of the definition of the
earthquake design ground motion that is integral
part of the proposed draft seismic design
specification also has important implications on
the assessment of the operational capabilities of
the Earthquake Emergency Routes of Indiana.
The effects of the 2001 Nisqually Earthquake
that occurred in the State of Washington gave
invaluable insight on the expected situation for
the State of Indiana due to a comparable bridge
inventory in age and bridge types and a parallel
increase of the seismic risk awareness in both
regions over the last decades.
Using the information collected in this study, the
GIS implementation through FEMA-HAZUSMH software may be used for mitigation of
vulnerability, simulation, and response to a
strong earthquake in southwestern Indiana.
Vulnerability was evaluated for different levels
of ground acceleration in order to obtain
behavior patterns for selected bridges. Using
these results, seismic behavior patterns were
obtained for bridges located in southwestern
Indiana included in the INdot Vincennes District
maintenance data base. Soil amplification and
liquefaction potential were evaluated for the
cases having reported SPT measurements from
borings. Based on this process, information
critical for the identification of upgrade needs
for the transportation structures part of the
Earthquake Emergency Routes is made available
to the INdot.
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Implementation
The findings and developments of this research
project are presented next in the form of
suggested implementation steps by the Indiana
Department of Transportation.
1.

2.

3.

Formal adoption of the selected
emergency routes or some variation of
the same by the state is a necessary
step. Such routes adopted and
maintained by INdot will be affected by
issues and policies outside the scope of
those considered in this study. For
instance, policy decisions, budgetary
constraints,
new
projects,
i.e.
continuation of I-69, will likely affect
the formal adoption of a set of
emergency routes and will continue to
impose changes in the future. The
methodology developed in this study
and the information implemented in
HAZUS-MH should be of assistance to
state decision makers in the future.
Future implementation strategies can be
studied through simulation studies
using appropriately updated information
for different earthquake scenarios
including earthquake ground motion
defined in current AASHTO Standard
Specifications,
proposed
Draft
AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions, or
other. These simulations will provide
corresponding bridge retrofit scope for
the proposed routes or alternative
definitions.
The information in the maintenance
database should be periodically
evaluated
and
should
include
information currently available only in
the bridge drawings (see Section 7.5 of
the final report). This will improve the
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vulnerability assessment of the bridges
refining the mitigation policies to adopt
in the future. This expansion of the
maintenance database can be extended
to other counties and districts not
covered in this research project.
4.

Establish a program for assessing the
liquefaction,
soil
spread,
and
embankment failure potential along the
routes at locations other than bridge
sites by providing a consistent
evaluation methodology supported with
the information developed in this study.
This implementation will require a soil
exploration
program
to
obtain
geotechnical properties of sites where
no information exists or where such
information was obtained years ago
with
different
objectives
than
liquefaction evaluation. In the research
conducted in this study, liquefaction
evaluations were made using solely
boring information contained in
selected bridge drawings.

5.

To establish procedures for emergency
response under different earthquake
occurrence scenarios.

6.

INdot should consider the formal
adoption of HAZUS-MH software for
scenario management, mitigation and
vulnerability studies and to train
appropriate personnel. An important
feature in this implementation step is
the engagement of the Polis Center in
the training of INdot personnel on the
use of HAZUS-MH software. The Polis
Center is a nationally recognized
HAZUS implementation facility.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and Motivation
Earthquakes can significantly disrupt societal functioning, cause ecological damage,
and lead to loss of human lives and property, warranting a coordinated and efficient
response to mitigate their negative impacts. Past experience with earthquakes has
demonstrated the vulnerability of the critical infrastructural lifelines and the need for
mitigation strategies as well as emergency response planning. For example, the bridge
failures under the 1989 Loma Prieta and the 1994 Northridge earthquakes resulted in
substantial losses to the regional economies [Chang and Nojima, 2001].
Highway transportation systems are vital to the normal functioning of a society and
can be even more so under disasters. Under disasters, emergency response agencies need
to transport various commodities, including food, clothing, medicine, medical supplies,
machinery and personnel from different points of origin to different locations in the
disaster areas in an efficient manner [Haghani and Sei-Chang, 1996]. Damage to the
highway system can seriously affect emergency response, recovery operations and
disrupt the regional economy; hence the functionality of these systems is critical for postdisaster response. Gordon et al. [1998] estimate that twenty percent of the $6.5 billion in
losses due to the Northridge earthquake resulted from damage to the transportation
system. This highlights the need for countermeasures to mitigate the possible risk of
damage to the highways and the associated consequences.
Bridges typically represent the elements of a highway system that are most
susceptible to failure under earthquakes. Hence, the seismic vulnerability of bridges has
been extensively studied [Buckle et al. 1994]. As a consequence, seismic retrofitting of
bridges has been the most preferred solution adopted in the pre-disaster strategic planning
stage so as to minimize the risk of unacceptable damage to highways in earthquake-prone
regions. Due to the significant effort and cost involved in strengthening existing bridges
to seismic design standards it is not practical to retrofit every bridge in an earthquake-
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prone region, and even if it were possible, retrofitting cannot be done simultaneously
across all bridges. Also, seismic risk can vary across bridges due to their physical
characteristics, age, and current structural condition. Hence, a key problem faced by
earthquake response planners is the identification of the set of bridges for seismic
retrofitting. This implies prioritization given budget limitations and the effort involved.
The bridge prioritization problem, that is, the selection of bridges for seismic
retrofitting, can be viewed from structural and transportation domains vis-à-vis
performance. From a structural perspective, the risk/vulnerability of a bridge to seismic
failure is the predominant factor that influences prioritization. In the transportation
context, the focus is on ensuring the survival of links (and the bridges on those links) that
minimize emergency response times and maximize the population that can be reached, by
retaining a network-level perspective. The existing literature predominantly addresses the
prioritization problem from a structural perspective. The dominant approach is the use of
multi-attribute utility theory [Nojima, 1999] to determine the risk for each bridge in the
highway network. This is done by weighing the values of the various attributes to
generate a measure of risk. For example, one study [Osaka Municipal Government
Report, 1998] uses attributes on seismic capacity (or vulnerability) and importance (or
criticality). Seismic capacity, an indicator of the structural sufficiency of a bridge with
regard to an anticipated earthquake, is based on the bridge type, structural condition,
service life, and geotechnical and seismic hazards. The importance criterion indicates the
criticality of the bridge to post-disaster relief operations based on the traffic flow on the
associated link, economic impacts due to its failure, and the connectivity with crossroads.
While the seismic capacity criterion has been well-studied in the literature, the
importance criterion has not been adequately addressed [Chang and Nojima, 2001]. This
is because bridge importance is not readily quantifiable, implying subjectivity in its
determination. The issue of accessibility across the transportation network vis-à-vis
earthquake response can be influenced by political, social and economic factors in
addition to the engineering solutions. Hence, only a few retrofitting schemes exist in
practice, and are primarily based on engineering judgment [Buckle, 1994], indicating
methodological gaps in the state of knowledge to address this problem. The intuitive
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solution to the earthquake response planning problem is the retrofitting of every bridge in
the shortest path between the selected origin-destination (O-D) pairs in the network.
However, this is typically cost prohibitive. This implies the need for a network level
perspective to address the problem which considers the interactions between the failure of
a bridge and its influence on the network-level system performance [Werner et al., 1997,
Chang and Nojima, 2001]. The Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering
Research (MCEER) Bulletin (1994) suggests that the system performance considerations
be addressed before performing the seismic capacity evaluation of bridges.
Few studies consider network-level transportation system performance in determining
prioritization schemes. Basoz and Kiremidjian [1994] develop a network-level procedure
to quantify the importance of bridges. It determines the bridges that constitute minimal
cuts in a transportation network and ranks the individual bridges within the set. The
minimal cut for a given O-D node pair in a network is the minimum number of links
whose failure disconnects the two nodes. Performance was tied to the connectivity
between critical destinations under disasters. Wakabayashi [1997] performs an
importance analysis of the Kobe highway network based on several network realizations.
The travel time between Osaka and Kobe represented the performance criterion. The
structural vulnerability of the links was not considered.
Nojima [1999] proposed a performance based prioritization method for upgrading
network components with limited resources. The performance measure was the reliability
of system flow capacity, defined as the maximum flow between a specified O-D pair in
the network. The study rank-orders links based on their ability to improve the reliability
measure. Chang and Nojima [2001] develop performance measures based on the total
length of the surviving network and the accessibility provided by it.
The overview of the past work indicates that several studies exist that address the
bridge seismic retrofit aspects of the earthquake response planning problem. Hence, the
problem has been addressed primarily in the structural engineering domain. Different
criteria have been used to evaluate the bridges in the network. Some of them are ad-hoc
in nature and involve considerable subjectivity. Only a few studies exist that address the
seismic retrofit problem from a transportation systems perspective. Among those, there
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are very few studies that analyze the problem at a network-level. Those that do are
primarily concerned with the effect of retrofit decisions on vehicular flow performance
measures for the surviving network. Studies addressed from the perspective of earthquake
response are sparse, and typically consider a single criterion such as connectivity between
O-D node pairs, travel time for a single O-D pair, or accessibility to population. None of
these studies explicitly consider budget constraints in the planning problem. This
significantly increases the problem complexity due to the dependence of the surviving
network under an earthquake on the budget investment decisions. This key gap,
significant from a practical standpoint, motivates the development of a new class of
models that can aid planners in developing an effective budget allocation scheme to
prioritize retrofit decisions. The proposed research addresses this by developing the
MCNDP model.

1.2 Study Objectives
The primary study objective is to develop a methodology to address the strategic
planning problem at a network-level for earthquake response. This methodology enables
the decision-makers to identify an effective seismic retrofit scheme vis-à-vis earthquake
response for the bridges of a network. The proposed methodology is motivated by the
need to consider the key factors for effective earthquake response in a single framework.
This is done by first defining the concept of “critical routes”. The critical routes of a
transportation network are the set of routes whose functionality is critical to the
effectiveness of earthquake response. The associated problem is labeled the critical routes
problem. The specific tasks to address the study objective are:
1. Identification of criteria for selection of critical routes. These criteria are based on
factors that directly affect the effectiveness of earthquake response.
2. Formally define the critical routes problem. This involves the description of the
problem context, its constraints and the criteria used to solve the problem.
3. Development of a model to address the critical routes problem. A mathematical
formulation is developed that seeks to optimize the response criteria under budget
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limitations and other constraints. This generates the critical routes for the study region of
interest.
4. Application of the model to a case study. Sensitivity analyses are conducted with
respect to the model parameters to derive insights that assist decision-makers. This is
done primarily by identifying a non-inferior frontier, which provides an intuitive practical
tool for decision-making. The region of interest in this study is the earthquake-prone
southwest region of Indiana. Figure 1.1 depicts the seismic map of the region.

1.3 Organization of the Report
This report is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the relevant
literature in network design and coverage. Chapter 3 defines the critical routes problem
and formulates it. It further proves that the problem is NP-hard, and identifies valid
inequalities to enhance solution efficiency. Chapter 4 discusses the application of the
formulation to a case study in the southwest Indiana region, and provides the
implementation details. Chapter 5 reports the results from experiments conducted and
derives insights. Chapter 6 reports the results from experiments conducted after
incorporating the recommendations of the Study Advisory Committee in terms of
“required” routes as part of the critical routes subnetwork. Chapter 7 provides some
concluding remarks.
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Figure 1.1 Seismic map of southwest Indiana

6

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter provides a brief review of the methodological approaches relevant to the
problem addressed in this research. As the focus is on network-level transportationrelated planning for disaster response, especially under earthquakes, most of the relevant
literature is in the urban operations research domain as applied to network models. For
the sake of exposition, we first define the two types of link costs that are typically
encountered in network design problems, namely fixed costs and routing costs. The fixed
cost of a link is a one-time cost incurred with choosing that link for routing commodity
flows and is independent of the quantity routed through it. The routing cost of a link is
defined as the cost incurred in transporting a unit commodity across that link. For
example, in an earthquake response planning context, bridge seismic retrofit costs would
represent fixed costs for that link, and the time to traverse that link would correspond to
the routing costs.

2.1 Network Design
A broad range of practical network optimization problems occur in the context of
transportation, distribution planning, emergency response, telecommunications and
computer networking. A specific class of these, labeled as network design problems,
arises primarily in the capital investment phase of engineering problems. The network
design problem generally seeks to determine a network configuration that minimizes the
sum of the fixed costs of the links chosen and the cost of routing different commodities
through the network defined by these links. Due to its usefulness in the aforementioned
applications, the fixed charge network design problem has been well studied. Magnanti
and Wong [1984] provide a comprehensive survey of integer programming-based
methods to address network design problems. They develop a generic discrete choice
network design formulation that unifies the different types of network design models.
Well-known problems in combinatorial optimization, including the shortest path,
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minimum spanning tree, Steiner tree and traveling salesman problem have been shown to
be special cases of the generic network design model. However, these models have
focused primarily on cost minimization and do not consider other important criteria like
population coverage, environmental impacts and revenues.

2.2 Network Coverage
Current and Min [1986] emphasize the potential for multiple objectives in
transportation planning problems and highlight the conflicting nature of such objectives
in the context of public sector decision-making. For example, the shortest path network
across O-D pairs may not maximize the accessibility to the population in the region. To
overcome these limitations, Current et al. [1985] introduce the notion of coverage to the
network design problem by formulating the maximum covering shortest path problem for
a single O-D pair with two objectives: (i) to minimize the path cost for that O-D pair, and
(ii) to maximize the total population covered by that path. They associate some fraction
of the population with each node, which is labeled as the demand of that node. They
define a demand node as covered if the path includes the node or passes through another
node that is within a pre-specified distance from that node. They also formulate a
variation of this problem for hazmat routing applications, called the minimum covering
shortest path problem [Current at al., 1988], in which the demand covered is minimized.
Hutson and Revelle [1989] extend the concept of coverage to tree networks by
considering two types of coverages: direct and indirect. A demand node is directly
covered if there is a link in the tree incident upon it. Indirect coverage is assumed if the
demand node is within a prescribed distance from a link in the tree. The maximal direct
covering tree problem seeks to minimize the cost of the subtree and maximize the total
demand covered by it. Hutson and Revelle [1993] extend the approach to develop the
maximal indirect covering tree problem. They suggest the use of these models for
problems involving road network construction in sparsely populated areas under resource
constraints.
Kim et al. [1989] introduce the subtree r-cover problem which seeks a connected
subgraph covering every demand node with minimum total length for a given network. A
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cover radius is associated with each demand node. It is used to ensure that the distance
between the demand node and the closest point in the subgraph does not exceed a
threshold value. The formulation is applied to position troops in a war situation to ensure
that troops protect/cover the various demand nodes within pre-specified threshold
response times. Kim et al. [1990] consider a special case in which the given network is a
tree.
Current and Schilling [1989] adapt the coverage concept to the traveling salesman
problem by formulating the covering salesman problem. The problem aims to identify a
minimum cost subtour in a network such that every demand node is within a specified
distance from a node on the subtour. They extend this model to develop the maximal
covering tour problem [1994], in which the objectives are to minimize the total tour
length and maximize the demand covered by the tour, subject to a requirement on the
number of nodes in the subtour. Suggested application domains include rural health care
and overnight delivery systems. Gendreau et al. [1997] solve a variant of the maximal
covering tour problem in which a given set of nodes must always be present in a tour, and
propose its application to the location of post boxes and the design of collection routes.
They also propose classes of valid inequalities for use in a branch-and-cut algorithm to
solve large problem instances in a reasonable amount of time.

2.3 Discussion
The overview of the literature indicates that the coverage criterion has been
successfully applied to identify a path, tree or tour, all of which are special network
structures. This research extends the coverage criterion to a network problem with
multiple O-D pairs, labeled the multicommodity maximal covering network design
problem (MCNDP). Its objectives are to minimize the routing costs over all O-D pairs
and maximize the total demand covered, subject to a budget constraint based on the fixed
costs incurred on the chosen links. To our knowledge, there exist no prior studies that
consider budgetary limitations, routing costs and coverage criteria in a single model with
multiple O-D pairs. Such a model is essential for strategic planners to make long-term
budget allocation decisions that factor in system-wide impacts of budgetary decisions
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over time vis-à-vis performance. Potential applications of the MCNDP other than the
problem addressed in this study include the design of regional transit systems and the
planning of truck shipment routes. With modifications, the MCNDP can be used to
design electric power networks to build high voltage lines for new power plants or to
connect to existing power plants.
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CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY

This chapter develops the methodology to address the critical routes problem using
the MCNDP. Section 3.1 illustrates the applicability of the MCNDP to the “critical
routes problem”. Section 3.2 states the MCNDP. Section 3.3 presents the mathematical
model. Notation and parameters are introduced in Section 3.3.1, the decision variables are
defined in Section 3.3.2, and the formulation is illustrated in Section 3.3.3. Section 3.4
examines the computational complexity of the MCNDP. Section 3.5 presents valid
inequalities for the formulation.

3.1 The Critical Routes Problem
Network-level disaster management planning is vital for effectively responding to
natural calamities and security-related problems. For example, the availability of the
transportation network is critical to emergency response [Haghani and Oh, 1996] under
earthquakes. It entails the identification of “critical routes” in a planning context that
remain functional following an earthquake, to enable the response operators to access as
much population as possible in a minimum amount of time. This implies two objectives
for the selection of the critical routes: (i) minimizing the total travel time on the routes
between the O-D pairs, and (ii) maximizing the total population that can be covered by
these routes. The functionality or survivability of a route, implying its availability under
an earthquake, is governed significantly by its weakest elements, the bridges. The seismic
retrofitting [Cooper et al., 2001] of bridges can enhance the survivability of the
associated routes under earthquakes. However, as discussed earlier, due to the significant
cost and effort involved in retrofitting, it is impractical to retrofit every bridge in an
earthquake-prone region, especially with limited budgets. Hence, the budget serves as a
constraint in the determination of the critical routes. Therefore, the critical routes problem
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can be viewed as a budget-constrained covering network design problem which seeks low
cost routes that cover the maximum population while satisfying budget constraints
introduced by the need to retrofit bridges on the critical routes.

3.2 Problem Statement
We formulate the MCNDP generically here, and apply it to the critical routes
problem in the next chapter. We are given the locations of demand centers of a region
and its associated undirected network. The network links have a fixed cost for their usage
and a routing cost. There is a budget constraint on the total fixed cost incurred. The
MCNDP seeks to allocate a limited budget to links such that the total routing costs for a
set of O-D pairs is minimized and the total demand covered by the routes connecting
them is maximized. The demand of a center is covered if a link in one of the selected
routes provides access to it.

3.3 Mathematical Model
This section first introduces the notation, parameters and decision variables, and then
proposes an integer programming formulation for the MCNDP.

3.3.1 Notation and Parameters
Let G(N, E) denote an undirected network with node set N and link set E. The indices
i and j denote a node in the network, i, j ∈ N and E ⊆ N×N, where [i, j] denotes an
undirected link between nodes i and j with a nonnegative fixed cost fij. Let B to denote
the available budget. Each O-D pair in the network is represented as a unique commodity
type. Let k represent the commodity type index, k ∈ K, where K denotes the set of all
commodities. One unit of flow of commodity k must be transported over the network
from its origin O(k) to its destination D(k). To differentiate the direction of flow of a
commodity, we consider two directed links (i, j) and (j, i) corresponding to each original
undirected link [i, j]. Let A denote the set of the directed links; all links are uncapacitated.
Let c ijk be the nonnegative routing cost for a unit of commodity k on link (i, j), and m
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demand the demand center index, m ∈ M, the set of demand centers in the region. Let rm
represent the demand associated with demand center m, and Em the set of links that are
eligible to cover it. We treat the demand centers separately from the nodes in the
network, whereas past studies assign demand centers to a node in the network which is a
more restrictive approach.

3.3.2 Decision Variables
The formulation contains three types of variables: (i) the arc flow variables denoted
by the vector x = { xijk }, which define the flow of different commodities in each of the
selected links, (ii) the design variables denoted by the vector y = { yij }, which define the
links selected for the network design, and (iii) the coverage variables denoted by the
vector z = { zm }, which define whether or not a demand center is covered. They are
defined as follows:

⎧1, if there is a unit flow of commodity k on link (i, j )
xijk = ⎨
⎩0, otherwise

⎧1, if link [i, j ] is used in a flow path
y ij = ⎨
⎩0, otherwise
⎧1, if demand center m is accessible from a link of a flow path
zm = ⎨
⎩0, otherwise

3.3.3 The MCNDP Formulation
The MCNDP formulation has two objectives: Z1, the total routing cost, and Z2, the
total demand covered where,
Z1 =

k k
k k
∑ ∑ (cij xij + c ji x ji ) and Z2 = - ∑ rm zm .

k∈K [i , j ]∈E

m∈M

The integer programming formulation for the MCNDP is expressed as follows:
MCNDP:

Minimize Z = [Z1, Z2]

13

(1)

subject to
∑

(i , j )∈ A

xijk

−

x kji

⎧ 1, if i = O(k )
⎪
= ⎨− 1, if i = D(k )
⎪⎩ 0, otherwise

∀ i, k

(2)

∀m

(3)

xijk ` ≤ yij

∀ k, [i, j] ∈ E

(4)

x kji ≤ yij

∀ k, [i, j] ∈ E

(5)

∑

( j ,i )∈ A

zm ≤ ∑

k
k
∑ ( xij + x ji )

k ∈K [i , j ]∈E m

∑

[i , j ]∈E

f ij yij ≤ B

∑

xijk ≤ 1

∑

xijk ≤ 1

(i , j )∈A

(i , j )∈A
k
∑ xij

(6)

∀ i, k

∀ k, j = D(k)

≤ | Q | −1

(7)

(8)

∀ k, Q ⊆ N, 2 ≤ |Q| ≤ |N|-2 (9)

{(i , j ) ∈A|∀ i , j ∈Q}

xijk , x kji = 0 or 1

∀ k, [i, j] ∈ E

(10)

yij = 0 or 1

∀ [i, j] ∈ E

(11)

zm = 0 or 1

∀m∈M

(12)

x ∈ S

(13)

In multiobjective programming, there may never exist a single solution that optimizes
all the objectives. Thus, the notion of an optimal solution is not relevant here and is
replaced by the concept of a noninferior solution set from which the decision-maker
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selects the most preferred solution. A solution to the above formulation is said to be
noninferior if there exists no other feasible solution that improves one objective without
degrading the other. There are two popular solution approaches to multiobjective
programming: preference based techniques and generating techniques [Cohon, 1978].
The latter approach, which has been commonly employed due to its simplicity, generates
the entire noninferior solution set or an approximation of it. We adopt this approach. An
approximation of the set can be obtained by using a single objective function formed by
different convex combinations of the objective functions. Our objective function
becomes:
Z(w1,w2) = w1Z1 + w2Z2

(14)

where w1 + w2 = 1, and w1, w2 ≥ 0.
The use of the weight pair (w1,w2) reflects the explicit tradeoffs between the total
routing cost and the demand that can be covered. Due to the discrete nature of the
MCNDP solution set, the above weighting method is incapable of identifying noninferior
solutions that lie in the duality gap of the convex hull of the set. Figure 3.1 illustrates an
example of a noninferior frontier which is a discrete set of points. The boundary of its
convex hull is obtained by joining its exterior points. However, there can be nondominated solutions that lie within the convex hull. For example, point B represents such
an instance in the figure. Hence, point B is said to lie in the duality gap of the convex
hull. Solving a constrained version to enable such identification entails a substantial
increase in the computational effort. Also, the number of noninferior solutions is large,
though finite, for even small-size discrete optimization problems and in the worst case
increases exponentially with problem size. Hence, it is not practical to generate the entire
noninferior set. Instead, it is appropriate to focus on generating an approximation to the
noninferior solution set.
Constraints 2 denote the network flow conservation constraints that require x to
describe a simple path from the origin to the destination for all commodities. Constraints
3 represent the coverage constraints, which imply that a demand center is covered only
when at least one of the links providing accessibility to the center is in a flow path.
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Constraint sets 4 and 5 are the forcing constraints; they state that no flow is allowed in
either direction of link [i, j] unless the associated fixed cost is incurred. The MCNDP can
be formulated in an alternative way by expressing the forcing constraints in an
aggregated form:

∑x

k∈K

k
ij

∑x

k∈K

k
ji

≤ | K | yij

∀ [i, j] ∈ E

(15)

≤ | K | yij

∀ [i, j] ∈ E

(16)

Using constraint sets 15 and 16 instead of 4 and 5, respectively, significantly reduces the
number of constraints in the formulation, and consequently the problem size. However,
past efforts suggest that the generic network design models with the less efficient
disaggregate formulation perform computationally much better than the more efficient
aggregate formulation [Magnanti and Wong, 1984]. This is because the disaggregate
version of the forcing constraints better approximates the convex hull of the set of
feasible integer solutions of the MCNDP, and hence, yields tighter lowerbounds for the
linear programming (LP) relaxation of the formulation.
Constraint 6 is the budget constraint; it states that the sum of the fixed costs of the
links in any solution should not exceed B.
Due to constraint set 3, any solution can entail looping paths of the kind C1 and C2,
as shown in Figure 3.2, for one or more commodities as loops help to achieve extra
population coverage. We seek loopless paths and this is enabled through constraint sets 7
and 8. Constraints 7 state that the maximum flow of any commodity type exiting any
node in the network should not exceed unity. Constraints 8 prevent the occurrence of
loops at destination nodes (similar to C2), which is not precluded by 7.
The coverage constraints can also lead to isolated subtours such as ST (as shown in
Figure 3.2) that do not share any link with the corresponding commodity flow paths in
the solution. These subtours are prevented by adding subtour elimination constraints 9, in
which Q denotes the nodes in a subtour. Since, |Q| can potentially take several values
between 2 and |N|-2, there are potentially an exponential number of such constraints.
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Constraint sets 10, 11 and 12 restrict the flow, design, and coverage variables,
respectively, to 0-1 values.
Constraint 13 restricts the flow variables to the set S which represents a restricted
solution domain S in which some flow variables are fixed a priori. As discussed in the
next chapter, this is necessary to restrict the geographical region within which the search
is performed to enable computational time savings. Presumably, the commodity paths to
be determined would be confined to a subnetwork surrounding the O-D pair, and not
circuitous. Hence, it models the topological restrictions upon the commodity flows in the
network.
The MCNDP is a linear integer program with (2|K||E|+|E|+|M|) integer variables and
comprises of (|K||N|+|M|+2|K||E|+1+|N||K|+|K|) constraints and an exponential number
(O(2|E|)) of subtour elimination constraints.

3.4 Computational Complexity of MCNDP
Lemma: The MCNDP is NP-hard.
Proof: We prove it by restriction. Consider the instance MCNDPR of problem MCNDP:

|M| = 0, that is, there are no demand centers and the objective function is just the total
routing cost of the various commodities. The coverage constraints 3 cannot be imposed as
there are no demand centers. Also, the constraints sets 7, 8 and 9 are redundant in the new
formulation and can be ignored. Solving this instance, which has only one objective, is
equivalent to solving a budget design problem which is known to be NP-hard [Johnson et
al., 1978]. Therefore, the MCNDP generalizes the budget design problem. It follows that
the MCNDP is NP-hard.
Hence, the MCNDP is rather intractable, implying that the solution approach is
typically an enumeration-type procedure.

3.5 Valid Inequalities
Typically, integer programming formulations are solved using branch-and-bound type
methods that solve linear programs at the nodes of the branch-and-bound tree. The
computational time for such procedures is dependent on the number of tree nodes
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enumerated to obtain the solution, as well as the time required to solve the formulation at
each enumerated node. The number of nodes to be enumerated is dependent on the
quality of the bounds generated by associated LP relaxations. Valid inequalities, which
are constraints based on the problem characteristics, are useful in this context. They are
redundant in an integer programming formulation but can eliminate non-integer solutions
that are optimal for the LP relaxations. Hence, they improve the lower bounds computed
by the solution algorithms, thereby generating computational time savings. Valid
inequalities can be appended to the MCNDP to enhance the formulation.
Proposition 1. The constraint

xijk + x kji ≤ yij

∀ k, [i, j] ∈ E

(17)

is a valid inequality for the MCNDP.
Proof: In any feasible design, a link [i, j] is either chosen or not. Consider the case where

link [i, j] is selected, which implies yij = 1. Then, the corresponding set of inequalities for
that link in constraints 17 are its subtour elimination constraints for |Q| = 2. If that link is
not selected, it implies yij = 0. Then, the forcing constraints imply that xijk = 0,∀ k, and the
corresponding constraints in 17 are valid. This completes the proof.
This valid inequality is a virtual constraint vis-à-vis the problem as it is not a direct
representation of a physical reality or a logical characteristic. However, it can replace
constraints 4 and 5, and part of constraints 9 (that is, for |Q| = 2). Hence, it can be used to
generate some computational time savings by reducing the problem size.

Proposition 2. The following constraints are valid for the MCNDP.

yij ≤ zm

∀ m, [i, j] ∈ Em

(18)

xijk ≤ z m

∀ m, k, [i, j] ∈ Em

(19)

xijk + x kji ≤ zm

∀ m, k, [i, j] ∈ Em

(20)
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Proof: If xijk = 1 for some k and [i, j] ∈ Em then yij assumes the value 1, and the demand

center m is covered implying zm = 1. If xijk = 0 ∀ k, [i, j] ∈ Em then no fixed cost is
incurred for the ∀ [i, j] ∈ Em and the demand center m is not covered. This completes the
proof of constraints 18. The proof of constraints 19 follows directly from the forcing
constraints, and the result just proved. Constraint set 18 is redundant in the MCNDP
formulation and directly follows from constraints 17 and 18.
These valid inequalities imply that if a demand center m is not chosen, then links in
Em do not appear in the solution. This simplifies the budget constraint and network flow
conservation constraints, leading to potential computational efficiencies.
Proposition 3. Let m1 and m2 be two demand centers such that Em1 ⊆ Em2, then the

following relation holds.
zm1 ≤ zm 2

(21)

Proof: Suppose demand center m1 is covered by flow of some commodity k in arc (i, j),

this flow also covers demand center m2. If demand center m1 is not covered, constraint
21 reduces to the nonegativity constraint for the variable zm2. The proof is complete.
This valid inequality can potentially reduce computations by exploiting the problem
characteristic that if a demand center is covered by a link (i, j), it is redundant to search
other links to cover this demand center.
In summary, the MCNDP is a NP-hard integer programming formulation. It is
exacerbated by the need for subtour and looping elimination constraints. In addition,
valid inequalities can be proposed to increase computational efficiency by exploiting the
problem structure. The next chapter discusses the application of the MCNDP to the
determination of critical routes for earthquake response planning.
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Total population covered

Total travel time

Figure 3.1 Example of noninferior
solution in the duality gap
B
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C2
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ST

Figure 3.2 Example of a solution with looping paths and a subtour
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CHAPTER 4 CASE STUDY: CRITICAL ROUTES FOR EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE
PLANNING

This chapter discusses the application of the MCNDP formulation to the
determination of critical routes for earthquake response in southwest Indiana. It first
describes the details of the case study, followed by a summary of the solution procedure
and its implementation. A problem reduction strategy is proposed to reduce
computational times.

4.1 Case Study
The MCNDP is used to determine the critical routes under earthquakes for a network
representing southwest Indiana, as shown in Figure 4.1. It consists of 184 nodes, 307
links, and 93 population centers. The demand of a center is set equal to its population as
obtained from the US Census 2000 Data [US Census Bureau, 2000]. Fifteen centers have
a population greater than 5000 and are denoted as major population centers. The
remaining 78 have a population between 3000-5000, and are labeled minor population
centers. O-D node pairs, which represent the commodities (that is each O-D pair
represents one commodity), are chosen so as to ensure connectivity between the major
population centers. From Figure 4.1, the 15 major population centers can be viewed to lie
in five different layers from top to bottom: 3 centers each in the first three levels, 2 in the
fourth level, and 4 in the fifth level. To enable connectivity across the region it is
reasonable to choose O-D node pairs that connect major population centers between
adjacent layers, as also those within each layer. Note that the network topology
constituted by any feasible set of critical routes is connected. This approach generated 33
O-D node pairs. Using engineering judgment, the paths of 5 O-D pairs are predetermined. The fixed cost of a link is the total retrofit area of all the bridges on that link.
The link routing costs are their free-flow travel times, implying that link capacity is
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ignored. This is because the problem addresses the planning stage of earthquake
emergency response. The link travel times are assumed to be symmetric. The links that
can potentially cover a population center are those that are within some pre-specified
threshold distance of it. They were identified by observing its location and the proximity
of roads (interstates, US roads and state roads) to it using the geographical map of the
region.

4.2 Solving the MCNDP

4.2.1 Solution Procedure
The MCNDP is solved using the branch-and-cut algorithm in CPLEX [ILOG CPLEX
7.1, 2001]. It is a search technique that uses the tree structure in which CPLEX
dynamically adds cut constraints at the tree nodes to reduce the tree size. The solution
procedure has two primary computational aspects. The first is the number of the tree
nodes searched in the branch-and-cut method since each requires the solution of a linear
program (that is, the LP relaxation of the MCNDP formulation). The LP relaxation
represents the formulation obtained by allowing the integer decision variables to assume
continuous values in the range within their upper and lower limits. The optimal value of
this formulation provides a lower bound for the MCNDP formulation as it is less
restrictive than the original formulation. Thereby, larger the number of tree nodes
searched, the greater the computational time. This highlights the critical importance of
the second computational aspect, the MCNDP formulation size, which depends on the
number of constraints. In this context, computational savings can be generated by using
valid inequalities, and/or by including or excluding the subtour elimination constraints.
The solution procedure first excludes most of the subtour elimination constraints to make
the problem computationally tractable. The only ones included are those for |Q|=2
implying link subtours. This is because there are only a few constraints with |Q|=2, and
preliminary analysis indicates that the associated subtours can occur frequently in the
solution if they are not precluded. Next, the solution procedure identifies subtours in the
solution obtained from CPLEX using this relaxed formulation. If subtours exist, it adds
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the necessary subtour elimination constraint(s) and reoptimizes the new formulation. This
step is repeated until no more subtours are encountered in the solution.
The best-known integer solution, which is the upper bound to the optimal solution, is
the final solution obtained from CPLEX. The lower bound to the optimal solution is the
best objective function value across all LP relaxation solutions of the branch-and-cut
nodes. They are used to determine the percentage optimality gap, which is a measure of
the quality of the solution. The percentage optimality gap is defined as [(upper bound –
lower bound)*100]/lower bound, where the bounds are obtained from CPLEX. It
indicates how close the best-known integer solution is to the optimal solution.

4.2.2 Implementation Details
The computing environment consists of a Sun Ultra Enterprise server E6500 with 26
400Mhz UltraSparc II processors under the multi-user Solaris 7 operating environment
with 23GB RAM, 131GB swap space and 8MB cache. A C++ program was implemented
to solve the problem and was compiled using GNU, g++ v2.95.3. It invokes subroutines
from the CPLEX Callable Library version 7.1 to construct the formulation and solve it
with the in-built mixed integer programming (MIP) optimizer that provides a customized
branch-and-cut procedure. Experiments are performed by excluding and including the
valid inequalities in the formulation.
A preliminary analysis was performed to calibrate the CPLEX parameter settings for
different experimental scenarios in terms of the budgets and the relative weights of the
two objectives, and for different % optimality gaps. A trial and error approach was
adopted in order to determine a good choice for the optimality tolerance level to solve an
instance to the maximal permissible closeness to optimality as possible within a
reasonable computational time. Our test runs indicated that for very low values w2 (≤
0.005), default settings yielded good computational performance. However, some
analysis was required to arrive at a good setting for higher values of w2. It was based on
aggressive probing, best estimate search for the node selection strategy, and variable
branching using pseudo reduced costs. The CPLEX preprocessor was set to on, as it was
able to achieve reduction in the MIP problem size leading to faster solution times. Also,
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based on our preliminary analysis a priority order was assigned to the variables in which
branching would be performed first on the x variables, then on the y variables and finally
on the z variables. Each instance was solved under exactly identical parameter settings for
the set of experiments with or without valid inequalities to compare the performance of
the two cases.

4.2.3 Problem Reduction Strategy
The preliminary runs indicated the intractable nature of the MCNDP; an instance
with budget B = 3.33 million sqft and weight pair (w1,w2) = (0.99,0.01) required over 5
days to solve to a 1% optimality gap. To generate significant computational time savings,
a strategy to reduce the search domain was incorporated based on the notion that the
solution for an O-D pair would lie within some restricted geographical area around it.
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the path for an O-D pair is confined to a
subnetwork around it rather than including circuitous components that are geographically
further away. This enables us to set the commodity flow variables to zero for the rest of
the network, which provides the restricted solution domain S for the formulation.
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Major population center

Minor population center

Figure 4.1 Road network of southwest Indiana
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CHAPTER 5 RESULTS FROM COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS

This chapter reports the results and derives insights from the computational
experiments conducted using the case study. The primary objective of the experiments is
to analyze model sensitivity for different budgets and relative weights for the two
objectives. We make a few comments on the computational performance. Subsequently
we seek to develop noninferior frontiers that illustrate the trade-offs between the
conflicting objectives for different budgets to provide practical insights to decisionmakers.

5.1 Model Sensitivity and Computational Performance
An effective problem reduction strategy was sought to be identified based on
computational efficiency of the test runs conducted. In the runs all the valid inequalities
were included for computational efficiency. A strategy which sets 83.46% of the total
number of flow variables to zero a priori, performed in a robust manner. Hence, further
experiments were conducted using this strategy. The formulation was solved for the
following weight pairs: (0.999,0.001), (0.99,0.01), (0.95,0.05) and (0.9,0.1) for the
budget range 1.43 million sqft to 3.33 million sqft. The value 1.43 million sqft is the
minimum budget required for a feasible solution to the formulation. Table 5.1 illustrates
the total travel time and the total population covered for the instances solved. The
computational times were higher for larger w2 values because of the need to search more
routes due to the increased importance of population coverage in the objective function.
When w2 is smaller, the problem approaches the budget design problem where the
network structure can be favorably exploited to yield better computational performance.
For low budgets, the problems are more difficult to solve due to interactions between
commodities caused by the need to share links in the final solution. This was also
observed by Dionne and Florian [1979]. In our experiments, subtours occur in the
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intermediate solutions for all budgets with weight pairs (0.95,0.05) and (0.9,0.1), and
only for two instances in (0.99,0.01). This is because a larger weight for population
coverage leads to physically meaningless isolated subtours in an effort to improve the
objective function value.

5.2 Noninferior Frontiers: Travel Time-Population Coverage Trade-offs
Figure 5.1 displays the noninferior solution set for the budget range 1.43 million sqft
to 3.33 million sqft. In the figure, the solutions towards the left of the graph for any
budget correspond to lower w2 values; for example, the leftmost points correspond to w2
= 0.001.
In general, for a budget, higher values of w2 lead to greater population coverage at the
expense of increased system travel time. This plot provides flexibility [Hall, 1985] to the
decision-maker by generating a range of solutions. Noninferior solution sets, like the ones
shown here, can be very useful to the decision-maker as they highlight the tradeoffs
between conflicting objectives. They also aid decision-makers to compare the additional
benefits accrued in terms of system travel time savings and extra population coverage due
to additional budget. For example, the marginal benefits that could be realized from a
budget of 2 million sqft instead of 1.67 million sqft would be higher than those under
2.33 million sqft instead of 2 million sqft.
Figures 5.2a-g depict the critical routes for seven of the instances solved above. For
the lowest budget, 1.43 million sqft., the subnetwork formed by the critical routes is
sparse, but still covers approximately 90% of the total population of the region. For the
critical route networks shown in these figures, the travel times and the population covered
are higher as the weight for population is increased, keeping the budget fixed. This is
because the routes are more circuitous.
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Figure 5.1 Noninferior solution set for different budget values
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Figure 5.2a Critical routes for the weight pair (0.9,0.1) and budget 1.43 million sqft
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Figure 5.2b Critical routes for the weight pair (0.99,0.01) and budget 1.67 million sqft
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Figure 5.2c Critical routes for the weight pair (0.9,0.1) and budget 1.67 million sqft

32

Figure 5.2d Critical routes for the weight pair (0.99,0.01) and budget 2 million sqft
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Figure 5.2e Critical routes for the weight pair (0.95,0.05) and budget 2 million sqft
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Figure 5.2f Critical routes for the weight pair (0.99,0.01) and budget 2.33 million sqft
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Figure 5.2g Critical routes for the weight pair (0.95,0.05) and budget 2.33 million sqft
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Table 5.1 Objective function values for the instances solved

1.43

(0.999,0.001)
(0.99,0.01)
(0.95,0.05)
(0.9,0.1)

Total travel time
(minutes)
1656.67
1670.96
1670.96
1686.42

Total population
covered
409572
412062
412062
412354

% of Total
population covered
89.46
90.00
90.00
90.06

1.67

(0.999,0.001)
(0.99,0.01)
(0.95,0.05)
(0.9,0.1)

1442.33
1510.70
1758.24
1766.11

415148
430861
437885
438561

90.68
94.11
95.64
95.79

2.00

(0.999,0.001)
(0.99,0.01)
(0.95,0.05)
(0.9,0.1)

1350.84
1454.16
1639.79
1903.84

423192
441712
450129
449489

92.44
96.48
98.32
98.18

2.33

(0.999,0.001)
(0.99,0.01)
(0.95,0.05)
(0.9,0.1)

1342.47
1428.82
1601.52
1809.39

433975
448727
452715
455482

94.79
98.01
98.88
99.49

2.67

(0.999,0.001)
(0.99,0.01)
(0.95,0.05)
(0.9,0.1)

1335.77
1407.88
1620.63
1786.13

436682
450804
456039
455953

95.38
98.47
99.61
99.59

3.00

(0.999,0.001)
(0.99,0.01)
(0.95,0.05)
(0.9,0.1)

1335.77
1409.15
1561.31
1713.74

436682
452018
455904
457111

95.38
98.73
99.581
99.85

3.33

(0.999,0.001)
(0.99,0.01)
(0.95,0.05)
(0.9,0.1)

1335.77
1409.15
1584.22
1635.3

436682
452018
456184
456448

95.38
98.73
99.64
99.70

Budget
(million sqft)

(w1,w2)
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CHAPTER 6 RECOMMENDED CRITICAL ROUTES CONSISTENT WITH INDOT
(SAC) NEEDS

This chapter reports the results from the computational experiments conducted using
the case study after incorporating the recommendations of the Study Advisory Committee
based on the critical route subnetworks identified in Chapter 5. Section 6.1 states the
recommendations briefly and discusses them. Section 6.2 discusses the critical routes
obtained by incorporating the recommendations.

6.1 Feedback from Study Advisory Committee and Emergency Response Operators
Based on the feedback from the SAC, the following recommendations were proposed
for the critical routes:
1) Inclusion of the section of I-64 that passes through the study region.
2) Provision of connectivity of the critical routes to adjacent states, namely, Illinois
and Kentucky.
The first recommendation attempts to address the omission of I-64 in the critical
routes shown in Chapter 5. Since I-64 is a freeway, it would potentially provide an
efficient critical route subnetwork component due to the superior structural and
maintenance characteristics of freeways; that is, it would need minimal budgetary
investments to ensure seismic tolerance. Hence, it would seem natural for it to be a part
of at least some of the critical routes. To analyze the reasons for its omission in the
critical route subnetworks suggested in Chapter 5, we revisit the model presented in
chapter 3 that determines the critical routes. This model trades off three factors, namely
total travel time, population covered and budget. Observing the figures (figures 5.2a-g)
shown in Chapter 5, we note that the population centers close to I-64 that are not covered
in most critical routes are Griffin, Elberfield and Lynnville. Their populations are 160,
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636 and 781, respectively. Hence, together they constitute only 0.34% of the total
population of the study region. Due to the budgetary constraints, the benefits of higher
population coverage achievable through the routes other than I-64 are greater than the
lower total travel time achieved due to its inclusion. Hence, the model excludes I-64 from
the critical routes shown in Chapter 5.
Routes that provide connectivity to adjacent states are important. They aid in the
coordination of response plans with adjacent states and also enable the response operators
in Indiana to utilize the assistance offered by their counterparts in the adjacent states in
the event of an earthquake primarily causing damage in Indiana. This potentially
increases response effectiveness.
Both sets of recommendations were incorporated into the determination of the critical
routes by adding the associated constraints into the original MCNDP formulation. This
also means that the new formulation has a more restricted solution set compared to the
original one. Therefore, the new objective function value (denoting the optimal solution
for the more-constrained problem) incorporating these additional constraints can never be
better than that of the original formulation corresponding to the results in Chapter 5.

6.2 Characteristics of the Recommended Critical Routes
After the addition of constraints to incorporate the SAC recommendations, the
minimum budget required for a feasible solution increased to 1.67 million sqft. The
critical routes were solved for budgets ranging from 1.67 million sqft. to 3.33 million
sqft. Table 6.1 shows the total travel time and the total population covered for the various
instances solved. Figure 6.1 depicts the noninferior solution frontier obtained. It
illustrates that the marginal benefits realizable from a 2 million sqft. budget compared to
the 1.67 million sqft. case are higher than those corresponding to the noninferior frontiers
illustrated in Chapter 5 for the same budgets. The results (Figures 6.2a-f) suggest that the
critical routes identified in Chapter 5 do not differ perceptibly from those computed here.
For identical problem parameters, in most cases, the total travel time and the total
population covered have worsened due to the recommendations. This is because the
addition of new constraints leads to a more restricted solution set.
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It may be noted that, in some instances, the results in Table 6.1 seem better than those
shown in Table 5.1. This is not because the solution is inherently better in the restricted
case. As just stated, the restricted optimal solution will always be worse. However, due
the problem complexity (NP-hard problem) discussed in Chapter 3, neither of these two
cases is solved to optimality, but only to a certain optimality tolerance level. Hence, when
more variables are fixed (as is done in Chapter 6), the problem can in many instances be
solved much closer to optimality though the problem is more constrained.
Connectivity was provided at three sections with Illinois and two sections with
Kentucky as desired by the SAC.
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Total population covered

455000

445000

435000

1.67 million s qft

425000

2.00 million s qft
2.33 million s qft
2.67 million s qft

415000

3.00 million s qft
3.33 million s qft
405000
1300

1400

1500

1600

1700

1800

Total travel time (minutes)

Figure 6.1 Noninferior solution set for different budget values
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1900

Figure 6.2a Recommended critical routes for the weight pair (0.99,0.01) and budget 1.67
million sqft
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Figure 6.2b Recommended critical routes for the weight pair (0.9,0.1) and budget 1.67
million sqft
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Figure 6.2c Recommended critical routes for the weight pair (0.99,0.01) and budget 2.00
million sqft
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Figure 6.2d Recommended critical routes for the weight pair (0.95,0.05) and budget 2.00
million sqft
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Figure 6.2e Recommended critical routes for the weight pair (0.99,0.01) and budget 2.33
million sqft
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Figure 6.2f Recommended critical routes for the weight pair (0.95,0.05) and budget 2.33
million sqft
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Table 6.1 Objective function values for the instances solved

1.67

(0.999,0.001)
(0.99,0.01)
(0.95,0.05)
(0.9,0.1)

Total travel time
(minutes)
1662.63
1685.59
1686.69
1715.19

Total population
covered
408422
410802
410802
411855

% of Total
population covered
89.21
89.73
89.73
89.96

2.00

(0.999,0.001)
(0.99,0.01)
(0.95,0.05)
(0.9,0.1)

1391.75
1466.27
1646.53
1755.28

413091
429665
434609
434461

90.23
93.85
94.93
94.90

2.33

(0.999,0.001)
(0.99,0.01)
(0.95,0.05)
(0.9,0.1)

1346.02
1398.75
1584.67
1778.19

427829
445473
449826
450736

93.45
97.30
98.25
98.45

2.67

(0.999,0.001)
(0.99,0.01)
(0.95,0.05)
(0.9,0.1)

1337.33
1425.29
1599.52
1695.34

435301
450589
453614
455026

95.08
98.42
99.08
99.39

3.00

(0.999,0.001)
(0.99,0.01)
(0.95,0.05)
(0.9,0.1)

1328.15
1411.76
1592.24
1689.16

436562
451015
455519
456991

95.36
98.51
99.50
99.82

3.33

(0.999,0.001)
(0.99,0.01)
(0.95,0.05)
(0.9,0.1)

1323.77
1407.76
1516.12
1614.49

436682
452018
456048
457661

95.38
98.73
99.61
99.97

Budget
(million sqft)

(w1,w2)
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS

This chapter summarizes the study and highlights its contributions.

7.1 Summary
Seismic retrofit planning plays an important role in determining the effectiveness of
the operational stage of earthquake response management. At a strategic level, it is
dependent on the routes critical for effective emergency response. However, past studies
have not addressed the identification of critical routes under budget constraints. This is a
very important practical problem for emergency response planners as it involves
identifying effective transportation routes while accounting for bridge structural
conditions and budget limitations. It implies the identification of bridges to retrofit under
earthquake response planning. This study develops a network-level methodology to assist
decision-makers in identifying an effective seismic retrofit scheme for the bridges of a
network. It introduces the MCNDP, which seeks routes that minimize the total routing
costs over the selected routes and maximizes the total demand covered, subject to a
budget constraint. An integer programming formulation of the problem is presented, and
is shown to be NP-hard. The problem characteristics are exploited to develop some valid
inequalities.
In general, the MCNDP model is useful in addressing network-level disaster
management planning. The MCNDP is applied to generate critical routes for earthquake
response planning in southwest Indiana, which is part of a seismically active region that
includes parts of Illinois, Kentucky and Missouri as well. The branch-and-cut procedure
of the CPLEX MIP optimizer is used to solve the problem. A problem reduction strategy
is proposed to reduce computational time while ensuring that the resulting solution is
close to or equal to the optimal solution. Noninferior frontiers are generated using convex
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combinations of the two objectives so as to provide practical insights for decisionmakers. These frontiers assist the decision-maker in analyzing the trade-offs among
various objectives and making budget allocation decisions.
A new set of critical routes were developed based on the SAC feedback for the first
set of critical routes identified. The SAC recommendations were to include the section of
I-64 passing through the study region, and to provide connectivity to the adjacent states
(Illinois and Kentucky) to ensure seamless inter-state coordination and cooperation in the
event of an actual earthquake. These recommendations were incorporated to generate a
new set of critical routes through the addition of constraints to the MCNDP formulation.
The updated critical routes do not differ perceptibly from those obtained from the
experiments prior to the SAC recommendations.

7.2 Contributions of the Study
This study formally defines the Multicommodity Maximal Covering Network Design
Problem (MCNDP) and formulates it. To our knowledge, it represents the first attempt to
incorporate the coverage objective in a generic network model, leading to a new class of
models with significant practical implications. Past work has used the coverage criterion
in identifying a path, tree or tour on a network by considering either the routing or the
fixed cost, while the proposed model simultaneously considers the routing and fixed costs
subject to a budget constraint. That is, none of the existing models consider routing costs,
fixed costs and coverage criterion in a single framework.
From a practical standpoint, the key contribution of this study is its ability to address
planning problems faced by emergency response agencies vis-à-vis disaster management.
The specific problem addressed here relates to earthquake response management. Under
budget constraints, there is a need to determine an effective retrofit plan for the bridges in
a seismically-prone region. Most studies in the literature have adopted a local perspective
to solving this problem, and do not consider the effect of potential bridge failures on the
transportation system performance. The few methodologies that use a systems approach
do not consider the influence of retrofit decisions on the quality of the associated routes
vis-à-vis effective earthquake response. The proposed model fills this critical gap by
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considering the total travel time for the key O-D pairs in the network and the total
population covered by them as the criteria for determining the critical routes. The budget
limitation on the total bridge retrofit costs for the links constituting the critical routes is
represented as a constraint in our model. Hence, this methodology simultaneously
determines the set of bridges in a network requiring retrofit and the routes that serve as
focal points for earthquake response.
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Introduction
The possibility of very strong earthquakes in the
central Mississippi Valley has been known for 200
years in the New Madrid Seismic Zone. Awareness
of the seismic risk in the State of Indiana has
increased in the last decades. In the last two
decades identification of an independent tectonic
process occurring in the Wabash River Valley has
implications for the seismic risk of the State of
Indiana from what has recently been defined as the
Wabash Valley Seismic Zone. The occurrence of a
strong earthquake in these seismic zones or in
Indiana or the neighboring states due to other not
so well understood tectonic processes, as has
occurred in the past, has serious implications for
the State Transportation System. The definition of
Earthquake Emergency Routes for the state is a
priority for the Indiana Department of
Transportation. The identification of Emergency
Routes takes into account issues related to
transportation including coverage of population and
area and travel time along these routes.
This study formulates a multicommodity maximal
covering network design problem (MCNDP) for
identifying critical routes, for earthquake response
and to seismically retrofit bridges. The MCNDP
seeks routes that minimize the total travel time over
the selected routes and maximizes the total
population covered, subject to a budget constraint
on bridge retrofitting costs on the selected routes.
The problem is formulated as a two-objective

integer programming model and solved using the
branch-and-cut module in the CPLEX optimizer.
The model performance was analyzed using the
transportation network of a seismically-prone
region in southwest Indiana. Thereby, the search
for the critical routes for an origin-destination (OD) pair is confined to a limited geographical region
around it.
A Geographical Information System (GIS) system
was developed for evaluation of seismic
vulnerability of the proposed Indiana Emergency
Routes. The GIS based implementation of the
technical information developed in this project
through FEMA HAZUS-MH software was
conducted in collaboration with the Polis Center in
Indianapolis, nationally recognized and FEMA
authorized HAZUS implementation facility.
HAZUS software may be used for mitigation of
vulnerability, simulation, and response to a strong
earthquake in southwestern Indiana. It uses
information from the Indiana Department of
Transportation (INdot) maintenance database and
selected structural and geotechnical information
from the bridge drawings data base. Vulnerability
assessment was performed using the general
information from maintenance and final calibration
was performed using a series of cases based on
bridge drawings and soil exploration descriptions
contained in these drawings.

Findings
Computational experiments were conducted to
investigate the effects of varying the budget and the
relative weights of the two objectives. A set of
12-3 08/05 JTRP-2003/22

critical routes was obtained. Seismic retrofit planning
plays an important role in determining the
effectiveness of the operational stage of earthquake
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response management. At a strategic level, it is
dependent on the routes critical for effective
emergency response. However, past studies have not
addressed the identification of critical routes under
budget constraints. This is a very important practical
problem for emergency response planners as it
involves identifying effective transportation routes
while accounting for bridge structural conditions and
budget limitations. It implies the identification of
bridges to retrofit under earthquake response
planning. This study develops a network-level
methodology to assist decision-makers in identifying
an effective seismic retrofit scheme for the bridges of
a network.
This study formally defines the Multicommodity
Maximal Covering Network Design Problem
(MCNDP) and formulates it. To our knowledge,
it represents the first attempt to incorporate the
coverage objective in a generic network model,
leading to a new class of models with significant
practical implications. Past work has used the
coverage criterion in identifying a path, tree or
tour on a network by considering either the
routing or the fixed cost, while the proposed
model simultaneously considers the routing and
fixed costs subject to a budget constraint. That
is, none of the existing models consider routing
costs, fixed costs and coverage criterion in a
single framework.
From a practical standpoint, the key contribution
of this study is its ability to address planning
problems faced by emergency response agencies
vis-à-vis disaster management. The specific
problem addressed here relates to earthquake
response management. Under budget constraints,
there is a need to determine an effective retrofit
plan for the bridges in a seismically-prone
region. Most studies in the literature have
adopted a local perspective to solving this
problem, and do not consider the effect of
potential bridge failures on the transportation
system performance. The few methodologies
that use a systems approach do not consider the
influence of retrofit decisions on the quality of
the associated routes vis-à-vis effective
earthquake response. The proposed model fills
this critical gap by considering the total travel
time for the key O-D pairs in the network and
the total population covered by them as the
criteria for determining the critical routes. The
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budget limitation on the total bridge retrofit costs
for the links constituting the critical routes is
represented as a constraint in our model. Hence,
this methodology simultaneously determines the
set of bridges in a network requiring retrofit and
the routes that serve as focal points for
earthquake response.
The evolution of the earthquake resistant bridge
design requirements contained in the AASHTO
Specifications and the existence of a proposed
draft seismic design specification being
discussed have significant implications in the
assessment of the existing vulnerability, its
mitigation, and the design of new bridges along
the Emergency Routes. Along with this
development, the USGS assessment of the
seismic risk of southwestern Indiana and a
change of format of the definition of the
earthquake design ground motion that is integral
part of the proposed draft seismic design
specification also has important implications on
the assessment of the operational capabilities of
the Earthquake Emergency Routes of Indiana.
The effects of the 2001 Nisqually Earthquake
that occurred in the State of Washington gave
invaluable insight on the expected situation for
the State of Indiana due to a comparable bridge
inventory in age and bridge types and a parallel
increase of the seismic risk awareness in both
regions over the last decades.
Using the information collected in this study, the
GIS implementation through FEMA-HAZUSMH software may be used for mitigation of
vulnerability, simulation, and response to a
strong earthquake in southwestern Indiana.
Vulnerability was evaluated for different levels
of ground acceleration in order to obtain
behavior patterns for selected bridges. Using
these results, seismic behavior patterns were
obtained for bridges located in southwestern
Indiana included in the INdot Vincennes District
maintenance data base. Soil amplification and
liquefaction potential were evaluated for the
cases having reported SPT measurements from
borings. Based on this process, information
critical for the identification of upgrade needs
for the transportation structures part of the
Earthquake Emergency Routes is made available
to the INdot.
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Implementation
The findings and developments of this research
project are presented next in the form of
suggested implementation steps by the Indiana
Department of Transportation.
1.

2.

3.

Formal adoption of the selected
emergency routes or some variation of
the same by the state is a necessary
step. Such routes adopted and
maintained by INdot will be affected by
issues and policies outside the scope of
those considered in this study. For
instance, policy decisions, budgetary
constraints,
new
projects,
i.e.
continuation of I-69, will likely affect
the formal adoption of a set of
emergency routes and will continue to
impose changes in the future. The
methodology developed in this study
and the information implemented in
HAZUS-MH should be of assistance to
state decision makers in the future.
Future implementation strategies can be
studied through simulation studies
using appropriately updated information
for different earthquake scenarios
including earthquake ground motion
defined in current AASHTO Standard
Specifications,
proposed
Draft
AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions, or
other. These simulations will provide
corresponding bridge retrofit scope for
the proposed routes or alternative
definitions.
The information in the maintenance
database should be periodically
evaluated
and
should
include
information currently available only in
the bridge drawings (see Section 7.5 of
the final report). This will improve the
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vulnerability assessment of the bridges
refining the mitigation policies to adopt
in the future. This expansion of the
maintenance database can be extended
to other counties and districts not
covered in this research project.
4.

Establish a program for assessing the
liquefaction,
soil
spread,
and
embankment failure potential along the
routes at locations other than bridge
sites by providing a consistent
evaluation methodology supported with
the information developed in this study.
This implementation will require a soil
exploration
program
to
obtain
geotechnical properties of sites where
no information exists or where such
information was obtained years ago
with
different
objectives
than
liquefaction evaluation. In the research
conducted in this study, liquefaction
evaluations were made using solely
boring information contained in
selected bridge drawings.

5.

To establish procedures for emergency
response under different earthquake
occurrence scenarios.

6.

INdot should consider the formal
adoption of HAZUS-MH software for
scenario management, mitigation and
vulnerability studies and to train
appropriate personnel. An important
feature in this implementation step is
the engagement of the Polis Center in
the training of INdot personnel on the
use of HAZUS-MH software. The Polis
Center is a nationally recognized
HAZUS implementation facility.
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ABSTRACT

Awareness of the seismic risk in the State of Indiana has increased in the last decades.
The possibility of very strong earthquakes in the central Mississippi Valley has been
known for 200 years in the New Madrid Seismic Zone. In the last two decades
identification of an independent tectonic process occurring in the Wabash River Valley
has implications for the seismic risk of the State of Indiana from what has recently been
defined as the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone. The occurrence of a strong earthquake in
these seismic zones, or in Indiana, or in the neighboring states due to other not so well
understood tectonic processes as has occurred in the past, has serious implications for the
State Transportation System. The definition of Earthquake Emergency Routes for the
State of Indiana became a priority for the Indiana Department of Transportation. The
definition of these Emergency Routes takes into account issues related to transportation
including coverage of population and area and travel time along these routes, and issues
related to structural and geotechnical seismic vulnerability of the transportation structures
along these routes. The transportation related issues are presented in Part I of this Report,
and the structural and geotechnical seismic related issues are presented in Part II.
Previous experience in the United States and elsewhere in the world with bridge damage
during strong earthquakes has influenced the bridge earthquake resistant specifications
and mitigation procedures. The effects of the Nisqually Earthquake that occurred in the
State of Washington in 2001 give insight on the expected situation for the State of
Indiana due to a comparable bridge inventory in age and bridge types and a parallel
increase of the seismic risk awareness in both regions over the last decades. The
evolution of the earthquake resistant bridge design requirements contained in the
AASHTO Specifications and the existence of a proposed draft seismic design
specification being discussed have significant implications in the assessment of the
existing vulnerability, its mitigation, and the design of new bridges along the Emergency

xv

Routes. Along with this development, the USGS assessment of the seismic risk of
southwestern Indiana and a change of format of the definition of the earthquake design
ground motion that is an integral part of the proposed draft seismic design specification
also has important implications on the assessment of the operativeness of the Earthquake
Emergency Routes of Indiana.

Vulnerability assessment was performed using the general information from
inspection and maintenance, and final calibration was performed using a series of cases
based on bridge drawings and soil exploration descriptions contained in these drawings.
Vulnerability was evaluated for different levels of ground acceleration in order to obtain
behavior patterns for selected bridges. Using these results, seismic behavior patterns were
obtained for bridges located in southwestern Indiana included in the Indot Vincennes
District Inspection and Maintenance Database. Soil amplification and liquefaction
potential were evaluated for the cases having reported SPT measurements from borings.
Based on this process, information, upgrade needs for the transportation structures part of
the Earthquake Emergency Routes were obtained. With this information, it is possible to
perform simulations that will help Indot in devising mitigation policies, perform
simulations for different earthquake occurrence scenarios, and establish, evaluate, and
implement alternatives for response strategies using the Earthquake Emergency Routes.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has developed HAZUS-MH,
a GIS-based software tool that empowers communities with the ability to assess risk from
earthquakes, flood, and wind related disasters. While HAZUS-MH can be used to assess
risk with the significant default inventory that it includes, it is possible to integrate local
data into the HAZUS-MH analysis in order to produce more realistic loss estimates. As
a component of the research work conducted in this project and with the approval of the
Study Advisory Committee, The Polis Center from Indianapolis was tasked with the
integration of bridge and soils data into HAZUS-MH for the purpose of using that tool to
conduct earthquake risk analysis. The Polis Center is a FEMA authorized HAZUS-MH
earthquake and flood service provider and is thus able to support the goals of INDOT in

xvi

this instance. The GIS implementation through FEMA HAZUS-MH software conducted
during this study uses information from the Indiana Department of Transportation (Indot)
Inspection and Maintenance Database and structural and geotechnical information from
the bridge drawings data base.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose
The purpose of the project was to propose Earthquake Emergency Routes for the
State of Indiana with emphasis in the southwestern part of the State, to review the
selected routes for earthquake hazards identifying conditions related to the structures
along those routes that may affect their functioning in case of occurrence of a strong
earthquake in the region, and to propose procedures for mitigation, evaluation and
maintenance of their status as emergency routes.

1.2 Scope
1. To recommend Earthquake Emergency Routes for the Vincennes District of the
Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT), located in the southwestern
corner of the State, based on travel times and scope of retrofit work necessary to
implement these routes with the final decision of which routes to select resting
with INDOT (see Part I of this report).
2. To develop a tool based on geographical information systems technology (GIS)
that INDOT engineering may use for identifying and maintaining the Earthquake
Emergency Routes network of Indiana and for establishing policies for mitigation
of earthquake hazard on these routes, to perform simulations for different
earthquake scenarios, and to help in the response to an actual emergency caused
by the occurrence of a strong earthquake in the region.
3. To assess the seismic vulnerability of selected bridges belonging to the Vincennes
INDOT District based on detailed information, and to correlate this vulnerability
assessment with one obtained using just the information currently contained in the
INDOT Inspection and Maintenance Database. To recommend items relevant to
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the vulnerability of the routes to be added to the Inspection and Maintenance
Database.
4. To give guidance on how to prioritize the mitigation of the vulnerability of
existing bridges according to the analyses performed and their importance in
keeping the transportation network system functional with emphasis in the
Earthquake Emergency Routes selected.

1.3 Methodology
Given the multidisciplinary nature of the project, the methodology used took
advantage of the most advanced resources of each discipline. The methodology
corresponding to each of the components is described in detail along this report at the
pertinent locations, with Chapter 4 of this report presenting a summary of the
vulnerability assessment methodology used.

1.4 Participants
Joint Transportation Research Program – JTRP
Kumares C. Sinha, Director
Study Advisory Committee
Indiana Earthquake Preparedness Committee
J. Thompson, Chairman
K. Dughaish, Secretary
W. Dittelberger
B. Dittrich
S. Garrison
J. R. Hill
K. Hoernschemeyer
D. Leonard
T. McClellan
J. McCrary
T. Nantung
C. Schum
G. Snyder
J. Steel
L. Vaughan
M. Wood
M. Zaheer

(Indiana Department of Transportation)
(Indiana Department of Transportation)
(Indiana Department of Transportation)
(Indiana Department of Transportation)
(Indiana Department of Transportation)
(Indiana Geological Survey)
(Federal Highway Administration)
(Indiana Department of Transportation)
(Indiana Department of Transportation)
(Indiana Department of Transportation)
(Indiana Department of Transportation)
(Indiana Department of Transportation)
(Indiana Department of Transportation)
(Indiana State Emergency Management Agency)
(Indiana Department of Transportation)
(Indiana Department of Transportation)
(Indiana Department of Transportation)
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Purdue University
Earthquake Engineering and Structural Engineering:
Mete A. Sozen, Investigator, Kettelhut Distinguished Professor of Civil
Engineering
Julio A. Ramirez, Co-Principal Investigator, Professor of Civil
Engineering
Luis E. Garcia, Research Engineer, Visiting Professor of Civil
Engineering (Professor of Civil Engineering, Universidad de los
Andes, Bogotá, Colombia)
Laura Jones Metzger, Graduate Research Assistant
Geotechnical:
Antonio Bobet, Co-Principal Investigator, Associate Professor of Civil
Engineering
Dimitri Loukidis, Graduate Research Assistant
Transportation:
Srinivas Peeta, Co-Principal Investigator, Associate Professor of Civil
Engineering
Kannan Viswanath, Graduate Research Assistant
1.5 Organization of the report
This report is presented in two volumes; the first one – Part I – deals with
Transportation issues related to definition of the selected Earthquake Emergency Routes;
this second volume – Part II – is organized in the following manner:
Chapter 2 presents background on seismic vulnerability of transportation networks. It
includes the reasons behind the need of defining earthquake emergency routes. Discusses
the seismic vulnerability issues linked to transportation structures. A summary of the
performance of transportation networks in past earthquakes is presented. Finally, it
presents and discusses the development of the specifications that govern their design
including associated geotechnical issues.
Chapter 3 discusses the tectonic setting of the southwestern corner of Indiana and
how it fits within the two main regional seismogenic structures – the New Madrid
Seismic Zones and the Wabash River Faulting System – commenting on the earthquakes
that have affected the region. The earthquake mean return period is presented and the
importance of its definition for earthquake resistant design of structures is brought into

3

perspective by describing the values being used in current and proposed earthquake
resistant bridge design specifications. The implications of adopting a draft seismic design
specification by AASHTO are discussed.
Chapter 4 presents the methodology for evaluation of seismic vulnerability of the
selected Indiana Emergency Routes, the available information, the Geographical
Information System (GIS) implementation and its use for mitigation of vulnerability,
simulation, and response to a strong earthquake in southwestern Indiana.
Chapter 5 is devoted to geotechnical sources of vulnerability for transportation
structures in general and, in particular, the approach used in defining and assessing these
sources of vulnerability for the Earthquake Emergency Routes of the State of Indiana.
Chapter 6 parallels the previous chapter, with the focus on bridges. The methodology
used and its application is discussed in detail.
Chapter 7 defines the upgrade needs for the transportation structures part of the
Earthquake Emergency Routes.
Chapter 8 presents the conclusions and recommendations of the study.
Chapter 9 lists the bibliographic references relevant to the study.
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CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND

This chapter describes previous background information related to earthquake
emergency routes and performance during earthquakes of highway systems,
transportation facilities, and structures with special reference to the State of Indiana. This
background information has been divided in information related to highway systems,
bridges, and issues associated with geotechnical aspects.

2.1 Transportation systems
The Federal Response Plan (FRP) of the United States [FEMA, 2003] created under
the auspices of the Robert T. Stafford Act, which is the enabling legislation for
emergency response in the United States, provides the legal mandate, the resources, and
the mechanisms for an integrated emergency response after the declaration of any disaster
by the President. The Federal Response Plan establishes 12 Emergency Support
Functions (ESF) to facilitate the implementation and coordination of a broad spectrum of
integrated emergency response activities after natural and technological disasters.
ESF No. 1 is “Transportation” and is defined as access to the disaster area. It is based
on the assumptions that the transportation infrastructure in the area will sustain damage,
which will influence the means and accessibility of relief services and supplies to protect
people and property. The disaster responses requiring transportation capacity will be
difficult to coordinate effectively during the immediate post-disaster period. Clearing of
debris and completion of repairs will be gradual, in spite of best efforts, disrupting access
routes for a significant period.
Transportation systems in the Central U.S. – including highways, bridges, railways,
waterways, ports, and airports – are vulnerable to the effects of a damaging earthquake in
the New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) [CUSEC, 2000]. Furthermore, damages to
transportation systems may extend to several states, which present transportation officials
in government and the private sector with unique problems and challenges.
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2.3.1 Ground motion amplification due to soil profile characteristics
Association of earthquake damage with poor soil conditions have been known for
many years. Early approach to the problem was manifest in seismic codes through a
difference in seismic design forces associated with bearing capacity used in foundation
design (see 2.2.2). With the increase deployment of strong ground motion accelerometers
from the 1950’s on, instrumental evidence of the influence of the underlying soil profile
permitted interpretations of earthquake damage in several events such as the 1957 San
Francisco, California, Earthquake; the 1957 Mexico City Earthquake; the 1964
Anchorage, Alaska, Earthquake; and the 1967 Caracas, Venezuela, Earthquake.
From the mid 1970’s on, a clearer picture emerged and different approaches were
adopted to account for the effect of amplification by the soil profile. For the first time in
the 1974 SEAOC Blue Book Lateral Force Requirements for Buildings [SEAOC, 1974]
included a coefficient S, called then Coefficient for Site-Structure Resonance having
values between 1.0 and 1.5 depending on the ratio between the fundamental period of the
structure, T, and a characteristic site period Ts. The 1974 SEAOC Requirements included
an Appendix for obtaining a range of values for the soil deposit characteristic period.
This procedure was adopted by the 1976 Uniform Building Code and was kept for several
issues of this Code.
Studies conducted for moderate magnitude events in the western U.S. [Seed et al.,
1976a] permitted grouping different soil profiles into broad categories [Seed et al.,
1976b]. This type of soil profiles and the corresponding amplifications were combined
with studies of spectral shapes and were included in the ATC-3-06 project [ATC, 1978]
for incorporation in model building earthquake resistant regulations. This classification
comprised three types of soil profiles namely: Type 1 – Stiff soils and rock, Type 2 –
Deep cohesionless or stiff clay soils, and Type 3 – Soft to medium clays and sands. As
part of the requirements a soil coefficient, S, was introduced. This coefficient amplified
the medium to long period part of the acceleration spectrum in rock to model the effects
of the soil according to the soil profile type by factors of 1.0, 1.2, and 1.5 respectively.
This is the same soil profile classification that was used in the seismic bridge design
recommendation ATC-6 project [ATC, 1981].
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The Central U.S. Earthquake Consortium (CUSEC) is a nonprofit organization,
funded by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which is dedicated to reducing
deaths, injuries, damage to property and economic losses resulting from earthquakes
occurring in the Central United States. Its members are the seven states that are most
vulnerable to earthquakes in this region: Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Missouri, and Tennessee.

Fig. 2-1 – Map showing hypothetical maximum intensities for a magnitude 7.6
earthquake in the Central United States region [CUSEC, 2000]
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The document [CUSEC, 2000] discusses the transportation system vulnerability and
the earthquake risk in the Central United States taking into account the multi-state impact
of future damaging earthquakes in the region including associated problems with
earthquake induced hazards such as faulting, liquefaction, slope instability, dam or levee
failure, and hazardous materials spills. The effects of earthquakes on the transportation
system including: highway, railroad, waterway, and air transportation and liquid fuel
transport; the steps that must be taken for mitigation of vulnerability of transportation
systems in the region; and response and recovery policies are discussed in this important
document. It assigns the following consequences of failure in a transportation system due
to an earthquake or other natural disaster:
•

Direct loss of life due to collapse or structural failure of the lifeline.

•

Indirect loss of life due to an inability to respond to secondary catastrophes,
such as fires, and/or provide emergency medical aid.

•

Delayed recovery operations.

•

Release of hazardous products (e.g., losses from tank cars derailed by track
failure, gas leaks from ruptured utility lines) and environmental impacts.

•

Direct loss of property and utility service (e.g., the collapse of a bridge
carrying utilities).

•

Losses due to interruption of access (e.g., export losses due to port damage).

•

Disruption of economic activity across the region and nation as well as in the
community directly affected.

The [CUSEC, 2000] document proposes a New Madrid Transportation Plan and
Strategy, which would be the product of an intergovernmental-private sector planning
process, aimed at addressing the following:
1. Loss estimates and functionality assessments for selected earthquake scenarios.
2. Common set of planning assumptions for federal, state, and local governments.
3. Criteria for decisions on establishing field operations in a multi-state, multiple
region disaster.
4. Proper allocation of resources to multiple impacted areas.
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5. State versus Federal roles in determining priorities and planning for infrastructure
repair.
6. Procedures and criteria for conflict resolution in meeting requests for resources.
7. Pre-disaster determination of conditions that must be present before federal
transportation support is withdrawn.
Similar tasks have been studied in other regions of the U.S., but there has been none
requiring such a broad coordination between different States and the Federal
Government. The role played by CUSEC and the State Departments of Transportation in
implementing this plan can not be underestimated. At present, CUSEC has compiled the
Emergency Routes shown in Fig. 2-2.

Fig. 2-2 – Earthquake Emergency Routes and staging facilities of the
CUSEC State Departments of Transportation
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These routes are currently under study individually by each State. Detailed literature
review on transportation issues is presented in Part I of this report.
2.2 Bridges
2.2.1 Bridge performance during earthquakes
In general, the likelihood of bridge damage increases if the ground motion is
particularly intense, the soils are soft, the bridge was constructed before modern codes
were implemented, or the bridge configuration is irregular [Moehle and Eberhard, 2000].
Depending on theses conditions, bridge damage could be grouped in the following
general categories:
1. Unseating of the superstructure — Short seat lengths at span hinges or simple
supports permit the partial or total collapse of the superstructure if the
displacements caused by the ground motion exceed the support length. Curved
bridges are especially vulnerable for this condition. Restrainers have been
used for several years to mitigate this problem; although, there were cases in
which they were not effective during the Northridge Earthquake [EERI,
1995a].
2. Column failure — Lack of adequate confining transverse reinforcement leads
to brittle modes of failure of reinforced concrete columns and piers. Short lap
splices or inadequate embedment length of anchorage at the foundation of
vertical reinforcement has led to numerous failures. For steel columns, local
buckling may allow damage leading to collapse.
3. Damage to abutments — The abutment is affected by the underlying soil
conditions, the type of foundation, and the demands imposed by the
superstructure movement. Usually, abutments are elements where it is
difficult to provide ductility and toughness.
4. Damage to bearings — Bearings used in bridges designed only for gravity
effect are especially prone to failure under horizontal displacement of the
superstructure transverse to the direction of thermal expansion.
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5. Structural configuration — Unique complex structures with curved or
significant skew geometry, or bridges having unique features or details, are
more susceptible to damage induced by ground motion.
6. Age, Modifications and Maintenance — Bridge design specifications have
changed in recent years as a result of experience from earthquakes and
structural research. The correlation between bad behavior and old bridges is
high as observed in many recent earthquakes. Changes introduced after
original construction sometimes affect behavior. Numerous cases in which
protection barriers or walls reduce the clear height of columns have led to
failures under earthquake ground motions. Deterioration of the bridge due to
corrosion and other causes has had an influence in the observed behavior.
7. Geotechnical conditions — Liquefaction, soil spread, slope instability,
proximity to the fault, approach settlement, and other causes of distress
influence the response, and damage of the bridge.
The following publications describe extensively bridge behavior and damage during
earthquakes [ACI, 1999], [Moehle and Eberhard, 2000], [Penzien, 2000], and [Priestley
et al., 1996]. Reports from earthquakes were damage to bridges is specially described are:
San Fernando, California, 1971 Earthquake [Lew et al., 1971]; Chile 1985 Earthquake
[EERI, 1986]; Whittier Narrows, California, 1987 Earthquake [EERI, 1988]; Loma
Prieta, California, 1989 Earthquake [EERI, 1990] and [NRC, 1994]; Costa Rica 1991
Earthquake [EERI, 1991]; Northridge, California, 1994 Earthquake [EERI, 1995a] and
[CRSI, 1994], the Kobe, Japan, 1995 Earthquake [EERI, 1995b]; the Turkish
Earthquakes of 1999 [EERI, 2000]; the Taiwan Earthquake of 1999 [EERI, 2001], and
the 2001 Nisqually, Washington State, Earthquake [Ranf et al., 2001], and [Nisqually EQ
Clearinghouse Group, 2001]. Just a summary will be presented limiting it to cases of
bridges designed using U.S. or comparable specifications. Direct reference is made to the
relevant U.S. earthquakes. Even with these limitations, several things have to be kept in
mind in translating this information for application in the State of Indiana. These issues
will be discussed after the performance information is presented.
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Although there is record of previous damage to bridges both in the U.S. and abroad,
the February 9, 1971, San Fernando, California, Earthquake constitutes the first case on
intense damage to bridges of modern design that belonged to the Interstate system [Lew
et al., 1971]. The 1971 San Fernando Earthquake affected the greater Los Angeles area
and specially the northern San Fernando Valley. Post-earthquake reports by the
California State Highway Commission indicated that the earthquake damaged
approximately 11 miles of multilane freeways and 6 miles of conventional state
highways, in addition to numerous city and county streets. Approximately 1/5 of the total
damage cost to transportation infrastructure was represented in damage to sixty bridges.
Several of these bridges either collapsed or were severely damaged to the point of having
to be replaced. Considerable disruption of traffic was caused by the bridge damage. The
heavily traveled Interstate 5 was reopened to traffic using emergency detours within five
days of the earthquake occurrence. Approximately 80% of the bridge damage cost was
concentrated in 4 miles of highway at the intersection of I-5, I-210, and State Road 14. It
is interesting to note that one of the collapsed curved bridges rebuilt after the San
Fernando Earthquake collapsed during the Northridge 1994 Earthquake.

Fig. 2-3 – Bridge collapse during the February 9, 1971, San Fernando Earthquake
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The Loma Prieta, California, 1989 Earthquake [EERI, 1990] provided insight on the
influence of geotechnical conditions on bridge behavior by the preponderance of damage
in the perimeter of San Francisco Bay where relatively deep and soft soil deposits
amplified the ground motion. The collapsed portions of the two-story Cypress Street
viaduct (see Fig. 2-4) coincide with the soft soil sites. Soil conditions may have played a
role in damaging a structure of 1950’s with detailing common at that time that did not
provide toughness.

Fig. 2-4 – Collapse of the Cypress Street Viaduct during the
Loma Prieta, California, 1989 Earthquake
Loma Prieta Earthquake also highlighted the vulnerability of adjacent short and long
spans imposing differential deformation demands and producing the collapse of the short
span next to a large span (see Fig. 2-5). During this earthquake there were five bridge
collapses (counting the extensive Cypress Viaduct as one) and four other bridges
sustained major damage.
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Fig. 2-5 – Collapse of a span of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge
during the Loma Prieta, California, 1989 Earthquake
The Costa Rica 1991 Earthquake [EERI, 1991] confirmed the influence of soil
conditions on bridge behavior especially in abutment failures, embankment settlement,
and liquefaction. Collapses caused by unseating of skewed spans were also observed.
The 1994 Northridge Earthquake, [EERI, 1995a] and [CRSI, 1994], produced high
accelerations throughout the Los Angeles metropolitan area where the California
Department of Transportation owns and maintains approximately 2,200 bridges.
Approximately 1,200 were located in zones that experienced horizontal accelerations
more than 0.25g and several hundred bridges were subjected to accelerations more than
0.5g [ACI, 1999].
Five bridges presented partial or complete collapse. All these structures were of
reinforced and/or prestressed concrete, with construction completion dates ranging from
1964 through 1976. Several had been retrofitted with hinge restrainers following the 1971
San Fernando Earthquake. Collapse causes in all cases appear to involve column flexural
or shear failures (see Fig. 2-6), or unseating at in-span or abutment hinges (see Fig. 2-7).
Three reinforced and/or prestressed concrete bridges sustained major to moderate damage
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to their columns but did not collapse. There was damage to bridge abutments throughout
the epicentral region.

Fig. 2-6 – Failure of flared column in the Route 118, Mission Gothic Undercrossing
during the Northridge, California, 1994 Earthquake
The observed abutment damage included shear key cracking and failure, spalling or
failure of abutment backwalls and wingwalls, approach settlement, and approach slab
buckling. Damage in steel bridges comprised pounding damage between adjacent
elements, buckling of cross bracing, bending of cross-brace gussets, bearing damage
including anchor bolt and restrainer fractures, and damage to supporting abutments and
pier walls.
The epicentral region contained 132 bridges that had been retrofitted using post San
Fernando, 1971, details (Caltrans Phase I), and 63 with post Loma Prieta retrofit details
(Caltrans Phase II). Retrofit consisted in hinge restrainers and/or column jackets. Most of
the retrofitted bridges performed adequately although, in some cases, hinge restrainers
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presented problems. Column jackets, whether made of steel or fiberglass, performed well
in all cases.

Fig. 2-7 – Collapse of the Gavin Canyon Undercrossing during the
Northridge, California, 1994 Earthquake
The Los Angeles County Department of Public Works reported serious damage in
only four out of 1,500 bridges on the county system. The City of Los Angeles reported
that 62 out of a total of 800 spans were damaged, and two required closure due to column
damage in one case, and fill settlement in the other. Other damage to city bridges
consisted of approach-fill settlement, pavement cracking, shear key damage,
superstructure rotation, rocker bearing damage, and architectural damage.
Several important observations were made regarding the performance of the
transportation system [EERI, 1995a].
•

In this earthquake, all bridge collapses were associated with poor performance of
older columns with inadequate transverse reinforcement and short seat widths,
both of which have been identified as sources of vulnerability in previous
earthquakes. The progress in knowledge and design practice was evident in the
good performance of bridges constructed or retrofitted to current standards.
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•

Architectural column flares affected the pier behavior. Earlier design practice
assumed that flares spalled off, whereas actually they act as an integral part of the
column.

•

Current and older design procedures may not adequately represent the distribution
of design forces in long, multiframe bridges. Failure and damage in end frames
indicates that the stiffer end frames may attract larger forces than anticipated in
design.

•

As with other construction forms, structural changes can occur during
construction and maintenance that invalidate the design assumptions. It is
important to verify that as-built conditions are consistent with design
assumptions, and not just the design drawings. Improved documentation of design
assumptions may be desirable.

•

Caltrans Phase I hinge restrainer retrofits had mixed performance. There were
many examples of restrainer unit failure (cable fracture, fitting failure, and
diaphragm punching).

•

Older bridges with 6-inch and 8-inch seats should be reevaluated, even if
retrofitted with restrainers.

•

Caltrans Phase II retrofits appeared to perform well in all instances. (Its focus was
on retrofitting columns in single-column bridges because of the perception that
they were more vulnerable than multicolumn bridges.)

•

Several skewed bridges collapsed. An apparent cause was torsional response
associated with skewed geometries. Methods are needed for improved design of
skewed bridges, possibly including elimination of the skew where feasible,
elimination of in-span hinges, and lengthening of seats.

•

Damage to abutments and approaches was widespread. Considering the extent of
this damage for a moderate earthquake, it seems that the current design strategy to
accept abutment damage should be reevaluated.

•

Major damage and collapse in multicolumn bridges indicates that the increased
reliability associated with redundancy of multicolumn bents is not necessarily
sufficient to avoid collapse. Retrofit priorities given to multicolumn bridges and
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high-traffic-volume bridges may need to be reconsidered. Furthermore, damage
and collapse required closure of bridges that usually carry heavy traffic volume.
•

Modern traffic management techniques were effective in managing traffic
following the earthquake. Furthermore, emergency procedures, including strong
incentive and disincentive clauses, were effective in achieving rapid
reconstruction of the freeways.

The February 28, 2001, Nisqually, Washington State, Earthquake affected the Seattle,
Tacoma, Olympia region [Ranf et al., 2001], and [Nisqually EQ Clearinghouse Group,
2001]. No bridge collapses were observed during this earthquake. In total, 78 bridges
were damaged. A total of 10 bridges sustained moderate damage, 16 had mild damage,
and 52 bridges had minor damage. The event had a moment magnitude of 6.8 and a depth
of focus of 52 km on the Juan de Fuca Plate. The distance from the hypocenter to Seattle
was 78 km, 57 km to Tacoma, and 54 km to Olympia.

Fig. 2-8 – Damage to the I-5 Holgate Street overpass, Seattle, during the
2001 Nisqually, Washington State, Earthquake
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The Nisqually Earthquake caused moderate ground motion throughout the Puget
Sound region. Of the 31 stations for which preliminary information was available, only
13 showed peak ground accelerations more than 10%g and only 2 stations recorded
values more than 25%g. Several correlations of damage with bridge characteristics and
ground motion intensity were made [Ranf et al., 2001]. For 72 bridges that were damaged
(6 movable bridges were excluded because of their unusual characteristics) types of
damage were: 48 with damage to concrete, 6 with damage to steel, 11 with damage to
beams, restrainers or joints, and 7 with damage due to settlement.
In order to help interpret the correlation of damage with age of the bridge, Figure 2-9
shows the age of construction of the total bridge inventory in the region. The number of
bridges built increased from the beginning of the 1950’s and then decreased at the
beginning of the 1980’s coinciding with the construction of the interstate highway
system. Figure 2-10 shows the correlation of age of construction with damage observed.
From this figure it is evident that bridges built between 1910 and 1940 suffered more
damage.

Fig. 2-9 – Age of the total bridge inventory affected by the
2001 Nisqually, Washington State, Earthquake
Figure 2-11 shows the spectral accelerations in percentage of g (T = 0.3 s) for each
bridge site for the total bridge inventory in the area and Fig. 2-12 correlates the damage
observed with the spectral acceleration. Correlation of spectral acceleration and bridge
damage is evident from these figures.
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Fig. 2-10 – Percentage of damaged bridges by decade of construction for the
2001 Nisqually, Washington State, Earthquake

Fig. 2-11 – Spectral acceleration (%g at T = 0.3 s) at the bridge site for
the total bridge inventory affected by the 2001 Nisqually, Washington State, Earthquake

Fig. 2-12 – Percentage of bridge damaged for different values of spectral acceleration
(%g at T = 0.3 s) at the bridge site during the 2001 Nisqually, Washington State,
Earthquake
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The bridge behavior observed during the Nisqually Earthquake is relevant because it
may be similar to what would be expected in southwestern Indiana for a large earthquake
in the New Madrid zone. The accelerations expected are of the same order of magnitude
of those recorded during Nisqually Earthquake. The bridge inventory has similar
characteristic with respect to age and type of bridges. Awareness of the seismic risk in the
Pacific Northwest evolved about the same time as that for awareness of the seismic risk
in the Central U.S. Earthquake resistant design of new bridges started about the same
time in Central U.S. and Pacific NW.

2.2.2 Bridge seismic design criteria evolution
The early days
In 1931 the American Association of State Highway Officials (AASHO) published
the first edition of the Standard Specifications for Highway Bridges [AASHO, 1931].
These specifications were – and still are – for ordinary bridges having span lengths less
than 500 feet. No reference to considering earthquake effects on bridges was made in the
Standard Specifications until the fifth edition (1949) in which a statement requiring that
earthquake effects should be considered was included without guidance on how to
account for them. The same statement was kept in the sixth (1953) and seventh (1957)
editions.
The eighth edition (1961) of the Standard Specifications [AASHO, 1961] was the
first to specify an earthquake loading for design (EQ) to be applied statically in any
horizontal direction as part of Group VII load combination which included along with
earthquake effects: dead loads, earth pressure, buoyancy, and stream flow effects. This
load combination was to be used in the working stress design (WSD) procedure with a 1/3
increase in allowable stress permitted for occasional loads. The earthquake load was
defined using a seismic coefficient (C) that multiplied the dead load (D):

EQ = C ⋅ D

(2-1)

Values of C were 0.02 for structures supported on spread footings where the soil
bearing capacity was rated to be greater than 4 t/ft2, 0.04 for structures supported on
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spread footings where the soil bearing capacity was rated to be less than 4 t/ft2, and 0.06
for structures founded on piles. No seismic zone factors or seismic zoning map was
provided, leaving to the State Bridge Commissioner or the State Highway Department the
decision of considering the State, or regions within the State, as seismic. These seismic
provisions were an extension of the lateral force requirements for buildings developed
prior to 1961 by the Structural Engineers Association of California (SEAOC). The
seismic loading provisions of the eighth (1961) edition of the Standard Specifications
were kept, without modification, in the ninth (1965), tenth (1969) and eleventh (1973)
editions.

The 1975 AASHTO Interim
As a result of the 1971 San Fernando, California, Earthquake, during which many
highway bridges were severely damaged and some even collapsed – as described
previously – the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) issued, in 1973, a
new seismic design procedure for bridges which formed the basis of the 1975 AASHTO
Interim Specifications for Highway Bridges [AASHTO, 1975]. This document specified
an equivalent static lateral force:

EQ = C ⋅ F ⋅W

(2-2)

The procedure was restricted to bridges having supporting members of approximately
equal lateral stiffness. The equivalent static lateral force was to be applied in any
horizontal direction as part of the same Group VII load combination used in the eighth
(1961) Standard Specifications edition in a working stress design procedure permitting a
1/3 increase in allowable stress. In Eq. (2-2), W represents dead load, F is a framing
factor assigned the values of 1.0 for single columns and 0.8 for moment resisting frames
with the horizontal force acting along the frame, and C was a combined response
coefficient expressed by:

C=

A⋅ R ⋅ S
Z
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(2-3)

in which A denotes the maximum expected peak ground acceleration (PGA) associated
with each seismic risk zone of the map of the United States shown in Fig. 2-13, R is a
normalized (PGA = 1g) acceleration response spectral value for a rock site, S is a soil
amplification factor, and Z is a force reduction factor depending upon structuralcomponent type which accounts for the allowance of inelastic deformations.
The numerical values specified for A were 0.09g, 0.22g, and 0.50g in seismic zones
numbered 1, 2, and 3 respectively in the map of Fig. 2-13.

Fig. 2-13 – Seismic Risk Map contained in the
1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications for Highway Bridges
Numerical values for R, S, and Z were not provided in the 1975 AASHTO Interim

Specifications for Highway Bridges; instead four plots of C as a function of period T were
given for different values of A. Each of these plots represents a different depth range of
alluvium to rock-like material. The ranges were 0-10 ft, 11-80 ft, 81-150 ft, and greater
than 150 ft. Figure 2-14 shows the response coefficient C values as a function of period T
for 81 to 150 ft depth of alluvium. Minimum values for C were set at 0.10 for values of A
greater than or equal to 0.3g, and 0.06 for values of A less than 0.3g.
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Fig. 2-14 – Response coefficient C for 81-150 ft depth of alluvium contained in the
1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications for Highway Bridges
Period T was to be evaluated using the relationship

T = 0.32

W
P

(2-4)

in which P was equal to the total uniform static load required to cause a 1-inch lateral
deflection of the whole structure. For complex or irregular structures the 1975 Interim
Specifications required use of the modal response spectrum analysis method to obtain
design loads. For structures adjacent to active faults, sites with unusual geologic
conditions, unusual structures, and structures having a fundamental period greater than 3
seconds it required that the design should be made using current seismicity, soil response,
and dynamic analysis techniques. The 1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications for Highway
Bridges also included a procedure for design of restraining features to limit the
displacement of the superstructure including hinges, ties, and shear blocks.
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The seismic design criteria contained in the 1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications
were kept in the twelfth (1977), thirteenth (1983), and fourteenth (1989) editions of
AASHTO’s Standard Specifications. The only modification was to allow the use of loadfactor design (LFD) or ultimate strength design (USD). For WSD the same Group VII
load combination was specified with a 1/3 allowable stress increase – see Eq. (2-5) –.
When using LFD, the Group VII combination was as shown in Eq. (2-5).

Group VII (WSD) = D + E + B + SF + EQ
Group VII (LFD) = γ [ β D ⋅ D + β E ⋅ E + B + SF + EQ ]

(2-5)

where D denotes dead load; E earth pressure; B buoyancy; and SF stream flow; γ = 1.3;

βD = 0.75 when checking columns for minimum axial load and maximum moment or
eccentricity, βD = 1.0 when checking columns for maximum axial load and minimum
moment, and βD = 1.0 for flexure and tension members; and βE = 1.3 for lateral earth
pressure and βE = 0.5 for positive moment in rigid frames.
Although the introduction of these requirements for computing seismic forces and
their use in design was an improvement with respect to previous practice, no
corresponding changes were introduced in the detailing requirements for the structural
materials within the Standard Specifications. Seen from a more recent perspective, the
lack of requirements to introduce toughness to the structural elements as was being
required at the same time for the earthquake resistant design of buildings [ACI, 1977]
would turn later to be one of the major sources of seismic vulnerability for transportations
structures designed and built during this era.
The ATC 6 and Division I-A of AASHTO Standard Specifications
In the aftermath of the February 9, 1971, San Fernando, California, Earthquake the
Structural Engineers Association of California (SEAOC) established the Applied
Technology Council (ATC), an independent, nonprofit, tax-exempt corporation for the
purpose of implementing current technological developments into active structural
engineering practice. Their initial efforts were aimed at earthquake resistant design of
buildings. In the late 1970’s with the sponsorship of the National Science Foundation and
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the National Bureau of Standards the Applied Technology Council published document
ATC-3-06 [ATC, 1978] devoted to building earthquake resistant design. This document
was the draft of what was to become current Model Code seismic requirements in the
United States and many countries. In 1981 ATC, with the sponsorship of the Federal
Highway Administration, Department of Transportation, published document ATC-6
Seismic Design Guidelines for Bridges [ATC, 1981]. These guidelines with minor
revision made by the National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research (NCEER) in
Buffalo, NY, under the sponsorship of the National Cooperative Highway Research
Program (NCHRP), were adopted as the earthquake resistant design requirements for
bridges in the fifteenth (1992) edition of AASHTO Standard Specifications. These
requirements were kept without modification in the sixteenth (1996) and in the current
seventeenth (2002) edition [AASHTO, 2002] as Division I-A Seismic Design.
Under the requirements of Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th Edition of
the Standard Specifications the acceleration coefficient A for the bridge site must be
obtained from the acceleration contour maps provided. The northern Midwest portion of
the map of horizontal acceleration A (expressed as a percent of gravity) in rock with 90
percent probability of not being exceeded in 50 years – mean return period 475 years – is
shown in Fig. 2-15. This map was prepared by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) for
the 1988 edition of the NEHRP Recommended Provisions for the Development of Seismic
Regulations for New Buildings [NEHRP, 1988]. Although the values of A in this map do
not differ in the order of magnitude from those contained in the original ATC-6 1981
report for the same geographical regions, the 1988 map uses a finer resolution by
assigning values of A in a county by county basis and presenting them in smaller
acceleration increments.
Once the acceleration coefficient is obtained, the bride structure must be classified as
either “Essential” or “Other” in accordance with given guidelines. An importance
classification (IC= I) shall be given to Essential bridges and (IC=II) shall be given to
ordinary bridges. The classification of “Essential” must be given to all bridges located in
zones where the value of A is greater than 0.29g and on the basis of social, survival,
security, or defense requirements. Guidance is given in the commentary of ATC-6 for
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including bridges in either importance group. The bridge also must be assigned to a
Seismic Performance Category (SPC) A, B, C or D as a function of the acceleration
coefficient A as defined in Table 2-1.

Fig. 2-15 – Northern Midwest portion of the map of horizontal acceleration A (g) in rock
with 90 percent probability of not being exceeded in 50 years (Division I-A Seismic
Design of the current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications)
Table 2-1 – Seismic Performance Categories (SPC) Division I-A Seismic Design
of the current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications
Bridge Classification
Acceleration Coefficient
Essential
Other
A
A
A ≤ 0.09g
B
B
0.09g < A ≤ 0.19g
C
C
0.19g < A ≤ 0.29g
0.29g < A
D
C
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The effects of site conditions on bridge response are determined from a Site
Coefficient (S) based on soil profile types summarized in Fig. 2-16.
Soil Profile Type I - S = 1.0
Surface

Surface
Rock
Rock with shear wave
velocity greater than
2,500 ft/sec

Less than 200 feet of stiff
sand or gravel, or stiff clays

< 200 ft

Rock
Soil Profile Type II - S = 1.2
Surface
> 200 ft

More than 200 feet of stiff
sand or gravel, or stiff clays
Rock
Soil Profile Type III - S = 1.5
Surface

> 30 ft

More than 30 feet of soft
to medium stiff clays
Rock
Soil Profile Type IV - S = 2.0
Surface

> 40 ft

More than 40 feet of soft
clays or silts with shear wave
velocity less than 500 ft/sec
Rock

Fig. 2-16 – Soil Profile Types
(Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications)
No dynamic analysis is required in Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th
Edition of the Standard Specifications for bridges having single spans, regardless of the
value of the site acceleration coefficient A, and for all bridges in SPC A. All other
bridges, regular or irregular, having two or more spans must be analyzed by at least one
of two dynamic analysis procedures, namely, the single-mode spectral method (SMSM)
or the multi-mode spectral method (MMSM). The SMSM is specified as minimum for
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regular bridges in SPC B, C, and D; while the MMSM is specified as minimum for
irregular bridges in these same categories. An "irregular" bridge is defined as one having
abrupt or unusual changes in mass, stiffness, and/or geometry from abutment to
abutment; a "regular" bridge is one not meeting the definition of an "irregular" bridge.
The seismic input in any horizontal direction to be used in each of these minimum
dynamic analysis procedures is specified in terms of an elastic seismic response
coefficient, Cs, as expressed for the single-mode spectral SMSM method for a bridge
period T by:
Cs =

1.2 ⋅ A ⋅ S
T 2/3

(2-6)

The value of Cs need not exceed 2.5⋅A. For sites with soil profile types III and IV in
areas where A is greater or equal to 0.3g, Cs need not exceed 2.0⋅A.

Normalized Design Coefficient (Cs /A )

3.0
Soil Profile Type III
and IV and A < 0.3

2.5

Soil Profile Type IV

2.0
Soil Profile Type III

1.5

1.0
Soil Profile Type I
Soil Profile Type II

0.5

0.0
0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

Period T (sec)

Fig. 2-17 – Seismic response coefficient Cs for different soil profiles normalized with
respect to acceleration coefficient A (Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th
Edition of the Standard Specifications)
For the multi-mode spectral method (MMSM) the same relationship for Cs is used
and for each individual vibration mode “m” the mode period Tm must be used in Eq. (2-6)
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as T. In this case a reduction of Cs is allowed for modes other than the fundamental and
periods shorter than 0.3 sec, with the value of Cs tending to the value of A at a period
equal to zero. For long periods greater than 4 sec a minimum value of Cs is required.
Deformations in the nonlinear range of response of the bridge elements are expected
to occur when subjected to the earthquake design ground motion prescribed in the
Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications.

Response modification factors (R) are prescribed for the cases listed in Table 2-2.
Table 2-2 – Response Modification Factors (R) Division I-A Seismic Design of the
current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications
R
Connections
R
Substructure
Wall-Type Pier
2
Superstructure to abutment
0.8
Reinforced concrete pile bents
Expansion joints within a
0.8
a. Vertical piles only
3
span of the superstructure
b. One or more battered piles
2
Single columns
3
Columns, piers, or pile bents
1.0
to cap beam or superstructure
Steel or composite & steel
Columns or piers to
1.0
concrete pile bents
foundation
a. Vertical piles only
5
b. One or more battered piles
3
Multiple-column bent
5
In a great departure from the earthquake resistant design of buildings in which the
response modification factor is assigned for the structure as a whole by dividing the
design forces by R before performing the analysis; in the ATC-6 document the analysis,
static or dynamic, is performed for the bridge without reducing the design forces by the
response modification factor. Here it is used at the element level by dividing the design
forces by R just when computing modified values (EQM) that replace values of (EQ) in
Eq. (2-5). This form of use for the response modification factor in bridges has been kept
up to Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th Edition of the Standard
Specifications.

Other major departure from previous bridge design practice introduced by the ACT-6
document was to assign differential detailing requirements depending on the Seismic
Performance Categories (SPC). This leads to increased structural toughness from
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category A to D, with category A corresponding to the Standard Specifications
requirements without any seismic provisions beyond using seismic forces in analysis and
design and no special detailing. The reinforced concrete requirements for SPC B to D
were based on corresponding requirements of the ACI 318 Code [ACI, 1977] for
buildings. This may be considered a landmark in improved expected performance of
transportations structures subjected to strong earthquake ground motion.
Other significant improvement with respect to previous practice was the introduction
of dimension of minimum support-width length to be used at expansion ends of girders in
all bridges; regardless of seismic performance category and number of spans (see Fig. 218). Prescribed minimum support lengths depend on angle of skew of the support,
distance between expansion joints, pier height, and seismic performance category.

Fig. 2-18 – Minimum support length definition (Division I-A Seismic Design
of the current 17th Edition of the Standard Specifications)
AASHTO LRFD
Reinforced concrete design departed from the working-stress design (WSD)
philosophy in the mid 1950’s and by the early 1970’s had moved completely into
ultimate strength design (USD) philosophy. Other materials lagged but by the mid 1980’s
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a push for probabilistic design methods coined a new term for USD as load and resistance
factor design (LRFD) which was adopted especially by the steel industry and later by
AASHTO. Between 1988 and 1993 with the sponsorship of the Federal Highway
Administration under the National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP)
developed and published in 1994 the first edition of AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design
Specifications, reviewed later for a second edition in 1998 [AASHTO, 1998], and

recently in a third edition in 2004 [AASHTO, 2004].
The AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design Specifications, First (1994), Second (1998), and
Third (2004) Editions, requires that each bridge component and connection satisfy all
limit states in accordance with the relation

η ∑ ( γ i ⋅ Qi ) ≤ φ ⋅ Rn

(2-7)

in which η is a factor related to a ductility factor ηD, a redundancy factor ηR, and an
operational importance factor ηi in accordance with η = ηD⋅ηR⋅ηi; γi is a statisticallybased load factor applied to force effect Qi; and φ is a statistically-based resistance factor
applied to the nominal resistance Rn. The numerical values to be used for these factors
can be found in the LRFD Specifications (AASHTO LRFD, 1994, 1998, and 2004).
The value of Qi for the value of i representing an extreme seismic event, designated
EQ, is found using the same procedure described above for Standard Specifications,
Fifteenth (1992), Sixteenth (1996), and seventeenth (2002) Editions.
An additional bridge classification, "Critical," has been added to the LRFD
Specifications; and the number of substructure response modification factors R, have
been increased and made different in all three classifications, "Critical," "Essential," and
"Other" as indicated in Table 2-3. The response modification factors for connections
remained the same in the LRFD Specifications than in the Standard Specifications.
Although, at first glance it may look that the impact of adoption of AASHTO LRFD
Specification to replace the AASHTO Standard Specifications with respect to seismic

design is minor because they are based on the same requirements, this is not true for
bridges in the “Critical” and “Essential” categories where seismic design forces described
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by EQM (EQ/R) increase by a factors ranging from 1.33 to 3.33 for “Critical” bridges and
from 1.33 to 1.5 for “Essential” bridges.
Table 2-3 – Response Modification Factors (R) in AASHTO LRFD Specifications
Substructure
Wall-type piers-larger
dimension
Reinforced concrete pile bents
• Vertical piles only
• One or more battered piles
Single columns
Steel or composite & steel
concrete pile bents
• Vertical piles only
• One or more battered piles
Multiple-column bent

Critical
1.5

Importance Category
Essential
1.5

Other
2.0

1.5
1.5
1.5

2.0
1.5
2.0

3.0
2.0
3.0

1.5
1.5
1.5

3.5
2.0
3.5

5.0
3.0
5.0

The presented material describes current AASHTO Specifications both Standard and
LRFD. Notwithstanding, several important changes on seismic bridge specifications are

being discussed in the corresponding drafting committees and it is important to be aware
of their implications, if approved. These changes come basically from three sources:
•

the first one corresponds to changes in the California Department of
Transportation (Caltrans) seismic design criteria,

•

the second one from changes in the way to define the design ground motion
both in the description of the movement at rock by the U.S. Geological Survey
(USGS) that is discussed in Chapter 3, and

•

the third in the way to assess the amplification caused by the soil profile by
the Building Seismic Safety Council (BSSC) as part of the National
Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP) for incorporation in the
NEHRP Recommended Provision for Seismic Regulations for New Buildings
that is discussed in 2.3.1.
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Some of these new trends have already been adopted as regulations in the corresponding
earthquake resistant design requirements for new buildings. A brief description of these
trends follows.

Caltrans Seismic Design Criteria
In the aftermath of the Loma Prieta Earthquake of 1989, the California Department of
Transportation (Caltrans) decided to sponsor a project to conduct a critical review and to
recommend changes where needed in the seismic design part of the Caltrans Bridge
Design Specifications (BDS) also known as the California Seismic Design Criteria
(SDC). The result of this project was presented in document ATC-32 [ATC, 1996] which
provided a number of recommended improvements to seismic bridge design practice in
California. The project focused on issues related to seismic loading, structural response
analysis, and component design. Special attention was given to design issues related to
reinforced concrete components, steel components, foundations, and conventional
bearings. In addition, the specifications were revised to give a bigger role to the
evaluation of displacement and to use it as a tool to define performance criteria. Although
a new definition of the design ground motion was contained, the production of new
seismic risk maps was considered then outside the scope of the project.
The ATC-32 was, as the title indicated, a recommendation. It took some time for
Caltrans to update the Caltrans SDC. In July 1999 Version 1.1 of the Caltrans SDC was
published [Caltrans, 1999], with Version 1.2 in December of 2001 [Caltrans, 2001], and
Version 1.3 in February 2004 [Caltrans, 2004].
The Caltrans SDC adopts a performance-based approach specifying minimum levels
of structural system performance, component performance, analysis, and design practices
for ordinary standard bridges. For bridges with non-standard features or operational
requirements above and beyond the ordinary standard bridge a greater degree of attention
than specified by the SDC is required. Many of the methodologies contained in the SDC
evolved from the seismic retrofit program and some of the procedures are major
departures from previous practice while others are slight modifications to current
practice. The most significant change in design philosophy for new bridges is a shift from
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a force-based assessment of seismic demand to a displacement-based assessment of
demand and capacity. The displacement approach is based on comparing the elastic
displacement demand to the inelastic displacement capacity of the primary structural
components while insuring a minimum level of inelastic capacity at all potential plastic
hinge locations.
The SDC document [Caltrans, 2004] warns about its applicability in places different
from California: “This document is intended for use on bridges designed by and for the
California Department of Transportation. It reflects the current state of practice at
Caltrans. This document contains references specific and unique to Caltrans and may not
be applicable to other parties either institutional or private.” One important aspect that

makes its direct applicability elsewhere difficult is the way the earthquake design ground
motion is defined. California has unique tectonic characteristics with a relatively thin
earth’s crust producing predominantly shallow earthquakes. The fault mapping of
California is comprehensive; leading to definition of design ground motion supported on
relatively well-known faults that lend themselves to establish earthquake mean recurrence
periods with somewhat less uncertainty than in other places in the U.S. (this will be
discussed latter in Chapter 3 with respect to the implication for the State of Indiana). This
means that the design ground motion proposed by Caltrans SDC is particular for the
tectonic setting and the types of soil profiles common in California. Other important
aspect is that the Caltrans SDC is focused on concrete bridges. The Caltrans SDC
specifies target ductility demands, defined as the ratio of the estimated global frame
displacement demand to the yield displacement of the subsystem from its initial position
to the formation of plastic hinge, for different structural components. For instance, for
multi-column bents a value of 5 is prescribed while for wall piers in the strong direction a
value of unity (= 1) is given. The structure must be designed to resist the internal forces
generated when the structure reaches its Collapse Limit State. The Collapse Limit State is
defined as the condition when a sufficient number of plastic hinges have formed within
the structure to create a local or global collapse mechanism.
The local displacement capacity of a member is based on its rotation capacity (see
Fig. 2-19 for cantilever column and Fig. 2-20 framed columns), which in turn is based on
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its curvature capacity. The curvature capacity must be determined from a momentcurvature (M-φ) analysis. Each ductile member shall have a minimum local displacement
ductility capacity of 3 to ensure dependable rotational capacity in the plastic hinge
regions regardless of the displacement demand imparted to that member.

Fig. 2-19 – Local displacement capacity – cantilever column with fixed base
(Caltrans Seismic Design Criteria [Caltrans, 2004])

Fig. 2-20 – Local displacement capacity – framed column assumed as fixed-fixed
(Caltrans Seismic Design Criteria [Caltrans, 2004])
Caltrans SDC defines how the expected material properties can be obtained, how to

compute the plastic moment capacity for ductile concrete members, how to perform the
moment curvature (M-φ) analysis, and how to obtain the shear capacity of the
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components. The designer is required to check that the nominal capacity of the
superstructure longitudinally and of the bent cap transversely are sufficient to ensure that
the columns respond in the nonlinear range prior to the superstructure or bent cap
reaching its expected nominal strength. Caltrans SDC requires assessing the force and
deformation demands and capacities on the structural system, and its individual
components, using analysis. The document prescribes for ordinary standard bridges the
use of equivalent static analysis and linear elastic dynamic analysis for estimating the
displacement demands, and inelastic static analysis (push-over) for establishing the
displacement capacities. The Caltrans SDC document gives guidance with respect to the
use of appropriate cracked sections for each type of analysis.
The geotechnical engineer is required to provide the following information relative to
the bridge site: seismicity, fault distance, earthquake magnitude, peak rock acceleration,
soil profile type, liquefaction potential, and foundation stiffness or the soil parameters
necessary for determining the force deformation characteristics of the foundation. The
document contains standard acceleration response spectra for preliminary design, but in
general requires a site specific spectrum for design. The standard acceleration and
displacement response spectra provided are function of soil profile type and design
earthquake magnitude. Magnitude ranges from 6.5 to 8, and envisioned peak ground
accelerations in rock as high as 0.7g are presented. Acceleration amplification caused by
the soil profile follows latest BSSC and NEHRP recommendations (see 2.3.1). The
foundation subsystem response must be evaluated based on the quality of the surrounding
soil. Soils are classified as competent, poor, or marginal.
In the Caltrans SDC the bridge designer is required to maintain the ratio of effective
stiffness between any two bents within a frame or between any two columns within a
bent within prescribed limits. Hinge seat width are prescribed to accommodate the
anticipated thermal movement, prestress shortening, creep, shrinkage, and the relative
longitudinal earthquake displacement demand between adjacent frames. As a rule
adequate seat width must be provided to prevent unseating as a primary requirement.
Hinge restrainers are considered secondary members to prevent unseating. Moment
resisting connections between the superstructure and the column must be designed to
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transmit the maximum forces produced when the column has reached its flexural and
shear overstrength capacity. Caltrans SDC considers bearings as sacrificial elements for
ordinary standard bridges. Typically bearings must be designed and detailed for service
loads. However, bearings must be checked to insure their capacity and mode of failure
are consistent with the assumptions made in the seismic analysis. The designer must
detail bearings so they can be easily inspected for damage and replaced or repaired after
an earthquake. Columns flares require special treatment to insure proper behavior of the
column. At the foundation, the size and number of piles and the pile group layout must be
designed to resist service level moments, shears, and axial loads and the moment demand
induced by the column plastic hinging mechanism. The linear elastic demand analysis
model must include an effective abutment stiffness that accounts for expansion gaps, and
incorporates realistic values of the embankment fill response. Seat type abutments must
be designed to resist elastically all transverse service load and moderate earthquake
demands.

Draft AASHTO LRFD Update
The Caltrans SDC imposed a trend that was picked up by the National Cooperative
Highway Research Program (NCHRP) for incorporation in an update of the AASHTO
LRFD Specifications. A research project sponsored by AASHTO in cooperation with the

Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) produced a draft update of the AASHTO
LRFD Specifications that is summarized and described in NCHRP Report 472 [NCHRP,
2002] and presented in final form in four reports published by the Applied Technology
Council: “Recommended LRFD guidelines for the seismic design of highway bridges –
Part I: Specifications” [ATC/MCEER, 2003a], “Recommended LRFD guidelines for the
seismic design of highway bridges – Part II: Commentary and Appendices”
[ATC/MCEER, 2003b], “Liquefaction Study Report for Recommended LRFD guidelines
for the seismic design of highway bridges” [ATC/MCEER, 2003c], and “Design
Examples for Recommended LRFD guidelines for the seismic design of highway
bridges” [ATC/MCEER, 2003d],. The research was performed by a joint venture of the
Applied Technology Council (ATC) and the Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake
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Engineering Research (MCEER), Buffalo, NY. The project purpose was to develop new
specifications for the seismic design of bridges, considering all aspects of the design
process. These aspects include the following: (1) design philosophy and performance
criteria, (2) seismic loads and site effects, (3) analysis and modeling, and (4) design
requirements. The new specification should be nationally applicable with provisions for
all seismic zones. The emphasis was on design of new bridges rather than on retrofit of
existing ones. The Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) contains a
number of new concepts and additions, as well as some major modifications to existing
provisions. These are summarized in the following paragraphs.
The definition of the design earthquake has been moving away from the 10%
probability of exceedance in a 50-year life span of the structure towards a definition of a
maximum considered earthquake with a lower (3%) probability of exceedance and
sometimes a longer life span (75 years). On the other hand, the use of effective peak
ground acceleration as the mapped parameter to define the design ground motion has
been substituted in the specifications for design of new buildings for a direct definition of
the design response spectrum including the site effects. The USGS has developed maps
for these new definitions as will be explained in Chapter 3 of this report. The Draft
AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) uses these new definitions and

maps.
The proposed provisions provide performance objectives and damage states for two
design earthquakes with explicit design checks to ensure that the performance objectives
are met (see Table 2-4).
In Table 2-4 the upper-level event, termed the “rare” or Maximum Considered
Earthquake (MCE), describes ground motion that, for most locations, is defined
probabilistically and has a probability of exceedance of 3% in 75 years (approximately
2500-year mean return period). The frequent or expected earthquake has a probability of
exceedance of 50% in 75 years (approximately 100-year mean return period). For the
service level: “Immediate” means full access to normal traffic and the bridge must be
available for traffic after an inspection, and “Significant Disruption” means limited
access (reduced lanes, light emergency traffic) may be possible after shoring but the
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bridge may need to be replaced. Detailed geometric constraints on service level are
presented in the draft. For the damage levels: “None” means evidence of movement may
be present but no notable damage; “Minimal” means some visible signs of damage
produced by minor nonlinear response (narrow flexural cracking), no permanent
deformations, and repair can be performed under non-emergency conditions,
“Significant” means no collapse, but permanent offsets, cracking, reinforcement yielding,
and major spalling of concrete may require closure for repairs. Partial or complete
replacement of columns may be required in some cases.
Table 2-4 – Design Earthquakes and Seismic Performance Objectives in the Draft
AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49)
Probability of exceedance for
design earthquake ground motion
Rare earthquake (MCE)
3% in 75 years

Frequent or expected earthquake
50% in 75 years

Service
Damage

Performance level
Life Safety
Operational
Significant
Immediate
Disruption
Significant
Minimal
Disruption

Service

Immediate

Immediate

Damage

Minimal

Minimal to none

The design ground motion in Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP
12-49) is described through a design response spectrum that can be obtained from the

general procedure or from a site-specific study. The site-specific study is required if the
bridge is considered a major or very important structure, when the site is located within
10 km of an active fault, or when the site has a Type F soil profile (see 2.3.1) with peats
or highly organic soils, high plasticity clays, or very thick deposits of soft to medium stiff
clays.
The general procedure defines response spectra for the rare MCE earthquake and for
the frequent earthquake based on maps produced (or being produced in the case of the
frequent earthquake) by the USGS. The acceleration spectrum for 5% of critical damping
is obtained using a two point procedure. The spectral design acceleration at 0.2-second

39

period, SDS, and at 1-second period, SD1, are obtained from Equations (2-8) and (2-9)
respectively.
S DS = Fa ⋅ S S

(2-8)

S D1 = Fv ⋅ S1

(2-9)

where SS and S1 are the 0.2-second and 1-second period spectral accelerations on rock
(Class B site, see 2.3.1) from ground motion maps and Fa and Fv are site coefficients
associated with the site class and mapped acceleration value. The maps for the Maximum
Considered Earthquake contained in the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions
(NCHRP 12-49) are the same maps produced by the USGS for BSSC to be included in

the 1997 NEHRP recommendations for new buildings [NEHRP, 1997]. These maps are
presented and discussed in Chapter 3. For the frequent earthquake there were no maps
available when the draft was produced and the draft suggests obtaining them by
interpolation from the hazard curves produced by the USGS compatible with the maps
for the MCE. The design spectrum is obtained from the values given by Equations (2-8)
and (2-9). Two control periods are given: Ts and T0 defined in Equations (2-10) and
(2-11) respectively. Figure 2-21 shows the design spectrum construction using the twopoint method.

S D1
S DS
T0 = 0.2 ⋅ Ts
Ts =

(2-10)
(2-11)

For periods less than or equal to T0, the design response spectral acceleration is
defined by Eq. (2-12). Note that as T tends to T = 0 seconds, the resulting value of Sa is
equal to the peak ground acceleration (PGA).

Sa = 0.60 ⋅

S DS
⋅ T + 0.4 ⋅ S DS
T0

For periods greater than or equal to T0 and less than or equal to Ts, the design
response spectral acceleration, Sa, is defined by Eq. (2-13).
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(2-12)

Sa = S DS

(2-13)

For periods greater than Ts the design response spectral acceleration, Sa, is defined by
Eq. (2-14).

Sa =

S D1
T

(2-14)

Sa = SDS =Fa ⋅ SS

Sa
(g)

Ts =
Sa =

SD1
T

SD1
SDS

T0 = 0.2 ⋅ Ts
Sa = SD1 =Fv ⋅ S1

0.4 ⋅ SDS

T0

Ts
1.0 s
Period, T (sec)
0.2 s
Fig. 2-21 – Design Response Spectrum – Probabilistic general procedure
(Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49))
When a site-specific response spectrum is used, a probabilistically based spectrum
must be obtained using a characterization of the seismic sources and ground motion
attenuation that includes current scientific interpretations, including uncertainties in
seismic source and ground motion models and parameter values. If the spectrum obtained
this way exceeds the limits shown in Fig. 2-22, a deterministic spectrum may be used.
The deterministic design response spectrum may be used in regions having known
active faults if the deterministic spectrum ordinates are less than those of the probabilistic
spectrum. The deterministic spectrum must be the median-plus-standard-deviation
spectrum calculated for characteristic maximum magnitude earthquakes on known active
faults (the corresponding building requirements require 150% instead of the 184% for
bridges), but must not be less than the spectrum shown in Fig. 2-22. If there is more than
one active fault in the site region, the deterministic spectrum must be computed as the
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envelope of spectra for the different faults. Alternatively a deterministic spectrum may be
computed for each fault, and each spectrum, or the spectrum that govern bridge response,
may be used for the analysis of the bridge. When the design response spectrum is
determined from a site-specific study, the spectrum ordinates must not be less than 2/3 of
the ordinates of the probabilistic spectrum obtained following the general procedure. The
draft permits also the use of acceleration time histories instead of a design response
spectrum and provides guidance on how to define them. Design for vertical acceleration
effects are prescribed in detail for bridges located less than 50 km from an active fault.

Sa
(g)

Sa = 1.5 ⋅ Fa

Sa =

0.6 ⋅ Fv
T

0.6 ⋅ Fa
Period, T (sec)

Fig. 2-22 – Minimum Deterministic Design Response Spectrum
(Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49))
The Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) defines a Seismic
Hazard Level (SHL) classification into four groups (I to IV). The bridge must be assigned
in the larger SHL obtained from Table 2-5 or 2-6.
Table 2-5 – Seismic Hazard Level based on FvS1
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49)
Value of FvS1
Fv S1 ≤ 0.15g
0.15g < FvS1 ≤ 0.25g
0.25g < FvS1 ≤ 0.40g
0.40g < FvS1

Seismic Hazard Level
I
II
III
IV
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Table 2-6 – Seismic Hazard Level based on FaSS
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49)
Value of FaSS
FaSS ≤ 0.15g
0.15g < FaSS ≤ 0.35g
0.35g < FaSS ≤ 0.60g
0.60g < FaSS

Seismic Hazard Level
I
II
III
IV

The Seismic Design Level is used, in turn, to define the Seismic Design and Analysis
Procedure (SDAP) and the Seismic Detailing Requirements (SDR). Table 2-7 defines the
Seismic Design and Analysis Procedure.
Table 2-7 – Seismic Design and Analysis Procedure (SDAP)
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49)
Seismic Hazard Level
I
II
III
IV

Life Safety
A1
A2
B/C/D/E
C/D/E

Operational
A2
C/D/E
C/D/E
C/D/E

Brief description of the different Seismic Design and Analysis Procedures (SDAP):

•

SDAP A — Observance of minimum seat widths, checking of connection
design forces for bearings, and use of minimum shear reinforcement in
concrete piles are the only requirements. The horizontal connection design
force in the restrained direction must be 10% of the vertical reaction for
SDAP A1 and 25% for SDAP A2. No rigorous analysis is required instead
these default values are used as design forces.

•

SDAP B — Does not require a seismic demand analysis. Capacity design
principles and minimum design detailing are required. There are certain
restrictions to use SDAP B associated with span length (maximum 80 feet),
skewness of the bridge (maximum 30°), bent stiffness, and element crosssection dimension and reinforcement, and other.

•

SDAP C — Requires the use of the capacity design spectrum approach. This
procedure applies only to bridges that behave and can be modeled as a single-
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degree-of-freedom system. The procedure is also restricted to bridges with a
very regular configuration, bridges not having more than six spans, spans not
greater than 60 feet, maximum skewness of 30°, and other.

•

SDAP D — Requires the use of the elastic response spectrum method.
Cracked sections are required. The procedure is divided into a single-mode
equivalent lateral load procedure, and a multimode dynamic analysis
procedure.

•

SDAP E — Consist in an elastic response spectrum analysis used for design
plus a displacement capacity verification performed afterwards.

Response modification factor, RB, to be used in SDAP D and E are presented in Table
2-8 for the substructure. Response modification factor for connections are all R = 0.8 but
are not intended for cases where the design of the connection is made using capacity
design principles.
Table 2-8 – Base Response Modification Factors, RB, for the substructure
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49)

Substructure Element
Wall pier – larger dimension
Columns – Single and multiple
Ductile detailing
Pile bents and drilled shafts – vertical piles –
above ground
Pile bents and drilled shafts – vertical piles –
2 diameters below ground level – no owner’s
approval required
Pile bents and drilled shafts – vertical piles –
in ground – owner’s approval required
Pile bents with batter piles
Seismically isolated structures
Steel braced frame – ductile
Steel braced frame – Nominally ductile
All elements for frequent or expected
earthquake

Performance Objective
Life Safety
Operational
SDAP
SDAP
SDAP
SDAP
D
E
D
E
2
3
1
1.5
4

6

1.5

2.5

4

6

1.5

2.5

1

1.5

1

1

N/A

2.5

N/A

1.5

N/A
1.5
3
1.5

2
1.5
4.5
2

N/A
1
1
1

1.5
1.5
1.5
1

1.3

1.3

0.9

0.9

The value of R must be obtained from Eq. (2-15)
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R = 1 + ( RB − 1) ⋅

T
≤ RB
T*

(2-15)

where T* = 1.25 Ts and Ts is defined in Eq. (2-10).
Table 2-9 defines the Seismic Detailing Requirements (SDR) for each Seismic
Hazard Level (SHL) and Table 2-10 defines the component detailing requirements for
each SDR.
Table 2-9 – Seismic Detailing Requirements (SDR)
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49)
Seismic Hazard Level
I
II
III
IV

Life Safety
1
2
3
5

Operational
2
3
4
6

Minimum seat width must not be less than 1.5 times the displacement of the
superstructure at the seat including P-Δ effects, Δm, obtained using Eq. (2-16), but can not
be less than the value of N obtained from Eq. (2-17):
Δ m = Rd ⋅ Δ
⎧ ⎛ 1 ⎞ T* 1
⋅ +
for T < T *
⎪= 1 −
Rd ⎨ ⎜⎝ R ⎟⎠ T R
⎪= 1 for T ≥ T *
⎩

2
⎡
⎛ B ⎞ ⎤ 1 + 1.25Fv S1
N = ⎢0.1 + 0.0017 L + 0.007 H + 0.05 H ⋅ 1 + ⎜ 2 ⎟ ⎥ ⋅
≥ 1.25 ⋅ Δ m
L⎠ ⎥
cos α
⎢
⎝
⎣
⎦

where,
Δ

= displacement demand from the seismic analysis

Δm

= nonlinear displacement demand

Rd

= displacement amplification factor

L

= distance between joints in m
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(2-16)

(2-17)

H

= height of the tallest pier between the joints in m

B

= width of the superstructure in m

α

= skew angle
In Eq. (2-17) the ratio B/L need not be taken greater than 3/8.
The proposed LRFD design provisions contain an incentive from a design and

construction perspective for performing a more sophisticated “pushover analysis”
[NCHRP, 2002]. The response modification factor (R) increases approximately 50
percent when a pushover analysis is performed, primarily because the analysis results
will provide a greater understanding of the demands on the seismic resisting elements.
The analysis results are assessed using additional plastic rotation limits on the
deformation of the substructure elements to ensure adequate performance.
The proposed LRFD provisions provide a mechanism to permit the use of some
seismic resisting systems and elements –– termed earthquake resisting systems (ERS) and
earthquake resisting elements (ERE) –– that are not permitted in current AASHTO
provisions. Selection of an appropriate ERS is fundamental to achieving adequate seismic
performance. The classification of ERS and ERE into three categories: permissible,
permissible with owner’s approval, and not recommended, is done to trigger due
consideration of seismic performance that leads to the most desirable outcome.
The state of the art in earthquake resistant bridge design has been presented. The
more recent changes in mandatory and proposed specifications derive from behavior
experiences during recent earthquakes; from the intensive seismic retrofit programs in
some states, specially in the West Coast; and from recent research in seismic behavior of
bridges.
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Table 2-10 – Component Detailing Requirements for SDR’s — Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49)
Component
Seat width
Bearing

Conventional
Isolation
Flexure

Column
Shear

Connection of column to
superstructure, bent beam,
footing/pile cap
Soil and pile
Concrete
aspects of
foundation
Steel
design

SDR 1

SDR 2

SDR 3

SDR 5

SDR 6

N/A except
bearing above

N/A except
bearing above

Design forces from capacity design using over-strength ratios of 1.5 and 1.4
for concrete and steel respectively

N/A

Piles top 3D
minimum
reinforcement

Design forces
from capacity
design using
over-strength
factor of 1.0

N/A

N/A

Concrete

N/A

Steel

N/A

Min. shear reinf.
down to 10D
below surface
N/A

Abutments

N/A

N/A

Liquefaction

Only if requested by owner

ESR/ERE

N/A

N/A

SDAP B and C –
non-seismic req.
SDAP D and E –
Detailed req.
If Mw < 6 not
required. If >6
full procedure
Use procedure

Approach/settlement slab

N/A

N/A

N/A

Pile bents

SDR 4

Use Eq. (2-17)
Capacity design procedure or elastic forces with R = 0.8
0.10 ⋅ DL
0.25 ⋅ DL
Detailed and tested for 1.1 times 5% in 75-years forces and displacements
SDAP B and C – non-seismic or minimum steel or P-Δ or 50% in 75-years
Non-seismic requirements
forces for C.
SDAP D and E – Moment demand divided by R or minimum steel or P-Δ
Non-seismic
Minimum shear
From capacity design procedures or elastic forces with R = 0.67
requirements
reinforcement

Design forces from capacity design and overstrength
factor of 1.5 and 1.4 for concrete and steel respectively.
Minimum shear reinforcement apply

Design forces from capacity design using over strength ratio of 1.5 and 1.4
for concrete and steel respectively. Minimum shear reinforcement as per
SDR 2.
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Detailed requirements

Full procedure
System requiring owner’s approval not permitted
Encouraged but
N/A
Required
not mandated

Bridge retrofit
The leader in seismic retrofit programs has been the State of California. There are
more than 12,000 bridges in the California State Highway system, plus an additional
12,000 city and county bridges. Since the 1971 San Fernando earthquake struck the Los
Angeles area Caltrans has been engaged in an ongoing bridge retrofit program. Initially,
Caltrans Seismic Retrofit program consisted of restraining sections of 1,262 bridges with
steel cables. The Seismic Retrofit program now involves strengthening the columns of
existing bridges by encircling certain columns with a steel casing or, in a few instances,
an advanced woven fiber casing. In addition to the column casing, some of the bridge
footings are made bigger and given more support by placing additional pilings in the
ground or by using steel tie-down rods to better anchor the footings to the ground. In a
few projects bridge abutments are made larger and the existing restrainer units are made
stronger because encasing the columns make them stiffer and can change the way forces
are transmitted within the bridge. Many Seismic Retrofits involve "hinge seat extensions"
which enlarge the size of the hinges that connect sections of bridge decks and helps
prevent them from separating during severe ground movement.
The Seismic Retrofit program was divided into Phase 1 and Phase 2. Phase 1 included
1,039 bridges identified for strengthening after the Loma Prieta quake. Phase 2 identified
an additional 1,364 bridges for strengthening following the January 1994 Northridge
earthquake. Currently the state's bridge earthquake strengthening program will involve
approximately 2,200 additional structures, including the state's toll bridges. In addition a
total of 1,114 city and county-owned bridges have been identified as candidates for
seismic strengthening.
Washington Sate has carried similar programs. Between 1999 and 2001 more than
350 bridges were retrofitted statewide. After the 2001 Nisqually, Washington State,
Earthquake the scope of the retrofit program was expanded.
Since 1983 the Federal Highway Administration has published three documents on
seismic retrofit of highway bridges [FHWA, 1983, 1987, and 1995]. The latest, 1995
document, is compatible with current Division I-A of the AASHTO Standard
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Specifications [AASHTO, 2002]. This document covers procedures for preliminary
screening of the bridges, detailed evaluation, and design of retrofit measures.

Fig. 2-23 – Caltrans Seismic Retrofit Program Poster
The preliminary screening – Chapter 2 – emphasizes the need of developing an
inventory of bridge seismic information accompanied by a seismic rating system, and
gives guidance for establishing them. Using the vulnerability rating a priority index of
retrofit is computed.
The detailed evaluation guidelines – Chapter 3 – define the different evaluation
methods starting with the analysis procedures: analysis procedures for capacity/demand
method, and analysis procedure for lateral strength method. Then, gives detailed
requirements for performing a capacity/demand evaluation of the bridge, and establishes
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the principles for applying the lateral strength method. Using the results of the two
procedures an overall assessment of the bridge components is described including
assessment of: bearings and expansion joints; columns, walls, and footings; abutments;
and the possibility of liquefaction. Potential retrofit measures are discusses for each of the
assessed components.
The rest of the document [FHWA, 1995] is devoted to detailed retrofit measures for
the assessed components including: Chapter 4 – discuses seismic retrofit strategies
including conventional and innovative earthquake protective systems; Chapter 5 – deals
with the retrofit of bearings, seats, and expansion joints; Chapter 6 – covers retrofit of
columns, cap beams, and joints; Chapter 7 – discusses the retrofit measures for
foundations including footings and abutments; Chapter 8 – covers retrofit measures for
bridges on hazardous sites including bridges across or near active faults and bridges on
liquefiable soils discussing potential remedial solutions for these cases ; and Chapter 9 –
discusses protective measures using seismic isolation. The appendices cover: (A) detailed
indication for obtaining capacity/demand ratios for bridge components, (B) the
assessment of members strength and deformation capacity, and (C, D, and E) worked
examples for two bridges and the use of cable restrainers.
Although this document was developed a few years ago, it covers all the basic
procedures. This document [FHWA, 1995] combined with some of the detailed concepts
covered by the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) [NCHRP,
2002] makes an excellent seismic bridge retrofit guide that is totally up-to-date.

2.3 Geotechnical issues
In the previous section when discussing the evolution of the bridge seismic design
criteria the parameters associated with geotechnical issues were presented without
explaining and discussing their background. The following sections present the
corresponding background and relevant information that that will be needed for the
assessment for geotechnical issues of the earthquake emergency routes of Indiana as
presented in Chapter 4.
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During the 1985 Mexico City Earthquake very large soil amplifications were
recorded. This brought the introduction of an additional soil profile type for deep soft
clay deposits that was termed Type 4 and was assigned a soil coefficient S = 2. With this
addition this corresponds to the soil profile classification used when the ATC-6
requirements were modified to be adopted as Division I-A Seismic Design of the fifteenth
(1992) edition of AASHTO Standard Specifications. These requirements have been kept
without modification in the sixteenth (1996) and in the current seventeenth (2002) edition
[AASHTO, 2002] of the AASHTO Standard Specifications. The soil profile definition
and soil factor, S, were shown previously in Fig. 2-16.
Information mainly from the 1989 Loma Prieta, California, Earthquake, and the 1985
Mexico City event, in addition to data from other cases in other parts of the world
permitted in the early 1990’s to restudy the ground motion amplification due to soil
profile characteristics and to propose a new classification of soil profile types and soil
amplification factors [Whitman, 1992]. These new procedures take into account the level
of shaking, rock stiffness, and soil type, and the stiffness and depth effect on the
amplification of ground motions at short and long periods. These new soil profile types
and soil amplification factors were incorporated into the 1994 NEHRP Provisions
[NEHRP, 1994]. Among the more important changes are larger amplification factors for
lower levels of acceleration caused by the soil responding in the linear range with less
damping as compared with larger amplitude movement responding in the nonlinear range
and inducing greater damping. Some adjustments were introduced in the 1997 NEHRP
Provisions [NEHRP, 1997] with the change of the definition of the design ground motion
introduced then, and were kept in the 2000 NEHRP Provisions [NEHRP, 2000].
The soil site must be assigned into one of six soil profile classes labeled A to F. The
definition of the soil profile is based on averaged soil properties for the upper 100 feet
(30 m) of soil profile. The properties used for this definition are: average shear wave
velocity ( vs ), average standard penetration resistance ( N ), average standard penetration
resistance for the cohesionless soils only ( N ch ), and average undrained shear strength in
case of cohesive soils ( su ). These averages are weighted with respect to each layer
thickness. Table 2-11 indicates how these parameters are used to define the soil profile.
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Table 2-11 – Site Classification [NEHRP, 2000]
Site class

vs

N or N ch

su

A
Hard rock

>5000 ft/s
(> 1500 m/s)

N/A

N/A

B
Rock

2500 to 5000 ft/s
(760 to 1500 m/s)

N/A

N/A

C
Very dense soil or
soft rock

1200 to 2500 ft/s
(360 to 760 m/s)

> 50

> 2000 psf
(> 100 kPa)

D
Stiff soil

600 to 1200 ft/s
(180 to 360 m/s)

15 to 50

1000 to 2000 psf
(50 to 100 kPa)

< 600 ft/s
(< 180 m/s)

< 15

< 1000 psf
(< 50 kPa)

E
Soft soil

F
Soils requiring sitespecific evaluation

Any profile with more than 10 ft (3 m) of soil having
• Plasticity Index PI > 20,
• Moisture content ω ≥ 40%, and
• Undrained shear strength su < 500 psf (25 kPa)

1. Soils vulnerable to potential failure or collapse (liquefiable,
quick- or highly-sensitive clays, collapsible weakly
cemented soils).
2. More than 10 ft (3 m) of peat and/or highly organic clays.
3. More than 25 ft (7.5 m) of very high plasticity clays
(PI > 75).
4. More than 120 ft (37 m) of soft to medium clays.

N/A =Not applicable.
Figure 2-24 shows the values of the coefficient Fa as a function of the site class and the
short period maximum considered earthquake spectral acceleration SS. Figure 2-25 shows
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the values of the coefficient Fv as a function of the site class and the 1-second period
maximum considered earthquake spectral acceleration S1. For sites class F a site-specific
procedure must be used for determining the maximum considered earthquake spectral
acceleration.
3.5

3.0

2.5

Site Class E

2.0

Fa
1.5
Site Class D

Site Class D

Site Class C

1.0

Site Class B
Site Class A

Site Class E

0.5

0.0
0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

1.25

1.50

S S (g)

Fig. 2-24 – Values of Fa [NEHRP, 2000]
It is important to note that the reference accelerations for obtaining Fa and Fv, as
shown in Figure 2-24 and 2-25, were changed in the 1997 NEHRP Provisions [NEHRP,
1997] from what was presented originally in the 1994 NEHRP Provisions [NEHRP,
1994]. In the 1994 Edition the abscissa of Figures 2-24 and 2-25 were mapped values of
effective peak ground acceleration Aa (EPA) and acceleration Av derived from effective
peak ground velocity (EPV), respectively, based on a 10% probability of being exceeded
in a 50-year life span of the structure — 475 years mean return period —. In the 1997
Edition the definition of the design ground motion was changed to the spectral values of
the maximum considered earthquake — 2500 years mean return period — described
through SS and S1 respectively, as used in Figures 2-24 and 2-25.
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Fig. 2-25 – Values of Fv [NEHRP, 2000]
Although this methodology for evaluation of site effects was originally introduced in
documents for earthquake resistant building design, it is as well applicable to bridge
design, as recognized in the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49)
[NCHRP, 2002]. This last document requires a site-specific evaluation for Site Class F
soils, when the bridge is considered a major or very important structure requiring a higher
degree of confidence of meeting the seismic performance objectives, or when the site if
within 10 km of an active fault. The Draft document includes Appendix 3A containing
guidelines for conducting site-specific geotechnical investigations and dynamic response
analyses. Appendix 3A gives guidance on the site-specific geotechnical investigation to
be performed, the modeling of the soil profile, the selection of the ground motion at
bedrock to use in the analysis, the procedure of the analysis, and how to interpret the
results.

2.3.2 Liquefaction
Liquefaction is a process caused by the earthquake ground motion vibration by which
sediments below the water table temporarily lose strength and behave as a viscous liquid
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rather than a solid. The type of sediments most susceptible are clay-free deposits of sand
and silts; occasionally, gravel liquefies [Seed and Idriss, 1982]. Seismic waves, primarily
shear waves, passing through saturated granular layers, distort the granular structure, and
cause loosely packed groups of particles to readjust. This readjustment increases the
pore-water pressure between particles if drainage cannot occur. It the pore-water pressure
raises to a level approaching the weight of the overlying soil, the granular layer
temporarily behaves as a viscous liquid producing what is called liquefaction of the soil.
In the liquefied condition, soil may deform with little shear resistance. Deformations
large enough to cause damage to structures are called ground failures. The ease with
which a soil can be liquefied depends primarily on the looseness of the soil, the amount
of cementing or clay between particles, and the amount of drainage restriction. The
amount of soil deformation following liquefaction depends on the looseness of the
material, the depth, thickness, and extension measured in area of the liquefied layer, the
ground slope, and the distribution of loads applied by the structure.

Fig. 2-26 – Damage due to liquefaction on Bridge 002/6s-w
2001 Nisqually, Washington, Earthquake
Liquefaction is restricted to certain geologic and hydrologic environments primarily
recent deposited sand and silt in areas with high ground water levels. Generally, the
younger and looser the sediment and the higher the water table, the more susceptible the
soil is to liquefaction. Sediments most susceptible to liquefaction include Holocene (less
than 10,000-year-old) delta, river channel, flood plain, and aeolian deposit, and poorly
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compacted fills. Liquefaction has been most abundant in areas where ground water lies
close — generally within 30 ft — to the ground surface; few instances of liquefaction
have occurred in areas with ground water deeper than 60 ft. Dense soils, including wellcompacted fills, have low susceptibility to liquefaction.
Only when liquefaction is accompanied by some form of ground displacement or
ground failure it is destructive to the built environment. For engineering purposes, it is
not the occurrence of liquefaction that is of prime importance, but its severity or its
capability to cause damage. Adverse effects of liquefaction can take many forms. These
include: flow failures; lateral spreads; ground oscillations; lose of bearing strength;
settlement; and increased pressure on retaining walls.
Flow failures — Is evident by lateral displacement of large masses of soil. Flows may
consist on completely liquefied soil or blocks of intact material riding on a layer of
liquefied soil. It occurs on sites having loose saturated sands or silts lying on steep slopes.

Fig. 2-27 – Turnagain Heights, Anchorage, a sector approximately 2,600 m by 270 m slid
21 m toward Cook Inlet. Sand lenses liquefied and moved down slope. Slope failure
began 2 minutes after the start of ground motion – 1964, Alaska, Earthquake
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Lateral spread — Lateral spreads involve lateral displacement of large, surficial
blocks of soil as a result of liquefaction of a subsurface layer. Displacement occurs in
response to the combination of gravitational forces and inertial forces generated by an
earthquake. Lateral spreads generally develop on gentle slopes (most commonly less than
3 degrees) and move toward a free face such as an incised river channel. Horizontal
displacements commonly range up to several meters. The displaced ground usually
breaks up internally, causing fissures, scarps, horsts, and grabens to form on the failure
surface. Damage caused by lateral spreads is severely disruptive. For example, during the
1964 Alaska Earthquake, more than 200 bridges were damaged or destroyed by spreading
of floodplain deposits toward river channels. The spreading compressed the
superstructures, buckled decks, thrust stringers over abutments, and shifted and tilted
abutments and piers [NAS, 1973].

Fig. 2-28 – Damage caused by lateral spreading at Sunset Lake trailer park
in Tumwater – 2001 Nisqually, Washington, Earthquake
Loss of Bearing Strength — When the soil supporting the structure liquefies and loses
strength, large deformations can occur within the soil which may allow the structure to
settle and tip. Conversely, buried tanks and piles may rise buoyantly through the liquefied
soil. For example, many buildings settled and tipped during the 1964 Niigata, Japan,
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Earthquake. The most spectacular bearing failures during that event were in an apartment
complex where several four-story buildings tipped as much as 60 degrees. Apparently,
liquefaction first developed in a sand layer several meters below ground surface and then
propagated upward through overlying sand layers. The rising wave of liquefaction
weakened the soil supporting the buildings and allowed the structures to slowly settle and
tip. In many cases, the weight of a structure will not be great enough to cause the large
settlements associated with soil bearing capacity failures. However, smaller settlements
may occur as soil pore-water pressures dissipate and the soil consolidates after the
earthquake. The eruption of sand boils (fountains of water and sediment emanating from
the pressurized, liquefied sand) is a common manifestation of liquefaction that can also
lead to localized differential settlements.

Fig. 2-29 – Settlement of pile cap in liquefied soil beneath industrial building south of
downtown Seattle – 2001 Nisqually, Washington, Earthquake
Increased Lateral Pressure on Retaining Walls — If the soil behind a retaining wall
liquefies, the lateral pressures on the wall may greatly increase. As a result, retaining
walls maybe laterally displaced, tilt, or structurally fail, as has been observed for
waterfront walls retaining loose saturated sand in a number of earthquakes.
Now we turn our attention to the evolution of the engineering procedures to evaluate
the liquefaction potential. The number of variables that should be taken into account to
properly evaluate the liquefaction potential can be grouped into three broad groups [Seed
and Idriss, 1982]: soil properties (dynamic shear modulus, damping characteristics, unit

59

weight, grain characteristics, relative density, and soil structure), environmental factors
(procedure of soil formation, seismic history, geologic history – aging, cementation –,
lateral earth pressure coefficient, depth of water table, and effective confining pressure),
and earthquake characteristics (intensity of ground shaking, and duration of ground
shaking). A combination of in-situ test and laboratory tests of undisturbed samples may
be used to obtain properties that can be used to define the liquefaction potential using
engineering judgment to properly account for the large intrinsic variability of the
measured properties — because of the difficulty of retrieving and testing really
undisturbed samples — and unknown or difficult to estimate parameters, specially those
associated with the earthquake ground motion.
Because of the noted reasons, since the mid 1970’s a methodology termed the
“simplified procedure” has evolved to be the accepted standard of practice for evaluating
liquefaction resistance of soils. This procedure is based on regressions of data from field
observations and laboratory measurements. Recently an update of the procedures
involved was made by a panel of experts under the sponsorship of the National Center for
Earthquake Engineering and the National Science Foundation [Youd and Idriss, 2001].
The proposed updated procedure constitutes the method of choice in which an allencompassing procedure is not employed.
The procedure requires the computation of two variables that describe the seismic
demand on a soil layer — cyclic stress ratio (CSR) — and the capacity of the soil layer to
resist liquefaction — cyclic resistance ratio (CRR) — respectively. The factor of safety to
liquefaction of the soil layer is the obtained as:

FS =

CRR
CSR

(2-18)

The cyclic stress ratio, CSR, is obtained from:

⎛τ ⎞
⎛a
CSR = ⎜ av ⎟ = 0.65 ⋅ ⎜ max
⎝ g
⎝ σ vo′ ⎠
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⎞ ⎛ σ vo ⎞
⎟ ⋅ ⎜ ′ ⎟ ⋅ rd
⎠ ⎝ σ vo ⎠

(2-19)

where amax = peak ground acceleration at the ground surface generated by the earthquake;
g = acceleration of gravity; σ vo and σ vo′ are total and effective overburden stresses,
respectively; τav = induced shear stress; and rd = stress reduction coefficient accounting
for flexibility of the soil profile.
For a depth below ground surface z in m, rd can be obtained from:

⎧1.0 − 0.00765 ⋅ z
rd = ⎨
⎩1.174 − 0.0267 ⋅ z

for z ≤ 9.15 m
for 9.15 m < z ≤ 23m

(2-20)

Four field tests are recommended for routine evaluation of liquefaction resistance
CRR: the cone penetration test (CPT), the standard penetration test (SPT), shear-wave
velocity (Vs) measurements, and for gravelly sites the Becker penetration test (BPT).
Each test has its advantages and limitations with the CPT providing the most detailed soil
stratigraphy and robust field-data based liquefaction resistance curves now available.
CPT testing should always be accompanied by soil sampling for validation of soil type
identification. The SPT has a longer record of application and provides disturbed soil
samples from which fines content and other grain characteristics can be determined.
Measured shear-wave velocities provide fundamental information on small-strain soil
behavior that is useful beyond analyses of liquefaction resistance. Vs is also applicable at
sites, such as landfills and gravelly sediments, where CPT and SPT soundings may not be
possible or reliable. The BPT test is recommended only for gravelly sites and requires use
of rough correlations between BPT and SPT, making the results less certain than other
tests. Where possible, two or more test procedures should be applied to assure adequate
definition of soil stratigraphy and a consistent evaluation of liquefaction resistance.
When using the standard penetration test (SPT) the blow count must be normalized to
take into account the overburden pressure and the hammer energy. This is done by
adjusting the blow count values, N, to a normalized value termed (N1)60 that corresponds
to an overburden pressure, Po, of approximately 100 kPa (2 kip/sq ft) and a hammer
efficiency of 60%. The cyclic resistance ratio (CRR) is first defined for an ideal cleansand base curve for magnitude 7.5 earthquakes:
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CRR7.5 =

( N1 )60
1
50
1
+
+
−
2
34 − ( N1 )60
135
200
⎡⎣10 ⋅ ( N1 )60 + 45⎤⎦

(2-21)

Equation (2-21) is valid for (N1)60 values less than 30. For greater values clean
granular soils are too dense to liquefy and are classified as non-liquefiable. A series of
adjustments must be made to CRR7.5, as follows:
Fines content adjustment — CRR increase with soil fines content (FC) by adjusting
(N1)60 to an equivalent clean sand value (N1)60cs. This is performed using the following
empirical equation:

( N1 )60cs = α + β ⋅ ( N1 )60

(2-22)

and α and β are obtained from:

⎧
⎪0
⎪ ⎛
190 ⎞
⎪ ⎜1.76− 2 ⎟
α = ⎨e⎝ FC ⎠
⎪
⎪5.0
⎪
⎩
⎧
⎪1.0
⎪
⎪
FC 1.5
β = ⎨0.99 +
1, 000
⎪
⎪
⎪1.2
⎪⎩

for FC ≤ 5%
for 5% < FC ≤ 35%
for 35% < FC
(2-23)
for FC ≤ 5%
for 5% < FC ≤ 35%
for 35% < FC

Other corrections to SPT — Several corrections in addition to the fines content
influence SPT results. They are incorporated by:

( N1 )60cs = N m ⋅ CN ⋅ CE ⋅ CB ⋅ CR ⋅ CS
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(2-24)

where Nm = measured SPT blows; CN = factor to take into account the overburden stress;
CE = factor to take into account hammer energy ratio; CB = factor to take into account the
borehole diameter; CR = factor to take into account the rod length; and CS = correction for
samplers with or without liners. Table 2-12 lists the values for these corrections factors.
Table 2-12 – Corrections to SPT [Youd and Idriss, 2001]
Factor
Overburden pressure

Equipment variable
—

Overburden pressure
Energy ratio
Energy ratio
Energy ratio
Borehole diameter
Borehole diameter
Borehole diameter
Rod length
Rod length
Rod length
Rod length
Rod length
Sampling method
Sampling method

—
Donut hammer
Safety hammer
Automatic trip Donut
65-115 mm
150 mm
200 mm
<3m
3–4m
4–6m
6 – 10 m
10 – 30 m
Standard sampler
Sampler w/o liners

Term
CN

Correction
0.5
( Po / σ vo′ )

CN
CE
CE
CE
CB
CB
CB
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CS
CS

CN ≤ 1.7
0.5 – 1.0
0.7 – 1.2
0.8 – 1.3
1.0
1.05
1.15
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.95
1.0
1.0
1.1 – 1.3

The recommended procedure [Youd and Idriss, 2001] presents procedures to obtain
CRR based on cone penetration test (CPT) and on shear wave velocity (Vs). They were
not used in present research due to lack of CPT and Vs information for bridge sites in
Indiana with few exceptions [Bobet et al., 2001]. The interested reader is referred to
[Youd and Idriss, 2001].
Magnitude correction — An earthquake magnitude scaling factor (MSF) must also be
applied using Eq. (2-25).

⎛ CRR7.5 ⎞
FS = ⎜
⎟ ⋅ MSF
⎝ CSR ⎠

(2-25)

The magnitude scaling factor, MSF, for moment magnitude, Mw, is presented in Eq.
(2-26).
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MSF =

102.24
M w2.56

(2-26)

The proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) [NCHRP,
2002] requires a liquefaction potential evaluation, as indicated in Table 2-10, for the
different component detailing requirements (SDR). For SDR 1 and 2 no evaluation is
required unless requested by the owner. For SDR 3 to 6 its must be performed unless
requested by the owner or one of the conditions in Table 2-13 are met.
Table 2-13 – Cases for SDR 3 to 6 for which liquefaction potential evaluation need not be
performed in Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49)
Magnitude for the 3%
probability of exceedance
75-year event
Mw < 6.0
6.0 ≤ Mw < 6.4

Normalized SPT blow
count, (N1)60

Fa ⋅ SS

N/A
> 15
> 10
>5

N/A
N/A
0.375g > Fa ⋅ SS ≥ 0.25g
0.250g > Fa ⋅ SS

Maps of mean earthquake magnitude are provided. These maps were prepared by the
USGS using the maximum magnitude that can affect the site for all relevant seismic
sources to produce the design ground motion with 3% of being exceeded in 75 years. If
liquefaction potential must be evaluated, the procedures of Appendix 3B must be used.
Appendix 3B is devoted to liquefaction and other geological hazards. It uses the same
principles presented [Youd and Idriss, 2001], and gives guidance for making an in depth
evaluation of liquefaction potential. The results of the liquefaction assessment are used to
evaluate the potential severity of three liquefaction related hazards to the bridge: (1) flow
failures involving large slope failures, (2) limited lateral spread, and (3) ground
settlement. It permits to evaluate these hazards on the basis of safety factor for
liquefaction. If the safety factor is less than 1.0 to 1.3 the potential related hazards must
be evaluated following detailed guidelines for each one of them.
In general the procedures included require improving the soil or locating the support
foundation elements below the liquefiable layer and to design the bridge to meet the
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performance objectives while being subjected to the settlements and/or lateral
displacements imposed by the lateral spread.

2.3.3 Fault rupture
The morphology of rivers is associated with geological fault setting in many cases.
The possibility of having a bridge located along the path of a geological fault is real. Two
recent cases of bridge damage caused by the bridge crossing the fault path are shown in
Figures 2-30 and 2-31.

Fig. 2-30 – Collapse of Bei-Feng Bridge located on the earthquake causing fault
Chi-Chi, Taiwan Earthquake, September 21, 1999
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Fig. 2-31 – Bolu Viaduct, crossed by the North Anatolian Fault
November 12, 1999 Duzce, Turkey, Earthquake
In many cases the fault existence and location is difficult to detect. The degree of
activity of a fault is subjective and estimation the amount of displacements and
recurrence period is difficult to forecast. There are very few acceleration records obtained
very close to a fault and the expected ground motion is difficult to estimate. Design for
theses circumstances is challenging and has a high degree of uncertainty in meeting any
performance objective. The proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP
12-49) [NCHRP, 2002] recommends avoiding bridge construction across faults.

2.3.4 Embankment failure
High embankments in bridge approaches may fail due to different type of problems.
Liquefaction may cause lateral spread or settlement, leading to failure of the
embankment. The ground motion, without liquefaction occurring, may cause the failure
of the slopes. Techniques developed for embankment dams and slope stability may be
used to assess the possibility of failure of the road embankment or the bridge approach.
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2.3.5 Landslides
Landslides present a significant hazard to roadways in seismically active areas and
can pose a hazard for bridges. Damage can be in the form of ground movement either at
the abutment or extending to the central piers of the bridge. Bridges located near steep
slopes, or places with a history of rock falls, or avalanches.

Fig. 2-32 – Landslide induced by the earthquake. A nearby bridge had major
structural damage – Morgan Hill, California, Earthquake of April 24, 1984
Design must include dynamic slope stability analysis or other procedures of stability
assessment of nearby slopes, such as Newmark sliding block method. It is important to
estimate the order of magnitude of displacement during the landslide.
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CHAPTER 3 SEISMIC RISK OF SOUTHWESTERN INDIANA

3.1 Tectonic setting
The great majority of the World’s seismic activity occurs at the tectonic plate
boundaries. Continental U.S. is contained within the North American Plate with Indiana
practically in the middle of it and far away from the plate boundaries. Notwithstanding,
earthquakes have been felt in Indiana since colonization began by the French in
Louisiana and from the east after the Louisiana Purchase. Intraplate earthquakes can be
caused by a number of different kind of stresses — large scale glacial rebound (the slow
flexure of the crust back up after a large sheet of ice is removed), for example, or the
broad compresional stress caused within eastern North America by the compression
forces from the mid-Atlantic spreading center.
In recent decades, earth scientists have collected evidence that strong earthquakes in
the central Mississippi Valley have occurred repeatedly in the geologic past. Small
earthquakes happen in the region frequently. The area in which most of these quakes
occur is referred to as the New Madrid seismic zone (NMSZ) which stretches from just
west of Memphis, Tennessee, into southern Illinois. Several times in the past century,
moderate earthquakes have been widely felt in southern Illinois and southwestern
Indiana. In the last decade geologic evidence that the Wabash Valley faults, initially
considered the northern portion of the New Madrid Seismic Zone, is a different system
with its own tectonic setting has led to define it as an independent seismic zone that has
been named the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone (WVSZ).
The New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) — Geologic structures related to earthquakes
in the central Mississippi Valley region have been deeply buried over hundreds of
millions of years by thick layers of sediment. Geophysical studies have revealed a major
buried northeast-trending feature known as the Reelfoot Rift [Hildenbrand and
Hendricks, 1995], which formed more than 500 million years ago by a process of
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extension in the middle of the North American Plate. A rift structure is created when
geologic forces begin to pull the Earth's crust apart. If this process continues long
enough, the crust separates to form an ocean basin, as happened to form the Atlantic
Ocean basin. The Reelfoot Rift is called a failed rift because the Earth's crust did not
separate enough to create a new ocean basin. However, the crust was disturbed enough to
form major faults that mark the axis and margins of the rift and now contribute to the
occurrence of earthquakes in the NMSZ.

Fig. 3-1 – The Reelfoot Rift in the New Madrid Region
A sequence of powerful earthquakes struck the mid-Mississippi River Valley, central
United States, in the winter of 1811-1812. The first one occurred December 16, 1811,
Intermittent strong shaking continued through March 1812 and aftershocks strong enough
to be felt occurred through the year 1817. The initial earthquake of December 16 was
followed by two other principal shocks, one on January 23, 1812, and the other on
February 7, 1812. Judging from newspaper accounts of damage to buildings, the
February 7 earthquake was the biggest of the three. On the basis of the large area of
damage (600,000 km2), the widespread area of perceptibility (5,000,000 km2), and the
complex physiographic changes that occurred, the Mississippi River valley earthquakes
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of 1811-1812 rank as some of the largest in the United States since its settlement by
Europeans [Stover and Coffman, 1993]. The estimated magnitudes for these events vary
considerably from different sources (7.2 to 8.8 depending on the parameters used to
define the magnitude and the scale in which it is reported).

Fig. 3-2 – Isoseismal map for the Arkansas earthquake of December 16, 1811, first of
the 1811-1812 New Madrid series [Stover and Coffman, 1993]
The association of the 1811-1812 earthquakes to a causing fault has been hindered by
lack of information from a scarcely inhabited region at the time of occurrence. Since the
early 1970´s a great amount of multidisciplinary research have been devoted to find and
define characteristics of the events and the tectonic setting in order to understand the
tectonic process taking place and validate seismic risk assessments for the region.
From the information gathered from different sources it is accepted (with dissent) that
the causing faults were those shown in Fig. 3-3. The USGS along with the Geological
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Surveys of the CUSEC member States and several universities in the region have to a
certain degree reached consensus on what is known with certainty and what needs more
research to frame adequately the seismic risk assessment for the region. The primary
types of evidence are geological — paleoseismological, stratigraphic, geomorphic,
structural, and sedimentological information — and seismological, instrumental and
historical.

Fig. 3-3 – The New Madrid seismic zone showing the three faults that ruptured in
1811-1812 and earthquakes recorded in recent years [Hough, 2002]
Paleoliquefaction investigations have provided constraints on recurrence in the
NMSZ and have been conducted at 44 sites. From these studies it is know that two pre1811 episodes of liquefaction comparable to that of 1811-1812 can be interpreted
[Participants, 2000]. Best estimates of the dates of these events are 1450 and 900 (Fig.
3-4), which leads to a median recurrence interval ranging between 267 and 644 years.
The volume of sand mobilized at many of the liquefaction sites in the NMSZ implies they
could not have been formed by local events of moderate magnitude. Further indication of
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very strong shaking comes from geotechnical measurements at liquefaction sites in the
NMSZ, which show the shallow sub-surface materials to be only moderately liquefiable.

Fig. 3-4 – Estimated ages of paleoliquefaction features (vertical axis) arranged by site
location, from north (left) to south (right), excluding the Current River sites. Vertical gray
shaded segments indicate most probable ages, with brackets showing approximate two
standard deviation uncertainties. Shaded horizontal bars indicate the inferred timing of
paleoearthquakes. Dashed horizontal line is at 1811-1812. [Participants, 2000]
The paleoliquefaction interpretations also suggest that recurrence rates for events with
magnitude on the range of 5 and the largest earthquakes cannot be simply related.
Magnitude regressions of the large events for the approximate periods of recurrence
implied from the paleoliquefaction record indicate that the mean return period for the
smaller magnitude events should be smaller (more frequent). Quoting from [Participants,
2000]: “In short, the largest earthquakes occur much more frequently than the rate of
smaller earthquakes would imply. Finally, the paleoliquefaction record suggests that the
clustering of earthquakes that occurred in 1811-1812 also occurred in prior events.
Multiple units of vented material are evident in many of the sandblows and have been
interpreted as resulting from major events that occurred within weeks to months of each
other. The lack of soil development, but evidence for bioturbation in materials between
the units, constrains the timing between clustered events.”
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The length of the active fault system and the lack of relative motion measured across
the system make the use of models that work well for earthquakes occurring in plateboundary settings not appropriate. Models for intraplate tectonics have recently been
proposed but their use is just being implemented in the NMSZ. Magnitude estimates of
large New Madrid earthquakes rely on uncertain conversions of observations of their
effects measured as Modified Mercalli intensities derived mainly from newspapers
accounts. It is evident that the spread of intensity is much larger than for comparable
events in the West Coast, as shown in Fig. 3-5. The magnitude conversion may be biased
by different causes, but one that has been pointed out several times is that soil profile
amplification may have increased the reported magnitudes because most towns at the
time were settlements along rivers.

Fig. 3-5 – Comparison of areas of damage from the New Madrid
and San Francisco Earthquakes
Slip rates for the known faults in the region estimated mainly using characteristics of
secondary features show that three episodes of deformation are apparent in folded fluvial
deposits overlying the Reelfoot fault with their ages close to the three major events
evident in the paleoliquefaction record. The inferred rates of slip are compatible with the
short recurrence interval for major earthquakes evident in the paleoseismic record. The
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potential for currently classified as non-active faults within and beyond the NMSZ
producing moderate-to-large earthquakes remains unknown, although Quaternary surface
faulting has been documented on the periphery of the NMSZ [Participants, 2000].
Wabash Valley Seismic Zone — The Wabash Valley Fault System is about 90 km
long and 50 km wide in southeastern Illinois, southwestern Indiana, and northwestern
Kentucky near the deepest part of the Illinois Basin. The fault system consists of
subparallel, high-angle normal faults that have vertical displacements as great as 150 m.
The faults bound horsts and grabens, and commonly overlap one another. Major fault
plains dip at angles ranging from 50 to 85 degrees. Individual fault blocks are only
slightly tilted, and drag is generally absent or weakly expressed.

Fig. 3-6 – Wabash River Valley Faults [René and Stanonis, 1995]
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In the past decade, there has been increasing awareness that the seismic hazard in this
zone may be greater than the historical earthquake record would suggest. Numerous
prehistoric large magnitude earthquakes have struck southern Indiana and Illinois; some
may have been larger. Geologic evidence for these earthquakes in the form of sand-andgravel intrusions in river sediments has been discovered at more than 200 sites in the
Wabash River Valley and along its tributaries in Indiana and Illinois. This information is
the result of USGS studies done in cooperation with the Indiana Geological Survey,
Indiana University, Illinois Department of Natural Resources-Illinois State Museum and
the Illinois State Geological Survey. Clastic dikes filled with sand and gravel, interpreted
to be the result of earthquake induced liquefaction, occur throughout much of southern
Indiana and adjacent parts of Illinois. At least seven and probably eight prehistoric
earthquakes have been documented during the Holocene, as well as, at least one during
the latest Pleistocene (see Fig. 3-7) [Munson et al., 1997]. Nearly all of these liquefaction
features originated from earthquakes centered in southern Indiana and Illinois, and not
further south in the nearby source region of the great 1811-12 New Madrid earthquakes
[Crone and Wheeler, 2000].

Fig. 3-7 – Map of southern two-thirds of Indiana showing sites where
ancient sandblows have been found, and showing areas of liquefaction
for six major prehistoric earthquakes. [Kirby, 2001]
In the absence of well-determined data on the timing of paleoevents and the amount
of tectonic slip associated with those events, it is impossible to estimate reliable or even
meaningful Holocene or late Quaternary slip rates [Crone and Wheeler, 2000]. In
summary the tectonics of the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone it not well understood at
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present. No historical earthquakes in the Wabash Valley region have been strong enough
to cause liquefaction. It is likely that numerous other magnitude 6 to 7 Holocene
earthquakes have struck the region, but did not leave a record because of the lack of
liquefiable deposits in large parts of the region.

3.2 Earthquake history of Indiana
Earthquakes originated within Indiana and from neighboring seismic zones have been
felt in Indiana since the start of the colonization. Figure 3-8 shows the seismicity for the
New Madrid and Wabash Valley Seismic Zones. The following description of the seismic
history of Indiana was abridged from [Stover and Coffman, 1993].

Fig. 3-8 – Earthquakes in the New Madrid and Wabash Valley, red circles indicate
earthquakes that occurred from 1974 to 2002 with magnitudes larger than 2.5, green
circles denote earthquakes that occurred prior to 1974 [USGS, 2002]
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The most damaging Indiana earthquake originating within the State occurred on
September 27, 1909, near the Illinois border between Vincennes and Terre Haute. Some
chimneys fell, several building walls were cracked, light connections were severed, and
pictures were shaken off the walls. It was strong in Indianapolis and Oakland City. It was
felt over an area of 80,000 km2 (see Fig. 3-9) including the southwestern half of Indiana,
all of Illinois and parts of Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, Arkansas, and probably in parts of
Kansas.

Fig. 3-9 – Isoseismal map for the Wabash River Valley, Indiana,
Earthquake of September 27, 1909.
The latest important earthquake originated within the State occurred June 18, 2002,
with magnitude 4.6 (USGS, but mb = 5.0 according to other sources) near Evansville.
There was very little damage. The location of the earthquake and its hypocentral depth
(14-18 km) indicated ongoing deformation along reactivated Precambrian and Paleozoic
basement structures, in a zone of recurring seismic activity, and in an area of possibly
heightened neotectonic strain [Hamburger et al., 2002]. Figure 3-10 shows the intensity
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map for this earthquake obtained from the Community Internet Intensity Map USGS
program.

Fig. 3-10 – Isoseismal map for the Evansville, Indiana,
Earthquake of June 18, 2002
Other damaging earthquakes originated in Indiana include the April 29, 1899,
Earthquake with rated intensity VI to VII on the Modified Mercalli Scale. It was
strongest at Jeffersonville and Shelbyville; at Vincennes, chimneys were thrown down
and walls cracked. It was felt over an area of 110,000 km2.
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In 1876, twin shocks fifteen minutes apart were felt over an area of 160,000 km2. A
shock in 1887 centered near Vincennes was felt over 200,000 km2 and an 1891 shock
damaged property and frightened people in church at Evansville.
Indiana has also suffered from damage caused by earthquakes originating in
neighboring States. The worst occurred on November 9, 1968, and centered near Dale in
southern Illinois. The shock, a magnitude 5.3, was felt over 1,500,000 km2 and 23 States
including all of Indiana. Intensity VII was reported from Cynthiana where chimneys were
cracked, twisted, and toppled; at Fort Branch where groceries fell from shelves and a loud
roaring noise was heard, and at Mount Vernon, New Harmony, Petersburg, Princeton,
and Stewartsville, all of which had similar effects.
Almost exactly ten years earlier on November 7, 1958, an earthquake originating near
Mt. Carmel, Illinois, caused plaster to fall at Fort Branch. Roaring and whistling noises
were heard at Central City and the residents of Evansville thought there had been an
explosion or plane crash. It was felt over 90,000 km2 of Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, and
Kentucky.
On March 2, 1937, a shock centering near Anna, Ohio, threw objects from shelves at
Fort Wayne and some plaster fell. Plaster was also cracked at Indianapolis. Six days later,
another shock originating at Anna brought pictures crashing down and cracked plaster in
Fort Wayne and was strongly felt at Lafayette.
The great New Madrid earthquakes of 1811 and 1812 must have strongly affected the
State, particularly the southwestern part, but there is little information available.

3.3 Design earthquake return period
For the foregoing discussion on the seismic risk of Indiana it is important to establish
a common base for comparing the probability of exceedance of the design ground
motion, the earthquake mean return period, and the lapse of exposure or life of the
structure.
The probability, q, of having ground motion that exceeds in one year a pre-fixed
value of a descriptive parameter, ao, – for example peak ground acceleration – is:
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q = P(a ≥ ao , in one year )

(3-1)

The probability of not exceeding the value of ao in t years, under the assumption of
statistical independence between events, is:
qt = (1 − q ) (1 − q ) (1 − q ) " (1 − q )
1

2

3

"

(3-2)

t

Then:
qt = (1 − q )t

(3-3)

The probability, qo, of having at least one event with a value greater than ao in a time
span of t years is:

qo = 1 − qt = 1 − (1 − q)t

(3-4)

The return period is defined as the mean time, in years, between events producing a
value of the descriptive parameter greater or equal to ao:

T =

1
q

(3-5)

Then:

⎛ 1⎞
qo = 1 − qt = 1 − ⎜1 − ⎟
⎝ T⎠

t

(3-6)

For example, if the design earthquake has been defined as an event that produces a
value of the descriptive parameter having a probability of 3% of being exceeded in a 75
year interval; using the formulation presented: qo = 0.03 and t = 75 years. Applying Eq.
(3-6):
⎛ 1⎞
0.03 = 1 − ⎜1 − ⎟
⎝ T⎠

75

⎛ 1 ⎞

75

⎜ ⎟
⎛ 1⎞
⎛ 1⎞
then 0.97 = ⎜1 − ⎟ and ⎜1 − ⎟ = 0.97⎝ 75 ⎠ = 0.999594
T
T
⎝
⎠
⎝
⎠

1
= 1 − 0.999594 = 0.00040604 , and the mean period of recurrence for
T
this case is, then:

It follows that
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T =

1
= 2463 years
0.00040604

Table 3-1 – Design Ground Motion Mean Return period used in different documents

Document and reference
AASHO Standard Specifications for
Highway Bridges 5th Edition (1949)
AASHO Standard Specifications for
Highway Bridges 8th Edition (1961)
AASHTO 1975 Interim Specifications
for Highway Bridges [AASHTO,
1975]
ATC-3-06 Recommendations for
Buildings [ATC, 1978]
ATC-6 Design Guidelines for Bridges
[ATC, 1981]
Division I-A of AASHTO Standard
Specifications (15th to current 17th
Edition) [AASHTO, 2002]
AASHTO LRFD Specifications (1st,
2nd, and 3rd Edition) [AASHTO, 1998]
Caltrans Seismic Design Criteria
[Caltrans, 2001]
NEHRP Recommendations for New
Buildings [NEHRP, 1997] – Maximum
Considered Earthquake (see Note)
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic
Provisions [NCHRP, 2002] –
Maximum Considered Earthquake
Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic
Provisions [NCHRP, 2002] – Frequent
Earthquake

Structure
life-span
(years)

Probability
of
exceedance

Mean
Return
Period
(years)

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

50

10%

475

50

10%

475

50

10%

475

50

10%

475

N/A

N/A

N/A

50

2%

2475

75

3%

2463

75

50%

109

Note – In NEHRP 1997 the Design Ground Motion for buildings corresponds to 2/3 of the Maximum
Considered Earthquake ground motion. This reduction is not used in the Draft AASHTO LRFD seismic
provisions for bridges although the definition of the Maximum Considered Earthquake is practically the
same.

Figure 3-11 shows the sensitivity to the mean return period when changing the life
span of the structure or the probability of exceedance.
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Fig. 3-11 – Mean return period as a function of the probability of
exceedance and the life span of the structure in years
3.4 Seismic risk assessment for bridge design in Indiana
The awareness of the seismic risk associated with the New Madrid Seismic Zone and
more recently the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone, as presented before, has been increasing
in the last decades with the corresponding increase in the seismic forces and related
requirements used in design of building structures and bridges. The following sections
present the seismic risk parameters presented by the bridge specifications in the last
decades in order to set a common frame of reference to be used in the vulnerability
assessment of the transportation structures within the selected Earthquake Emergency
Routes of Indiana.
Figure 3-12 shows the 1949 revision of the seismic risk map developed by the U.S.
Coast and Geodetic Survey [Housner, 1970]. Table 3-2 presents the peak ground
accelerations suggested by Housner to be used with the map of Fig. 3-12.
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Fig. 3-12 – U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey Seismic Probability Map
of the United States (Revised 1949)
Table 3-2 – Maximum zonal acceleration to be used with
map of Fig. 3-12 [Housner, 1970]
Maximum
Acceleration
0.50g
0.33g
0.16g
0.08g
0.04g

Zone 3 (near a great fault)
Zone 3 (not near a great fault)
Zone 2
Zone 1
Zone 0

M
8.5
7.0
5.75
4.75
4.25

This map was developed before seismic zoning was introduced in the building or
bridge design requirements. Although the map was referred as a seismic probability map
it actually was based on Mercalli intensity and no guidance was given on the
corresponding return period or probability of exceedance. Seen from a modern point of
view this map contains features such a neighboring Zone 1 and 3 areas without a
transition Zone 2 in between, and other that currently would be frowned at.
Notwithstanding, the general location of the zones and envisioned peak ground
acceleration do not differ much from more recent maps. In this map southwestern Indiana
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is located in a Zone 2 corresponding to a maximum acceleration of 0.16g and a
corresponding magnitude of 5.75 for the design event. The rest of Indiana, with the
exception of a small Zone 2 bordering Ohio, was located in a Zone 1 (maximum expected
acceleration of 0.08g and magnitude of 4.75 for the design event. No design response
spectrum was defined. This map was never mandatory in Indiana for bridges or buildings.

3.4.1 1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications for Highway Bridges
In Section 2.2.2 the 1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications [AASHTO, 1975] were
presented. Figure 3-13 shows the northern Midwest portion of the map including Indiana
(the whole U.S. map is shown in Fig. 2-13). The seismic design criteria contained in the
1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications was included in the twelfth (1977), thirteenth
(1983), and fourteenth (1989) editions of AASHTO’s Standard Specifications.

1
2
1

3

2
Fig. 3-13 – Northern Midwest portion of the map included with the
1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications [AASHTO, 1975]
No more detailed map was included with the 1975 Interim. The southwestern corner
of Indiana containing Gibson, Posey and Vanderburgh counties was a Zone 3 with a peak
ground acceleration A = 0.5g. A region south of an approximate line linking Terre Haute,
Indianapolis and Fort Wayne was included in a Zone 2 (A = 0.22g PGA). The rest of the
State was located in a Zone 1 (A = 0.09g PGA).
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Table 3-3 – Maximum values for the Response Coefficient (C) in Indiana
1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications [AASHTO, 1975]
Depth of
Alluvium
0 – 10’
11’ – 80’
80’ – 150’
> 150’

Zone 1 (A = 0.09g)
C max
T at peak
0.060
0.066
0.40 s
0.080
0.60 s
0.065
0.65 s

Zone 2 (A = 0.22g)
C max
T at peak
0.072
0.30 s
0.120
0.35 s
0.110
0.55 s
0.090
0.55 s

Zone 3 (A = 0.50g)
C max
T at peak
0.163
0.30 s
0.203
0.30 s
0.155
0.50 s
0.120
0.50 s

3.4.2 ATC 6 and AASHTO Division I-A
The ATC-6 [ATC, 1981] recommendations were modified to be incorporated in the
fifteenth (1992) edition of AASHTO Standard Specifications as Division I-A Seismic
Design. These requirements were kept without modification in the sixteenth (1996) and
in the current seventeenth (2002) edition [AASHTO, 2002]. The ATC-6 document used
for peak ground acceleration in rock, A, the map of Av originally proposed for the ATC-306 building requirements project.
The ATC-3-06 requirements for buildings were taken over by the BSSC and became
the NEHRP recommended provisions. By the time the ATC-6 proposed bridge
requirements were incorporated into AASHTO Standard Specifications the maps had been
updated in the 1988 NEHRP provisions [NEHRP, 1988] by the USGS [Algermissen et
al., 1990]. The map included in the 15th Edition AASHTO Standard Specifications and
still contained in the current 17th Edition correspond to the Av map as modified in 1988.
Figure 3-14 shows the State of Indiana portion of this map. The values given correspond
to peak ground acceleration in rock expressed as percentage of the acceleration of gravity
for a probability of exceedance of 10 percent in 50 years, which is approximately equal to
a 15 percent probability of exceedance in the 75-year design life now advocated for a
typical highway bridge (see Fig. 3-11).
The southwestern corner of Indiana is located within contours labeled for peak grouns
acceleration of A = 0.075g and A = 0.10g; including totally (t) or partially (p) the
following 20 counties: Brown (p), Clay (p), Daviess (t), Dubois (p), Gibson (t), Greene
(t), Knox (t), Lawrence (p), Martin (t), Monroe (p), Morgan (p), Owen (t), Pike (t), Posey
(t), Putnam (p), Spencer (p), Sullivan (t), Vanderburgh (t), Vigo (p), and Warrick (t)..

85

Section 3.2 of Division I-A Seismic Design indicates that “Local maxima (and minima)
are given inside the highest (and lowest) contour for a particular region. Linear
interpolation shall be used for sites located between contour lines and between a contour
line and local maximum (or minimum).”
The rest of the south half of the state is located within a contour line for peak ground
acceleration A = 0.05g and local maxima labeled as A = 0.06g. This zone includes Terre
Haute and Indianapolis. The northern half of the State, including the cities of Lafayette
and Fort Wayne, located within the contour line for peak ground acceleration A = 0.05g
and local maxima labeled as A = 0.04g.
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Fig. 3-14 – Values for peak ground acceleration for the State on Indiana in
Division I-A Seismic Design of 17th Edition of AASHTO Standard Specifications
[AASHTO, 2002]
All editions of the AASHTO LRFD Specifications (1994, 1998, 2004) [AASHTO,
2004] include the same map but contain variations in the design requirements that may
lead to a different design although based on the same seismic risk assessment (see 2.2.2).
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3.4.3 USGS 1996 Maps for the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions
In 1993, the USGS embarked on a major project to prepare updated national
earthquake ground motion maps. The result of that project was a set of probabilistic maps
published in 1996 that cover several rock ground motion parameters (peak ground
acceleration — PGA — and elastic response spectral accelerations for periods of
vibration of 0.2, 0.3, and 1.0 sec) and three different probability levels or return periods
(10% probability of exceedance in 50 years, 5% probability of exceedance in 50 years,
and 2% probability of exceedance in 50 years – which is approximately equal to 3%
probability of exceedance in 75 years). In addition to the maps, the ground motion values
at any specified latitude and longitude can be obtained via the Internet.

Fig. 3-15 – 1996 USGS Map of peak ground acceleration in rock
for a probability of exceedance of 10% in 50 years
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These maps form the rock ground motion basis for seismic design using the Draft
AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) [NCHRP, 2002]. Figure 3-15 shows
the 1996 USGS Map of peak ground acceleration in rock for a probability of exceedance
of 10% in 50 years that although not used in the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic
Provisions, is given here for reference with previous requirements.

Fig. 3-16 – 1996 USGS Map of peak ground acceleration in rock
for a probability of exceedance of 3% in 75 years (= to 2% in 50 years)
The upper-level event, termed the “rare” or Maximum Considered Earthquake
(MCE), describes ground motions that, for most locations, are defined probabilistically
and have a probability of exceedance of 3% in 75 years (mean return period
approximately 2500 years). Figure 3-16 shows the 1996 USGS Map of peak ground
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acceleration in rock for a probability of exceedance of 2% in 50 years (equivalent to 3%
in 75 years as shown in Fig. 3-11) that although not used also in the Draft AASHTO
LRFD Seismic Provisions, is given here for reference with previous requirements using a
different return period.
For locations close to highly active faults, the mapped Maximum Considered
Earthquake ground motion was deterministically bounded so that the levels of ground
motion did not become unreasonably high. Deterministic bounds on the ground motion
were calculated by assuming the occurrence of maximum magnitude earthquakes on the
highly active faults. It is equal to 150% of the median ground motion for the maximum
magnitude earthquake, but not less than 1.5g for the short-period spectral acceleration
plateau and 0.6g for 1.0-sec spectra acceleration (see Fig. 2-22). Deterministic bounds
were applied in high-seismicity portions of the West Coast, Alaska, and Hawaii leading
to a design ground motion lower than the ground motion for 3% probability of
exceedance in 75 years. The Maximum Considered Earthquake governs the limits on the
inelastic deformation in the substructures and the design displacements for the support of
the superstructure.
The lower level design event, termed the “expected” or “frequent” earthquake,
defines a ground motion corresponding to 50% probability of exceedance in 75 years.
This event ensures that essentially elastic response is achieved in the bridge substructure
for the more frequent or expected earthquake. This design level is similar to the 100-year
flood and has similar performance objectives. An explicit check on the strength capacity
of the bridge substructure is required. Parameter studies made as part of the development
of the draft provisions show that the lower level event will only impact the strength of
columns in parts of the western United States.
With respect to Indiana the USGS 1996 Maps used the then recently identified
paleoearthquakes in southern Indiana and Illinois based on widespread paleoliquefaction
features as described in 3.1. An areal zone with a higher Mmax of 7.5 to account for such
large events was used. The Wabash Valley Mmax zone that was used in the maps was
based on the Wabash Valley fault zone.
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Fig. 3-18 – 1996 USGS Map of spectral acceleration S1 in rock
for a probability of exceedance of 3% in 75 years (= to 2% in
50 years)

Fig. 3-17 – 1996 USGS Map of spectral acceleration SS in rock
for a probability of exceedance of 3% in 75 years (= to 2% in
50 years)
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The Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions uses maps that define spectral
ordinates at periods of 0.2 sec. (SS) and 1.0 sec. (S1) to be used as a two point procedure
to obtain the design response spectrum (see Fig. 2-21). Figures 3-17 and 3-18 show the
maps for SS and S1 in rock respectively for the Maximum Considered Earthquake having
a 3% probability of exceedance in 75 years.
No maps were developed by USGS for the expected frequent earthquake, defining a
ground motion corresponding to 50% probability of exceedance in 75 years. The Draft
AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions suggests the values of SS and S1 for this earthquake
may be obtained from interpolation from information provided by USGS either in the
CD-ROM published with the maps or in the Internet by using latitude and longitude for
the site or the ZIP code of the location. The web site to perform these operations is:
http://eqint.cr.usgs.gov/eq/html/deaggint.html

Fig. 3-19 – Results obtained for Vincennes, IN, for spectral acceleration SS
for the frequent earthquake, in rock for 50% probability of exceedance in 75 years
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Figure 3-19 show the results obtained for Vincennes for spectral acceleration SS in
rock for 50% probability of exceedance in 75 years as required for the frequent
earthquake. The values obtained were SS = 0.06g and S1 = 0.01g.
3.4.4 2002 Update of the 1996 USGS Maps
In 2002 changes were introduced by the USGS [Frankel et al., 2002] to the maps
developed in 1996. Numerous changes were introduced with varying effects on the
mapped values. Some of these changes affected the parameters used in the New Madrid
Seismic Zone and the Wabash Valley Seismic Zone. Among them the more important are
changes in the mean recurrence time, the characteristic magnitude, and the spatial
concentration of New Madrid sources of large earthquakes, and the incorporation of
additional attenuation relations. Two versions of the maps exist one from January and the
other from October. Only the later version maps are be presented here.
The 2002 update uses a shorter mean recurrence time for characteristic earthquakes in
New Madrid than was used in the 1996 maps, as well as a smaller median magnitude than
that applied in 1996. The three equally weighted “fictitious sources” used in the 1996
maps were substituted for three sources consisting in a fault trace matching recent microearthquake activity and two adjacent sources that are situated near the borders of the
Reelfoot Rift. It is important to note that the probabilistic ground motions for the 10%
probability of exceedance level have increased markedly around the New Madrid area,
compared to the 1996 maps. This is caused by the shorter mean return time of 500 years
for characteristic earthquakes used in the 2002 maps. The Mmax 7.5 zone assigned to the
Wabash Valley area was enlarged to include the most likely rupture zones from
paleoearthquakes with magnitudes above about 7.0.
Significant differences between the 1996 and 2002 maps are caused by the inclusion
of additional attenuation relations in the 2002 maps. These changes affected mainly the
Atlantic seaboard. There is little change for the probabilistic ground motions at 2%
probability of exceedance in 50 years for most of the central U.S. During 2003, changes
were made twice to the 2002 maps but these changes only affect some areas of the West
Coast.
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Fig. 3-20 – 2002 USGS Map for Peak Ground Acceleration in
rock with 10% probability of exceedance in 50 years

Fig. 3-21 – 2002 USGS Map for Peak Ground Acceleration in
rock with 3% probability of exceedance in 75 years (= to 2% in
50 years)
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Fig. 3-23 – 2002 USGS Map for S1 Spectral Acceleration in
rock with 3% probability of exceedance in 75 years (= to 2% in
50 years)

Fig. 3-22 – 2002 USGS Map for SS Spectral Acceleration in
rock with 3% probability of exceedance in 75 years (= to 2% in
50 years)
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In April 2004 the USGS included in their website the possibility of producing maps
for latitude and magnitude pairs. The Indiana PGA map for 475-year return period is
presented in Fig. 3-20 and for the 2500-year return period in Fig. 3-21, and the maps for
SS and S1 for 2500-year return period in Figures 3-22 and 3-23 respectively.
3.4.5 JTRP Project SPR 2812 – Analysis of Seismic Hazard Assessment for Indiana
A Joint Transportation Research Program Project (SPR 2812) lead by Purdue
Professors J. Haase and R. Nowack is currently working on an assessment of the seismic
hazard in Indiana with specific application to transportation structures. The results of this
research were not available to be used in the Emergency Routes Project but undoubtedly
will have a large impact in the application of future bridge design specifications for the
Indiana Department of Transportation and seismic rehabilitation policies to be used with
existing bridges. Once the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) is
adopted by AASHTO, and later by INDOT, the need for having an in-house State
assessment of the seismic risk to be coordinated with the USGS will become very
important.
The Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) includes in
Commentary to Section 3.10.2.1 a clause that reads: “In lieu of using the national ground
motion maps referenced in the Specification, ground motion response spectra may be
constructed based on approved State ground motion maps. To be accepted the
development of State maps should conform to the following:
1. The definition of design ground motion should be the same as described in Article
3.10.1.2 and Table 3.10.1-1.
2. Ground motion maps should be based on a detailed analysis demonstrated to lead
a quantification of ground motion at a regional scale that is as or more accurate
than achieved at the scale of the national maps. The analysis should include:
characterization of seismic sources and ground motion that incorporates current
scientific knowledge; incorporation of uncertainty in seismic source and ground
motion models and parameter values used in the analysis; detailed documentation
of map development; detailed peer review. The peer review process should
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preferably include one or mode individuals from the U.S. Geological Survey who
participated in the development of the national maps.”

3.4.6 Comments on the results from the different maps and bridge design requirements
Mapped values for acceleration in rock in Bloomington, Evansville, Indianapolis,
Jasper, New Albany, Terre Haute, and Vincennes (see Fig. 3-24 for location) are shown
as read from the different seismic risk maps in Table 3-4.

Indianapolis

Terre Haute
Bloomington

Vincennes
Jasper

New Albany

Evansville

Fig. 3-24 – Location where acceleration mapped values are compared for the different
seismic risk map versions (see Table 3-4). Base map shows INDOT districts.
In comparing the values shown in Table 3-4 is must be noticed that the values from
the 1949 map developed by the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey [Housner, 1970] and in
the 1975 AASHTO Interim [AASHTO, 1975] are higher, as a rule, than the values for
peak ground acceleration contained in Division I-A Seismic Design of the current 17th
Edition of the AASHTO Standard Specifications AASHTO, 2002]. It may be argued than
the values contained in Division I-A correspond to EPA (Effective Peak Ground
Acceleration) which takes into account several additional parameters such as duration of
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the strong ground motion and are not directly comparable to the instrumental peak
ground acceleration recoded in an accelerometer, in addition to the acceleration in the
1949 and 1975 documents not being defined clearly with respect to mean return period.

AASHTO
Div. I-A

1996
USGS
Maps

2002
USGS
Maps

Jasper
(Du Bois)

New Albany
(Floyd)

Terre Haute
(Vigo)

Vincennes
(Knox)

AASHTO
1975
Interim

Indianapolis
(Marion)

1949
USCGS

Evansville
(Vanderburgh)

Map

City (County)
→
Parameter
Presented ↓

Bloomington
(Monroe)

Table 3-4 – Seismic Zone definition and mapped values of acceleration for selected cities
in Indiana for the different maps

Zone

2

2

1

2

1

2

2

PGA

0.16g

0.16g

0.08g

0.16g

0.08g

0.16g

0.16g

Zone

2

3

2

2

2

2

2

A (PGA)

0.22g

0.50g

0.22g

0.22g

0.22g

0.22g

0.22g

A (PGA)
10% PE 50y
PGA
10% PE 50y
PGA
2% PE 50y
SS
2% PE 50y
S1
2% PE 50y
PGA
10% PE 50y
PGA
2% PE 50y
SS
2% PE 50y
S1
2% PE 50y

0.078g 0.085g 0.063g 0.075g 0.068g 0.070g 0.090g
0.045g 0.130g 0.032g 0.070g 0.039g 0.056g 0.110g
0.14g

0.49g

0.08g

0.20g

0.12g

0.08g

0.40g

0.28g

0.80g

0.20g

0.60g

0.22g

0.36g

0.80g

0.12g

0.30g

0.10g

0.16g

0.14g

0.14g

0.20g

0.046g 0.120g 0.034g 0.070g 0.043g 0.060g 0.100g
0.12g

0.40g

0.10g

0.20g

0.12g

0.16g

0.30g

0.28g

0.80g

0.20g

0.60g

0.28g

0.36g

0.60g

0.12g

0.20g

0.10g

0.16g

0.12g

0.12g

0.16g

The maps in current bridge design requirements contained in Division I-A of the
AASHTO Standard Specifications were developed by the USGS in the 1970’s and
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updated in 1988 and they are comparable in respect of having the same mean return
period with the 1996 and 2002 PGA USGS maps for 10% probability of exceedance in
50 years (Figures 3-15 and 3-20). The impact of the knowledge that has been
accumulated about the New Madrid and Wabash Valley Seismic Zones is evident in the
more detailed acceleration values reported. The values of PGA for the same return period
in the new 1996 and 2002 maps are lower for Bloomington, Indianapolis, Japer, New
Albany and Terre Haute, and higher for Evansville and Vincennes. This is consistent with
the reported new understanding of the tectonic process of the Wabash Valley Seismic
Zone and if the new maps were made part of Division I-A of the AASHTO Standard
Specification the impact on the design of new bridges in Indiana would be marginal if not
less demanding in many cases.
In order to assess the impact of adopting the proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic
Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) [NCHRP, 2002] as seen solely from the design acceleration
point of view the following aspects come into play: (a) a change from a 475-year to a
2500-year return period design earthquake, (b) a change from peak ground acceleration
(effective or accelerographic reported) description of the design ground motion to be
routinely converted into a design spectrum to a new direct definition of the design
spectrum, (c) site effects that amplify design acceleration in a different way including
now short period accelerations along with long period ones both of them specially
affecting the low acceleration range where precisely Indiana sites are located, and (d) use
of a “frequent” earthquake for serviceability assessment.
The pertinent comments will follow in the same order listed. Although, the research
presented in this report deals mainly with existing bridges — the reference for any bridge
upgrade has been customarily related to current or in the process of being adopted
requirements for new bridges — the approach adopted minimizes the dependence on the
seismic risk assessment and focus on the expected behavior for increasingly severe
ground motions without putting a tap on them.
(a) Impact of change of design event return period — It is debatable that with a
relatively short-timed documented record of events proper extrapolations can be
performed. Extrapolation is common in other civil engineering disciplines with
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acceptable results from the point of view of proper design parameters and public
awareness of the problems involved in distinguishing between acceptable risk and
forecast. Flood control is a good example of the differences involved and the
acceptability of the design parameters involved. On the other hand, both extreme wind
design and earthquake resistant design have come into public scrutiny because of the gap
between code design parameters and reported measured values. This has brought a trend
to define design parameters in the same order of magnitude of the reported measured
values. The basis for this change is well documented in the related literature and the real
impact on the design procedures has been moderate because the reference to actual
behavior during catastrophic events is the judging parameter in most cases. The new
seismic risk maps presented in the USGS 1996 and 2002 maps describe a Maximum
Considered Earthquake (MCE) that is supposed to produce measurable parameters such
as peak ground acceleration of the same order of magnitude of those that may be
recorded in the occurrence of a catastrophic event. How these values are made
compatible with acceptable design parameters — from the economic and code
requirements perspectives — have been solved in different ways.
The building design requirements were the first to adopt this approach [NEHRP,
1997]. The MCE was accepted but the design ground motion was defined as 2/3 that
produced by the MCE. The end result was design parameters that did not differ much
from what was being used. The proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions
(NCHRP 12-49) [NCHRP, 2002] does not introduce the same reduction, although
changes the accepted Response Modification Factors (R) to higher values that may bridge
the difference (please compare values listed in Tables 2-3 and 2-8). Other subtle
difference between the approach for buildings and for bridges is that in the case of site
specific studies the building requirements require that the deterministic spectrum be
obtained from 150% the mean of the spectra computed for characteristic maximum
magnitude earthquakes while for bridges it requires the median-plus-one-standarddeviation which leads to 184% of the mean spectrum. One important conclusion is that in
the future the basic seismic risk design factors will be different for buildings and for
bridges although based on the same seismic risk maps.
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(b) Impact of change from PGA to spectral description — The description of the
design ground motion through a response spectrum was formalized in the ATC 3-06
project [ATC, 1978] based on the work of N. Newmark. The spectrum description was
based on two parameters defined as Effective Peak Acceleration (EPA) and Effective
Peak Velocity (EPV) that were related to the spectral ordinates as shown in Fig. 3-25
with EPA made equal to parameter Aa and EPV proportional to Av. This procedure was
the one adopted in ATC 6 for bridges and later in Division I-A of the Standard AASHTO
Specification and is the basis of current 17th edition with the acceleration parameter A
corresponding to the mapped value of Av of the 1988 maps[NEHRP, 1988] by the USGS
[Algermissen et al., 1990].
10
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0.5
1.0
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Fig. 3-25 – EPA = Sa/2.5 and EPV = Sv/2.5 obtained from a response
spectrum with 5% damping as prescribed by ATC 3-06 [ATC, 1978]
The use of two different parameters to define the design response spectrum one based
on acceleration and the other based on velocity was a wise decision because attenuation
with distance for the two parameters is not the same. The 2.5 proportional constant was
developed by Newmark based on the study of many accelerograms and their
corresponding response spectrum and in general works well for most records but the
commentary of the ATC-3-06 made it clear that effective peak acceleration and effective
peak velocity were different from the peak acceleration in the accelerogram, and the peak
velocity obtained by integration of the accelerogram.
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The proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions moves away from this
definition of the design ground motion and directly states the design spectrum severing
the link with the effective peak ground acceleration and velocity, although it states a way
to obtain the peak ground acceleration as 0.4SDS as was shown in Fig. 2-21 thus
apparently keeping the same 2.5 ratio. As shown in Table 3-4 for the seven Indiana sites,
in the 2002 USGS maps the ratio between SS and PGA for the same return period reports
ratios between 2 and 3 with a mean of 2.27. Although these ratios are not fixed and will
probably change in the future as new versions of the maps appear, the impact of moving
from a PGA definition to a directly defined spectrum as the description of the design
ground motion is minor.
Figures 3-26 and 3-27 show the combined impact of the change in return period and
the spectral definition from the current Division I-A seismic design requirements response
spectrum to the one required in the proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD requirements using
the 2002 USGS maps.
Design Spectra - Rock
0.90
0.80
Draft LRFD - Evansville

0.70

Sa (g)

0.60
0.50
Draft LRFD - Jasper and Vincennes

0.40
Draft LRFD - Bloomington

0.30

Current Division I-A
Bloomington, Evansville,
Jasper, and Vincennes

0.20
0.10
0.00
0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

Period (s)

Fig. 3-26 – Bridge Design Spectra in rock for Bloomington, Evansville, Jasper, and
Vincennes in current Division I-A and proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD requirements
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Design Spectra - Rock
0.40
Draft LRFD - Terre Haute
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Albany,
dT
H
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0.10
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Fig. 3-27 – Bridge Design Spectra in rock for Indianapolis, New Albany, and Terre Haute
in current Division I-A and proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD requirements

Indianapolis
(Marion)

Jasper
(Du Bois)

New Albany
(Floyd)

Terre Haute
(Vigo)

Vincennes
(Knox)

AASHTO
SPC
A/A
Div. I-A (Essent./Other)
SHL
II
Proposed
SDAP
A2/
Draft
(Life S. /Oper.) CDE
LRFD
SDR
2/3
(Life S. /Oper.)

Evansville
(Vanderburgh)

Specs

City (County)
→
Requirements
↓

Bloomington
(Monroe)

Table 3-5 – Analysis and Design requirements for selected cities in Indiana for the
current Division I-A and proposed Draft LRFD requirements (spectral values in rock)

A/A

A/A

A/A

A/A

A/A

A/A

IV
CDE/
CDE

II
A2/
CDE

III
BCDE/
CDE

II
A2/
CDE

5/6

2/3

3/4

2/3

III
III
BCDE/ BCDE/
CDE
CDE
3/4

3/4

Table 3-5 shows the implication from the point of view of the corresponding
associated design analysis and detailing requirements presenting the Seismic
Performance Category (SPC) (see Table 2-1) of the current requirements and for the
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proposed Draft LRFD requirements the Seismic Hazard Level (SHL) (see Tables 2-5 and
2-6), the Seismic Design and Analysis Procedure (SDAP) (see Table 2-7), and Seismic
Detailing Requirements (SDR) (see Tables 2-9 and 2-10).
(c) Impact of change of site effects evaluation procedure — The USGS 1996 and
2002 maps are defined at the B-C soil profile type interface (see Table 2-11) which is the
dividing line between rock and very dense soil or soft rock. The soil amplification factors
are both Fa =1.0 and Fv = 1.0 for soil profiles type B. This is similar to the Soil Profile
Type I of Division I-A of the current 17th Edition of the Standard AASHTO Specifications
for which has a Site Coefficient S =1.0 (see Fig. 2-16). Up to this point the procedures are
similar. When other soil profile types come into play, the difference is large because the
proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions (NCHRP 12-49) [NCHRP, 2002] has
soil amplification factors Fa that affects the short period part of the design spectrum.
AASHTO current Standard Specifications does not have a comparable soil dependent
factor. Both Fa and Fv are acceleration dependent with comparatively larger values for
lower accelerations (see Figures 2-24 and 2-25). Just for comparison purposes a site,
common in Indiana, with more than 30 ft of soft to medium stiff soil under current
Division I-A requirements would be a Type III soil profile and would have a Site
Coefficient S = 1.5 that amplify the medium to long period part of the design spectrum.
The same soil would probably be classified as a Type D Stiff Soil when using the
proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions. Table 3-6 shows the values obtained
for the cases being use for comparison.
For the short period portion of the design spectrum under the proposed Draft Seismic
Provisions the amplification caused by the soil profile would be 18% to 60% percent
higher than the current requirements with no amplification required. For the medium to
long period portion of the design spectrum the values under the proposed Draft Seismic
Provisions the amplification caused by the soil profile would be 33% to 60% percent
higher than the current requirements. The reason for this large impact is linked to Indiana
having mapped accelerations in the low range where the soil amplification effect is
relatively larger.
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Indianapolis
(Marion)

Jasper
(Du Bois)

New Albany
(Floyd)

Terre Haute
(Vigo)

Vincennes
(Knox)

A (PGA)
AASHTO 10% PE 50y
Div. I-A Site Coefficient
S
SS
2% PE 50y
Draft
AASHTO Soil Type D
Factor Fa
LRFD plus
2002
S1
USGS
2% PE 50y
Maps
Soil Type D
Factor Fv

Evansville
(Vanderburgh)

Specs

City (County)
→
Parameter
Presented ↓

Bloomington
(Monroe)

Table 3-6 – Values of the site coefficient for a Type III soil profile under current Division
I-A requirements and a Type D soil under proposed Draft LRFD Provisions

0.09g

0.09g

0.06g

0.09g

0.06g

0.06g

0.09g

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

0.28g

0.80g

0.20g

0.60g

0.28g

0.36g

0.60g

1.58

1.18

1.60

1.32

1.58

1.51

1.32

0.12g

0.20g

0.10g

0.16g

0.12g

0.12g

0.16g

2.32

2.00

2.40

2.16

2.32

2.32

2.16

Figures 3-28 and 3-29 show the combined impact of the change in return period, the
spectral definition and the soil amplification requirements for a Type III soil profile from
the current Division I-A seismic design requirements design spectrum to the one required
in the proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD requirements for a Type D profile using the 2002
USGS maps.
Table 3-7 shows the implication from the point of view of the corresponding
associated design analysis and detailing requirements presenting the Seismic
Performance Category (SPC) (see Table 2-1) of the current requirements and for the
proposed Draft LRFD requirements the Seismic Hazard Level (SHL) (see Tables 2-5 and
2-6), the Seismic Design and Analysis Procedure (SDAP) (see Table 2-7), and Seismic
Detailing Requirements (SDR) (see Tables 2-9 and 2-10).
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Design Spectra - Type III or Type D Soil Profile
1.00
Draft LRFD - Evansville

0.90
Draft LRFD - Jasper and Vincennes

0.80
0.70

Sa (g)

0.60
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Draft LRFD - Bloomington
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Current Division I-A
Bloomington, Evansville,
Jasper, and Vincennes
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Fig. 3-28 – Bridge Design Spectra in soil for Bloomington, Evansville, Jasper, and
Vincennes in current Division I-A and proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD requirements
Design Spectra - Type III or Type D Soil Profile
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Draft LRFD - Terre Haute

0.50
Draft LRFD - New Albany
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Draft LRFD - Indianapolis
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and Terre Haute
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Fig. 3-29 – Bridge Design Spectra in soil for Indianapolis, New Albany, and Terre Haute
in current Division I-A and proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD requirements
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It is evident from the values presented for rock and for soil that the impact of the
proposed Draft LRFD requirements is significant both for the design forces and for the
analysis and detailing requirements. Under the current Division I-A requirements the
analysis and detailing are the simplest (SPC-A) while for the proposed Draft LRFD the
most strict covered (SHL-IV) are required for Evansville and Vincennes in both cases
(rock and soil) studied and for Jasper in soil. In no case the simpler (SHL-I) is required.
The implications from the point of view of complexity of design and cost of
construction are significant.

Jasper
(Du Bois)

New Albany
(Floyd)

Terre Haute
(Vigo)

Vincennes
(Knox)

AASHTO
SPC
A/A
A/A
Div. I-A (Essent./Other)
SHL
III
IV
Proposed
SDAP
BCDE/ CDE/C
Draft
(Life S. /Oper.) CDE
DE
LRFD
SDR
3/4
5/6
(Life S. /Oper.)

Indianapolis
(Marion)

Evansville
(Vanderburgh)

Specs

City (County)
→
Requirements
↓

Bloomington
(Monroe)

Table 3-7 – Analysis and Design requirements for selected cities in Indiana for the
current Division I-A and proposed Draft LRFD requirements (spectral values in soil)

A/A

A/A

A/A

A/A

A/A

II
A2/
CDE

IV
III
III
IV
CDE/ BCDE/ BCDE/ CDE/
CDE
CDE
CDE
CDE

2/3

5/6

3/4

3/4

5/6

(d) Impact of use of “frequent” earthquake — The proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD
Seismic Provisions introduces a frequent earthquake to be used in verification of
serviceability of the bridge. Figure 3-19 shows the value 0.06g obtained for SS at
Vincennes for this earthquake based on results of the 1996 USGS maps. The impact of
using such a low spectral acceleration for verification of serviceability will be probably
negligible.
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CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATION OF SEISMIC
VULNERABILITY OF THE INDIANA EMERGENCY ROUTES

4.1 Route Alternatives
U.S. Congress and the Federal Administration through the FHWA have defined
priority and critical routes in different instances. One such example is the National Truck
Network established in 1982 by the Surface Transportation Assistance Act in order to
designate a national network of highways that would allow the passage of trucks of
specified minimum dimensions and weight. Figure 4-1 shows the National Truck
Network in southwestern Indiana.

Fig. 4-1 – National Truck Network in southwestern Indiana
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Corridor Network connectors linking major military installations and other defenserelated facilities to the Strategic corridors. The fifth component are important arterial
highways that serve interstate and interregional travel and that provide connections to
major ports, airports, public transportation facilities, and other intermodal facilities.

Fig. 4-3 – Congressional High Priority Corridors
The National Highway System and its role in determining geometric design of
highways is discussed in Section 40-1.03 (01) of Chapter 40 "Basic Design Controls" of
the Indiana Department of Transportation’s Design Manual.
Figure 4-4 shows the highways designated in Indiana as part of the National Highway
System. It includes in the north-south direction: SR-69 from I-64 to Mount Vernon in the
Kentucky border (Ohio River), US 41 from Terre Haute to Evansville and across the
Ohio River to Kentucky, I-164 from I-64 to Evansville, SR-57 from the intersection with
SR-67/US-231 to I-64, US-231 from the intersection with SR-67 to Kentucky border
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One more recent highway system definition is the National Highway System. The
National Highway System Designation Act of 1995 selected 264,000 km of roadways as
the National Highway System (NHS) including 4,750 km in Indiana. Figure 4-2 shows
the whole National Highway System.

Fig. 4-2 – National Highway System
NHS consists of five parts. The first component is the Interstate Highway System,
which accounts for almost 30 percent of NHS. The second component includes 21
congressionally designated high-priority corridors (see Fig. 4-3), three of which include
highways in Indiana as part of them. The third component is the non-interstate portion of
the Strategic Highway Corridor Network identified by the Department of Defense in
cooperation with the Department of Transportation. These corridors and the interstate
highways are critical strategic links. The fourth component is major Strategic Highway
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(Ohio River) south of Rockport, and SR-67 from Indianapolis to the intersection with SR57. In the east-west direction includes US-50 from the Ohio border to Vincennes in the
Illinois border (Wabash River), I-64 for the Ohio border to Illinois border (Wabash
River), SR-66 from Rockport on the Kentucky border (Ohio River) to Evansville, and
SR-62 fro Evansville to Mount Vernon on the Kentucky border (Ohio River).

Fig. 4-4 – Highways in Indiana designated as part of the National Highway System
From the methodological point of view it is evident that the routes in southwestern
Indiana contained in both the National Truck Network and the National Highway
Network had to be studied as candidates for the Earthquake Emergency Routes of
Indiana.
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Part I of this report presents different alternatives for Earthquake Emergency Routes
for the State of Indiana based on trade off of three parameters, namely total travel time,
population covered, and number of square feet of bridge deck (as a parameter associated
with eventual retrofit cost).
The Indiana Department of Transportation provides maintenance within the State to
Interstate Highways, U.S. Routes, and Indiana State Highways. County roads and city
roads are excluded unless special agreements are in effect. The grid of routes presented in
Fig. 4-5 corresponds to routes that belong to the National Truck Network, the National
Highway System, and are within the domain of the Indiana Department of
Transportation, and is presented as the preferred choice of Earthquake Emergency Routes
of Indiana.

Fig. 4-5 – Selected grid of Earthquake Emergency Routes
in the Indot Vincennes District
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The grid of routes presented in Fig. 4-5 comprises the following:
•

US 41 from Terre Haute South to Evansville and the Kentucky border (Ohio
River).

•

SR 67 from Freedom to SR 57 junction and SR 57 from SR 67 to I-64.

•

I-164 from I-64 to US 41.

•

US 231 from SR 54 at Bloomfield south to Rockport and to Kentucky border
(Ohio River).

•

SR 37 from Bloomington south to SR 237 and SR 237 to Cannelton and the
Kentucky border (Ohio River).

•

SR 154 from Illinois border (Wabash River) to US 41, and SR 54 from US 41 east
to SR 45.

•

US 50 from Illinois border (Wabash River) at Vincennes east to SR 446 east of
Bedford.

•

SR 64 from Illinois border (Wabash River) to Princeton to US 41.

•

I-64 from Illinois border (Wabash River) to SR 66 at Carefree.

•

SR 57 from US 41 past Evansville Airport to I-164.

•

SR 62 from Illinois border (Wabash River) thru Evansville to US 231

•

SR 66 from US 41 east to Rockport.

4.2 Available Information
The Indiana Department of Transportation has a very well organized data base where
information for the purposes of present project was obtained. The information used was
the following:
•

Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database – This database was modernized
just before the initiation of the project. It consists in a MS Access database that
contains records of all bridges being maintained by Indot. It follows Federal
Highway Administration guidelines [FHWA, 1996] and contains additional
information beyond the FHWA requirements. Only the portion related to bridges
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in the Vincennes Indot District was used containing 827 bridges, distributed by
Counties as shown in Table 4-1. See Fig. 4-6 for their location.
Table 4-1 – Distribution by County of Vincennes District bridges
contained in Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database
County
Crawford
Daviess
Dubois
Gibson
Greene
Knox
Lawrence
Martin
Monroe
Orange
Owen
Perry
Pike
Posey
Spencer
Sullivan
Vanderburgh
Vigo
Warrick
Washington
Total

•

No. Vincennes District
Bridges in Database
35
22
50
66
41
42
36
51
1
27
60
62
63
65
60
40
121
84
72
1
827

Bridge Drawings – The bridge drawings at the Indot Vincennes District offices
were consulted for bridges located on the selected Earthquake Emergency
Routes. The drawings contain the original design plans, those corresponding to
changes and modifications, and a description of the soil boring performed at the
time of design of the bridge reporting SPT values in many cases.

•

GIS Information – Geographical Information System (GIS) related to the State of
Indiana, and other information was supplied by Indot. This information can also
be

downloaded

from

the

following

Indiana

http://igs.indiana.edu/arcims/southwest/download.html
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University

webpage:

Fig. 4-6 – Vincennes District bridges contained in Indot Inspection
and Maintenance Database (those whose drawings were used in this
research are marked as blue filled dots)
4.3 GIS Implementation
A two tier approach was developed for managing the information described in the
previous section. The first stage consisted in developing tools for assessing the
vulnerability condition of the studied Earthquake Emergency Routes. The second stage
consisted in implementing the results in a dynamic database with Geographical
Information Systems (GIS) capabilities.
For the first stage a database was developed as a search-engine to allow the static and
dynamic evaluation of the condition of the selected critical routes prior to and following
an earthquake disaster. Several specialized software programs were developed to act as
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independent units — all of them interacting with the database as needed — for evaluating
the different sources of vulnerability along the Earthquake Emergency Routes.
Three modules were developed, as shown in Fig. 4-7. The first module corresponds to
a Data Management Module. This module handles the information related to the routes,
and bridges. The information included is the one described in the previous section
obtained from Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database.

Data Management Module

FEMA
HAZUS

Pattern Recognition Module

Mitigation
Simulation

Scenario Management Module
Response

Fig. 4-7 – Organization of the GIS implementation
The Pattern Recognition Module uses the information contained in the Data
Management Module to process and obtain vulnerability assessment of bridge structures
and geotechnical aspects of the bridges and routes and was used to feed information to
the Scenario Management Module.
The Scenario Management Module is implemented on the extraordinary capabilities
of HAZUS software developed by the Federal Management Agency [FEMA, 2005] that
is capable of accepting the feed-back of the results obtained from the Pattern Recognition
Module. HAZUS is capable of obtaining vulnerability assessments for any case in
particular for mitigation purposes, allows simulations for different earthquake occurrence
scenarios, and will allow in the future to be used when online capabilities are
implemented within Indot for monitoring response to an actual earthquake occurrence.
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4.4 Vulnerability Assessment Approach
The assessment of seismic vulnerability for a significant number of structures
requires the use of identification of patterns of behavior of these structures to the
envisioned earthquake ground motion. The approach used in comparable previous cases
has been to define groups of structures having similar properties or configuration for
which common behavior patterns can be defined. These behavior patterns have been
referred in the literature as fragility curves relating probability of having a particular type
of damage to a ground motion descriptor such as peak ground acceleration.
For implementation in this project several shortcomings were identified in using this
approach:
•

The inventory of bridges under study covers from bridges recently built to
bridges built in the 1910’s and 1920’s. Figure 4-8 shows the year of construction
of the Indot Vincennes District bridges. Establishing general fragility curves
giving probability that a certain type of damage occurs for such a diverse
inventory lead to many types of fragility curves and their use in establishing
actual vulnerability may be questionable.

•

Many of the bridges have been rebuilt (except bridges built after 1990) at
different moment. Figure 4-9 shows the percentage of the Vincennes District
bridges that have been rebuilt, and the average year when the rebuilding took
place. The influence of such a significant percentage of bridges having been
rebuilt makes the fragility curve type of approach even more difficult to apply.

•

Associating the bridge vulnerability of a set value of seismic risk assessment as
presented in a specific map, for example the one contained in Current 17th
Edition of the Standard AASHTO Specifications, will require a new assessment
if the map contained in the requirements changes. The adoption of new more
modern specifications will surely take place in the near future, but the nature of
the changes that will be introduced before adoption are unknown presently. The
adoption of the proposed Draft LRFD Seismic Requirements has been voted
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down by several states who have questioned the complexity and eventual
unneeded extra cost that their adoption will bring.

Decade Built (Vincennes District Bridges)
180
160
140

No. of Bridges
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19801989

19901999

20002001

Fig. 4-8 – Number of bridges built per decade (Vincennes District)
Percentage of Bridges Rebuilt and Average Year of Rebuild
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Fig. 4-9 – Percentage of bridges rebuilt according to decade of construction and average
year when rebuilding was made (Vincennes District bridges)
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Based on these limitations a different approach was implemented in this study. The
approach used is based in selecting a number of bridges to study their seismic behavior
under varying earthquake ground motion severity thus making the study independent of
current requirements and making the results valid under mapped values having different
return period or acceleration (peak ground or spectral) values. Using the results from the
study of these bridges a procedure to extrapolate the results to the rest of the bridges in
the Vincennes District was devised, requiring as information only that contained in the
Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database. This establishes two levels of confidence on
the vulnerability assessment. The first one is general and covers all bridges in the
Inspection and Maintenance Database. The second one is more detailed because is based
on the information contained in the bridge drawings. The advantage of this approach is
that it permits to gage the vulnerability of the whole bridge inventory. It permits devising
policies of general nature with respect to the selection, or variation in the future, of the
Earthquake Emergency Routes. It also permits a more detailed assessment by supplying
additional information to the GIS system data base, in case the detailed data is not already
in the system. A detailed explanation of the procedure is given in Chapter 6.

4.5 Mitigation and Simulation
Vulnerability mitigation policies that cover the bridge inventory in southwestern
Indiana are possible using the HAZUS GIS system. The assessment of the impact of a
variation of the seismic risk maps or the simulation of occurrence of an earthquake with
specific location and magnitude can be easily achieved by matching the new values to the
already computed curves relating the bridge expected damage to the level of acceleration.
If a bridge is retrofitted, the changes introduced to the bridge substructure or
superstructure can be introduced to the database for future assessments or simulations.
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CHAPTER 5 GEOTECHNICAL ASSOCIATED SOURCES OF VULNERABILITY

5.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the methodology implemented for processing the geotechnical
information available for the selected bridges and to be used, in the future, as the
database is expanded by adding more information from drawings or from soil
explorations. The Inspection and Maintenance Database does not contain geotechnical
information; therefore, the approximate vulnerability assessment does not include
evaluation of the geotechnical sources of vulnerability.
Not all the studied bridge drawings contained soil exploration boring information. In
the majority of cases studied the boring logs included in the drawings contained the soil
description for each layer and reported the Standard Penetration Test (SPT) values at
appropriate intervals. In rock sites many of the boring logs report the recovery percentage
appropriately. In some instances the boring logs only report the soil classification for
each layer without any SPT values. Textural description of the soil is the accepted
practice for defining the soil classification in the field by the boring team to be reported
in the boring log. In general, especially for older borings, the description is based on the
U.S. Department of Agriculture textural classification chart [USDA, 1951] presented in
Fig. 5-1. Percentages of sand, silt, and clay are established visually based only in the
particle size. The soil classification description used corresponds to the one in the zone of
the figure where the three percentage values meet. No laboratory procedures are involved
in assigning the soil layer description. The AASHTO Soil Classification System or the
Unified Soil Classification (ASTM D2487 — “Standard Classification of Soils for
Engineering Purposes — Unified Soil Classification System”) require laboratory tests
and are routinely performed on the soil samples and included later in the soils report.
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Fig. 5-1 – USDA Textural Soil Classification Chart [USDA, 1951] routinely
used for soil classification by soil exploration boring teams
The software implementation uses the soil exploration boring reports contained in the
selected bridge drawings to study the geotechnical sources of vulnerability for each of the
bridge sites. Other sites can be studied by adding information to the database in the
future.
Two evaluations are performed using the boring information: a soil profile
amplification assessment and a liquefaction potential assessment. These evaluations are
made for varying peak ground accelerations in rock to be consistent with the adopted
approach in this research project of obtaining the vulnerability for different levels of
ground motion at the site and not to depend on a unique description of ground motion as
contained in a particular set of seismic risk maps. Soil profile amplification and
liquefaction potential are acceleration dependent; therefore, the values obtained cover
different seismic risk levels.
The possibilities of evaluation are presented in the main screen of the software
developed for this purpose, as shown in Fig. 5-2.
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Fig. 5-2 – Main screen for the liquefaction evaluation module developed
This module permits to enter, save, and retrieve boring information for any bridge site
borings, and to process it to obtain the soil profile amplification potential, evaluate the
liquefaction susceptibility, and to save to results for further analysis.

5.2 Soil profile amplification
The amplification potential of the soil profile is needed for the liquefaction evaluation
and for the bridge vulnerability assessment; in the former case for estimating the ground
motion acceleration at the surface and in the later case for defining the ground motion
description for evaluation of the bridge. The methodology used is based on the procedure
contained in the 2000 NEHRP Provisions [NEHRP, 2000] as described in Section 2.3.1
of this report.
The first step is to define the site class (A to F) as presented in Table 2-11. The
classification is made using average shear wave velocity ( vs ), average standard
penetration resistance ( N ), average standard penetration resistance for the cohesionless
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soils only ( N ch ), and average undrained shear strength in case of cohesive soils ( su ). The
software implementation is capable of using the more appropriate parameter from the soil
exploration and laboratory reports. For the selected bridges because only Standard
Penetration Test are reported the amplification potential is evaluated from the average
standard penetration resistance ( N ) computed for the upper 100 ft (30 m) of the site
profile using Eq. (5-1). Profiles containing distinctly different layers are subdivided into
those layers by a number that ranges from 1 to n.
n

N=

∑d
i =1
n

i

di
∑
N
i =1
i

(5-1)

where di is the thickness of any layer between 0 and 100 ft (30 m) and N is the Standard
Penetration Resistance (SPT) not to exceed 100 blows/ft as directly measured in the field
without corrections.
Once the site is classified as being Class A to E (Class F requires a site specific
evaluation) the curves presented in Figures 2-24 and 2-25 are used to obtain the
amplification parameters Fa and Fv for the acceleration value under study. Spectral
acceleration (Ss or S1) values are used directly to obtain Fa and Fv. If peak acceleration in
rock is used (A) the value is multiplied by 2.5 to be used in Fig. 2-24 to obtain Fa and is
used directly in Fig. 2-35 to obtain Fv.
The values obtained were compared with results using the program SHAKE as
described for several sites in Indiana in [Bobet et al., 2001] obtaining good correlations of
the amplification levels obtained.
Figure 5-3 shows the results obtained for a specific case. The figure reports that in
this case (Bridge No. 41-42-04638) the bridge drawings included four borings. It also
indicates that the procedure classified the soil profile in all borings as being Type E. The
statistics shown in the screen indicate the number of borings that report a certain soil
profile type. As opposed to buildings, where usually a single soil profile type is present,
bridges by being extended structures may have different soil profile types under the
abutments or at the bridge piers. This is specially true in alluvial plain sites, where many
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of Indiana bridges are sited. Figure 5-3 also shows in graphic form the relationship
between the horizontal acceleration in rock and the horizontal acceleration in surface for
peak ground acceleration, or spectral ordinates (Ss and S1).

Fig. 5-3 – Typical results for soil profile classification and amplification potential
In total 182 bridge sites located on the defined Earthquake Emergency Routes were
evaluated. This includes all the bridges located on the Emergency Routes whose
drawings contained soil boring records shown as part of them. The information was used
directly to define the soil profile type for each boring using the procedure described.
When reporting the soil profile type that causes the maximum amplification the results
shown in Fig. 5-4 are obtained indicating that for 159 bridges out of 182 (87%) the soil
profile is classified as Type E (see Table 2-11 for description of the soil profiles). Soil
profile Type D is obtained in 16 bridges (9%), soil profile types (B and C) just carry 7
bridges (4%), and none are classified in soil profile Type A. These results are hardly
surprising for the State of Indiana where very few rock type sites are found.
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Notwithstanding, this situations has important implications from the point of view that
mild earthquakes may produce moderate to high peak ground accelerations on surface
due to the soil amplification caused by the intervening soil responding essentially in a
elastic manner without the possibility of a decrease caused by the damping inherent in the
nonlinear response of the soil ever occurring.
Soil Profile Type for Studied Bridge Sites
E
87%

A
0%
D
9%

C
2%

B
2%

Fig. 5-4 – Worse soil profile type at bridge site for 182 bridges
on the Earthquake Emergency Routes
5.3 Liquefaction
The liquefaction potential is evaluated using the procedure described in Section 2.3.2
of this report. The software implementation accepts information from field test in the
form of cone penetration test (CPT), standard penetration test (SPT), or shear-wave
velocity (Vs) measurements. The application of the procedure using the boring
information available was restricted to evaluations using Standard Penetration Test
values, but as more information is included in the database it is desirable to use more
reliable field information such as CPT or shear wave velocity measurements for
evaluations in the future.
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For the selected bridge evaluation corrections, as described in Section 2.3.2, for fines
content and earthquake magnitude were implemented. The corrections to SPT listed in
Table 2-12 were implemented but not used (except overburden pressure and rod length
corrections that were used in all cases) due to lack of information on the boring
equipment and procedures as reported in the bridge drawings. As the database is
expanded in the future the software implementation permits the use of these corrections if
reported in the boring log.
Fines content in a soil can have a significant influence in the liquefaction potential of
a soil layer. The procedure to account for the presence of fines in the evaluation of the
liquefaction potential is to adjust the value of the corrected blow count (N1)60 using Eq.
(2-22) to an equivalent value for clean sand, (N1)60cs. The effect of the adjustment is an
increase of the value of (N1)60 effectively used. It is considered [Youd and Idriss, 2001]
that clean granular soils having a value of (N1)60 greater than 30 are too dense to liquefy
and are classed as non-liquefiable. For most soil classification procedures, as shown in
Fig. 5-5, fines are considered particles that can pass through a No. 200 sieve
corresponding to a 0.08 mm size particle.

Fig. 5-5 – Soil particle size according to several soil classification
procedures [Winkerkorn and Fang, 1975]
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Boring reports as presented in bridge drawings do not include the results from the
sieve analysis. In order to adjust the fine content of the soils as reported in the boring logs
the percentage of silt and clay was determined from the soil classification reported in the
borings using the chart presented in Fig. 5-1 or alternatively for some soil descriptions
not contained there using the values suggested by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) classification as shown in Fig. 5-6. The implemented software permits editing the
value of the fines content for any soil layer when needed.
The influence of the fines content in the evaluation of the liquefaction potential
cannot be underestimated and is recommendable that in the future, as more sites are
included in the database, that fine content be reported from sieve analysis of the soil.

Fig. 5-6 – FAA textural classification of soils [Winkerkorn and Fang, 1975]
When evaluating liquefaction potential the expected number of cycles needed for the
pore pressure increase development has been traditionally associated with the causing
earthquake magnitude. The developers of the liquefaction evaluation procedure used the
moment magnitude scale — Mw. Magnitude for the 1811-1812 New Madrid events has
been estimated using different techniques, reporting values that range from a lower value
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of 6 to an upper value of 9. The magnitude scale in which these values have been
reported is uncertain and in some cases is not reported.
The preference for moment magnitude is based on being the most consistent scale
along a wide magnitude range, but it is the scale that requires more instrumental
information to define its assigned value. Recent studies made by the USGS [Frankel et
al., 2002] for the 2002 seismic risk maps update have set a maximum characteristic
magnitude for the central and eastern U.S. for purposes of seismic risk assessment. The
scale in which the characteristic magnitude is expressed is moment magnitude and has
direct use in liquefaction potential evaluation.
Figure 5-7 shows the maximum characteristic moment magnitude assessed for the
central and eastern U.S. A value of Mw = 6.5 is given for all the state of Indiana, except
the Wabash River Valley that is assigned a value Mw = 7.5. JTRP Project SPR 2812 on
Analysis of Seismic Hazard Assessment for Indiana being currently conducted by Purdue
Professors Haase and Nowack will surely give more insight on the values of Mw to be
used and implemented in future liquefaction potential assessments. The software
developed permits the variation of the magnitude to use.

Fig. 5-7 – Maximum magnitude for the Central and Eastern U.S. [Frankel et al., 2002]
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It is interesting to note that if the proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD seismic
requirements are adopted in Indiana, for the seven Indiana cities evaluated for
comparison purposes in section 3.4.6 of this report any new bridge design would require
liquefaction evaluation for the bridge site. Table 2-13 indicates the cases in which no
liquefaction evaluation is needed for Seismic Detailing Requirements (SDR) 3 to 6 that
require in all cases magnitudes lower than 6.4.
Typical results screens from the implemented software are shown in Figures 5-8 to 510. In Fig. 5-8 the description of the boring is given reporting the soil layers and the
Standard Penetration Test (SPT) values and the water table level.

Fig. 5-8 – Example description of boring log as presented in the implemented software
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In Fig 5-9 the safety factor for liquefaction is given. The software first searches for
the lowest surface ground acceleration that will produce liquefaction — in this case it is
15% of the acceleration of gravity g — and reports the safety factor along the soil profile.
In this case liquefaction occurs in a sand layer that reports a SPT value of 17 blows per
foot at elevation 410. The peak ground acceleration in rock that produces the acceleration
in surface leading to liquefaction corresponds in this case to 6% g. The soil profile
reported by this boring is classified as being Type E and for a peak rock acceleration of
6%g the amplification factor, Fa, has a value of 2.5 thus converting the 6% g acceleration
in rock into 15% g acceleration in surface.

Fig. 5-9 – Example description of liquefaction safety factor for the lowest ground surface
acceleration inducing liquefaction. In this case 15% g leads to a safety factor of 0.9
meaning that liquefaction would occur
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Different peak ground accelerations in rock can be evaluated. Figure 5-10 shows the
results in the liquefaction potential as described by the liquefaction safety factor for peak
ground acceleration in rock of 4%g leading to a ground surface acceleration of 10%g the
safety factor against liquefaction increases to a value of 1.4 thus reporting no
liquefaction. In this manner the safety factor is obtained for different acceleration
scenarios.

Fig. 5-10 – Example description of liquefaction safety factor for a different ground
surface acceleration from the one shown in Fig. 5-9 not inducing liquefaction. In this case
the lowest safety factor for 10% g surface acceleration is 1.4
The factor of safety for liquefaction for a range of ground surface acceleration is
stored in the database. This permits to handle different seismic risk scenarios without
having to reprocess the boring information in each instance.
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Bridge 050-42-06963 reported in the previous figures (Fig. 5-8 to Fig. 5-10) has
description for four borings included in the drawings. Borings 1 and 3 are classified as
being Soil Profile Type D while borings 2 and 4 are classified as Soil Profile Type E. The
peak ground acceleration in rock required to produce liquefaction obtained were 6% g for
borings No. 1, 2, and 4 and 4% g for boring No. 3.
The situation just described in present in many of the 182 bridges studied along the
Earthquake Emergency Routes. The evaluation was performed for two values of Mw (Mw
= 6.5 and Mw = 7.5). Table 5-1 presents a summary of the minimum peak ground
acceleration in rock required to produce liquefaction at bridge sites studied. The
information is presented for the two moment magnitude studied.

Table 5-1 – Minimum peak ground acceleration in rock required to produce liquefaction
on the 182 bridges sites studied along the Earthquake Emergency Routes
PGA rock (g)
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.10
0.11
0.12
0.13
0.14
0.15
0.16
0.17
0.18
0.28
0.42
0.48
No liquefaction

Mw=7.5
2
27
23
10
3
2
1
4
1
2
1
1

1
1

103
182

No. of Bridges
%
Mw=6.5
1.1%
14.8%
3
12.6%
18
5.5%
24
1.6%
10
1.1%
7
0.5%
2
2.2%
2
0.5%
1
1.1%
0.5%
1
0.5%
2
0.0%
2
0.0%
1
0.0%
0.5%
0.5%
2
0.0%
1
0.0%
1
0.0%
1
56.6%
104
182
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%
0.0%
1.6%
9.9%
13.2%
5.5%
3.8%
1.1%
1.1%
0.5%
0.0%
0.5%
1.1%
1.1%
0.5%
0.0%
0.0%
1.1%
0.5%
0.5%
0.5%
57.1%

With the minimum peak ground acceleration in rock needed to produce liquefaction
at the bridge site it is possible to have a general picture of the vulnerability caused by
liquefaction for the bridges along the Earthquake Emergency Routes. This information is
presented in Fig. 5-11. In this figure the percentage of bridge sites that may be affected
by liquefaction when the peak ground acceleration in rock reaches a certain value may be
obtained. At peak ground accelerations in rock of the order of 10% g the curve flattens,
meaning that the number of bridges sites susceptible of liquefaction would remain
essentially the same even for higher accelerations. At this level of acceleration in rock
approximately 40% of the bridges located along the Earthquake Emergency Routes
would have reported liquefaction. This acceleration is of the same order of magnitude of
those contained in current Division I-A of AASHTO Standard Specifications.
% of bridges that will not have liquefaction by PGArock
100%
90%
80%

% of bridges

70%
60%
Mw=7.5
Mw=6.5

50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

PGArock (g)

Fig. 5-11 – Percentage of bridges along the Earthquake Emergency Routes that will not
have liquefaction at the site for a given peak ground acceleration in rock computed using
the minimum acceleration to produce liquefaction at the site
Liquefaction potential was computed at all borings for each of the studied bridge
sites. Only in few cases the minimum acceleration needed to produce liquefaction is the
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same for all borings. If instead of reporting the minimum peak ground acceleration in
rock the average acceleration for those borings reporting liquefaction is computed, the
vulnerability situation changes. Figure 5-12 shows the information computed for the
average peak ground acceleration in rock to produce liquefaction at the site. The curves
shown flatten at a higher acceleration (15% g) but show a similar trend. Using the
average peak ground acceleration in rock at the bridge site, the number of vulnerable
bridges due to liquefaction at the level of acceleration of the current AASHTO Standard
Specifications reduces to approximately 35% of the bridges on the Earthquake
Emergency Routes.
% of bridges that will not have liquefaction by PGArock
100%
90%
80%

% of bridges

70%
60%
Mw=7.5
Mw=6.5

50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

PGArock (g)

Fig. 5-12 – Percentage of bridges along the Earthquake Emergency Routes that will not
have liquefaction at the site for a given peak ground acceleration in rock computed using
the average acceleration to produce liquefaction at the site
The primary concern when interpreting the data just presented is related to the
difference in peak ground acceleration in rock values for the same bridge site. If the
difference between the minimum accelerations to produce liquefaction and the mean
acceleration for the same bridge site is relatively large, it indicates significant variations
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in the soil profile recorded in the soil exploration borings for the same bridge site. The
ratio of mean to minimum peak ground acceleration producing liquefaction at the same
bridge site has values that range from 1 to 6 with an average of the order of 1.4 for the
bridge sites studied, indicating significant variations in the soil profiles.
To emphasize the need for engineering judgment in interpreting the results presented,
the following example brings out features found in many of the bridges located in the
Earthquake Emergency Routes. Bridge 50-42-04625 on the Wabash River carries US
Route 50 across the river to Illinois. The bridge drawings contain records of 24 soil
borings made in 1960 all of them containing appropriate information (soil description and
standard penetration test – SPT – logs) to evaluate the soil amplification potential and the
liquefaction potential at each boring. The evaluation of the Soil Profile Type indicates
that the profile at one boring would be Type B, at five borings Type D, and Type E at the
remaining 18 borings. The general classification of the bridge site based on the softer
profile would assign the bridge site as being Type E. The liquefaction evaluation for the
borings report possibility of liquefaction in 11 out of the 24 borings for magnitude Mw =
7.5. Table 5-2 presents the peak ground acceleration in rock required for producing
liquefaction at each of the borings reporting liquefaction. In the same table the minimum
and maximum peak ground acceleration obtained is reported as well as the mean and
standard deviation for the acceleration.
In order to interpret the liquefaction potential computation for the studied bridges
besides the information presented, two other variables were studied:

•

Percentage of borings reporting liquefaction of the total number of borings.

•

Ratio of the range of peak ground acceleration in rock producing liquefaction
to the mean peak ground acceleration.

For Bridge 50-42-04625 the percentage of borings reporting liquefaction was 58%
and the ratio of the range of peak ground acceleration in rock producing liquefaction to
the mean peak ground acceleration was (0.36–0.05)/0.10 = 3.1. These values were
computed for all bridges reporting liquefaction and based on the values obtained a
recommendation was formulated dividing the bridges studied into four groups designated
as: bridges having no liquefaction, bridges with a high probability of liquefaction, bridges
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with an appreciable probability of liquefaction, and bridges having liquefaction but were
a wide variability of the results is present that require additional soil exploration and a
more in depth liquefaction study performed by geotechnical consultants.
Table 5-2 – Minimum peak ground acceleration in rock required to produce liquefaction
on the 11 borings that report liquefaction for Bridge 50-42-04625
Peak Ground
Acceleration in Rock
for liquefaction
8% g
8% g
9% g
7% g
6% g
6% g
8% g
36% g
5% g
7% g
7% g
5% g
36% g
10% g
9% g

Boring No.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Min. PGArock
Max. PGArock
Mean PGArock
Standard Deviation

Figure 5-13 presents the percentage of bridges studied that fall into the
recommendation categories for the two moment magnitude studied.
Other considerations that are beyond present study are related to issues related to
variation of the soil profile as used in the evaluation that may have occurred during the
years since the borings were performed. Other important consideration to take into
account is related to the water table at the site. Liquefaction can only occur in relatively
loose granular soils located under the water table. The potential for liquefaction studied
and reported used the water table level reported in the borings. The possibility of
variations of the water table level due to seasonal effect with respect to the moment the
borings were performed can affect the results presented. This is specially important for
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those cases not reporting liquefaction due to a depressed water table in cases were loose
granular soils exist at the site.
Recommendation
57%
60%

57%

50%
40%
24%
30%
13%
15% 5%

20%
10%

20%
8%

0%

Mw=6.5
Mw=7.5

No
Liquefaction

High
Appreciable
Liquefaction
Probability of
Probability of
But Wide
Liquefaction
Liquefaction
Variation in
Results - More
Studies
Needed

Fig. 5-13 – Recommendation for bridges located along the Earthquake Emergency
Routes
Using has HAZUS-MH [FEMA, 2005] — a GIS-based software tool developed by
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) — Indot bridge inventory was
assessed for the liquefaction potential that was evaluated using the actual soil borings
included in the bridge drawings, as described before. The Indot bridge data base was
integrated within HAZUS-MH and the GIS functions were activated. The liquefaction
potential was evaluated using HAZUS-MH own liquefaction potential evaluation
routines. This was performed for the Mw = 6.5 earthquake scenario obtaining comparable
result.
5.4 Soil spread
For a soil spread situation to occur during earthquake liquefaction has to occur. The
soil spread scenarios are difficult to state and requires analysis and studies beyond what
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can be implemented in application software of the type implemented in this project. In a
previous JTRP project [Bobet et al., 2001] soil spread scenarios and consequences were
studied for several sites in southwestern Indiana indicating the possibility of their
occurrence. The study also indicated that the Indiana Department of Transportation
practice of using steel H piles and steel encased concrete (SEC) piles reduces
significantly the potential damage to piles during earthquakes. This study recommends
mitigation studies and implementations that should be adopted for all bridge structures
located along the Indiana Emergency Routes. A warning should be issued when
liquefaction may occur and the bridge is supported on footings. The same type of
warning is given when possibility of liquefaction is identified bellow the tip of piles,
situation that seldom occurs.

5.5 Embankment stability
The absence of information on embankment slope geometry and description of
mechanical properties of the fill material both in the Inspection and Maintenance
Database and the selected bridge drawings precludes the inclusion of test cases for the
Earthquake Emergency Routes. Not withstanding, test cases studied for fill material
commonly used in Indiana indicate that for embankments with slopes of 1 vertical to 2
horizontal there is a low probability of instability in the embankment itself for ground
accelerations up to the order of 15% g and embankment heights lower than 30 ft (10 m).
The possibility of liquefaction or other type of ground failure under the embankment
must be studied independently along the routes. Information on soil profile under the
embankment and properties of the fill material probably would require soil exploration
for that purpose along the Emergency Routes.
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CHAPTER 6 BRIDGE VULNERABILITY

6.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the methodology implemented for assessing the bridge seismic
vulnerability by processing information available for all bridges located in the Vincennes
District of the Indiana Department of Transportation and for selected bridges whose
drawings were used. The information contained in the Indot Inspection and Maintenance
Database was used directly for obtaining an approximate evaluation of the bridge seismic
vulnerability. The drawings of selected bridges were used for obtaining a more reliable
vulnerability assessment of each selected bridge. The results of the analysis of the bridges
whose drawings were used to calibrate the approximate procedures based on the
Inspection and Maintenance Database information.

6.2 Information from the Inspection and Maintenance Database
Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database is implemented in MS Access and
contains information descriptive of the bridge that is relevant from the inspection and
maintenance management point of view. Only part of the information contained in the
database is related to structural information and although general in nature, lends itself to
assign the bridge within broad seismic behavior categories.
The information from the database that was used directly in the approximate
vulnerability assessment can be grouped in the following general categories: for database
indexing purposes, relative to location, road under or over the bridge, date of construction
and repair, general bridge geometry, superstructure characteristics including deck
information, substructure characteristics, and information on the approaches and
abutments. Table 6-1 presents the database keys that were used for processing the
approximate vulnerability assessment.
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Table 6-1 – Basic information from Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database
that was included in the analysis
Group
Database

File Data

Road Data

Age Data

Geometry Data

Superstructure Data

Substructure Data

Information
Number of Records
Total No. of Bridge Records
Record No.
National Bridge Inventory No.
INDOT Bridge No.
District Code
County Code
Sub-district No.
City Town Code
Location
Facility Carried
Feature Intersected
Road Number Over
Road Number Under
Year Built
Structure Designation
Year Reconstructed
Sufficiency Rating
Number of Intermediate Piers
Approach Structure Type
Deck Width
Skew Angle
Structure Length
Minimum Vertical Clearance Over
Minimum Vertical Clearance Under
Total Horizontal Clearance Over
Largest Vertical Distance
Structure Type
Length Maximum Span
Number of Main Spans
Deck Structure Type
Deck Thickness
Bearing Diaphragm
Bridge Joint Type Interior
Bridge Joint Type (N/E)
Bridge Joint Type (S/W)
Cross Bracing
Hinge Pin Connection
Intermediate Diaphragms
Main Structure Type
Number of Approach Spans
Number of Beams
Number of Floor Beams
Number of Girders
Number of Stringers
Redundancy Code
Abutment Type (W/S)
Abutment Type (E/N)
Approach Material
Approach Construction
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6.3 Approximate vulnerability assessment methodology
The approach to an approximate evaluation of vulnerability in many instances has
been based just on the type of bridge. This methodological approach depends on general
correlations for each bridge type, usually called fragility relationships, between
probability of reaching a certain performance level (total collapse, partial collapse,
reparable damage, or other) and expected ground acceleration at the bridge site. Results
from this type of analysis are applicable, within the uncertainties inherent to this type of
methodology, at a national or state level. As the size of the sample becomes smaller the
results obtained are less reliable especially if diverse bridge types of varying age are
present in the sample. In this research project it was considered that the information
contained in the Inspection and Maintenance Database is appropriate to determine, in an
approximate but more reliable manner, the relevant parameters that are needed to
establish a vulnerability level. The relevant parameters considered are:

•

Mass of the bridge

•

Stiffness of the substructure

•

Toughness available for adequate nonlinear response

•

Strength of the lateral load resisting elements

The Inspection and Maintenance Database contains information from which the
values of the relevant parameters can be estimated as follows:
The mass of the bridge is associated mainly with the mass of the superstructure and
the deck is generally the main contributor. The Inspection and Maintenance Database
lists the deck material, and deck width and thickness; thus permitting to obtain a good
approximation of its mass. Allowances for wearing surface, barriers and, guard rails are
also included. The number of girders, beams, and stringers; and the structural material is
listed in the database. Their mass can be estimated as a function of a span dependent
depth that is characteristic of each superstructure type. The contribution to mass of the
diaphragms and bracing elements can also be estimated from the number and type as
listed in the database. Having an estimative of the superstructure mass and geometry it is
possible to establish minimum cross-sectional dimensions required to support the gravity
effects for the bents based on the adjacent span lengths and structural type. Vertical
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clearance indicates the height of the bents. Results from these estimates were compared
with mass computed for the selected bridges whose drawings were used in the formal
vulnerability assessment and with comparison of projects whose information was
available in the literature.
The lateral stiffness of the bridge depends on the substructure type whose minimum
dimensions were established in the computation of mass. The Inspection and
Maintenance Database does not describe if the bridge is supported on frame or wall type
bents, thus the estimate of the lateral stiffness is approached from the low side.
Adjustments are made to this estimate for live load allowance especially in short span
bridges.
Using the estimative of mass and lateral stiffness fundamental vibration periods for
the transverse and longitudinal directions are computed taking into account the expansion
joint and hinge pin connection descriptions contained in the database. Lateral force
demand, longitudinal and transverse, is established for varying values of ground
acceleration. Expected lateral deformation of the superstructure and base shear demand
on the substructure is then estimated for each acceleration level.
The level of toughness required for adequate nonlinear response of the substructure
elements is associated directly with the date of construction of the bridge. Lateral load
strength is associated directly with the estimated substructure dimensions.
Bridge vulnerability is then established for each acceleration level based on excessive
lateral deformations or lack of strength to resist the imposed base shear. For each
acceleration level the bridge is red-tagged meaning vulnerable, yellow-tagged meaning
marginal vulnerability, and green-tagged meaning not vulnerable.
These computations are made for all bridges in the Vincennes district inventory. For
selected bridges the results were compared to the results obtained using the actual
dimensions and reinforcement from the bridge drawings.
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6.4 Formal vulnerability assessment methodology
The implemented software permits to include information from the bridge drawings
in the vulnerability assessment database. This was performed for selected bridges as
previously mentioned. The information covered is divided as shown in Table 6-2.
Table 6-2 – Basic information from bridge drawings needed for formal vulnerability
assessment and included in the software implementation database
Group
Database

Information
File management

General Bridge Information
Bridge
Information
Deck and Span Information
Geotechnical Information
Bent Column Information

Bent Beam Information

Bearings Information
Structural
Elements

Restrainers

Piles

Footings

Abutments

Bents

Ground Motion

Bent Types
Bent Location
Spectrum
Accelerogram
Spectrum computed from
accelerogram
Increasing ground motion
definition

Detail
Same Information from Inspection and
Maintenance Database
Number of spans, bents, element types, units (US
customary or metric SI)
Number of vibration modes to use
Use of rigid zones in bents
Deck width, thickness, additional mass,
Span Information
Deck expansion joints type and location
Same as described in section 5.2
Cross-section dimensions
Material information
Modeling parameters (cracking, effective area,
nonlinear characteristics)
Cross-section dimensions
Material information
Modeling parameters (cracking, effective area,
nonlinear characteristics)
Type
Dimensions
Type
Dimensions
Material properties
Pile types
Piles dimensional properties
Piles material properties
Footing Type
Footing dimensional properties
Footing material Properties
Piles geometrical distribution
Abutment Type
Abutment dimensional properties
Abutment material Properties
Piles geometrical distribution
Geometry
Element type
Location in bridge
From Bridge Specs
From accelerogram database
Computation of spectrum from ground motion and
smoothing possibilities
Parameters to obtain performance patterns by
variation of ground motion intensity
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The information gathering process for each bridge is initiated including the
information contained in the Inspection and Maintenance Database. The rest of the data
must be provided from information contained in the bridge drawings.
Using this information several tasks were performed once a process is initiated. Some
of these tasks are performed only once in the process — routine tasks — while others are
performed repeatedly with each level of intensity of ground motion — ground motion
intensity-dependent tasks—.
6.4.1 Routine tasks
Those processes that are not dependent on the ground motion intensity were
performed first. They comprised the following tasks:

•

Computation of element section properties.

•

Computation of mass and stiffness properties for the superstructure and
substructure elements.

•

Computation of transverse and longitudinal vibration periods and modal
shapes.

•

Definition of strength in flexure and shear for all elements. For bent girders
this was performed at sections where maximum stresses are expected under
seismic effects. For bent piers and walls flexure-axial force interaction
diagrams were computed. Reinforcement anchorage strength at joints was
evaluated.

•

Collapse mechanisms were evaluated for all bents defining the maximum
tributary base shear strength. Distinction was made between flexural and shear
collapse mechanisms.

•

The lateral-load strength of bearings was evaluated. For bearings vulnerable to
overturning or sliding under lateral load, the maximum transmitted shear
before overturning or sliding was evaluated. Maximum available seat lengths
were defined at non-fixed joints.

•

For abutments and foundation elements, stiffness and deformation properties
were evaluated. Strength for shear and overturning were evaluated.
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From the above computed information a path of least strength was defined. For
example bent piers were evaluated for the possibility of reaching shear strength before
flexural strength thus initiating a brittle failure mode. At pier-foundation or wallfoundation joints the ability to transmit the forces developed when the pier reaches its
maximum strength was evaluated, thus defining a weak link in the seismic load path. The
maximum seismic ground-motion induced-forces that the structural system is capable of
resisting were defined from the load path evaluation. These forces indicate the level of
seismic base shear that may induce severe damage or collapse of the bridge.
6.4.2 Ground motion intensity-dependent tasks
The processes that depend on the ground motion intensity were performed for
increasing levels of intensity of the ground motion. The ground motion intensity was
defined in rock as peak ground acceleration, Aa. For a set value of peak ground
acceleration in rock the following tasks (see Fig. 6-1) were performed in the order
presented:
1. From the geotechnical information the soil profile amplification was determined
using the procedure described in Section 5.2. This permitted the computation of
spectral ordinates that are comparable to those defined through parameters SS and

S1 as described in the Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions. This fully
described the response spectrum for which the rest of the vulnerability assessment
for the set ground motion was made.
2. The liquefaction potential was evaluated for the set acceleration value and
reported. No further analysis on collateral potential of damage to the bridge
caused by liquefaction was performed as explained in Section 5.4.
3. Structural element internal forces were obtained using a linear modal spectral
response procedure based on the vibration periods and modal shapes computed in
the routine tasks and the response spectrum from Step 1. Strength demands were
compared with the strength capacity levels obtained in the routine tasks. A similar
comparison was performed for the displacement demand against the maximum
allowable displacement obtained in the routine tasks. The bridge was deemed not
vulnerable for the set intensity of seismic ground motion and green-tagged and no
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further analysis was performed if: a) the strength demand in all the structural
elements was not exceeded, b) the displacement demand was within the
established tolerable limit, and c) displacements at the supports did not exceed the
limits established previously in the routine tasks,. If any of the strength or
displacements limits were exceeded tasks 4 to 7 were performed.
4. If the shear strength level or the evaluation of reinforcement anchorage indicated
possibility of a bond failure, the bridge was deemed vulnerable. The bridge was
yellow-tagged or red-tagged depending on the level of expected damage and the
spread of damage to the different elements.
5. If the possibility of bearing element failure by overturning or excessive
displacement at movable supports was detected, the bridge was deemed
vulnerable. The bridge was yellow-tagged or red-tagged based on the amount of
expected deformation and the magnitude of potential horizontal or vertical
permanent displacements of the superstructure.
6. The bridge was updated to red-tag if compound yellow-tagging was obtained both
from the strength and the displacement checks. No further analysis was performed
and the vulnerability level was reported for the set value of ground acceleration if
steps 4, 5, or 6 yellow-tagged or red-tagged the bridge.
7. If the flexural strength for any element was exceeded in the evaluation performed
in step 3, a nonlinear response evaluation was made. A substitute-structure
procedure [Shibata and Sozen, 1976] was performed by introducing damage
ratios, μ, greater than unity to the elements where flexural strength was reached.
A series of analyses were carried out for increasing values of the damage ratios to
the elements until the base shear strength of the bridge as computed in the routine
tasks was reached. The expected lateral displacement for the set value of ground
motion intensity was the one obtained when the bridge reached the base shear
strength. This procedure gives comparable results to those obtained by performing
a push-over analysis. The stability of the structure was judged for the
displacements obtained using displacement-based procedures. Based on these
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results the vulnerability of the bridge was assessed as yellow-tagged or redtagged.
Set value of peak
ground acceleration
in rock, Aa

Geotech
data

Obtain soil profile
amplification
Evaluate
liquefaction
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Liquefaction
report
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Shear
failure?
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no
Support
unseating?
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support unseating?

yes

Bridge is
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Fig. 6-1 – Flow diagram for the formal vulnerability assessment implemented
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CHAPTER 7 UPGRADE NEEDS OF BRIDGES ON THE EMERGENCY ROUTES

7.1 Introduction
The approach of developing and implementing a tool for studying the alternatives for
defining the Indiana Earthquake Emergency Routes and the upgrade needs of the
transportation structures along theses routes responds to the importance of two variables
linked to the emergency routes selected, and the definition of the earthquake ground
motion intensity for which the vulnerability of the current inventory of bridges should be
gauged. The effect on the upgrade needs of these two variables is substantial. Variations
of the road segments to be included within the emergency routes affect the travel times
and the number of bridges that may need upgrading. Once a set of routes were defined,
the envisioned earthquake ground motion intensity to be used in defining the
vulnerability of the transportation structures affects directly the upgrade needs for these
structures.
7.2 Bridges studied
Table 7-1 shows the distribution by bridge type of the inventory of bridges in the
Indot Vincennes District. Currently there are 827 bridges that are located in the Interstate
System, in US Routes, and in State Roads. The distribution by location in the different
counties was presented in Table 4-1. A total of 230 of these bridges are located in the
selected Earthquake Emergency Routes of Indiana, corresponding to 28% of the
inventory. Table 7-1 also shows the distribution by bridge type of the 69 bridges that
were studied in detail using the information contained in drawings. The sample was
defined trying to maintain the bridge type percentages similar.
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Sum
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1
1
23
69
5
1
27
1
162
3
89
16
2
51
1
56
10
8
1
23
3
10
61
31
1
3
1
32
1
17
16
51
21
2
2
6
6
9
1
3

0.1%
0.1%
2.8%
8.3%
0.6%
0.1%
3.3%
0.1%
19.6%
0.4%
10.8%
1.9%
0.2%
6.2%
0.1%
6.8%
1.2%
1.0%
0.1%
2.8%
0.4%
1.2%
7.4%
3.7%
0.1%
0.4%
0.1%
3.9%
0.1%
2.1%
1.9%
6.2%
2.5%
0.2%
0.2%
0.7%
0.7%
1.1%
0.1%
0.4%

827

100.0%

% by bridge
type

Bailey Truss
Continuous Concrete T - Beam
Continuous Prestressed Concrete Box Beam
Continuous Prestressed Concrete I - Beam
Continuous Prestressed Concrete T - Beam
Continuous Reinforced Concrete Box
Continuous Reinforced Concrete Girder
Continuous Reinforced Concrete Rigid Frame
Continuous Reinforced Concrete Slab
Continuous Riveted Plate Girder
Continuous Steel Beam
Continuous Steel Girder
Continuous Steel Tied Arch - Truss
Composite Continuous Steel Beam
Composite Continuous Steel Box Girder
Composite Continuous Steel Girder
Composite Steel Beam
Composite Steel Girder
Metal Pipe Arch
Multi-Plate Arch - Underfill
Precast Concrete Arch - Underfill
Precast Concrete Beam
Prestressed Concrete Box Beam
Prestressed Concrete I - Beam
Precast Concrete Slab
Precast Concrete Slab - Underfill
Post-Tensioned Reinforced Concrete Slab
Reinforced Concrete Arch
Reinforced Concrete Arch - Open Spandrel
Reinforced Concrete Arch - Underfill
Reinforced Concrete Box - Underfill
Reinforced Concrete Girder
Reinforced Concrete Slab
Reinforced Concrete Slab - Underfill
Riveted Plate Girder
Steel Beam
Steel Pony Truss
Steel Thru Truss
Unreinforced Concrete Arch
Welded Steel Thru Girder

Located on
EQ Emerg.
Routes

BT
CCTB
CPCBB
CPCIB
CPCTB
CRCB
CRCG
CRCRF
CRCS
CRPG
CSB
CSG
CSTA
KCSB
KCSBG
KCSG
KSB
KSG
MPA
MPAUF
PCAUF
PCB
PCBB
PCIB
PCS
PCSUF
PTRCS
RCA
RCAOS
RCAUF
RCBUF
RCG
RCS
RCSUF
RPG
SB
SPT
STT
UCA
WSTG

Bridge Type Description

% by bridge
type

Bridge
Type

Amount in
Vincennes
District

Table 7-1 – Distribution by bridge type in the Vincennes Indot District of the total bridge
inventory, in the suggested emergency routes, and in the bridges studied in detail

1
4
22
2

0.4%
1.7%
9.6%
0.9%

15
1
53
2
46
10

6.5%
0.4%
23.0%
0.9%
20.0%
4.3%

31

13.5%

33

14.3%

2
2
1

0.9%
0.9%
0.4%

2
1

0.9%
0.4%

1

0.4%

1

0.4%

230

100.0%

Figure 7-1 shows the distribution by bridge type on the Earthquake Emergency
Routes. The most abundant type of bridge (23%) corresponds to Continuous Reinforced
Concrete Slab bridge type both in the whole district and in the selected emergency routes.
Continuous Steel Beam bridges (20%) and Composite Continuous Steel Girder (14.3%)
correspond to the next largest groups.
BRIDGE TYPES ON EMERGENCY ROUTES
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0.4%
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Fig. 7-1 – Bridge type distribution on the Earthquake Emergency Routes

7.3 Retrofit Needs
The current inventory of bridges in the Vincennes Indot District was studied for
varying degrees of earthquake ground motion intensity using an approximate
vulnerability assessment methodology. The same approach of varying the intensity of the
ground motion was performed for the selected bridges that were studied in detail.
As expected, bridge vulnerability and liquefaction potential in some bridge sites
increased with the ground acceleration level. The importance of the definition of the
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ground motion intensity for which the vulnerability level is assessed is explained by the
number of bridges that would be red-tagged — 7% of the total Vincennes District bridge
inventory — when the envisioned design ground motion contained in current 17th Edition
of the AASHTO Standard Specifications are used as compared with a 15% when the
ground motion description contained in the Draft AASHTO LRFD Update.
The vulnerability assessment indicates that the most frequent cause of concern is
associated with unseating of the superstructure at supports (65% of bridges red-tagged)
followed by shear failure of bent vertical elements (25% of bridges red-tagged). Other
sources of vulnerability studied account for the rest of the red-tagged bridges. This figure
is consistent for the whole inventory and for the selected bridges studies in detail. Bridge
age correlates directly with vulnerability in the entire sample.
Overturning of the widely used movable expansion support of the type shown in Fig.
7-2 was found to be associated with many of the cases of unseating detected. In some
instances peak ground accelerations in surface as low as 10%g would cause overturning.

Fig. 7-2 – Typical Expansion Rocker Bearing
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Liquefaction as a source of vulnerability was present in the sample studied using the
bridge drawings that reported soil borings. 182 bridges out of 230 reported a geotechnical
exploration that could be used for evaluating liquefaction with 43% of them reporting
sand or sandy soil and a water table level above the material susceptible of liquefaction.
Lowest peak ground acceleration in rock that would produce liquefaction was below 5%
g in several sites. The average peak ground acceleration in rock to produce liquefaction
for the 79 sites where potential for liquefaction was detected was found to be
approximately 5% g for the Mw = 7.5 scenario and 8% g for the Mw = 6.5 scenario.
The HAZUS-MH implementation produced comparable results indicating the
approach of using the FEMA methodology is warranted.

7.4 Improvement of the approximate vulnerability assessment
The approximate seismic vulnerability assessment based on the information contained
in Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database can be improved in the future by including
additional information in the database. This additional information already exists in each
set of bridge drawings. Although the drawings are available in electronic form they were
scanned from hard copies and this format is not amenable for automatic retrieval of the
information thus requiring participation of an experienced engineer for collecting and
adding the information to the vulnerability assessment database.
There is a natural tradeoff between the effort of adding and maintaining this
additional information and the degree of resolution sought in the approximate assessment
procedure. The possibility of making a more detailed vulnerability analysis as
implemented for selected bridges constitutes the upper limit of the additional information
to be included. This may be unnecessary for a properly calibrated approximate procedure.
The amount of additional information must be selected in a manner that maximizes the
quality of the result and minimizes the data acquisition effort.
Based on this, the minimum suggested set of additional information is the following:

•

Description of bent type and element dimension for all supports of the bridge.

•

Reinforcement at selected sections of the bent elements focusing mainly on
transverse reinforcement.
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•

Additional information on bearings more from the point of view of vulnerability
to seismic effects.

•

Additional information on foundation types and soil profile.

This additional information may be collected when the routine programmed
inspections of the bridge are performed.
The improvement in dependability on the approximate vulnerability analysis with just
this additional information may well justify the information gathering effort.
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 Conclusions

Different alternatives for Earthquake Emergency Routes for the Vincennes District of
the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT), located in the southwestern corner of
the State, were studied from the transportation point of view (Part I of this report) and the
implications of seismic vulnerability of the transportation structures located in these
roads were studied (Part II of this report).

The Indot bridge inventory data and soils information were incorporated in a software
tool based on geographical information systems technology (GIS) developed by FEMA
(HAZUS-MH [FEMA, 2005]) for evaluation of the Earthquake Emergency Routes
network of Indiana and for establishing policies for mitigation of earthquake hazard on
these routes. This tool may be used to perform simulations for different earthquake
scenarios, and to help in the response to an actual emergency caused by the occurrence of
a strong earthquake in the region.

The software tool is capable of performing a seismic vulnerability approximate
assessment of the bridge inventory of the Vincennes Indot District using solely the
information contained in Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database. Using information
from the bridge drawings the software tool developed allows performing a detailed
seismic vulnerability assessment of selected bridges. The vulnerability assessment
performed for the selected bridges was used to calibrate the approximate analysis
procedure based only on Indot Inspection and Maintenance Database and to evaluate the
vulnerability of the selected bridges for different levels of earthquake ground motion
intensity.
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The reported research will help in the study and adoption of emergency response
policies for different earthquake occurrence scenarios. These policies may be updated in
the future as mitigation programs are implemented and their results incorporated in the
bridge vulnerability assessment database.

The reported comments on the current state of seismic risk evaluation for the
southwestern region of Indiana will help the State of Indiana in making decisions related
to the adoption of proposed bridge seismic design provisions or proposed seismic risk
maps by permitting an evaluation of the impact of the new provisions or seismic risk
maps.

8.2 Recommendations

It is suggested that the findings and developments of this research project may be
applied by the Indiana Department of Transportation in the following ways:

1.

Indot should consider formally adopting the Earthquake Emergency Routes
for the State of Indiana from the routes studied, or variations of them. It is
clear that the final set of Earthquake Emergency Routes adopted and
maintained will be affected by issues and policies whose scope is outside
those studied and reported in this research project. Policy decisions, budgetary
constraints, and decisions related to new road projects, such as the projected
south western continuation of I-69, will affect the formal adoption of the
selected routes and will surely impose variations in the future. The
methodology developed in this research project will provide valuable
information to assist Indot the decision-making process presently and in the
future.
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2.

The study and adoption of mitigation strategies to implement in the future by
Indot to update and maintain the Emergency Routes of Indiana can be made
possible by performing simulations for different earthquake scenarios
including earthquake ground motion defined in current AASHTO Standard
Specifications, proposed Draft AASHTO LRFD Seismic Provisions, or other
appropriate

bridge

specification.

These

simulations

will

provide

corresponding bridge retrofit scope for the selected routes or alternative
definitions.

3.

It is recommended that Indot expands the information contained in the
Inspection and Maintenance Database to include information currently
available only in the bridge drawings (see section 7.5). This will improve the
vulnerability assessment of the bridges refining the mitigation policies to
adopt in the future. This expansion of the database can be extended to other
counties and districts not covered in this research project.

4.

It is recommendable that Indot adopt a program for assessing the liquefaction,
soil spread, and embankment failure potential along the routes at locations
different from just bridge sites by providing a consistent evaluation
methodology based on the implementation developed in this research project.
This implementation will require a soil exploration program to provide
geotechnical properties of sites where no information exists or was performed
many years ago with different objectives than liquefaction evaluation. In the
reported research liquefaction evaluations were made using solely boring
information contained in selected bridge drawings.

5.

It is recommended that FEMA HAZUS-MH software be adopted as the
methodology for vulnerability assessment, mitigation decisions through the
study of appropriate earthquake occurrence scenarios, and emergency
response programs tuned to the study of these scenarios. Along with this
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recommendation a key feature is the training of Indot personnel in the use of
FEMA HAZUS-MH software. Engaging of the services of the Polis Center of
Indiana University, an authorized HAZUS-MH earthquake and flood service
provider, for this purpose should be studied by Indot.
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